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Abstract
This thesis has two aims: to expand scholarly understanding of the Iranian Revolution 
up to its transition to religious totalitarianism, and second, to present a non- 
deterministic theoretical framework for understanding revolutions more generally, 
which incorporates both structure and agency. Relying on a combination of extended 
interviews with leading participants and some hitherto unused primary sources, and 
with the help of secondary texts, it reconstructs the intense political struggles from 
1979-81 and the ideological formations which shaped the revolutionary process, in four 
steps: (1) an analysis of the ideological foundations of competing discourses of Islam, in 
particular those of Khomeini, Shariati, Motahari, Bazargan and Banisadr; (2) a narrative 
of historical events and socio-economic and political changes which set the stage for the 
Iranian Revolution; (3) a narrative of the process of revolution itself; and (4) a narrative 
of the emergence of political struggle within the revolutionary movement, which drew 
on two competing discourses of Islam, those of power and of freedom. The analysis of 
this evidence seeks to demonstrate that dictatorship was not an inevitable consequence 
of the revolution, but due to four main causes: (1) lack of unity within the democratic 
camp, (2) poor use of available resources and opportunities, (3) specific, critical 
decisions, and finally (4) international factors. It also suggests a theoretical framework 
which makes it possible to critically analyse the process of revolution, which takes 
account of unique socio-historical contingencies.
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Introduction
Neither “consciousness ” nor “existence ” altogether determines the other. They 
interact, as Marx more or less consistently knew. But “intervening variables ” are also 
at work: the means o f  mass communication, the machinery o f amusement, the cultural 
apparatus—in brief, features o f ideological superstructure. Such variables mediate the 
relations o f “existence ” and “consciousness; ” they affect each o f  these, and they affect 
their interplay. They can play and often do play an autonomous role in the development 
o f class consciousness or the lack o f it. Existence itself is subject to definitions o f  
reality carried by the cultural apparatus}
I  hate those absolute systems which make all the events o f  history depend on great first 
causes linked to each other by a chain o f fate and which thus, so to speak, omit men 
from the history o f mankind. To my mind, they seem narrow under their pretence o f 
broadness, andfalse beneath their air o f mathematical exactness.2
Nothing is inevitable in the birth o f  or the course o f revolution and the failure to 
examine the process itself blinds the analyst to the trajectories not taken, the 
possibilities contained in the revolutionary moment rather than the inevitable 
outcomes?
The 1979 Iranian revolution produced a major challenge to social scientific theories of 
social change and reignited debates about the nature of political Islam worldwide.4 At a 
time when theories of modernity were dominant, when religion was seen as a dying 
force in the political and cultural spheres of society, the apparent introduction of 
religion either provoked experts to explain this “anomaly” or served as an incentive for 
them to understand and explain this new phenomenon. It is also in this revolution that 
we observe the emergence of two competing discourses of Islam as power and freedom, 
each with subdivisions, definitions and relations to politics and development.
The revolution thus provoked the gradual emergence of an immense body of literature 
dedicated to analysing the Iranian revolution. This literature has to a large extent
1 C. Wright Mills. Quoted Sarah Amsler, Framing a National Consciousness: Representation of Class in Historical
Exhibits at the National Museum of American History, 1957-1985. Unpublished Masters thesis (Virginia: 
George Mason University, 1998), p. vii.
2 Alexis de Tocqueville quoted in Michael S. Kimmel, Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1990), p. 187.
3 Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics o f  Violence: Revolution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 73.
4 This is not to say that political Islam did not exist before the Iranian revolution. Anti-colonial movements in Islamic
countries have on many occasions used Islam as a rallying cry against colonialism. However, political Islam 
had never before framed the dominant discourse within elites and society as a whole, or been institutionalised 
by the state. In other words, as stated more simply in a recent BBC Radio4 broadcast, “until 1979, political 
Islam had been a dream. Now, it had become a reality.” See Frank Gardner, “Koran and Country: how Islam 
got political”, transcript of a recorded documentary, BBC Radio4 broadcast, 10 October 2005, accessed online 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/analvsis/transcripts/10 11 05.txt.
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successfully focussed on either explaining how such a revolution could happen in a 
seemingly rapidly developing country,5 or investigating the national and international 
effects of replacing an authoritarian ancien regime with a totalitarian religious state.6 
What has largely been lost in this literature, however, is the process and contingency of 
this transformation. Many theoreticians of revolution from different, if not competing,
7 R 0schools of thought (structuralist, modernist, functionalist, or advocates of natural 
history10) see the revolutionary process as organic, automatic and having a 
predetermined outcome. There is a common view among many that revolutions are 
always overtaken by radicals, that moderates are always driven out of the leadership and 
that the real winner of any revolution is the state, which becomes “more powerful, 
centralised and autonomous”.11 Thus, for followers of these schools of thought, the 
Iranian Revolution simply seemed to confirm this rule.
Therefore, scholarship on the process of the 1979 Iranian revolution, particularly of its 
initial phase, remains scant and descriptive. The lack of comprehensive theory and 
systematic approaches in the field is reflected in the poor use of data in many studies. 
In other words, much scholarship on the Iranian revolution suffers from intellectual 
biases as it works within the dominant models of revolutions. The dominance of these
5 For example, see the works of Mansoor Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1992); John Foran, Fragile Resistance (Connecticut: Westview Press,
Inc. 1993); A. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Alan 
Woods, Struggle Inside Iran: the First Shots o f the Iranian Revolution (London: Socialist Appeal, 1999); 
Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); John 
Vilanilam, Reporting a Revolution: the Iranian Revolution and the NIICO Debate (New Delhi and London: 
Sage Publications, 1989); and Mehran Kamrava, Revolution in Iran: the Roots o f  Turmoil (London: Routledge 
Press, 1990).
6 For example, see the works of John L. Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami: Florida
International University Press, 1990) and Graham E. Fuller, The Centre o f  Universe: the Geopolitics o f  Iran 
(Connecticut: Westview Press, 1991) or Efrain Karsh, ed., The New Global Threat: The Iran-Iraq War, Impact 
and Implications (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1989). A note on the use of the term “totalitarian” is 
necessary here. The term “totalitarianism” was used during the Cold War to describe an extreme form of 
dictatorship (specifically the USSR), and has been heavily politicised since. Still, as a conceptual tool the term 
maintains large parts of its explanatory power and can be used to differentiate between the pre- and post- 
dictatorial regimes in Iran. While the monarchic dictatorship in pre-revolutionary Iran can be characterised as 
authoritarian, the Islamic regime from 1981 onward can be seen as a totalitarian version of an autocratic regime 
as these two different forms of dictatorship differed in both degree and scope. The dictatorial tendencies of the 
Pahlavi regime in Iran was less ideological, and as its presence was more pronounced in the political sphere 
than in socio-cultural and economical spheres, it was less intrusive. The clergy regime, however, involved 
itself in all facets of society to the extent of controlling the daily lifestyles of its citizens. It aimed at 
standardising society through imposing its values and beliefs on the population through all forms of force. For 
further explanation of the term see Craig Calhoun, ed., Dictionary o f the Social Sciences (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) andJohn Scott and Gordon Marshall, A Dictionary o f  Sociology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).
7 Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in The Modern World (Cambridge University Press, 1994).
8 Samuel Huntington, Political order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
9 Charles Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Studies, 1964).
10 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy o f  Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
11 Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World.
8
approaches in the study of the Iranian revolution has led to the emergence of blind 
spots, especially among structuralists and modernisation theorists, and thus fails to 
explain the process of revolution and its immediate outcome thoroughly. It has not only 
trapped experts in post-hoc reasoning, but furthermore has made their arguments 
deterministic by preventing them from considering the contingent nature of this 
process.12
Consequently, it has also failed to consider that the outcome of revolution, like any 
other social experiment, should be analysed and understood within three different 
phases: short, medium and long-term. By focussing solely on the medium-term 
outcome of the Iranian revolution, when the totalitarian forces13 had already solidified 
their control over the state, the literature has failed to pay required attention to the short­
term outcome of the revolution, which was the emergence and expansion of socio­
political freedoms immediately after the revolution. Instead of tracing the roots of the 
demand for the democratisation of the system, which led to the election of Khatami as 
the president of the republic in 1997, to the goals and guiding principles of the 
revolution as Khatami himself and many student organisations and reformist leaders 
have done, they simply declare its “thermidor”,14 a term used to describe a point when 
the revolutionary class is able to outmanoeuvre and cast aside the ideological 
vanguard.15 This approach has legitimised the belief that the Islamic revolution in Iran 
was not about establishing democracy within an Islamic discourse, but about 
institutionalising fundamentalism. A classic example of this is the statement that 
“fundamentalist Islam has swept through the Middle East, most notably in the
12 For example, see Mohsen M. Milani, “The ascendance of Shi’i fundamentalism in revolutionary Iran,” Journal o f
South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 13, nos. 1 and 2 (Fall/Winter 1989). “Post-hoc” here means in or of 
the form of an argument in which one event is asserted to be the cause of a later event simply by virtue of 
having happened earlier.
13 Totalitarian forces, in this research, are defined, as religious and political actors and forces, which despite of varies,
ideological and political differences, formed a united front against democratic forces, which was led, primarily, 
by Bazargan, the first prime-minister and Banisadr, the first president. These forces were led by Islamic 
Republic Party and the most important of these organisations, at the early period, were Mojaheddin-e 
Enghelabe Eslami (Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organisation) and the Marxist-Stalinist Tudeh Party 
and Fedaeen-e Khalq (the majority faction).
14 A. Ehteshami also refers to this group in his introduction to Ali Ansari’s Iran, Islam and Democracy (UK: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p. viii.
15 It should be mentioned that the causes for the failure of Khatami to implement his democratization reforms can not
be explained by the lack of popular support, as it enjoyed the overwhelming public support, but in the 
contradictions in the philosophical and socio-political bases of the reformists, fragmentations and opportunism 
at the elite level and more importantly in the feebleness of the leadership to confront its opponents and total 
aversion to resort to popular support. An example of this fear can be found in Khatami’s refusal to meet 
students involved in demonstrations from 8-13 July 1999 and describing the movement as “anarchy, disturbing 
the order, and ugly acts”. See Kamran Nayeri, ‘Student protests in Iran’, Socialist Action (December 1999), 
online at http://www.socialistaction.org/news/19912/persia.htm 1 (accessed 24 June 2007).
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revolutionary downfall of the Shah of Iran in 1979”.16 G. R. Afhakmi sees the 
revolution as a “thanatos on a national scale”.17 Although he recognises freedom as one 
of the main goals of the revolution, he still sees it as a doomed revolutionary objective
1 ftsince it presupposed “a consensual political culture that simply did not exist”.
We can see the continuity of this belief to the present time. For instance, in a recent 
work Fred Halliday argues that “in the proper sense of the word, what happened in Iran 
was a comprehensively reactionary revolution, resorting to the term its original, 
astronomical, meaning of return to a previous order”.19 This interpretation is also 
reflected in the works of some of the most celebrated Iranian reformists. For example, 
Akbar Ganjy insistently argues that the 1979 revolution was by definition anti- 
democratic. Such arguments are based on the belief that Iranian society was not “ready 
for democracy” and the assumption that the establishment of democracy has certain pre­
requisites, among which are economic wealth, existence of modem institutions, strength 
of civil society and presence of democratic culture or... of proto-democratic
•y i
experience. However, even in the west, these conditions were not present when 
democracy emerged: “Westerners misremember their own national histories if they 
imagine that democracy must wait for these preconditions to be fulfilled. Few if any 
new democracies have ever been truly ‘ready’”. Furthermore, if Iranian society was 
unprepared for democracy in 1979 despite increasing urbanisation, rise of literacy rates, 
rapid expansion of schools and universities, and rapid economic development, then it 
would follow that a much poorer and less institutionally developed Iran was far less 
ready during the 1905 Constitutional revolution and the 1951-53 nationalisation of oil 
movement.
16 From the 1994 edition of the Oxford Dictionary o f Sociology.
17 Gholam R. Afkhami, The Iranian Rrevolution: Thanatos on a National Scale (Washington, DC: Middle East
Institute, 1985). In this book Afkhami tries to understand and explain the mass suicide of a nation, which was 
on the fast track of industrialisation and modernisation.
18 Ibid., p. 173.
19 Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth o f Confrontation (New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2003), p.44.
20 Akbar Ganjy is a celebrated Iranian journalist who achieved fame through the daring role he played in exposing the
role of the Iranian regime in the assassination of its opponents. He spent years in prison and in the end 
conducted a prolonged hunger strike (more than fifty days). While he did not in the end achieve his demands, 
the hunger strike put immense pressure on the Iranian regime. For more see Ganjy’s article, available online 
at: http://think.iran-emrooz.net/index.php7/think/more/13775/.
21 For example, see Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making o f  the Modern World (London: Penguin, 1991), Karl Terry Lynn, “Dilemmas of democratization in 
South America, Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1990), pp. 27-63, Seymour Martin Lipset, “The social 
requisites of democracy revisited, American Sociological Review, Vol. 59 (1994), pp. 1-21.
22 Charles Kurzman, “Not ready for democracy? Theoretical and historical objections to the concept of prerequisites”,
Journal o f Sociological Analysis, 1, no. 4 (1998), p. 10.
10
This dissertation argues that as in the Iranian revolutions of 1905-11 and 1951-53,23 the 
initial goal and immediate outcome of the 1979 revolution was neither a totalitarian 
state nor fundamentalist Islam, but rather democracy and freedom. It also argues that the 
establishment of the first was not inevitable, but the result of a power struggle between 
two competing political fronts. Both of these fronts interpreted and expressed their 
revolutionary goals in the framework of Islamic discourses, one as a “discourse of 
freedom” and the other as a “discourse of power”. There is much research about 
references to power within revolutionary Islamic discourse. However, references to 
democracy and freedom within Islamic discourse have been largely ignored, or rejected 
as having been possible goals and/or guiding principles of the revolution. For example, 
John Esposito discusses the institutionalisation of revolution and the emergence of 
militant clergy in 1981 without even referring to, let alone recognising the presence of a 
democratic front and dominance of a democratic Islamic discourse during the 
revolution.24 In another example, Ganjy, like many other Iranian reformists and 
radicals, tries to make his case for the anti-democratic nature of the revolution by 
casting aside the democratic political forces that during this time enjoyed overwhelming 
public support. The question is, why have so many experts turned a blind eye to the 
expansion of freedoms which followed the collapse of the Pahlavi regime in 1979, and 
instead concentrated solely on analysing (and often essentialising) the revolution’s 
medium-term results and establishment of a totalitarian regime?
The aims of this research
This dissertation is situated against this background. It is a theoretical and empirical 
historical study of political process, discourse and practice during the two and a half 
years immediately following the 1979 Iranian revolution. The analysis of the short-term 
outcome of the revolution focuses on the immediate post-revolutionary struggle 
between “democratic” and “totalitarian” fronts. The concept of “front” is used here in 
its loose form rather than its technical one, especially in regard to the democratic front. 
During this period the totalitarian front was best represented by the Islamic Republic
23 There is continuing debate about whether the changes the country experienced from 1951-53 were a form of
revolution or simply a socio-political movement. This paper treats the movement as a failed revolution as its 
goals of establishing an independent and democratic country enjoyed mass urban support and can therefore be 
seen as a popular social revolution. The debate on this matter, however, continues to be a concern for scholarly 
research.
24 John L. Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (US: Florida International University Press,
1999), p. 26.
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Party (IRP) and a combination of religious and Stalinist satellite organisations.25 The 
democratic front, on the other hand, was best represented by Mehdi Bazargan, the 
caretaker prime minister (February 1979) and leader of the Freedom Movement. Later 
this front was represented by Abol-Hassan Banisadr, the first elected president of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. This dissertation argues that the struggle between these two 
fronts resulted in the victory of totalitarian forces and the defeat of the democratic front. 
There is little research about the period of this struggle, which begins with the Shah’s 
collapse and ends in Banisadr’s presidency, although the latter’s fall was celebrated by 
the ruling clergy as the “third revolution”. That research which does exist is either 
descriptive or, when it aims to be explanatory, suffers from an inadequate use of data, 
unexamined and inaccurate presuppositions, or a poverty of relevant and comprehensive
97theoretical frameworks.
The dissertation therefore makes four arguments about the democratic potential of the 
1979 Iranian revolution. First, it argues that establishment of totalitarian power and 
religious fundamentalism in the 1980s was not an inevitable consequence of a 
movement guided by political Islam, but rather the historical outcome of distinct 
political and cultural processes, which enabled a minority social force to rise to power. 
This runs contrary to dominant interpretations of the outcome of the revolution,
9ftwhich assumes that Islamic fundamentalism had majority support. Second, the 
dissertation aims to illustrate that revolutionary leaders and elites were not a 
homogenous group and developed competing discourses of Islam to legitimise their
25 The IRP was the party of the clergy which was established with Ayatollah Khomeini’s blessing and which aimed at
establishing hegemony over Iranian state and society in the months immediately following the 1979 revolution.
26 Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that the occupation of the American embassy was a “second revolution”, an
“authentic revolution” bigger than the first, and Rafsanjani called the removal of Banisadr the “third” and even 
greater revolution. See the Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Iran’s Majles starts to debate Banisadr’s 
‘political competence’”, 18 June 1981, Item No. 061730. It is curious to note that in Rafsanjani’s memoir the 
phrase “third revolution” can be found in the index but is missing in the text. That makes one to wonder that 
whether such omission was intentional, in order to imply the removal of the president as an insignificant event 
in the process of revolution (which is consistent with the official narrative of event, as later on Rafsanjani 
argued that to remove Banisadr was easier than removing the head of a viWago-kadkhoda) or just a mere 
mistake. If this is a mistake then how such a mistake has been made. The reverse mistake, missing 
names/phrases in the index could be explained as human error, but having a phrase in the index, which is non­
existent in the text is much harder to explain by human error: See Hashemi Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran 
[Storming the Crisis], Tehran: Moaseseye Farhangee Honari-ye Taher-Leyla, 1999 [1378]), p. 227.
27 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making o f  Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1988), p. 324. See also Milani, “The ascendance of Shi’i fundamentalism” and Farideh Farhi, 
States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1990), pp. 
113-16.
28 Many experts of the Iranian revolution have not only taken the public support for the fundamentalist Islam for
granted; furthermore, they see the revolution itself as essentially, fundamentalist. For instance, see Fred 
Halliday, Islam and the Myth o f Confrontation (New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2003), p.44 and Said 
Arjomand, “Ideology as episodic discourse: the case of the Iranian revolution”, American Sociological Review, 
57, no. 3 (1992), p. 355.
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different agendas. The most significant of these struggles was between Abol-Hassan 
Banisadr, the president, and the IRP. The first advocated what he called the “Islam of 
Paris”,29 or a form of political Islam based on the concept of tawheed 
(holistic unity) and popular democratic principles. The second promoted veleyat-e 
faqih (rule of the jurist), a doctrine in which a single Islamic scholar carries 
ultimate religious, social and political authority over the people. These discourses 
became integrated into the political campaigns of the two political camps that emerged 
around Banisadr and the IRP. Khomeini increasingly lent his support to the IRP, which 
became increasingly dominant and ultimately gained hegemonic state power. Third, the 
dissertation aims to demonstrate the decisive role of human agency in the revolutionary 
process through an analytical study of political decision making processes and their 
effects on the outcome of the revolution. Fourth, the dissertation argues that the version 
of political Islam that was developed by the democratic camp during the earliest phase 
of the 1979 revolution remains a valuable point of reference for democratization in Iran 
and throughout the Islamic world. This is particularly because it demonstrates that there 
is a historical tradition of linking democratic politics and Islamic discourses. This 
provides theoretical resources for de-essentialising Islam and combating both religious 
and political fundamentalism. It also suggests that the ideological dominance or even 
the apparent popularity of more fundamentalist interpretations of Islam must be 
understood sociologically and politically, and in non-deterministic ways.
The single case study
This dissertation uses the case of the Iranian revolution to argue that the emergence of a 
stronger state is not an inescapable result of all revolutions. Rather, this outcome occurs 
when the main bodies of a revolutionary elite function within a discourse of power and 
fail to revolutionise political discourse by developing a discourse of freedom (see 
Chapter 2). In turn, members of other social classes internalise this discourse and
TOtherefore often authenticate power and power relations. Another task of this research 
is therefore to identify and introduce two distinct forms of Islamic discourse, which 
provided the principles and belief systems of the totalitarian and democratic fronts.
29 Banisadr called it the “Islam of Paris”, as it was in Paris that Khomeini had represented himself as committed to
democratic Islam in the world’s media.
30 H. P. McDonald, Political Philosophy and Ideology (Maryland: University Press o f America, 1997), p. 198.
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It can be asked how it is possible to develop a general theory of the Iranian revolution 
through a single case study. However, the goal of this work is not to develop a general 
theory, but to challenge the universality of such theories by demonstrating the 
importance of socio-historical particularity. In doing so, it aims to test the validity of 
these theories methodologically by using the Iranian revolution as a case study. 
Furthermore, it also tries to develop a localised theory which is capable of 
simultaneously explaining the dynamism of the revolution and its process, while 
avoiding deterministic approaches and introducing the element of contingency. It might 
be argued, however, that this is simply a way of introducing another universal theory of 
revolution from the back door (i.e., by challenging universal theories). Yet this 
dissertation makes no such claim to do so. The non-deterministic theory of revolution 
outlined here does recognise certain universal factors in the process and outcome of 
revolutions. These include factors like institutional and structural discrimination against 
large sections of communities both nationally and internationally, class relations, and 
access to economic markets and resources, means of production and the distribution of 
wealth and opportunity. However, the recognition of such factors is combined with a 
departure from general theories and the consideration of culture as a decisive factor in 
mass mobilisation, or its absence. Since culture is by definition localised, therefore it 
would be impossible to develop a general theory of revolution from this approach.
Furthermore, as Foran and Goodwin have demonstrated in the Nicaraguan case, it is 
very much possible to question the validity of universal theories, as they demonstrate in 
regard to Theda Skocpol’s theory of revolution. The “Nicaraguan case.. .challenges 
Skocpol’s argument that the exigencies of revolutionary state-building prevent the
T1emergence of liberal-democratic post-revolutionary regimes”. In other words, this 
indicates that single case studies can be used to disprove or develop general theories of 
revolution. It is thus viable to introduce another such case study to develop a theory 
which not only questions the validity of general theories, but which can also help us to 
develop an alternative theory to explain the Iranian revolution and suggest a general 
method, which might help us interpret others.
Temporal scope
31 Skocpol quotes this from Foran, in order to criticise it. See Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modem World, p.
337.
32 Ibid..
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As easy as it is to date the end of the Pahlavi regime in 1979, it is difficult to determine 
the terminus of the Iranian revolution, if such exists. This problem is not specific to the 
Iranian revolution. For instance, there is a range of competing opinions about how to 
determine the terminus of the 1789 French revolution. Francois Furet analyses this 
ongoing disagreement by trying to identify the different endpoints of the French 
Revolution as posited by different historians. He sees these opinions as spread between 
two poles dividing past and future, from those who see the end of the French revolution 
as being synonymous with the termination of the old regime, since “the essential 
features of the Revolution’s final outcome was fixed, when the final page of the ancien 
regime was turned” to the present time, when “the discourse of both Right and Left 
celebrates liberty and equality”.34 For Furet, if there is a consensus among 
contemporary scholars, it is only because “the political debate has simply been 
transferred from one Revolution to the other, from the revolution of the past to the one 
that is to come”. There are also other dates which are reasonable candidates for the 
revolution’s end, the most of which range from 1794, when Robespierre was executed, 
to 16 May 1877, when republicans defeated the monarchists. Even between in between 
these, there are other possible “stopping points” at 1799, 1815, 1830, 1848, 1851, and 
1870.
The Iranian revolution is much too young to provoke such a wide range of disagreement 
about its terminus. However, we can recruit insight from the widespread disagreement 
about the French revolution by recognising that the “touchstone, in identifying the 
terminus of the French revolution is the realization o f  the guiding principles o f the 
revolution”. That is why today such disagreements have subsided drastically since, as 
pointed out earlier on, “the discourse of both Right and Left celebrates liberty and 
equality”. A similar criterion is used in this thesis as a methodological device for 
defining the time period under inquiry, and classifies the outcome of the revolution 
according to its initially stated guiding principles of “freedom” and “independence”.37
33 Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, transl. by Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), p. 3.
34 Ibid., p. 5.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p.5.
37 It should be noticed that during the revolution, the word azadi meant both “freedom” and “democracy” and was
used interchangeably. It was only years later that the word mardomsalary was introduced into Persian to mean 
“democracy” and differentiated from freedom. Hence, it is important to understand what the word azadi meant 
within the context of the Iranian revolution. Because it does not now necessarily imply democracy, could be 
argued that someone using discourses of freedom is not necessarily also a democrat. The best method for 
demonstrating that tihe word azadi meant both “freedom” and “democracy” is the contextual analysis of its use 
during the early years of the revolution in the slogans and resolutions issued by demonstrators and strikers, but
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This dissertation that the revolution actually evolved in three stages, each representing a 
different outcome: the short-term outcome ending in June 1981, which was 
characterised by its relatively democratic character; the medium-term outcome, ending 
with the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1998 and defined by its totalitarian 
character; and the long-term outcome, characterised by the ongoing struggle between 
totalitarian political forces and growing demands for the democratisation of the state 
and society through a strengthening civil society. This research, by focussing on the 
short-term outcome, provides a framework for analysing the role of discourses of 
freedom and democracy in the Iranian revolution, which are overwhelmingly 
overlooked and under-analysed.
Methodology
Although there is little in-depth research about this period in Iranian history, many 
sources of information about it exist in the form of personal recollections, memoirs, 
primary documents and correspondence. However, many of these are unused or poorly 
used. One of the aims of this dissertation is therefore to find and use key sources of 
information about the early years of the revolution so that these marginalised 
perspectives can come to light. Because I am mainly interested in the political 
consequences of competing discourses of Islam during the first years of the revolution, I 
chose to interview mainly Muslim elites who were central political figures in politics, 
the academy and the media between 1979 and 1981. Interviews, and in political 
sociology especially elite interviews, are a very important source of data for such 
research. This is especially so in the case of the Iranian revolution, as the initial and 
decisive struggle amongst the revolutionary elite was determined largely within the elite 
itself. While the totalitarian front (led by the IRP and in the final stages by Khomeini) 
had highly mobilised but minority popular support, the democratic front (which in its 
final stages was led by Banisadr) failed to mobilise the majority democratic support that 
they had. Hence, for reasons of either number or mobilisation, non-elites remained 
largely outside this elite struggle.
particularly in the speeches and interviews of the leadership. The analysis demonstrates that during the 
revolution Khomeini used the word azadi to mean both freedom and democracy, and that in various interviews 
he used the English word “democracy” to emphasise his meaning of azadi. This was particularly the case when 
he was repeatedly arguing that the implementation of Human Rights and democracy were the main goals of 
revolution. See, for example, Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 5 (Tehran: 
Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e Eslami, 1999 [1378]), p. 353 and vol. 4, p. 199.
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This also meant that a relatively small number of key elite figures played vital roles in 
shaping the outcome of the political struggle to determine the nature of the revolution, 
and that those who survive are therefore important sources of information about these 
events. Abol-Hassan Banisadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic, was the most 
important public figure of the democratic movement during the first stage of the 
revolution. Mohammad Jafari was both the editor of Enghelabe Elsami (the most widely 
read newspaper during this period) and in charge of Banisadr’s public affairs, including 
a team that read and responded to, according to him, the estimated 12,000 letters a day
*1Q
that were sent to the president’s office during his presidency. Both of these roles gave 
Jafari particular insight into the public mood of the period. Although Banisadr intended 
to appoint Ahmad Salamatian, who initially headed the presidential campaign, as his 
prime minister, Salamatian was instead elected to parliament and became one of its 
most vocal ministers (as well as the target of attempted assassination). He had 
considerable insight about the factions within the parliament and government and also 
served as Banisadr’s representative to the United Nations during the 1980 American 
hostage crisis. Abdol-Samad Taghizadeh was the director of the National University 
during this time and had rich knowledge about student movements and organisations, 
especially during the Cultural Revolution and Dr Reza Hussein Zadegan, who was head 
of the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran during these years.
The experiences of this group of individuals -  who in total participated in ten in-depth 
and semi-structured interviews and a number of email correspondences -  make two 
contributions to our understanding of this period of the revolution. First, they provide 
insight into how elites who self-consciously interpreted Islam as a discourse of freedom 
actually used Islamic language and principles in their political work and revolutionary 
aspirations. Second, they provide insight into a narrative of the revolution that has been 
under-represented in research, and also represent a larger group of people whose voices 
have yet to be heard.
However, their experiences and narratives are not representative in general of Islamic 
discourses that were circulating and influential in the political struggle during this 
period. They were available to me and willing to give interviews in part because they 
lost this struggle and are now living in exile (in Europe and the United States). While I 
attempted to obtain interviews from other elites who were involved in this struggle and
38 Mohammad Jafari, interview by the author, London, 9 September 2004.
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who are still in power, such as Hojat-al-Islam Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Karubi, Ayatollah 
Khamenei, Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, and Behzad Nabavi, none were willing to 
participate. It was of course impossible to interview the most important elite leader of 
the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, who died in 1989. Consequently it became obvious 
that an over-reliance on interviews as the sole source of data could weaken the 
objectives of the research. In order to overcome this problem of equal access to 
individuals representing different Islamic discourses and to construct a more balanced 
narrative of the events, other sources of data were recruited. The methodology of this 
research is hence multi-layered, combining primary source data from interviews with 
published and unpublished primary source documents, and analysing these in the 
context of secondary resources about both revolution and Iranian society.
The research expanded the base of data primarily by drawing on other forms of primary 
sources, such as newspapers, journals, pamphlets and books, which were published 
during the period of the research, and memoirs, correspondence and interviews about 
the events that were published later. For example, the published collection of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s speeches, interviews and sermons, which runs to over twenty volumes, has 
been used heavily in this work. Rafsanjani’s memoir, speeches and published interviews 
about this period; Ayatollah Khamanei’s Friday prayers, published speeches and 
interviews; and Ayatollah Khalkhali’s memoir, interviews and speeches have all been 
used to represent the narratives of those elites who refrained from giving interviews.
IQ
Other resources, such as Mohsen Rezaei’s interviews and speeches, Mohsen Rafigh- 
Doost’s memoir and published interviews,40 and Ayatollah Reyshahri’s memoir and 
interviews,41 among others, were also included. These obviously cannot be considered 
substitutes for interviews or even as comparable sources of data. This is the case not 
least of all because the individuals have not been able to respond to the same questions 
as those that were interviewed. However, the inaccessibility of individuals who played 
key roles in the processes analysed in this research but who refrained from giving 
interviews makes the statements they have made publicly in memoirs, speeches and 
published interviews particularly valuable. They have enabled me to make a much 
richer analysis of the political and ideological struggles between competing political
39 Mohsen Razei was commander of the Revolutionary Guards from 1981-97.
40 Mohsen Rafigh-Doost was one founder o f the Revolutionary Guards.
41 Ayatollah Reyshahri was head of the Revolutionaiy Court during this period.
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camps during this period, and have also been used as a means of triangulating or ‘cross- 
examining’ many of the claims made by interviewees.
Newspapers present both a challenge and an opportunity for this research. On the one 
hand, they provide a rich source of contemporary account of the events. This is 
particularly because each political faction were actively using this media to represent 
and advance their political and religious discourses. On the other hand, during this 
particular period of the revolution, the clergy had already begun closing down the 
oppostional newspapers, hence limiting the range of accessible perspectives to two main 
newspapers. Hence while I had access to numerous newspapers published by different 
factions of the totalitarian front, I was confined to using two main opposition papers: 
Mizan, which represented Bazargan’s group and Enghelabe Eslami, which as the 
president’s newspaper continued its publication to the last days before his downfall. 
Hence, a systematic use of resources has been necessary in order to provide competing 
versions of the revolutionary process.
This combination of methods presents a particular set of epistemological limitations. It 
raises a classical question of how to confirm interpretive knowledge, especially when 
those producing it may have interests in presenting a specific narrative and where there 
are competing narratives of the same events. There are concerns about using “subjective 
experience” as a source of data about historical events, which Kurzman has 
summarised: “people’s statements about their inners states, especially retrospective 
statements, may not reflect their actual inner states”, and “people may not sufficiently 
understand those around them” or indeed the wider contexts that shape their lives. And, 
quoting Bourdieu, he points out that “social agents do not innately possess a science of 
what they are and what they do”.42 The use of memoirs and recollections raise 
additional problems of memory loss, re-contextualisation of past events in light of 
present ones, and inconsistency in the narratives that people create about their own lives 
and experiences. These problems can be exacerbated in elite interviews, where 
emotional and political stakes may be extremely high, and individuals may be even 
more likely to present overly positive and exaggerated narratives of events in order to 
protect the legitimacy of their own role in them. This is an important consideration not 
only for people in positions of power, but also for those who are no longer in power, 
particularly those living in exile such as those interviewed for this research.
42 Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution, pp. 166-69.
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Hence, the techniques of elite interviewing which have been used in this research focus 
on encouraging interviewees to critically analyse and reflect on their role in historical 
events.43 This is made more possible, as mentioned above, by the method of combining 
interviews with other types of primary sources from these individuals and by comparing 
their statements across different types of media (memoirs, speeches, sermons, published 
interviews and correspondence) and across time. This makes interviewees’ selections 
and inconsistencies are more easily identifiable. For example, the statements that 
Banisadr made during his presidency in numerous articles, speeches, interviews and 
public statements were compared to those that he made both before and after this 
period, as well as compared to statements made by other elites. While comparing past 
and present statements does not necessarily validate them, it does enable the researcher 
to trace differences between discourses and changes in discourses over time.
It is also extremely important to interpret these resources in their wider social context. 
Hence, the research also draws on other primary resources that were produced by non­
partisan experts and observers of the events during this era. This includes interviews 
with experts such as Eric Rouleau, Le Monde’s Chief Middle Eastern editor during the 
revolution, and contemporary reports in foreign newspapers and news agencies. As 
with the other sources of data these are far from neutral accounts, but they do provide 
comparative perspectives and arguably the individuals that produced them had less 
personal interest in creating self-protective narratives about the events. The 
combination of these methods and the use of untapped written and oral resources has 
enabled me to present a critical analysis of the revolutionary process from 1979-81, 
which can bring us closer to explaining more fully and accurately such an important and 
open-ended process.
These considerations are also applicable to myself, the researcher. I actively participated 
in the events of the revolution from 1979-81, and I myself fled the country three years 
after Banisadr was removed and have since lived in exile in the United Kingdom. I was 
not a member of either group of political elites that are the focus of this research, though
43 For some work about elite interviews, see Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two Decades o f  
Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1960); Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: 
Little Brown, 1978); John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, second ed. (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1995).
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I have been fortunate to have close access to those living in exile as part of this research. 
However, I was present during most of the major events (as well as numerous minor 
ones) that are referred to in recollections and that are recorded in contemporary 
documents: the Eide Fitr demonstration, ‘Black Friday’ and the brief armed struggle in 
February 1979. I was also in Sanandaj, a major centre in Iran’s Kurdish region, 
immediately after the first civil war,44 and present during the Cultural Revolution, the 
occupation of the American Embassy, and the violent confrontations of 14 Esfand 
(February 1981) and 30 Khordad (Junel981).45 My life history has therefore been 
fundamentally shaped by the outcome of the elite political struggle during this period. 
This, combined with the fact that I found almost no indepth discussion or analysis of 
these events or this period in the literature about the revolution, was initially a strong 
motivation for me to conduct this research. I believe there remains a story yet to be told, 
and a part of the story of the revolution which is rarely told even in other narratives: the 
emotional and spiritual experiences of its participants, and the role of these in the actual 
revolutionary processes. Michel Foucault captured this problem in a contemporary 
newspaper article, where he wrote that
for the people who inhabit this land, what is the point of searching, even 
at the cost of their own lives, for this thing whose possibility we have 
forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crisis of Christianity, a 
political spirituality. I can already hear the French laughing, but I know 
that they are wrong.46
A similar idea is expressed in a very different source, in the documents of the revolution 
themselves:
Fear of weapons was gone, fear of shooting, fear of blood, fear of the 
Guard that had until then been called Immortal and which had lost its
44 This refers to the first major military confrontation between the Iranian army and armed Kurdish organisations (the
Kurdish Democratic Party and Komeleh), a ten-day battle in which the latter unsuccessfully attempted to seize 
a military barrack.
45 The event that took place in September 1981 is referred to by the IRP as Ghaeleh 14 Esfand and more commonly
as Majaraye daaneshgah (or ‘the adventure in the university’). On this day, groups of Hezbolahis attempted to 
violently disrupt a gathering (attended by Banisadr) held to mark the anniversary of Mohammad Mussadeq’s 
birth, but were confronted by the audience and forced to retreat. The event of 30 Khordad in June 1981 was the 
last major demonstration in support of the president, which ended in bloodshed as Revolutionary Guards fired 
at the demonstrators, killing and injuring dozens of people.
46 Michel Foucault, ‘What are the Iranians dreaming about?’ in Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson,
Foucault and  the Iranian Revolution: Gender and  the Seductions o f  Islam  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), p. 208. First published in he N ouvel Observateur, October 16-22, 1978.
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immortality forever in the eyes of people -  this fear was gone. The way 
people stood up, you would think the Immortals were only setting off 
firecrackers.47
We cannot have understanding or explain the revolution without considering this 
phenomenon, and it seems particularly difficult for academics to do so. As Charles 
Kurzman argues, following his description of a particular revolutionary event as 
recounted by participants,
the sense of abandon is difficult to capture in academic prose. But it is 
central to the understanding of protest movements, people felt the normal 
rules of behaviour had been suspended. They did not recognize the 
limits of safety, deference, and routine. The future was suddenly up in 
the air.’48
I had also believed this, long before reading Kurzman’s work, and therefore felt that it 
was important to use my own memory of this period of the revolution as a resource. I do 
not argue that my subjective contribution is any more or less reliable than the memories 
and observations of others. However, I consider myself to be an equal participant in a 
set of events that were dynamic and complex. No participant can be present in every 
place at all times. I was in particular places at particular times and I have used this 
experience, critically and reflexively to guide me to include important but not fully 
explored events and issues that, in my experience, played a role in the revolutionary 
process. For example, information about the ‘Black Friday’ massacre, the confrontation 
of 14 esfand (September 1981) and the fatal demonstration of 30 khordad (June 1981) 
still varies considerably and is based on secondary sources. Where relevant I have 
therefore included my memories of these events (often as footnotes) and have attempted 
to use my own observations as an additional primary source of information where gaps 
in such resources exist.
The academic training in theory and research that I have gained in more recent years has 
enabled me to analyse and interpret these events sociologically. It might be argued that I
47 Reza Baraheni, Dar Enghelab-e Iran: Cheh Shodeh va Che Khahad Shod? [In the Iranian Revolution, What
Happened and What Will Happen?] (Tehran: Nashre Zaman, 1979 [1357]), p. 122.
48 Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution, p. 162.
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have been involved in them again in a new light and a different and more critical 
context. I am hence not immune to the criticisms that I made of more elite participants, 
or to the possibility of ‘misremembering’ or ‘reinventing’ history in order to suit a 
present viewpoint or subjective personal narrative. However, having political views can 
not be seen as merely a problem, because like everyone else social scientists have socio­
political and philosophical views. It is often still assumed even in social science that the 
possibility of having “objectivity” transfers a body of knowledge into scientific 
knowledge. However, it can also be argued that social research is scientific so long as it 
tries to provide knowledge of reality, which is as close to truth as humanly possible. 
Max Weber’s views on this are still important, as he argued that such a goal is 
achievable when scientists perceive their work as a vocation49 and as an intra-subjective 
rather than individualised activity.50
This is what I have attempted to achieve with this dissertation, which has been a long 
journey to answer some very difficult questions. In the defeat of the revolution’s 
democratic potential, who betrayed whom and with the help of whom? Was it actually 
a betrayal, or simply a natural and inevitable outcome which is intrinsic to all 
revolutions, or particular to social movements guided by religious ideas? Did I and 
others like me play a role in this process and, if so, why? I have written this dissertation 
to understand, for myself and for others, what actually happened during these decisive 
years immediately following the revolution. The project is itself a vocation and a 
commitment to truth.
Overview of the dissertation
The dissertation is divided into nine chapters, which are interrelated both 
chronologically and contextually. Following this Introduction, Chapter Two consists of 
a critical introduction to theories of revolution, primarily those typically used to provide 
the theoretical framework for the outcome of the 1979 Iranian revolution. By 
emphasising the process of revolution and the importance of human agency via culture, 
it provides a theoretical base for illustrating the “open-endedness” of the revolution, 
thus making a case for the contingency of this outcome. By introducing the concept of
49 See Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. by Hans Gerth and C. Wright
Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946 [1918]), p. 78.
50 Edward Portis, “Political action and social science: Max Weber’s two arguments for objectivity”,
Polity, 12, no. 3 (1980), p. 410.
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“historical possibility” while avoiding the trap of “hypothetical history” or “counter- 
factualism”, this chapter lays the groundwork for a critical analysis of revolutionary 
process in Iran during the decisive period from 1978-81, which demonstrates how 
totalitarian parties, led by the IRP in cooperation with the Stalinist left, were able to 
defeat the democratic constitutionalists and monopolise the state.
Social movements such as mass uprisings and revolutions must be understood within 
their historical context. In Chapter Three, the 1979 Iranian Revolution is therefore 
contextualised within the country’s history of social revolution, primarily the 1905 
Constitutional Revolution and 1951-53 nationalisation of oil movement, as well as a 
number of smaller social upheavals. It argues that the outcome of these earlier 
twentieth-century movements limited and conditioned the options available to political 
forces during subsequent uprisings and revolutions, and discusses the successes and 
failures which conditioned future movements and ultimately led to the emergence of the 
1979 Iranian revolution. The chapter concludes by explaining why the election of 
Jimmy Carter as US president in 1977 and the perceived changes in subsequent 
American foreign policy proved to be a decisive factor in the mobilisation of social 
forces against monarchic authoritarianism in Iran.
Chapter Four elaborates the political culture of the opposition prior to the 1979 
revolution against the backdrop of these socio-economic changes. It argues that without 
recognition of the importance of political culture as a factor which shapes the identity of 
revolution, as well as an understanding of its mechanisms, processes and outcomes, then 
the guiding principles of revolution cannot be clarified. The political culture of the 
opposition in pre-revolutionary Iran not only created an intellectual base for the 
revolution, but to a large extent also conditioned its process and outcomes. Therefore, 
this chapter introduces the various, often competing, political discourses of the 
opposition and their social bases. While it by no means disregards nationalist and 
Marxist ideologies and their effects on the political culture of the revolution, it pays 
special attention to introducing the different Islamic discourses, which were most 
influential in the political culture of the revolution. Five different discourses, 
represented by five influential Islamic thinkers, are analysed in this chapter. The focus 
is on the thinkers’ views on politics and power and the type(s) of relationship between 
the two, as well as their philosophies of both democracy and despotism.
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By identifying the location and role of the key actors at certain historical junctures, it is 
possible to expose the contingent nature of political decision-making, which had 
decisive effects on the process and outcome of the revolution. This methodology is 
used in Chapter Five to describe the process of the revolution at its initial stage, in 1978, 
which aimed at overthrowing the Pahlavi regime. It discusses the effect of events which 
enabled the opposition to tap into “cultural capital” within the society and to skilfully 
recruit cultural resources in order to mobilise its forces against the regime. The 
narrative analysis of political events illustrates the process by which, within the span of 
a few months, initial protests by a very small proportion of Iranian society became a 
full-blown and unprecedented revolution. This approach makes it possible to analyse 
how the trajectory of the revolution was influenced by particular choices and actions on 
the part of key agents. Narrative critical analysis, employed within the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter One, will be the main method used to analyse the 
process of revolution in subsequent chapters.
Chapter Six discusses the gradual emergence of the political conflict between the IRP 
and its supporting organisations, and democratic forces such as the Freedom Movement 
and figures such as Banisadr, after the initial stage of the revolution. It compares how 
these different fronts made use of opportunities and mobilised resources available to 
them. It also narrates how critical decisions by prime minister Mehdi Bazargan’s 
administration (from February to November 1979) led to the gradual increase in power 
for totalitarian parties, most notably the IRP, at the cost of a decrease in Bazargan’s 
authority. These events include the formation of a second standing army called the 
Revolutionary Guard, the Revolutionary Courts and an organisation called Jahad-e 
Sazandeghi (Jihad for Construction), which was based in the villages. Finally, the 
chapter investigates the effects of political violence and the enabling effect it had on the 
IRP’s strategy for controlling the state. In this regard, special attention is paid to the 
emergence of war and the occupation of the American embassy in November 1979, 
which drastically weakened Bazargan’s beleaguered government and forced it to resign.
Chapter Seven analyses the post-Bazargan period from November 1979 to the 
beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. The critical narrative of this period 
explores how the totalitarian forces were decisively defeated in the Islamic Republic’s 
first presidential election in February 1980. The election of Banisadr, by then a 
prominent Islamic theoretician, raised serious hopes of turning the tide against the IRP
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and its allies. The chapter goes on to demonstrate how the ensuing politico-ideological 
struggle and the reorganisation of the IRP, with increasing support from Khomeini, 
resulted in the latter’s gaining control of parliament and imposing Rajaei as prime 
minister on the president, thus using the leverages of legal state power to undermine the 
president’s authority. The chapter also analyses how “crisis” was used strategically by 
the theocratic forces on both ideological and political levels in the struggle between the 
fronts.
Chapter Eight investigates the final months of Banisadr’s presidency, which ended 
suddenly in June 1981 and which was followed by the complete domination of the state 
by the totalitarian forces. The analysis aims to demonstrate how this turn of events was 
influenced by the democratic front’s poor use of the resources and opportunities 
available to it. Also, by arguing that the revolution’s “spiritual leader” Ayatollah 
Khomeini was positioned as a “catalyst”, it demonstrates the vital importance of his 
political position in affecting the outcome of the struggle. In doing so it further 
questions the validity of theories which view the outcomes of the revolution as 
inevitable. Furthermore, the chapter analyses the use (or non-use) of internal resources 
in this political struggle and demonstrates the important role that international factors 
(mainly the American hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war), played in shaping the 
outcome of the struggle. In other words, it argues that both personal charisma and 
international factors became decisive when the totalitarian front used them as resources 
to bolster its policies and platforms.
Finally, the Conclusion uses the historical context of the revolution to focus on certain 
revolutionary events to demonstrate the element of contingency, the role of agency and 
thus the open-endedness of the revolution during this period. It demonstrates the 
methodological, ideological and demographic challenges the Iranian revolution created 
for dominant theories of revolution, and identifies culture as a main variable which 
holds the key to any successful attempt to develop a viable theory of revolution.
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1Structure, culture and agency in the Iranian Revolution
Any attempt to develop an adequate theory of the Iranian Revolution needs to challenge 
certain presuppositions about the relationship between structure, culture and agency. 
First, it must address the embedded determinism in many theories of revolution, 
particularly those that investigate revolutionary outcomes. Second, it must challenge 
the essentialisation of Islam, which is the result of an historical split between religion 
and science as well as of an Orientalist approach to Islam. Third, it must demystify the 
knowledge of specific characters and events during this time. This research aims to 
present an alternative approach to the Iranian revolution during this period by 
developing a non-deterministic theory of revolution, identifying competing discourses 
of Islam within it and demystifying revolutionary leaders and events.
A critical analysis of deterministic theories of revolution
Most explanations of revolution centre on either “structure” or “the agent”. However, 
like any other social phenomena, revolutions cannot be adequately explained solely in 
terms of “causes” which are the result of external forces, or “purposes”, the result of 
choices made by groups or individuals within a system of rules.51 In other words, any 
theory of revolution which relies exclusively on structure or agency is incomplete. This 
approach leaves unanswered fundamental questions and, worse, may even prevent 
others from being raised, as they do not fit within the specific theoretical framework. 
This problem is visible in theories which are based either on structure or agency.
Theories of agency
Many theories of revolution emphasise the importance of the human agent in its 
collective form. While these permit us to comprehend how groups respond to 
structural conditions, they also to a large extent neglect the importance of social 
structure in the emergence of revolution. “Aggregate social psychological” theories, for
51 Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1978), p. 6.
52 Gustav le Bon sees revolutions as irrational acts; see The Psychology o f Revolution (New York: Putnam, 1960).
An opposite example of this can be seen in Mancur Olson, The Logic o f  Collective Action (Schocken Books, 
1965). Needless to say that Freud’s analysis of group psychology had a direct effect on psychological theories 
of revolution, especially his work Group Psychology and the Analysis o f  the Ego (New York: Norton, 1959).
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example, explain revolutions as the outcome of frustrated collective expectations or 
desires. The single most important basis for these theories is the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis in social psychology, which understands human aggression as the 
consequence of frustration.53
The relative deprivation model, developed by James Davies54 and expanded by Ted 
Gurr,55 is the most celebrated model in this school. The roots of this model can be 
traced to Alexis de Tocqueville’s account of the origins of the French revolution.
Unlike Marx, who argued that the increasing misery of the working class by the 
exploitation of the state leads to revolution, Tocqueville stated the opposite. He argued 
that the roots of revolution cannot be understood by the increasingly repressive capacity 
of the ancien regime, but by the relative loosening of the state’s repression as the result 
of political reforms. Thus, he argued that “generally speaking, the most perilous 
moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways”.56 A 
contemporary example of this is Davies’ J-curve theory. His argument that the short­
term downturn which takes place after a longer term of relative increase in material 
well-being may cause revolution is well in tune with Tocqueville’s theory.57
However, there are major criticisms of this approach. First, the theory is incapable of 
explaining how the “revolutionary state of mind” can be transformed into a 
revolutionary organisation strong enough to overthrow a state.58 David’s failure to 
consider class analysis in his model has also made his theory susceptible to major 
criticism because in the absence of class it is difficult to identify which social groups 
may experience frustration as the result of declining gratification.59 One can, for 
example, argue that Davies seeks to explain the causes of revolution in a classless 
society; hence, the question would be, if there are no classes and therefore no dominant 
class, then how can such frustration develop in the first place, and subsequently, why 
should there be a need for revolution after all?
53 John Dollard, Leonard Doob, Neal Miller, O. H. Mowrer and Sears, Frustration and Aggression (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1967), p. 1.
54 James Davies, “Toward a theory of revolution”, American Sociological Review, 27, no. 1 (1962), pp. 5-18.
55 Ted Gurr, When Men Revolt and Why (New York: Free Press, 1971).
56 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York: Anchor, 1955), pp. 176-77.
57 Michael Kimmel, Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 75-
76.
58 Aya, Roderick, “Theories of revolution reconsidered: contrasting models of collective violence,” Theory and
Society, 8, no. 1 (1979), p. 54.
59 Ibid.
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However, the most important problem with such non-structuralist approaches is that, 
considering that “relative deprivation” is more or less present in many developing 
societies, it is impossible to differentiate between those situations in which revolutions 
occur and those in which it does not. This difficulty has opened up theories of agency 
to criticism by structuralist theorists. The element of voluntarism, which is implicit in 
the aggregate social psychological models, has taken the main brunt of the criticism.60 
After all, many structuralists argue that revolutions are not “made”; they “come”.61
However, a similar argument could be made in relation to the structuralist approach. 
The mere presence of structural conditions which create a revolutionary situation does 
not automatically lead to revolution. This is why, despite the presence of structural 
conditions for revolution in many societies, largely as a result of the presence or 
increase of inequality and despotism, social revolutions are rare phenomena. It is 
logically inconsistent to criticise aggregate psychological theories from the structuralist 
point of view for being inductive in their sampling when structuralists have used the 
same method. In other words, both schools suffer from the “fallacy of biased 
sampling”, or the use of samples that suit a particular purpose and ignore others which 
challenge the universality of the argument. In other words, both schools have focused 
on the few cases which have lead to revolution and have disregarded other similar 
circumstances which did not lead to revolution.62
Structural theories of revolution
In structuralist approaches, as questions of agency are largely absent, theories of 
revolution are mainly confined to explaining the causes and outcomes of revolutions. 
These theories lack attention to the revolutionary “process”. This has resulted in the 
failure to recognise alternative outcomes in the revolutionary process as a consequence 
of the different configuration and interplay of actors, structure and chance. 
Consequently, many of these theories have in effect become deterministic.
60 Theda Skocpol, “France, Russia, China: a structural analysis of social revolutions,” Comparative Studies in Society
and History, 18, no. 2 (1976), pp. 175-210. Walter Goldfrank, “World System, state structure and the onset of 
the Mexican Revolution,” Politics and Society, 5, no. 4; Aya, “Theories of revolution”.
61 See Skocpol: “As I put in the book, quoting the abolitionist Wendell Phillips, ‘revolutions are not made. They
come’.” Theda Skocpol, “Rentier state and Shia’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution”, Theory and Society, 11, no. 
3 (1982), p. 266.
62 For example, see Mark N. Hagopian, The Phenomenon o f Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974), p. 104.
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This is particularly visible in theories of the state. One can view the state in its Marxian 
terms as an instrument of domination by the ruling class, or perceive it within a 
functionalist framework and consider it an institution of passive administration. In 
Tocquevillian terms, the state is assigned autonomy vis-a-vis the ruling class. Both 
non-Marxist and many Marxist theorists of revolutions—primarily structuralist, 
structural-functionalist and modernization theories—using historical and contemporary 
cases of social revolutions argue that the real victor in any social revolution is the state 
itself, as it becomes strengthened and bolstered. Here we can see there is an 
essentialisation of “belief system”, “social construction” and “social process” which 
extends to the concept of social revolution and to understandings of its outcome.
The lack of attention to human agency in structural theories can also be seen as a result 
of the under-valuation of culture and ideology as motivating factors. Here again we can 
see that the essentialisation of culture and its perception either as a passive entity that 
simply produces or reflects the support value system for the infra-structure, or as a 
deterrent, has to a large extent prevented structuralists from giving proper recognition to 
it. This has opened a venue for another criticism of structuralism. John Walton phrases 
this criticism eloquently when he argues that
revolution does not follow spontaneously from the system of under­
development or the machination of the state. It is only as these interact 
with the cultural practice that political consciousness finds its theme and 
expressive vehicle. Revolutionary movements are successfully 
organised in proportion to the strength and relative unity of their cultural 
bases.63
The reason for this is that “culture is essential because it provides an ideational 
foundation for the structures and institutions that interact to form revolutionary crisis in 
structural theories”.64
Within this school of thought, structuralists have developed different probable outcomes 
for revolution. For instance, Marx combined a deterministic approach with optimism
63 John Walton, Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies o f  Revolutions and Underdevelopment (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984), p. 156.
64 Kimmel, Revolution, p. 189.
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and the belief that revolutions would lead to the emergence of free humans and the 
dissolution of the state.65 Contemporary structuralists like Skocpol,66 however, have 
fused their approach with pessimism. She argued that revolutions inevitably lead to the
67 •further loss of freedom and a much strengthened and bolstered state. In either case, 
the outcome of the revolution is pre-determined. Therefore, the resolutely structuralist 
approach in these theories and their failure to take agency and culture seriously, have 
made them deterministic. These theories are therefore insufficient for explaining the 
process and dynamics of revolutions if one aims to avoid theoretical fatalism.
Furthermore, the post-hoc approach in contemporary structuralism has also has 
increased the density of their determinism. They have systematically ruled out 
“contingency” and have thus become rationally inconsistent. As Eric Hobsbawn 
argued,
within the revolutionary moment, there is more than one potential 
outcome, the one that actually occurs. That outcome x  did result from 
structural conditions a, b, and c does not logically mean that outcomes y  
or z were not possible. Structure and situation interact, and determine 
the limits of decision and action; but what determines the possibilities of 
action is primarily situation.68
Some structuralists have tried to counter these criticisms. For instance, Gordon Wood 
attempted to explain the absence of the agent in these theories by arguing that the 
multiplicity of purposes and goals among participants in a revolutionary process makes 
it impossible to develop a theory based on the conscious action of participants.
It is not that men’s motives are unimportant; they indeed make events, 
including revolutions. But the purposes of men, especially in revolution,
65 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967).
66 Kimmel, Revolution, p. 179.
67 Skocpol continues to maintain her views in this regard. Even when confronted by the Foran-Goodwin study of the
Nicaraguan case, in which they introduce the emergence of a liberal-democratic regime in post-revolutionary 
Nicaragua, she still sees the approach as premature. See Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World, p. 
337.
68 Eric Hobsbawn, “Revolution”, Paper presented to the XIV Congress of Historical Sciences, San Francisco, CA,
1975. Although Hobsbawn talks about how structure/situation determines the possibilities of action, he does 
not see the certain outcome of any specific revolution as determined since he recognises the possibilities of 
other outcomes for revolutions
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are so numerous, so varied, and so contradictory that their complex 
interaction produces results that no one intended or could even foresee.
It is this interaction and these results that recent historians are referring 
to when they speak so disparagingly of these “underlying determinants” 
and “impersonal and inexorable forces” bringing on the Revolution.
Historical explanation which does not account for these “forces,” which, 
in other words, relies simply on understanding the conscious intentions 
of the actors, will thus be limited.69
It is a fact that there are multiplicities of purpose and goals among the participants in 
revolutions. However, as Crane Brinton argued, we must still consider that “human 
agency is essential to the phenomenon of revolution, and sociological analysis that fails 
to take into account the experiences and motives of the actors themselves, however
7ficomplex, varied, or contradictory, will also be limited”. It could also be argued that 
the only goal which totally unites the participants in any social revolution is the 
destruction of the ancien regime. However, the recognition of multiplicity should be 
juxtaposed with the recognition of its possible role as a unifying as well as limiting 
factor in revolution. This unifying factor can be identified by demarcating the guiding 
principles of revolutions. After all, unlike Trotsky’s belief that revolutionaries simply 
have a sharp feeling of not being able to endure the old regime and needing a guiding 
organisation to direct their energy,71 the participants of revolutions have a general view 
of what they perceive as an ideal alternative system which is worth struggling and 
taking risks for (if not in a specific way and in totality, at least to varying degrees).
The recognition of a multiplicity of goals and purposes does not necessarily prevent 
scholars from identifying unifying guiding principles and instead allows us to seriously 
consider the role of the agent in theories of revolution. This approach enables us to 
avoid falling into a dichotomist relation between structure and agency, and allows us to 
recognise that both structure and agency have enabling and preventative effects on each 
other; the agent is not merely determined by the structure. In other words, the agent is 
not simply the embodiment of the structure, a passive repository which structure lives 
through. Agents actively interact with and put limits on the structure. Hence, neither
69 Gordon Wood, “The American revolution” in L. Kaplan, ed., Revolutions: A Comparative Study (New York:
Vintage Books, 1973).
70 Cited in David V. J. Bell, Resistance and Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 129-30.
71 Leon Trotsky, The History o f the Russian Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. x-xi.
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the over-emphasis of agency (even in its collective form) nor the reliance on structure is 
sufficient to provide a thorough explanation of the causes, processes and outcome of 
social revolutions. A synthesis is therefore necessary.
The synthesis o f structure and agency
Marx, to a certain extent, was aware of this necessity when he famously argued (in 
apparent contradiction to his generally structural theory) that “men make their own 
history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past”.72 This synthesis of structure and agency also 
forms the ontological bases of Anthony Giddens’ theory of “structuration”, which 
argues that all “social life is generated in and through social praxis; where social praxis 
is defined to include the nature, conditions, and consequences of historically and spatio- 
temporally situated activities and interactions produced through the agency of social
7^actors”. This theory is the synthesis of a dialectical relationship between structure 
and agency, a synthesis, which provides space for the relative autonomy of “agency” 
since it is neither determined by structure nor totally free from it. This is because “the 
conception of agency in structuration theory resists the polarities of both thoroughgoing 
determinism and unqualified freedom, while preserving all possibilities between these 
polar extremes”.74 Therefore, this approach provides us with a theoretical base upon 
which to challenge deterministic theories of revolution, since it views social phenomena 
and events as socially shaped but also contingent and open-ended.
The ebb and flow interaction and fluid relation between structure and agency is, to 
various degrees, influenced by the conscious action of agents through culture and 
ideology. It is through this approach, by providing space for contingency, that we can 
develop a viable theory of revolution which can avoid both post-hoc arguments and 
determinism. This is because “nothing is inevitable in the birth of or the course of 
revolution and the failure to examine the process itself blinds the analyst to the 
trajectories not taken, the possibilities contained in the revolutionary moment rather
72 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 13.
73 Ira J. Cohen, Structuration Theory (Hampshire: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1989), p. 2.
74 Ibid., p. 26.
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than the inevitable outcomes”.75 From this perspective, we can see why Michelet, the 
nineteenth-century French historian, described the moment of revolution in France in 
1789 in the following way: “on that day everything was possible.. .the future was 
present.. .that is to say time was no more, all a lighting flash of eternity”. 76 Human 
beings might not be able to fully determine the waves of history to the end they desire, 
but surely, instead of passively playing the role which history tries to assign them, 
through developing consciousness and new value systems they can affect their general 
direction.
Tilly’s dialectical approach and its critique
Within this context, Charles Tilly’s theory of revolution—that of a dialectical 
relationship between structure and agency—is arguably the most suitable for explaining 
the phenomena of social revolution. Tilly synthesises structure and agency by fusing 
together several schools of thought in classical social theory. He does not include all 
schools of thought; for example, he is, as he put it, “doggedly anti-Durkheimian”. He 
sees rationality in collective social action, which makes him “sometimes reliant on 
Mill”. Furthermore, for him social action in the form of revolutionary behaviour is 
purposive action. This, plus the centrality of social classes and the development of 
capitalism as conditions for a revolutionary situation, makes him “resolutely pro- 
Marxian”. However, by ascribing relative autonomy to the state in regard to the ruling 
class and seeing it as a contender in its own right, Tilly is “sometimes indulgent to 
Weber”77 and Tocqueville.
Power, in the form of the state, and legitimacy are by definition problematic for Tilly, 
unlike functionalists who see states as a passive units of administration or, in Hegelian 
terms, as ultimate expressions of right. Tilly also moves away from Marxist theories of 
the state, which view the state as a tool of ruling class, and from Tocquevillian 
definitions that view the state as a self-preserving and autonomous entity and an 
omnivorous and greedy institution engaged in constant attempts to expand its purview. 
Tilly not only does not take the legitimacy of the state for granted; furthermore, he sees 
the power of the state as being under constant threat. For him, “discontent” is hence a 
constant variable and omnipresent in society. However, in order for this threat to
75 Leiden and Schmitt, Politics o f  Violence, p. 73.
76 Kimmel, Revolution, p. 185.
77 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 48.
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become materialised, he argues that five variables have to be present. These are
• 78interest, organisation, mobilisation, opportunity and finally collective action itself.
What bridges motivation to mobilisation is a level of organisation which transfers 
people’s anger or frustration into political action. In Tilly’s theory, the level of 
efficiency of organisation is the axial predictor for the success of revolution.
Here we can see the synthesis of structure and agency in Tilly’s theory. He takes 
people’s motivations and aspirations seriously as factors, which in their collective form 
make revolutions possible. However, these forces are not autonomous. They are both 
enabled and constrained by a complex set of structures; mainly, the armed forces, two or 
more blocs of powers and the transfer of power to its contender. Furthermore, 
“opportunity” in the form of domestic and international politics provides another 
inevitable domain for revolutionary action, which again can be enabling or constraining. 
That allows him to argue, contrary to Skocpol who sees revolution as determined, that 
“few revolutionary situations have revolutionary outcomes”.79
It is here that we can see one of the limits of Tilly’s theory. He takes the element of 
“discontent” as a constant variable in societies for granted and argues that the only time 
discontent will be transformed into mobilisation is when there is a viable organisation 
which transfers people’s frustration into political action. To some extent, this is a viable 
theory, which makes it possible to analyze the process of the Iranian revolution. It 
permits us to study the dynamics of the revolution as they appeared in the struggle 
between the democratic and totalitarian fronts. It also enables us to investigate the 
fronts’ ability to mobilise people and their accessibility to resources and organisation.
In brief, Tilly’s theory makes it possible to explain the mechanisms of the elite struggle 
in the initial period, to expound why the democratic front failed to utilise its position as 
the front with majority and army support, and to understand what other factors enabled 
the totalitarian front to monopolise power. Furthermore, Tilly’s recognition of 
international factors as variables affecting the outcome of the struggle adds to its 
credibility. In the case of the Iranian revolution, we can see the decisive effect of this 
variable during the Iraqi invasion in September 1980 and the occupation of the 
American embassy by students, which tilted the balance of power toward the side of the 
totalitarian forces (see Chapter 7).
78 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 7.
79 Quoted in Kimmel, Revolution, p. 206.
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However, Tilly’s work has shortcomings. It does not, for example, give enough 
recognition to the importance of the revolutionary leadership and its effect on other 
variables. In the Iranian case, this would include the effects of Khomeini’s charisma on 
the ability for one front to mobilise and organise against the other. Furthermore, and 
more importantly, the invisible shortcoming in Tilly’s theory is his relative disregard for 
culture. This might seem to be an odd claim since the heart of his theory is the agent’s 
anger and frustration, which can be transformed into political action. In this sense Tilly 
gives space to cultural variables by allowing that some revolutionary situations fail to 
produce revolution as the result of the absence of one or more necessary variables. By 
doing so, he has prevented his theory from becoming deterministic. However, his 
assumption that discontent and anger are latent variables that can be used to organise 
and mobilise frustration against the state makes him into a “conditional determinist”. 
Like psychological theorists, especially behaviourists, Tilly considers agents as 
psychological units which can produce similar reactions to external stimuli, and that 
these can be activated in the presence of certain conditions. This indicates that Tilly 
has not taken culture seriously as a sociological factor which generates motivation (or 
the lack of it) for the use of other variables such as mobilisation and organisation. In 
other words, Tilly’s variables, like structural conditions, can be present in many 
societies. But when culture is not conducive to making use of them it is possible that 
even a failed attempt to mobilise will not emerge.
Goldfrank, on the other hand, criticises Tilly’s theory for assigning too much 
importance to culture. As a structuralist, he aims to deconstruct Tilly’s theory and his 
account of mobilisation. He aims to undermine the bases of Tilly’s theory by arguing 
that his mobilisation analysis “falls back on member discontent and the development of 
new ideologies in accounting for the commitment of large numbers to revolutionary
on
contenders”. As already argued, Tilly takes discontent within society for granted. For 
him, potential revolutionaries are available “in the form of millennial cults, radical cells, 
or rejects from the positions of power. The real question is when such contenders
• fitproliferate and/or mobilize”. However, Goldfrank’s criticism disregards fluidity and 
changes in the level and intensity of discontent, which are affected by structural changes
80 Walter Goldfrank, “Theories of revolution and revolution without theory: the case of Mexico”, Theory and Society,
7, no. 1 (1979), p. 140.
81 Charles Tilly, The Formation o f  National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1975), p. 525.
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and socio-political events and processes, and which can result in different degrees and 
varieties of responses to domestic and international structural changes. These, therefore, 
can affect the outcome (a good example would be the collapse of political consensus 
within the state and international structure).
Skocpol criticises Tilly’s theory along the same lines as Goldfrank, but goes even 
further. For her, it is problematic to use ideology and religion as non-structural themes, 
which could be used as potentially mobilising forces. She argues that theories of 
revolution should avoid using social psychological variables as explanatory factors to 
explain revolution, especially “discontent,” which for her “re-emerge[s] as a central 
explanatory factor—only with the dependent variable no longer violent behavior, but,
89instead, acquiescence in the support of revolutionary elite, coalition, or organisation”. 
For Skocpol, after all, has long argued that revolutions come—they are not made. 
However, her reaction to the Iranian revolution undermines her criticism of Tilly. In 
order to explain it, she argued that “[the Iranian] revolution did not come; it was 
deliberately and coherently made”. Here, she recognises the role of ideas and culture 
in making revolution: “this remarkable revolution also forces me to deepen my 
understanding of the possible role of idea systems and cultural understandings in the 
shaping of political action”.84
Culture: the missing link
By recognizing the role of culture in the Iranian revolution, the “later Skocpol” also
undermined her theoretical standpoint and therefore challenged her own criticism of
Tilly. To some extent she finds herself having to assign even more importance to
culture in revolution than Tilly. While the she seemed to move towards recruiting
culture as an important ingredient in her analysis of revolution,85 it seems she even later
retracted her previous concession to the centrality of culture and agency in 
* 86revolutions. One can thus conclude that she sees the Iranian case as an exception.
Still, Skocpol’s agonising concession and the feeling of being “forced” to deepen her 
understanding of culture illustrates a central dilemma in sociology: the problem of
82 Skocpol, “France, Russia, China”, p. 167.
83 Skocpol, “Rentier state and Shia’a Islam,” p. 267.
84 Ibid., p. 268.
85 Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World, pp. 199-209.
86 Ibid., pp. 335-37.
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explaining, and often dichotomising, the relationship between structure and agency, 
macro and micro, objectivism and subjectivism, and determinism and voluntarism. It 
also exposes how these dichotomies have limited the debate regarding the relationship 
between culture and agency. Marxism, structural functionalist and voluntaristic schools 
of thought all shoulder responsibility for this neglect. After all, unlike what even many 
critics of this dichotomy have taken for granted,87 the determinist perspective, or 
nonintentionalist, as Skocpol likes to be called,88 is not the monopoly of structuralists. It 
is also deeply entrenched in many voluntaristic theories which consider agents to be 
psychological units that produce similar reactions to similar external stimuli, namely 
economic changes (i.e., the theory that material frustration necessarily leads to 
aggression). From a determinist point of view, if a certain collective response to 
economic or socio-political changes is taken for granted, it makes no difference whether 
the response is determined externally by structure or internally by psychological factors. 
Therefore, one could even argue that “voluntarism” does not always provide a non- 
deterministic alternative to “structuralism”; the term is inadequate and misleading.
Structuralist and voluntaristic theories have something else in common which emanates 
from their deterministic approach. This commonality is their shared failure to produce a 
general theory of revolution because of a lack of appropriate attention to cultural 
factors. The effect of this failure, as has been argued already, becomes apparent 
methodologically since all their sampling (cases chosen for analysis) suffers from “the 
fallacy of biased sampling”. This shortcoming is a predictable result of theories, which 
aim at developing universal explanations for revolution at the cost of disregarding 
culture. Here, it seems to be necessarily to give a definition of culture in order to avoid 
any misunderstanding of the concept. For our purpose we can define culture as the 
intelligible, non-material aspects of society, which produce, consume and reproduce 
worldviews, value systems and their subsequent repercussions. Having this definition 
in mind, we can see that while a theorist can develop or identify structural and 
psychological variables which may seem to be universal, this universality by definition 
cannot be extended to the domain of culture. The specificity of cultural location (in 
terms of both space and time) prevents the development of overarching theories. This is
87 See Margaret S. Archer, Culture and Agency: the Place o f Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. xi.
88 If social revolutions are about state building and the construction of a stronger state by revolutionaries is inevitable
(a belief which lies at the heart of Skocpol’s argument), then why should Skocpol, as the author of the theory,
shy away from determinist labelling by calling herself “nonintentionalist”? How can one distinguish between
the two? For more on her attempt to de-determinise her theory see Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern
World, pp. 199-201.
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the Achilles heel of all deterministic theories of revolution, whether structuralist or 
voluntaristic: they are by definition selective in their sampling of cases since the rarity 
of revolution in an increasingly unequal world tells us that mere objective or subjective 
conditions for revolt do not automatically lead to revolution. One might draw an 
analogy with chemistry in this regard, by arguing that the mere presence of oxygen and 
hydrogen do not result in water. These elements must coalesce in a specific way that 
makes it possible for water to form; if they coalesced differently, they might produce 
something different. Furthermore, in most cases the presence of these ingredients and 
the absence of the right conditions do not lead to any form of coalescent anyway.
Thus, culture can enable either a hostile or hospitable environment for specific elements 
in society to coalesce into revolutionary action. In other words, it provides a medium 
between structure and agency with its relative autonomy, which results in revolution or 
its absence. Furthermore, as culture varies globally and as a result of its interaction with 
structural variables (and in regard to the production of revolution), its particular density 
and fluidity regarding the emergence (or non-emergence) of revolution alters even 
within the same culture at different places and in different times. As there is no 
encompassing or universal culture, there can be no universal theory of revolution.
Structural conditions do not function like secondary instincts which blindly motivate 
and mobilise agents. Far from it. Structural variables interact through the relative
O Q
autonomy of culture, which imposes its own input. Culture filters both variables of 
structure and agency, which is why the same factors might produce different results in 
different situations. The production of different results within the same structural 
conditions reaffirms the argument that culture is not a passive entity, which transfers 
structural conditions to the agent, but rather a mediator and interpreter which has 
relative autonomy. Through culture, the agent not only subjectifies the objective 
conditions in which he or she acts (in other words, people make subjective choices 
within particular objective contexts), but also objectifies the subjective interpretation of 
structure (in other words, people give meaning to the contexts that they are located 
within). In other words, through interpretation, culture subjectifies objective structural 
conditions and objectifies subjective interpretations of social reality. This process takes 
place within a set or sets of cultural values. Given that culture is a subjective 
experience, and that the interpretation of new social situations interacts with already
89 Archer, Culture and Agency, p. xi.
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embedded or newly emerging values, the end result of this interpretation is not 
predetermined. It may result variably, for example, in the production and consumption 
of submission, consent, passive resistance or rebellion to existing conditions.
We can see similarities between these types of categorisation and types of individual 
adaptation in functionalist theories. Robert Merton represents this approach best in his 
identification of five ways that individuals adapt their behaviour to attain certain goals 
within a particular society: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion.90 
However, in the functionalist interpretation of these processes, actions take place within 
a conservative context. Certain types of responses are seen as different forms of 
adaptation, but most are seen as forms of deviant behaviour. Furthermore, even the 
more progressive functionalists see rebellion (and even more so revolution) as being 
based on a myth that we should do without.91 Nevertheless, this does not disregard the 
fact that such theory does recognise the relative autonomy of culture and the 
interconnection of value systems and social positions. This approach prevents theorists 
from becoming doggedly anti-functionalism.
In brief, taking culture seriously as an analytical and explanatory tool prevents the 
development of determinist theories of revolution (and social theory in general) and 
prevents biased sampling. Agency encompasses both structure and culture as it is the 
location of them, while maintaining its relative autonomy. However, these two domains 
within agency should not collapse into each other. Their relative autonomy should be 
recognised, and it is only through such recognition it becomes possible to analyse the 
interplay between the two.
A critique of the essentialisation of Islam
Some scholars have argued that Islam and democracy are incompatible entities. There 
are two main reasons for the persistence of this perceived antimony: the anti-religious 
position of both Marxism (primarily in its Stalinist form) and positivism, and Orientalist 
perceptions of “the East” and Islam. The combination of these factors makes it clear 
why the explosion of political Islam into modem politics was for many unwelcome and
90 Robert K. Merton, On Social Structure and Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 138-39.
91 Ibid., p. 150.
92 Archer, Culture and Agency.
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• 93seen as a complication, problem and aggravation to be dispelled with. For them 
“religion is evil, an archaism, a regression at least as far as women are concerned”.94
There have been, however, alternative voices who have challenged the status quo even 
at the time of the Iranian revolution. Among them was Foucault, who recognised the 
rising influence of Islam and warned the west against developing an antagonistic 
relationship with it. “The problem of Islam as a political force”, he wrote, “is one of the 
essential problems for our times and for the years to come. The first condition for 
approaching this problem with the slightest bit of intelligence is not to begin by adding 
hatred”.95 Foucault did not see the introduction of Islam into modem politics simply as 
a problem which the West had to leam to live with, but also recognised its merits. He 
believed that the Iranian revolution had the potential to offer something missing in the 
modem world, something “that we have forgotten, even as a possibility, since the 
Renaissance and the great crises of Christianity: a political spirituality” 96 It was from 
this perspective that he challenged the then-dominant belief regarding religion:
People always quote Marx and the opium of the people. The sentence 
that immediately preceded that statement and which is never quoted says 
that religion is the spirit of a world without spirit. Let’s say, then, that 
Islam, in that year of 1978, was not the opium of the people precisely 
because it was the spirit of a world without a spirit.97
Such dissenting voices, however, were anomalous at the time98 and the interpretation of 
Islam as inherently fundamentalist still has advocates who dominate academic as well 
as broader political and intellectual discourses. However, it is gradually being
93 Foucault noted this trend in his remarks regarding a journalist. “At Tehran she wrote an article that was published
in Paris and, in the last sentence in which she spoke of the Islamic revolt, she found that the adjective ‘fanatic,’ 
which she had certainly not written, had been crudely added. This strikes me as being fairly typical of the 
irritations that the Iranian movement has provoked.” Quoted in Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed.) Michael 
Foucault: Politics. Philosophy, Culture (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 212.
94 Claire Briere and Pierre Blanchet, Iran, la revolution au nom de Dieu, translated into Persian as Enghelab be name
khoda [Iran: Revolution with the Name of God]. Tehran: Kitab-e sahab, 1980 [1358].
95 See Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, translated by Betsy Wing (Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 288.
96 Ibid., p. 285.
97 Kritzman, Michael Foucault, p. 218.
98 Foucault was never forgiven for his daring approach to the Iranian revolution. Apart from his contemporary critics,
we can see this in one o f the latest work’s about the theme, Janet Afary’s and Kevin Anderson’s Foucault and 
The Iranian Revolution: Gender and Seductions oflslamism  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). In 
this book Foucault is severely criticised for his positions on Islam and Iranian revolution. See also the review 
of this book by Sarah Amsler in The British Journal o f  Sociology, 57, no. 3 (2005), pp. 521-23.
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challenged by a growing number of serious scholars, including John L.Esposito, Ervand 
Abrahamian, Haleh Afsahr and Sami Zubaida.
The “antimony”  of science and religion
This perception is not unique to the Iranian revolution; its roots can be traced back as far 
as the Enlightenment and the emergence of an ideological hostility between “religion” 
and “science” in the West. This dichotomous relation between the two ruled out any 
possible co-existence, let alone mutual cooperation between “reason” and “belief’ or the 
“rational” and “irrational”. During the eighteenth century, the balance tilted toward 
science as the grip of the Church over state and society weakened and science emerged 
as an ever-strengthening victor. Religion became equated with backwardness and 
stagnation, while science became equated with progress." It was believed that only 
through science and scientific methods could human development and freedom be 
realised.100
As “scientific reason” gave birth to rational science, the same rationality soon found its 
way from natural science into the newly developed social sciences.101 In the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries the new social science embarked on the mission of moving 
societies to new frontiers of progress and development. One key instrument in this 
process was “modernisation”. In particular, two competing schools of thought,
Marxism and positivism, laid claim to be the bearers of modem science. Each played a 
major part in developing such a perception. Although Marx viewed religion as the heart 
of a heartless word and the sigh of the dispossessed, for him, the main function of 
religion was still to opiate the dispossessed.102 He saw religion as a form of ideology 
which both underlined and disguised class interests.103 For Marx, religion was used to 
deflect the revolutionary attention of the exploited class, and he believed that the truth
99 For an example of the agonising relationship between religion and science, see Luis Wirth’s preface to Karl
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: Introduction to a Sociology o f  Knowledge (Florida: Harcourt Brace and Co., 
[1936] 1985), p. xii. For a recent example of this ongoing struggle, see the response of Richard Dawkins to Jay 
Gould, who tried to solve such a dichotomist relation by arguing that “science” and “religion” have two 
different domains of action which do not overlap; Richard Dawkins, “You can’t have it both ways: 
irreconcilable differences?” Skeptical Inquirer, 23, no. 4 (1999).
100 To see some of the latest work about this, see the work of Nobel Peace Prize winner Amartya Sen, Rationality and
Freedom (MA: Belknap Press, 2002).
101 To understand the roots of this, see “Toward natural science as a model of thought” in Mannheim, Ideology and
Utopia, pp. 290-92.
102 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f  Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right (London: Cambridge University Press,
[1844] 1970).
103 McDonald, Political Philosophy, p. 44.
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of this relation had to be excavated through science. Positivism and scientism, on the 
other hand, especially logical positivism, did not discard religion for its exploitative 
function. They simply dismissed it for not being “science”.104 Therefore, positivists 
shared with Marxism the view that religion was a form of ideology which hampered the 
development of modem societies. The expansion of modernisation theories from 
technology and the economy into social science strengthened the perception that 
religion was an obstacle to progressive social change. In this confrontation religion 
would first be pushed aside, its social role would disappear as it was confined to the 
private sphere of individuals, and it would gradually whither away under the 
unstoppable wheel of scientific reasoning and progress, which would result in the 
development of the modem rational human being.
However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the modernisation project 
encountered serious challenges in many non-western societies, including religion in 
general and Islam in particular. Egypt, Turkey and Iran have to various degrees resisted 
the imposed social engineering, westernisation and assimilation of their societies under 
the slogans of becoming “civilised” and “modernised”. The imperialist policies of 
developed countries had increased suspicion of these projects within Islamic countries. 
Thus, in order to construct these societies on a “scientific” model, the use and expansion 
of state power was legitimised as a means to remove the obstacle of religion. It is 
within this context that we can understand the emergence and political legitimization of 
“modernist despots” in South America, Africa and especially the Middle East. Such 
despots tried to gain legitimacy by becoming vehicles for the modernisation of their 
countries. We can thus see why the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, one of the most 
celebrated modernist despots of the late twentieth century, by an essentially religious 
revolution evoked disdain among advocates of the modernity project. They believed 
that the revolution aimed to turn the clock back.
Orientalist perceptions of Islam
The perception of religion as a backward and anti-developmental force was coupled by 
an Orientalist perception of the “East” in general and Islam in particular. For the West, 
Muslims were mainly “others” that it could define itself against. After the 
Enlightenment, Islam became the antithesis of the West: as much as the West perceived
104 Ibid., p. 47.
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itself as “rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without 
natural suspicion” it saw Islamic people as “none of these things”.105 In 1972, the 
Orientalist historian Bernard Lewis argued in a polemical essay that Islam was “an 
irrational herd or mass phenomenon, ruling Muslims by passions, instincts, and 
unreflecting hatreds”.106 Islam was seen as a belief system which was nothing but a 
“dead empty Theism, a merely negative Unitarian faith”.107 There was also no 
possibility for the development of a new synthesis between Islam and the West since 
“Islam does not develop, and neither do Muslims; they are merely are”.108 In other 
words, the Orient in general was a “kind of ideal and unchanging abstraction” which 
was “eternal, uniform”.109
The essentialisation of Islam and the Orient in general, but particularly in political and 
intellectual spheres, as well as its equation with despotism and its presumed inability to 
support democratic processes, is not confined to the past, such as when it was used by 
leaders such as Lord Balfour to legitimise colonialism during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.110 Its essentialisation has been deeply entrenched belief within the 
dominant discourses about Islam amongst Orientalists and intellectuals, from before the 
Iranian revolution to the present day. It became hegemonic within contemporary 
intellectual and political life to such an extent that Ernest Gellner could argue without 
any hesitation or scientific uncertainty that Islamic belief is incompatible with the 
democratisation of Islamic societies111 and that it is the only one of the four major
119religions to resist secularisation, which is a precondition for the emergence and 
institutionalisation of democracy. More recently, especially since 9/11, Samuel 
Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” hypothesis has proved very influential, not only
105 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 48.
106 Bernard Lewis, “Islamic concepts of revolution” in P. J. Vatikiotis (ed.), Revolution in the Middle East, and Other
Case Studies: Proceedings o f  a Seminar (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), quoted in Said, Orientalism, 
p. 317.
107 Friedrich Schlegel, quoted in Said, Orientalism, p. 99.
108 Vatikiotis, quoted in Said, Orientalism, p. 317.
109 Said, Orientalism, pp. 8 and 301.
110 Ibid., p. 32.
111 This is a major theme running through Gellner’s work on Islam. See Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
112 These four religious worlds are Christianity, the Indian world, the Sinic world and the Islamic world; it is the last
that he argues resists secularisation. Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 5-6. Apart from his studies of a village in the Moroccan Atlas in the 1950s, the rest of 
Gellner’s arguments about Islamic societies are untested propositions, which take many assumptions for 
granted and as matters of fact. For example, his interpretation of the 1979 Iranian revolution is based on a 
shallow understanding of the field. For example, on p. 66 of Muslim Society, he argues that the clergy leaders 
of the revolution tended not to be corrupt. Nevertheless, he makes sweeping generalisations about the 
revolution. However, the mere fact that his works on Islam have been so influential despite their weaknesses 
only suggests the presence of an already existing discourse about Islam which his work complements or seems 
to verify.
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among Right factions of politics and academia, but in other factions too. Similarly, 
his counterpart Francis Fukuyama can comfortably and without any serious challenge 
argue that there is something inherent in Islam, which systematically produces violent 
people.114 Although there is growing resistance to such arguments; as Said once 
pointed out, such “cliches about how Moslems.. .behave are bandied about with a 
nonchalance no one would risk in talking about blacks or Jews”.115
This type of approach has not been confined to Moslems, however, and academics have 
also made sweeping stereotypical statements about “others” which are presented as 
“objective” and “scientific”. However, during the 1960s, revisionist scholars 
specialising in African, East Asian and Third World studies seriously challenged this 
approach. The only discipline that remains unchallenged to the present day is 
Islamology.116 As a result, Moslems never gained the right to represent their own image 
in all its complexity. This remained the monopoly of western scholars. This partly 
explains, with a few exceptions, why the arguments of traditionalist and fundamentalist 
Moslems tend to receive publicity while those that challenge these views have remained 
in the shadows. Norman Daniel’s observation of this phenomenon in 1937 indicates its 
historical continuity. “It was with very great reluctance that what Muslims said 
Muslims believed was accepted as what they did believe. There was a Christian picture 
in which the details (even under the pressure of facts) were abandoned as little as
117possible, and in which the general outline was never abandoned.” This is not to say 
that the field of Islamology was a totally uniform discipline without inner discord.
There were challenges from major scholars such as Louis Massignon, Henry Corbon 
and after the Iranian revolution from Annemarie Schimmel, who were reinforced by 
other intellectuals like Michael Foucault, Eric Rouleau, Samir Amin, Ernest Mandel and 
Immanuel Wallerstein and many others to such an extent that even Fukuyama 
reconsidered his previous position by identifying alternative and democratic
liftinterpretations of Islam. However, these challenges took place against, if not within,
113 Samuel Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996).
1,4 Francis Fukuyama, “The West has won”, The Guardian, 11 October 2001. Fukuyama has, however, recently and 
increasingly distanced himself from this previous position. See Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroad: 
Democracy, Power, and the Neo-conservative Legacy (CT: Yale University Press, 2006).
115 Said, Orientalism, p. 301.
1,6 Ibid.
117 Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: the Making o f  an Image (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 103,
quoted in Said, Orientalism, p. 61.
118 Last year in a speech Fukuyama reconsidered his view of Islam and democracy and argued that any correlation
between the absence of democracy in most Islamic countries and Islam itself was “extremely unlikely”. See
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the domineering historical Orientalist discourse, upon which western identity is also 
partly defined. Hence, to some extent it has failed to “affect the course of an imposing 
research consensus maintained by all sorts of agencies, institutions, and traditions”.119
Against this background, and perceiving Islam as an essentialised set of cultural and 
socio-political despotic rules, it was improbable that scholars would imagine that the 
Iranian revolution, a predominantly religious revolution, had aimed to establish 
democracy within an Islamic discourse. Hence, the establishment of a totalitarian state 
in Iran almost two-and-a-half years after the 1979 revolution was not only not a 
surprise; in fact, it was widely viewed as the inevitable result, if not the goal, of the 
revolution itself.
Islam as a “discourse of power” vs. Islam as a “discourse of freedom”
This research does not define Islam in such essentialist terms. Instead it identifies two 
different discourses of Islam that emerged during the revolution. The concept of 
“discourse” may of course be defined in many different ways, ranging from utterances
19 0and conversations to an “entire social system”. Here, “discourse” is defined as a 
coherent explanation of social reality, the language of which is linked to particular 
theoretical or philosophical assumptions, political objectives and cultural knowledge. 
With this definition in mind, we can distinguish between two different discourses of 
Islam produced during the revolution and explain the role they played in shaping its 
outcome.
Islam as a “discourse of power”, as we shall see, is framed philosophically within an 
Aristotelian paradigm and syllogistic logic which divides genders, social and ethnic 
groups, and nations into hierarchical categories. Hence, it views power and domination 
within society as natural;121 it is hence within this discourse that political and socio­
cultural repression is legitimised. Society is divided into a minority of rulers (in Iran, 
the clergy) and a majority (the public) which has a duty to obey. From an Aristotelian
Francis Fukuyama, “After the ‘end of history’”, Open Democracy, 2 May 2006, available online at: 
http://www.opendemocracv.net/democracv-fukuvama/revisited 3496.isp.
119 Ibid., p. 301.
120 David Howarth, Discourse, (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), p. 2.
121 Rafgi Zaaher, Almantegh-al-soori, altabatol avali (Ghahereh, Egypt: Maktabatol al-nahsat al-mesriah, 1980), pp.
61-62. For a detailed analysis of the historical and theological effect of the Aristotalian paradigm on Islam, see 
Hassan Rezaei, Saabet va moteghayer dar nezaame jazaaeeye Eslami [Stability and Change in die Islamic 
Criminal Justice System] (PhD dissertation, Tarbiat Modarres University, 2002 [1381]), pp. 39-68.
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perspective, it tries to legitimise such a categorisation by arguing that the public as a 
whole is incapable of identifying the “right path” and therefore has to be led by the 
clergy, who, as the guardians of the “Truth,” have a monopoly over the interpretation of 
Islam. Within this discourse, the clergy is provided with the legitimacy and power to 
rule and the public are reduced to incumbent believers who are deprived of the right of 
leadership.
This discourse was most clearly represented by Khomeini’s political practices, as well
as his statements before the 1979 revolution and after June 1981 until his death in 1989,
most notably in one of his most famous statements in which he assigned powers to
Velayat-e faghih (the rule of the Jurist) that even the prophet Mohammad himself did
not have. For Khomeini, “governing is one dimension of the absolute authority of the
Velayat-e faghih and can take precedence over all secondary commandments, even
100prayer, fasting and pilgrimage”. However, an in-depth analysis of Khomeini’s belief 
system reveals a contradiction. During the revolution and in the early months 
immediately thereafter, we observe the presence of a relatively (discursively) 
democratic Khomeini who introduces himself as a believer in human rights and 
democratic values. However, another Khomeini (or another of his discourses) emerged 
after the revolution and dominated the scene from June 1981 until his death. In this 
discourse, he was a despot who ceaselessly redefined and reinterpreted Islam to 
legitimise a totalitarian form of power in which he could veto the demands of an entire 
nation.
The notion of Islam as a “discourse of freedom” challenges this dichotomist approach to
power. This discourse is best represented by Banisadr, one of the main theoreticians of
the country as well as its first elected president. This discourse is based on the rejection
of any relations which lead to power relations. Power in this discourse is not a natural
social phenomenon, but is external to human beings. Furthermore, it does not have an
independent existence; it is a dependent variable and only appears within unequal
relationships. Because power by this definition aims at domination, any division of
10*\power into “good power” and “evil power” is a fallacy. At the centre of the 
discourse of freedom stands the philosophical and theological concept of Tawhid, which
122 Resalat, 7 January 1988 [17 day 1366].
123 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, interview by the author, 22 January 2005.
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is the most important theological and philosophical principle of this discourse.124 It is 
through this principle that “free relations” which are devoid of power form the bases for 
the interaction of the individual with “self,” “society” and “nature”. According to the 
principle of Tawhid, leadership is not the monopoly of the ruling elite, but intrinsic in 
all humans. Therefore, the precondition for the exercise of this capability is the removal 
of all types of censorship in self and society. All forms of censorship (from sexual to 
socio-political and economic to cultural) have to be removed so the free flow of 
information and knowledge can make it possible for the capability of leadership to be 
realised in each individual. Within this discourse, politics does not aim at gaining and 
managing power, but intends to achieve and expand all types of freedoms. “Rights” are 
not merely the result of social contracts but are intrinsic to humans; hence, the only 
function of “duty” is the attempt to exercise these rights. Finally, it is within this 
discourse and by the removal of power as the means and goal of activity that 
competition between individuals, genders and societies is replaced by cooperation and 
mutual development. As a result, power loses the causes of its production, consumption 
and re-production at both individual and societal levels.
Demystifying the Iranian revolution
In addition to the biases of deterministic theory and the essentialisation of Islam,
analyses of the 1979 Iranian revolution have also been hindered by the dominance of
1^/
three factual myths. Understanding them may help explain why modernisation and 
structuralist theorists ignored or did not pay proper attention to important socio-political 
facts about the immediate outcomes of the revolution, the omission of which made it 
possible for them to simply equate the entire revolutionary process with a trend towards 
fundamentalism. The process of demystification becomes necessary as one of the 
functions of myth is to deflect the analysis or even recognition of social facts. That is
124 The classical definition of Tawhid as it is used in Judaism and Christianity is understood as the oneness of God.
The interpretation of Tawhid in Islamic mystic philosophy, however, which is best represented by the 
thirteenth-century mystic Rumi, has been expanded to mean that God is omnipresent within and outside 
humans. This notion is elaborated by Banisadr and forms the focal point of his philosophy. Within this 
system, Tawhid means the unity of humans with God, with other humans and with nature. The context is the 
reflection of human freedom and absence of all types of power relations. See Banisadr, Human Rights in Islam 
(Arab Encyclopedia House, 1987), p. 11. See also email interview with Banisadr, 14 M ay 2004.
125 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, “Human rights and democracy”, transl. by Mahmood Delkhasteh and Sarah Amsler,
Journal o f  Iranian Research and Analysis, 2002, 18, no. 2, pp. 13-16; see also Sarah Amsler and Doris 
Schroeder, “Human rights: a dialogue with Abolhassan Banisadr”, Journal o f Iranian Research and Analysis, 
2003, 19, no. 1, p. 10.
126 The word “myth” in this work is used to imply falsehood. It is not intended for use in another legitimate way, by
treating it as an aspect of ideology, as in the work of some scholars (e.g., Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy).
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because “a myth does not analyze or solve problems. It represents them as already 
analyzed and solved; that is, it presents them as already assembled images, in the way a
177scarecrow is assembled from bric-a-brac and then made to stand for a man.”
Any explanatory theoretical model for the early period of the revolution (1979-81) must 
be able to challenge the general consensus around (1) the equation of the medium-term 
outcome of the revolution with its goals, (2) a belief in Khomeini’s unconditional 
charisma, and leading from this, (3) an assumption that fundamentalist forces enjoyed 
majority support among the Iranian population during the revolution. Debunking these 
myths makes possible a more thorough theoretical analysis of this period and, by 
avoiding presuppositions and post-hoc theorisations, facilitates the introduction of a 
new method of analysis that can attempt to avoid reproducing the shortcomings of 
dominant explanations of the revolution.
The equation of the medium-term outcome of the revolution with its goals
The reduction of the revolution’s goals to its medium-term outcomes becomes possible 
only when the medium-term outcome is equated with its causes, while the goals and 
guiding principles of the revolution do not receive adequate attention. Thus, the process 
of demystification should begin by identifying the goals and guiding principles of 
revolution. Here this is done through a contextual analysis of literature produced by its 
theoreticians before and during the revolution, and of the statements, speeches, 
declarations and interviews of the leadership (primarily Khomeini) during and in the 
early months following it. The analysis also includes consideration of the mottos and 
slogans which were produced, consumed and reproduced in public demonstrations 
during this time.
This study demonstrates that freedom as defined by Khomeini in Paris and Islam as a
1 78discourse of freedom were key goals of the revolution. In other words, not only was 
fundamentalist Islam (Islam as a discourse of power) not a revolutionary goal, but the 
goal of freedom was dominant to such an extent that the revolutionary leadership had to
127 Said, Orientalism, p. 312.
128 In order to avoid becoming entangled in different philosophical definitions of freedom, for the purposes of this
research we will confine the characteristics of freedom to its socio-political dimensions in the freedom of 
thought, expression, media and parties. Using this more refined definition, we can conclude that freedom was 
one of the most important goals of revolution, and that its absence would indicate that “the revolution has 
deviated from its goals” (M. Motahari, Imam va mosahebehaaee pyraamone enghelabe Eslami [Imam and 
Interviews Around the Islamic Revolution] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Sadra, 1980 [1359]), p. 67.
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identify with it in order to sustain popular support. This does not disregard the ulterior 
and opportunistic motives of some of the leaders of the revolution, especially 
Khomeini.129 However, the production and consumption of these goals during the 
revolution and the fact that the future totalitarian leaders had to identify with them in 
order to maintain their political position verifies that freedom within an Islamic 
discourse was the principle goal of the revolution. Neglecting this fact has led 
researchers to argue that the rise of totalitarian forces after the revolution was
• • 130unsurprising.
The myth of Ayatollah KhomeinVs charismatic authority
In his typology of legitimate authority, Max Weber identified three forms of authority: 
“rational,” “traditional” and “charismatic”.131 Ayatollah Khomeini’s authority has often 
been characterised as charismatic. It is often assumed, for example, that his charisma 
was independent of his changing political position, and therefore also assumed that his 
supporters’ devotion was unconditional and timeless. This is based on the view that his 
supporters were a homogenous entity that had “absolute trust in the leader”132 and that 
would have followed him irrespective of his actions. Weber viewed the kind of 
charisma which has been ascribed to Khomeini as a form of “pure charisma”, that of a
1 ' X ' Xperson on a “mission” or who has a “spiritual duty” and someone who could demand 
and receive unconditional trust.
However, a study of Khomeini’s popularity during this era reveals that he did not 
possess this type of charisma. If “it is the recognition on the part of those subject to 
authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma”,134 Khomeini’s recognition was 
neither unconditional nor permanent. It is true that a hard core of his supporters’ 
devotion towards him remained un-rattled, since they were loyal regardless of the 
fluidity of his political stand. However, as many indicators demonstrate, for the 
majority of the public Khomeini’s popularity was directly correlated with his position
129 According to Banisadr, when Khomeini was criticised for violating the commitments he made in Paris with regard
to implementing democratic Islam, his response was, “it was expedient to say those things at the time”. A. H. 
Banisadr, interview with the author, 21 January 2005.
130 Milani, The Making o f  Iran’s Islamic Revolution, p. 324; Milani, “The ascendance of Shi’i fundamentalism”.
131 Max Weber, The Theory o f  Social and Economic Organisation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.
328.
132 Ibid., p. 358.
133 Ibid., p. 362.
134 Ibid., p. 359.
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on the guiding principles of the revolution which he had initially identified with. Three 
indicators are most revealing of this phenomenon.
First, the eighteen monthly surveys conducted after Banisadr was elected president in 
1980 indicated that Banisadr enjoyed increasing popularity, and that it actually 
exceeded Khomeini’s in the last three months of his presidency.135 However, 
Khomeini’s popularity weakened as the lines of battle were gradually drawn between 
Banisadr and the IRP and Khomeini’s apparent neutrality was exposed by his gradual 
and open support of IRP leaders and their political activities. By June 1981, when 
Khomeini openly stood against Banisadr, the balance had therefore tipped. The last 
survey, taken in June 1981, showed that 76% of respondents were satisfied with 
Banisadr and 49% with Khomeini. The gap was much wider among the young 
generation: nearly 80% supported Banisadr, while 30-35% favoured Khomeini.136
Second, as the continuing struggle between Banisadr and the IRP reached its apex, 
Khomeini’s open support for the IRP had a counterproductive effect. Instead of 
silencing Banisadr it made him even more defiant. As a result, in June 1981, Banisadr 
referred to Article 59 of the Iranian constitution and asked Khomeini to consent to a 
referendum on whether the people endorsed Banisadr’s vision of the future regime or
1 77the IRP’s. Khomeini, who during the revolution had proclaimed that the “criterion in
1 1QIslam is the people’s vote,” twice made famous public statements that “if thirty-five 
million people [referring to the population of Iran at the time] say yes, I would say
1 70no”. Khomeini’s uncom promising opposition to the referendum and his readiness to 
position himself against the will of the majority of Iranians suggest that he did not 
believe his party would win such a referendum.
135 The Markaz-e Sanjesh-e Afkaar (Centre for Conducting Public Opinion Surveys) was established by Banisadr in
1979; Ahmad Salamatian was its director until he was elected as an MP in 1981.
136 See the data from Markaz-e Sanjesh-e Afkaar, which can be found in A. H. Banisadr, My Turn to Speak
(Washington: Brassey's, 1991), p. 155. See also Eric Rouleau in Le Monde, 10 June 1980.
137 Article 59 reads, “in extremely important economic, political, social and cultural matters, the functions of the
legislature may be exercised through direct recourse to popular vote through a referendum. Any request for 
such direct recourse to public opinion must be approved by two-thirds of the members of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly”.
138 Even Ayatollah Khamenei, the present Iranian leader, referred to Khomeini’s statement whenever a high turnout
was needed. “The Leader then stressed a great popular turnout in the June 17th elections. The late Imam 
always underlined that the People’s vote is the criterion.” Accessed online at 
http://www.irib.ir/worldservice/englishRADIO/IRAN/iran-week.htm (accessed November 2006).
139 Ayatollah Khomeini, speech made on 26.May.1981. See Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 14
(Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e Eslami, 1378/1999), p.377. Also see Khomeini’s speech of 
25.June.1981, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 15 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e 
Eslami, 1378/1999), pp 20-21.
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Third, in the first parliamentary election in June 1980, public dissatisfaction with IRP 
policies and with candidates put forward by the IRP and its satellite organisations 
became alarming. In order to increase voter turnout, Khomeini intervened and asked 
people to participate in the election. Despite this and despite massive vote rigging, the 
number of voters dropped from 20 million in the referendum on the Islamic Republic 
(March 1979) and from 14 million in the presidential election (February 1980) to just 
6.1 million.140 In other words, the parliament ultimately represented around 14% of the 
voting public.
Based on these three indicators, it is possible to argue that Khomeini’s charisma was 
conditional rather than stable. This is apart from his enduring status among a core 
group of supporters, which comprised a small but organised and violent minority 
section of the population, and which were called Hezbollahis, or Party of God. His 
general popularity remained dependent on his loyalty to the goals and guiding principles 
of the revolution as understood by the population. The more he distanced himself from 
these, the more the reach of his charisma shrunk.
The myth ofpopular support for Islamic fundamentalism
Although the fundamentalist141 faction of the revolution eventually dominated the 
Iranian state and society, it does not follow that it had majority support during the 
revolution—in fact, far from it. Fundamentalists were always a minority within the 
population; the majority of Iranians continuously demonstrated their support for a 
democratic interpretation of Islam and its political representatives.142 This was best 
illustrated in the first presidential election. Hassan Habibi, the presidential candidate of 
the IRP and its satellite groups, received just over 474,000 votes (just under 4%), while 
Banisadr received nearly eleven million votes (over 76%) despite boycotts and fierce
140 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign o f Ayatollahs (London: I. B. Tauris and Co., 1985), p. 149.
141 In this work the concept offundamentalism is not used in accordance with the origins of the word but to its
contemporary political-religious usage. Hence it does not have merely a theological meaning. Consequently, 
the use of the term fundamentalism' here should be understood not only to mean the literal and rigid 
understanding of religious texts, but also to the political attempt to enforce this reading upon society and to 
recruit violence to do so, ideally through the use of state power. In such situation, the term fundamentalism 
comes close to totalitarianism since it shares three main characteristics, which might be seen as common 
denominators of totalitarian ideologies, whether secular or religious: rigid interpretation of text, appeals to the 
uniformity of the society, and the use of violence to implement such uniformity.
142 It should be mentioned that the first presidential election was by far the most democratic election, unlike
subsequent elections in which candidates were screened.
52
opposition from the IRP.143 Hence, in order to explain the rise of fundamentalists and 
their domination over state and society, one should look beyond “popularity” and 
majority support.
Constructing a non-deterministic theory of revolution
Having deconstructed these myths about the causes and consequences of the 1979 
Iranian revolution and exposed biases in theories about revolution and the relationship 
between Islam and democracy, it is possible to develop a non-deterministic theory of 
the revolutionary process. This demands a combination of theoretical and empirical 
variables, which are examined through a critical analysis of the relationship between 
structure and agency. “Culture” is the key explanatory factor in this theory; it is a 
mediating factor, constrained and enabled by both its internal dynamism and its 
interaction with structural variables. Other variables include the role and limits of 
charismatic leadership and its importance as a factor for catalyst events, the effect of 
political events and their intended and unintended consequences, and the comparative 
study of the leadership within the two political fronts in relation to their use of resources 
and opportunities available to them. The dynamic relationship between these variables 
will lead to the development of a theory, which can not only explain the medium-term 
outcome of the struggle, but also allow us to understand this outcome as contingent and 
open-ended and therefore not pre-determined.
In brief, recruiting these variables in the construction of a localised theory enables us to 
consider revolutions as social phenomena and processes, not pre-determined but open- 
ended. Michel Foucault, who reported on the revolution from Tehran for the Italian 
newspaper Corriere della Sera, showed a fair understanding of this approach when he 
wrote, “I do not know how to write the history of the future. I am a maladroit forecaster 
of the past. I would, however, like to grasp things as they are happening, because these 
days, nothing is finished, and the dice are still rolling.”144 Perhaps this was the reason, 
along with his belief in the open-endedness of social action, that despite the complete 
monopoly of totalitarian forces by June 1981, and despite having encountered a 
blistering attack for his support of the Iranian revolution by fellow intellectuals,
Foucault not only did not change his initial position, but believed until his death that the
143 Mohammad Javad Muzzafar and Avalin Reis Jomhoor, The First President (Tehran: Enteshaaraate Kavir, 2000
[1378]), p. 16.
144 Eribon, Michel Foucault, p. 288.
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Iranian revolution would eventually remove “this last obstacle for establishing 
democracy in Iran”.145 Thus, the remainder of this thesis aims at challenging the certain 
inevitable presumptions regarding the revolution by demonstrating the open-endedness 
of the revolutionary outcome during this era.
145 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
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2The Iranian Revolution in historical context
Structural roots of dependent development in Iran
In all revolutions, the state becomes the main cause of its own collapse. The Pahlavi 
state was no exception, and the Iranian state in various ways provided the necessary 
conditions for its own downfall during the 1979 revolution. This, however, went 
largely unnoticed at the time. The deceptive stability of the Shah’s regime, which 
Henry Kissinger saw as a “pillar of stability in a turbulent and vital region”,146 was so 
misleading that just one week before serious demonstrations in which many were killed, 
Jimmy Carter toasted Mohammad Reza Shah, saying, “Iran, under the great leadership 
of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This 
is a great tribute to you, your Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect, 
admiration and love which your people give you”.147 Even after “Black Friday” (the 
most violent massacre of the revolution in which hundreds of people were killed and 
injured) Carter made a publicised call of support to the Shah.148 The Shah had 
enormous wealth, (as he himself said) the fifth strongest army in the world, and a 
fearsome secret service under his command. In theory, he should have been able to ride 
out the wave of urban social unrest, just as other weaker third-world leaders had 
done.149
However, despite this fa9ade, the regime suffered from chronic internal socio- 
economical and cultural problems. The roots of these weaknesses, which became 
preconditions for the revolution, should be sought in the changes experienced by Iranian 
society between the 1940s and 1970s. These are best characterised as dependent 
development, in which the chief actors were the various classes, the rentier state, and 
external powers led by the United States. In order to understand the 1979 revolution, a 
brief analysis of the structural roots of dependent development in Iran.
146 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979).
147 Quoted in James Bill, The Eagle and The Lion (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 1989), p. 171.
148 John Foran, A Century o f  Revolution: Social Movements in Iran (London: UCL Press, 1994), p. 171.
149 Theda Skocpol, “Rentier state and Shia’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution”, Theory and Society, 11, no. 3 (1982),
p. 268. It should also be noticed that SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, was mainly trained to counter 
underground guerrilla organisations. However, like other intelligence organisations at the time, it was 
unprepared to deal with unpredicted spontaneous public uprisings and hence proved ineffective.
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Constitutional Revolution and the emergence of the Pahlavi regime
In the century prior to the 1979 revolution, there were a number of significant political 
movements which aimed at reducing or eliminating the power of the Iranian monarchs. 
These were motivated in particular by a desire to prevent the monarchs from selling the 
country’s resources to foreign (particularly western) companies. These events began 
with the Tobacco Protest of 1891, which was soon followed by a revolution and civil 
war.150 These events provoked people from across classes and political beliefs into 
revolutionary struggle, and the outcomes of these early conflicts framed the strategic 
options available during subsequent movements, including the 1979 revolution.
At the turn of the century, Iran experienced a revolution and a civil war, which lasted 
from 1905-11. The “Constitutional Revolution”, as it was called, aimed at and 
temporarily succeeded in abolishing the traditional monarchical political system under 
which kings ruled arbitrarily and without constitutional restrictions. This first 
experience of democracy in Iran came to an end in 1911 with Russian military 
intervention, the execution of regional revolutionary leaders, the threat of further action 
and most importantly by a British-backed coup, conducted in 1921 by Reza Khan, the 
Iranian king who later founded the Pahlavi dynasty. Three years after Russian 
intervention the new parliament, although weakened, was able to re-establish itself and 
reject Britain’s attempt to put Iran under its mandate. Hence, Reza Khan hammered in 
the last nail on the coffin of political democracy; three years later he inaugurated a new 
dynasty and became known as “Reza Shah”.151
After the coup, the few remaining political parties which could be traced back to the 
Constitutional Revolution (e.g., Reformists, Tajaddudists [Modernists], Socialists and 
Independents), could not reach a consensus to carry out their socio-economic 
programmes. These parties can be more generally classified into two camps: 
“authoritarian” and “democratic”. Those in the first category, the Tajaddud and 
Socialist parties, opposed provincial autonomy and favoured strong central government. 
These objectives coincided well with Reza Khan’s own agenda and the parties were
150 In 1891, Naser-al-Din Shah granted a tobacco concession to a British company in which the company received
exclusive rights to buy, sell and export Iran’s tobacco (one of Iran’s major crops). This led to a national 
boycott on tobacco which eventually forced the king to annul the agreement. For detailed information see 
Nikki Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran; The tobacco protest o f 1891-1892 (London: Cass, 1966).
151 Foran, A Century o f Revolution. See also Michael Zirinsky, “The rise of Reza Khan” in Social Movements in
Iran: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives, ed. by John Foran (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 
1994), p. 54.
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willing to work under military leadership. They believed they could use his military
1 Ostrength to further their objectives and carry out their own programmes, such as 
creating a strong national army and efficient professional bureaucracy, sedentarising 
tribes, expanding westem-style state-supported schools (including girls’ schools), 
encouraging Iranian capital development, and separating religion from politics. Reza 
Shah, who sought legitimacy via economic development and modernisation 
programmes, also gained enough legitimacy from these plans to eliminate rival political 
leaders. Although the agricultural sector was largely ignored, he succeeded in building 
some basic infrastructure for industrialisation.
The social structure of the country remained largely unchanged from 1926 until 1941, 
when the Allies forced Reza Shah to abdicate his throne for having pro-German 
tendencies during World War II. In the mid 1930s, large landlords owned half of the 
land, while 95-98% of the agrarian population owned no land at all.153 In fact, the state 
itself became an important wealth holder, benefiting the royal family and the upper 
classes. By 1941, Reza Shah, who was from a family of small landlords, had become 
the largest landowner in the country. By 1940 he owned “at least 3 million acres”154 in 
the north of Iran alone, and overall his personal estates were estimated to encompass 
more than 2,000 villages or parts thereof.155 While the balance of his account in the 
National Bank totalled 100,000 tomans in 1930, by 1940 it had risen 680 times to 68 
million.
In the political and cultural spheres, Reza Shah gradually initiated policies of de- 
Islamicisation and forced westernisation through an authoritarian style of rule, 
following the path of Kamal Ataturk, the founder of modem Turkey. Islam was re­
imagined as an alien religion historically imposed on Persians by Arabs and identified 
as the source of Iran’s backwardness. Attempts were made to rewrite Iranian history 
and dichotomise Iranian culture: the pre-Islamic era was glorified, while the Islamic era 
was demonised. In the cultural domain, Persian dimensions of the culture were 
nourished and encouraged while Islamic and ethnic dimensions were overlooked. The 
state aimed to produce a modem image of Iran, irrespective of economic and social cost.
152 Lancelot Oliphant to P. Loraine, 6 March 1923, Loraine Papers, Correspondence with Lancelot Oliphant, Foreign
Office Records, FO 1011.
153 George Lenezowski, ed. Iran Under the Pahlavis (CA: University of Stanford Press, 1978).
154 Donald Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction o f Iran (New York: Exposition Press,
1975), p. 245.
155 Mansoor Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993).
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More specifically, it aimed to give the impression of development rather than facilitate 
any actual development. This was exemplified in the “uniform dress law” for men and 
women, which was passed into law by parliament in 1935 and instituted compulsory 
western dress for men.156 While urban women were also forced, through violent means, 
to abandon their traditional veiling in favour of western clothing, no real changes were 
made regarding the status of women in Iranian society. Their positions in regard to 
gender relations, family, marriage, and work remained unchanged.
One exception was the introduction of women’s education in secular schools. The 
secularisation of education and replacement of schools (madresseh) with religious 
schools (imaktabkhaneh) resulted in reduction of clergy control over education (although 
religious centres for religious education remained under their control). However, the 
expansion of modem education was limited and confined to urban areas, particularly 
Tehran. The Shah intentionally decided to prevent the education of well over 80% of 
the rural population. As the largest landlord in Iran, he had a shared interest with other 
landlords in maintaining the status quo and preventing the education of the peasants.
1 <7For this reason, there was not a single school in the royal states.
During this period, any opposition to the regime was ruthlessly suppressed and many 
political leaders were executed, imprisoned, or banished. Moreover, Reza Shah 
determined the outcome of Majles (parliament) elections by putting forward his own list 
of candidates. The 180,000-man-strong army, which consumed a third of the state’s 
budget159 and was created on a western model, proved to be highly effective in 
suppressing internal opponents yet totally ineffective when Iran was invaded by Allied 
forces in 1941. By that time the Shah had begun to show great interest in the European 
fascist states, most notably Nazi Germany, which had become a major trading 
partner.160 He was accused of harbouring pro-German sympathies and deposed in 
August 1941 by Allied leaders, who appointed his eldest son, Mohammad Reza Shah, 
as his successor. However, the main reason for the invasion of Iran could be seen in 
Britain’s total dependence upon Persian oil, coupled with the need to create a supply 
route to the Soviet Union against the Germans.
156 Houchang Chehabi, “Staging the emperor’s new clothes: dress codes and nation building under Reza Shah”,
Iranian Studies, 26 (Fall 1993), pp. 209-33.
157 M. Reza Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 104.
158 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 137-38.
159 Ghods, Iran, p. 103.
160 Ibid., pp. 106-07.
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Reza Shah’s departure and the new monarch’s inexperience and weakness provided 
space for classes and political parties to mobilise and organise for the first time since 
Reza Shah’s coronation in 1925.161 The Majles was strong and the new Shah was 
unable to impose authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, state policies still served the interests 
of the landed upper classes, industrialists and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.162 Although 
labour unions were permitted, leftist groups which had been extremely influential in the 
formation of the unions were suppressed before the end of the decade. As pressure 
increased for multinational companies to enter the Iranian market, the government 
weakened protection of domestic industries. Cheap western goods flooded the Iranian 
market between 1947 and 1952, causing bankruptcies among artisans and bazaar 
shopkeepers.
The oil nationalisation movement and emergence of the National Front
This period also saw the emergence, rise and eventual collapse of the “National Front” 
(NF) movement as a democratic, nationalistic response to British control of Iran’s oil 
industry. The NF emerged from the protests made by various groups against the Iranian 
government’s lack of interest in protecting the national interest relating to oil. In 1908, 
William Knox d’Arcy, a British subject, discovered oil in southern Iran. This oil was 
therefore subject to British influence. The agreement on usage made with the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) allocated a very small proportion of the possible oil 
revenues to Iran and Iran had little input in setting the terms of the oil concession that 
remained in effect until 1961.164
In 1933, however, Reza Shah repealed this agreement and signed one that was 
seemingly more beneficial to Iran. The new treaty, however, was even more 
detrimental to Iran’s interest. On paper, Iran received a greater share of oil revenues, 
but it did not have the right to investigate the company’s accounts. It was therefore left 
at the mercy of the company to decide the amount the Iranian government would
161 Abrahimian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 214.
162 Nikki Keddie, Roots o f Revolution: An Interpretive History o f  Modern Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1981), p. 114.
163 According to the agreement, Iran would receive £20,000 in cash, £20,000 in shares, and 16% of the profit.
However, the Iranian government never received the 16% and the AIOC always tried to reduce the amount 
payable to Iran. See Jaami Research, Gozashteh cheraagh-e raah-e ayandey [The Past Lightens the Path to the 
Future] (Tehran, Ghoghnoos Publishing Co., 1998 [1377]), pp. 31-46.
164 L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil (Westport: Hyperion, 1976), pp. 15, 26-35.
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receive. Iran also had no voice in the management of the company and only the AIOC 
had the right to annul the treaty at any given time. Finally, and most importantly, the 
new contract extended the original deadline for terminating the agreement in 1993.165 
This created extreme resentment among nationalists, who argued that this verified their 
belief that Reza Shah was a British agent.166 Although this resentment was not 
expressed during Reza Shah’s dictatorial reign due to his repressive state control, one 
unintended consequence of Iran’s occupation by Allied forces and the Shah’s 
subsequent abdication was that political spaces emerged where, with the help of a free 
press, such anger and grievances could be expressed, exposed and communicated with 
people.
The nationalists’ frustration over the oil issue led to demands for a revision of the 1933 
concession. The AIOC’s response was to propose minor changes, which infuriated 
nationalists, and became a subject of heated parliamentary debates in the final months of 
the Fifteenth Majles. The economic basis for the argument was that from 1914-50, 
Britain exported 324 millions tonnes of Iranian oil, paying only $420 million in 
royalties to Iran, a mere 8% of the company’s net profit of $5 billion.167 In order to 
deprive the agreement’s opponents of their platform, the Sixteenth Majles’ election was 
rigged. In October 1949, Mussadiq and nineteen other influential individuals took 
sanctuary for four days in the Shah’s palace in protest, demanding an investigation into 
the claim of vote rigging. Though the protest failed to achieve this goal, the protesters 
founded the National Front during these days.168
The initial statutes of the NF were the basic freedom of thought and action, free 
elections and the establishment of a strong, nationalist and centralised government.169 
Initially, divergent political groups supported the nationalisation of oil to varying 
degrees and during the next two years, larger groups of parties representing various 
classes joined the NF, counting on the support of different factions of middle and lower 
classes. The NF was a loose umbrella organisation, which at its height united different 
political parties from nationalists to Islamists and some leftist organisations around the 
single issue of the nationalisation of oil.
165 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy o f Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 1500-1941
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966), p. 274.
166 Ghods, Iran, p. 117.
167 Suroush Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran (Bath: Pitman Press, 1983), p. 70.
168 Karim Sanjabi, Umidha va na-umidiiha [Hopes and Disappointments] (London: Nashr-i Kitab, 1989), p. 97.
169 Bakhtar-e emrooz [Today’s West], no. 273, 7 July 1950.
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The movement very soon developed into an expression of a genuine popular desire to 
establish Iran as an independent nation-state. It therefore attracted massive support 
from large sections of the urban population, spanning classes and diverse ideological 
beliefs. The movement was middle class in its modem and traditional forms, uniting 
with the lower class against foreign influence and domestic oligarchy. As such, it 
elaborated revolutionary programmes that aimed at the destruction of all aspects of the
I  »7A
oligarchic-imperial alliance through the elimination of the AIOC. The movement 
was led predominantly by democratic intellectuals who united around a single leader, 
Mohammad Mussadiq, a committed democrat and charismatic politician. The 
ideological basis of the NF was Mussadiq’s doctrine of “negative equilibrium”, a theory 
that the country’s independence could be regained by preventing outside powers from
171interfering in its economic and political affairs.
Despite this common theme, the NF still failed to become an integrated or dynamic 
party or to overcome internal weaknesses and personal rivalries. NF leaders who 
cooperated in the early days of the movement had divergent ideologies and visions for 
the future of Iranian society. In the absence of a strong political structure, the clash of 
interests and personalities heightened such political differences. According to Karim 
Sanjabi, Mussadiq’s education’s minister, “the greatest flaw of the National Front was 
the lack of a coherent ideology and organisational structure”.172 Party differences and 
the absence of a coherent party structure provided conditions within which the 
leadership could not determine the NF’s policy or ensure the support of all its 
constituent parties.
Nevertheless, the NF’s ultimate defeat must be understood with reference to the 
relationship between domestic and international factors. At this time, the Shah was 
desperate to wrench power from Mussadiq. Soon after the nationalisation of oil, he 
therefore approached the US government, suggesting that the only way of stopping
1 71Mussadiq was to overthrow him. His later reluctance to cooperate in the coup,
170 Richard Cottam, Nationalisation in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), p. 268.
171 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005. This should be understood in the Cold War context, as well as in view of
Soviet internal politics. The belief underlying Cold War politics was that no country—especially Third World 
countries—could be independent; all needed the support of one of the world’s two superpowers in order to be 
able to stand against the other.
172 Ghods, Iran, p. 179.
173 On 26 December 1951, he told Henderson, the American ambassador, “since there is no efficient organisation to
oppose Mussadiq he does not know any other way for change but a coup d’6tat”. See Ahmad Ali Rejaei and
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therefore, cannot be seen as a sign of his desire to work with Mussadiq, but rather of a 
characteristic weakness. This was regarded as one of his “long-standing personality 
traits”174 and also influenced his behaviour during the 1960s crisis and the 1979 
revolution. Eventually, as a result of concerted efforts of both Britain and the US, 
Mussadiq’s administration was toppled by a bloody coup in August 1953. It arguably 
would not have succeeded if the NF movement had been more internally united. It is 
therefore important to understand the origins of the internal fragmentation which 
provided the conditions for Mussadiq’s overthrow.
Preconditions of the August 1953 coup against Mussadiq
The NF retained some initial cohesion until immediately after oil was nationalised, 
mainly due to Mussadiq’s charismatic leadership. However, it was soon weakened by 
the departure of certain parties and other influential leaders like Baga’i, the leader of the 
Toilers Party and Ayatollah Kashani, an influential clergyman, head of the Majles and 
for some time the spiritual leader of the Fedaeen-e Islam. Many parties were in fact 
personal vehicles for ambitious leaders who were temporarily brought together in the 
nationalisation of oil. As the front was contradictory, including groups adopting liberal 
and illiberal ideologies and both socialist and capitalist organisations, any attempt at 
maintaining solidarity was a Herculean task.
The clash between Baga’i and Kashani, both ambitious leaders, with Mussadiq simply 
intensified these internal divisions. Though they believed themselves to be as popular 
as Mussadiq, their popularity waned when they split from him. As a result, Baga’i not 
only left the front but sided with the monarchy and may have played a role in the 
assassination of Afshar Tous, the head of Mussadiq’s police force.175 He, along with 
Kashani (who had received support from Ayatollah Behbahani, another influential 
clergyman) and Hussein Maki developed a clandestine relationship with the court, the 
United Kingdom and America. This collaboration proved so instrumental that the
Mahin Sarvari, Panj dahe bad az koodeta [Five Decades after the Coup d’6tat] (Tehran: Rasa Publication, 
1383/2005), first volume, document 138, p. 485. Also see details about the declassification of CIA documents 
related to the coup on the National Security Archive website, accessed online at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28.
174 Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution, p. 107.
175 Shanehchi, Ahzabe siasi-ye Iran, p. 182.
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British government not only opposed the US’s decision to work with Mussadiq, but also
1 7 ( \convinced them to support British attempts to overthrow Mussadiq’s government.
Thus, the collaboration between Baga’i and Kashani’s made the coup d’etat a real 
possibility.
The coup d’etat of August 1953
As has already been argued, the success of the coup against Mussadiq was occasioned 
by a dynamic interrelation between internal and external factors. The British grew 
increasingly hostile as the success of oil nationalisation would be economically and 
politically damaging for British prestige in the Middle East. They initially 
contemplated an invasion of Abadan (then the world’s largest oil refinery), but were 
forced to call it off when US president Harry Truman withheld American support.177 
They confined themselves instead to a full naval blockade and international boycott to 
prevent Iran from exporting oil on its own. In the meantime, they also tried to persuade 
the US to collaborate in overthrowing Mussadiq. This eventually succeeded as unlike 
his predecessor Harry Truman, who saw Mussadiq as “the most effective barrier to a 
communist takeover in Iran”, the newly-elected US president Dwight Eisenhower saw 
him as “a liability” that had to be removed.178
Mussadiq was overthrown by a coup on 19August 1953, in which the US Central
1 7QIntelligence Agency (CIA) played a leading role in both planning and financing. The
British contributed the oil boycott and economic blockade and introduced Iranian 
collaborators to the CIA. Apart from Kashani, Bagha’i and Maki, collaborators also 
included “Majles members, royal court officials, newsmen, bank officials, both active
i soand retired military officers, some bazaaris and some of the clerics”. Due to the 
amount of American money employed to mobilise the royalists and the speed with
176 Rejaei and Sarvari, Panj dahe bad az koodeta, pp. 666-69.
177 Foran, Fragile Resistance, p. 295.
178 National Security Council, NSC 136/1, “United States Policy regarding the present situation in Iran”, Top Secret
Report, November 20, 1952. Located in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record 
Group 59, “Records relating to State Department Participation in the Operations Coordinating Board and the 
National Security Council, 1947-1963”, Lot 63D351, National Security Council, Box 68, Folder “NSC 136: 
U.S. and Policy regarding the Present Situation in Iran”.
179 James Risen, “The secret CIA history of the Iran coup, 1953”, New York Times, 16 April and 18 June 2000.
180 Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, pp. 124-25 and 140-41; Ahmad Ashraf, Mavani-e tarikhi-ye rush-e sarmayeh dar Iran
[Historical Obstacles for the Growth of Capital in Iran] (Tehran: Zamineh, 1980), p. 117, fn. 2; and Kermit 
Roosevelt, Countercoup: the Struggle for the Control o f Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). More 
importantly, in 2000 the CIA released documents relating to its role in the coup. Furthermore, Clinton and his 
foreign minister Madeleine Albright apologised for the US government’s role in terminating the democratic 
process in Iran by overthrowing Mussadiq.
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which it was deployed, there was insufficient time to exchange it into Iranian currency. 
The value of the dollar fell.181 The royalists’ crowd, paid for by the CIA via the clergy 
(primarily Ayatollahs Kashani and Behbahani), brought together lutis and urban 
marginals and peasants who were trucked in from the countryside by landlords. Many 
were killed when they attacked Mussadiq’s house with the support of the army in 
August 1953. Mussadiq was arrested, imprisoned, and then banished under house arrest 
to his village, where he died in 1967. Many other leaders and supporters were 
subsequently arrested, imprisoned and executed.
This coup was “the first peacetime use of covert action by the United States to
1 89overthrow a foreign government”, and it set a precedent for subsequent coups 
conducted by the CIA against governments not in line with US foreign policy. Of the 
groups supporting it, the most enthusiastic (apart from the monarchists) were religious 
groups—primarily the small but brutal Fedaeen-e Islam who, the day after the coup, 
stated,
yesterday Tehran was shivering under the manly boots of the army and 
anti-foreigner Moslems. Mussadiq, this old bloodthirsty man, was 
forced to resign.... Soldiers of the holy jihad, the nation is thirsty for 
blood, the fire of our Moslem nation will not be satisfied but by shedding 
the blood of these criminals, traitors and spies.. .if the revolutionary 
government of General Zahedi shows mercy to these people, then it has 
committed a most heinous crime against the nation, people and religion.
The bullet and only the bullet is the prize for these traitors.
Ayatollah Kashani also accused Mussadiq of being a traitor who should be executed.184 
It was thus that Iran’s second experience of democracy ended in bloodshed. This 
movement, like that of the 1905-11 revolution, was the result of a multi-class, popular
181 New York Times, 20 and 24 August 1953; Ervand Abrahimian, “The crowd in Iranian politics” in In Modern Iran:
The Dialectics o f Continuity and Change, ed. by M. Bonnine and N. Keddie (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1978), pp. 274 and 285; Gladys Harkness, “The mysterious doings of the CIA, Part II” in the 
Saturday Evening Post, 6 November 1954.
182 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 coup d’etat in Iran”, International Journal o f  Middle East Studies, 19 (August
1987); see also Risen.
183 Nabarde Melat newspaper, 20 August 1953 [29 Mordad 1332].
184 Mohammad Dehnavi, Writings, Speeches and Messages o f  Ayatollah Kashani (Iran: Chapakhsh, 1983 [1362], pp.
32-36.
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and urban alliance responding to a situation of dependency. Both the Constitutional 
Revolution and the nationalisation of oil movement led by Mussadiq generated intense 
social movements which simultaneously targeted both state and foreign powers. 
However, these two revolutions differed from each other in one aspect. The 
Constitutional Revolution's main targets were the state and institutional reform (i.e., 
curtailing and confining the absolute power of the king). The nationalisation of oil 
movement, however, focused on pioneering the effort of a small state to break away 
from dependency on a western power. Though both revolutions had initial phases of 
success; both were defeated as a result of internal fragmentation followed by foreign 
intervention.
Political, social and economic changes in Iran from 1953-63
After the coup, political activities grew moribund under increased repression and the 
country was condemned to another cycle of dependent development under an 
authoritarian regime. The new regime ruthlessly suppressed socio-political forces for 
more than twenty-five years; a long political silence only briefly interrupted by a failed 
social movement which began in 1960 and culminated in June 1963. This brief window 
emerged through the combination of certain economic and political factors.
From 1958-60, economic problems developed as a result of a budget deficit, a bad 
harvest, foreign borrowing and rising inflation. The last factor forced the country into a 
deep recession and an International Monetary Fund stabilisation programme was 
implemented. The recession hit domestic trade and bazaars particularly hard and 
increased unemployment. Workers in industrial cities reacted with sudden and 
widespread strikes, and widening dissatisfaction with the state created an opportunity 
for the political opposition. This opportunity found an outlet in the Majles elections, 
and though the parliamentary elections were rigged, the reactivated political forces 
challenged the fraudulent election and the Shah was forced to cancel and annul the 
election.
An external factor also reinforced these changes: the shift in US strategy toward socio­
economic and therefore political problems of third-world countries like Iran. The 
election of John F. Kennedy in 1961 signalled a drastic change in US foreign policy, 
mainly its strategy against communism. Whereas Kennedy’s predecessors had resorted
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to coercion and suppression in an attempt to control social unrest in the Third World, 
his government, affected by Fidel Castro (the Cuban nationalist who with a wave of 
public support defeated the corrupt and dictatorial Batista regime) drastically changed 
the foreign policy of its successors and adopted a policy of relative political 
participation and economic reforms to counter the spread of Communism.185
The rise of Ayatollah Khomeini
In 1961, Kennedy forced the Shah to appoint Ali Amini, a liberal politician, as his 
Prime minister. This led to the relative opening of the political atmosphere and the 
formation of a “Second National Front” (SNF). However, despite impressive initial 
support, it failed to become a serious alternative force.187 This was a result of its 
members’ failure to interpret the radical nature of the public mood, the depth of public 
dissatisfaction with the regime’s performance and with the country’s dependence on 
America. This failure created a vacuum that was only filled with the new emerging 
political force of Khomeini’s leadership. Relatively immune to criticism because of his 
high religious position, Khomeini’s sermons became regarded as the most radical 
among laity and clergy leaders—a reputation that led to the rapid rise of his popularity 
among the masses.
Khomeini’s early attacks on the Shah’s socio-economic policies revealed his 
conservative nature. Although elections under the Shah were little more than 
systematically rigged fa9ades, Khomeini attacked both new electoral laws enfranchising 
women and a referendum endorsing the Shah’s “White Revolution”,188 which he saw as 
un-Islamic and unconstitutional. However, what attracted most of his supporters was 
his daring challenge to the Shah and breaking of the wall of silence which had been 
built after the 1953 coup. His blunt denunciations of the Shah’s policies led to his arrest 
in 1963. In June of that year, Muharram processions developed into large street protests
1 SOin which hundreds of protesters were killed. Khomeini was released after two
185 Behzad Touhidi-Baghini, The Historic Roots o f the Iranian Revolution. PhD dissertation. American University,
Washington, DC, 1983, p. 239.
186 S. Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism In Iran (CT: West View Press, 1990), p. 107, quoted from the Shah’s memoir.
187 In their first public gathering more than 80,000 people attended the meeting without any preparation, Ibid., pp. 103
and 110.
188 For Khomeini’s sermons against the White Revolution, see A. Davani, Nahzat-e ruhaniyun-e Iran [The Movement
of Iranian clergy] (Qom: Imam Reza Foundation, 1981), Vol. 3.
189 Muharram is the holiest month of the year for Shi’a Muslims, when Imam Hussein (the third Shi’a Imam) and his
companions were killed in Karbala in seventh century BC. The acts of morning, which bring together large 
numbers of people in passionate ritual, are often used as opportunities for political mobilisation.
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months, having already gained a reputation as the most outspoken leader of the 
opposition. The Shah’s de facto recognition of Israel, which was soon followed by an 
extension of diplomatic immunity to US military advisers in Iran, gave Khomeini an 
opportunity not only to attack his policies but also to base his protest on progressive 
grounds. This extended his support from traditional sections of society to the modem 
middle-classes and university students, and established him as a representative of 
Iranian independence from foreign powers. He criticised the recognition of Israel and 
compared the Shah’s concessions to US military personnel to the notorious 1919 
Vosogh-al-doleh Agreement, which aimed to make Iran a British protectorate, thus 
directly accusing the Shah of betraying Iran and endangering Islam.190 He was arrested 
again and exiled in 1964, only to return fifteen years later in order to lead the overthrow 
of the Shah’s regime in the 1979 revolution.
Structural bases of the revolution: the contradictions of modernisation
Although the political opposition was largely crushed, during this time, the regime still 
had to secure access to resources in order to stay in power. The Shah’s regime hence 
aimed at controlling social forces via three leverages: oil income, security forces and 
governmental administration, and dependent relationships with foreign powers, 
especially the United States. As Pesaran argues, there are two types of political 
stability—one brought about by increased participation and another by repression.191 
The Shah’s regime, having gained power via a coup d’etat, lacked popular legitimacy.
Its lack of belief in democracy and fear of losing any degree of control prevented it from 
establishing legitimacy by allowing some participation in the political process. It 
therefore resorted to repression for establishing stability.
Oil revenues
When Mussadiq’s government fell, the Shah (who had escaped from Iran after the 
failure of the first attempted coup) returned to Iran and authorised and implemented a 
policy of harsh repression. Politically, Iran’s main external source of support gradually
190 Front for the Liberation of Iranian People (JAMA), Khomeini va jonbesh [Khomeini and the Movement]
(Moharam Press, 1973), pp. 1-18. Quoted from Arvand Abrahimian, Khomeinism (I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 
1993), p. 11.
191 Hashem Pesaran, “The system of dependent capitalism in pre- and post- revolutionary Iran,” International Journal
o f  Middle East Studies, 14 (1982), p. 505. Pesaran also argues that a third option, “cooperation”, was to some 
degree pursued by the Shah on the elite level.
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shifted, over twenty-five years, from Britain to America. In 1954, the Shah reversed 
Mussadiq’s greatest achievement, the nationalisation of oil, and negotiated a new 
agreement with the west to produce and export oil. The newly formed British 
Petroleum company (created after the collapse of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
during oil nationalisation), along with eight other western companies (five major 
American companies, one small American company plus a Dutch and French company) 
were contracted to extract and market resources for the next twenty-five years. The 
consortium had the power to set prices and production levels and profits were to be 
shared on a 50-50 basis, though according to one estimate, the consortium made a profit 
of $12.56 on each tonne of oil between 1954 and 1963, while Iran received only 
$1.50.192 Although the fa?ade of oil nationalisation was kept intact, in practice the oil 
industry became de-nationalised and Iran became the nominal owner of its oil.
Despite gross exploitation by the consortium, the Shah’s regime nonetheless received a 
considerable amount of income from the agreement. The inefficiency and corruption of 
the Shah’s government was clearly illustrated by the fact that while Mussadiq’s 
government had managed to finance the country without oil revenues, it would have 
been unthinkable for the Shah’s regime to do this. In any case, as a result of massive 
price increases, the Iranian state’s oil revenues ($22.5 million in 1954) leapt to $20 
billion in 1977, an increase of almost a thousand times. The state became totally 
dependent on oil income. By 1977-78, a year before the revolution, oil accounted for 
34% of the GNP, 77% of the state’s income, and 87% of foreign exchange.193 This 
made the society and economy entirely dependent on the state.194
The formation of OPEC in 1960, the Israeli-Arab wars in 1967 and 1973 and the oil 
boycotts in 1973 led to dramatic rises in the price of oil. However, according to 
Banisadr, who predicted a sharp increase in the price of oil months before the actual rise 
of the oil price in 1973,195 the real reason was the hefty accumulation of Euro-dollars in 
Europe and Europe’s desire to exchange them for American gold. The merit of this 
argument is strengthened by tracing the uneasy financial relations between the US and
192 Ivanov, Tarikh-e nuvin-e Iran, p. 184.
193 This is according to official data; however, its reliability is questionable since the government was known for its
attempt to cover the country’s actual dependency on oil.
194Massoud Karshenas, Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
Halliday, Iran, p. 143; Fred Halliday, “Economic development and revolutionary upheavals in Iran”, 
Cambridge Journal o f Economics, 4, no. 3 (September 1980), pp. 271-92.
195 Banisadr tried to publish his analysis in Le Monde, however the paper declined to publish it on the grounds that 
the argument was too radical. Banisadr, interview, 21.January 2005
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Europe to 1965, when French president Charles de Gaulle asserted that the US was 
deriving unfair advantage from being the principle international reserve currency.196 It 
was within this context in 1971 that Richard Nixon ended the convertibility of the US 
dollar into gold, thereby ending the Bretton Woods system that had been in place since 
the end of World War II, leading to the devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1971 
and 1973 and improving the sluggish American economy. Although this policy had 
limited success, according to Banisadr, in order to ensure that the reserves of euro­
dollars would not threaten the US economy, oil countries (encouraged by America and 
undertaken by Saudi Arabia and Iran) transferred these Euro-dollars to petro-dollars,
107thereby saving America’s economy from recession. This argument has strong 
explanatory power since it answers the question of how the Saudi and Shah’s regimes, 
both of which were totally dependent on US support and therefore unwaveringly pro- 
American, could adopt drastic policies which seemed detrimental to the US economy.
The Pahlavi state’s total reliance on its oil income turned it into a rentier state. One 
major effect of this drastic transformation was a reduction in the state’s dependence on 
domestic social classes. Within less than three decades, the state changed from a weak 
and dependent player to a powerful, dynamic and autonomous one—and one pitted 
against society. The institutions benefited most astronomically from oil revenues were 
the Shah, the royal family, and the court. Each member of the royal family created their 
own mini court, surrounding themselves with the upper echelons of Iranian society and 
selling all major contracts in the economy. The system was ridden with officially 
sanctioned corruption, bribery and greed. The political function of this corruption was 
to create a power base among the upper class which sought to secure allegiance to the 
Shah’s state and to his person. Ironically, this corrupt upper class was the first to sense 
the rise of the revolution, desert the regime and escape with its wealth to the West.198
The armedforces
The Shah’s second institutional power base was the state’s repressive apparatus. The 
army’s share of the national budget increased from 25% in the 1950s to 40% in the mid- 
1970s, and the oil boom enabled increases in the defence budget from $1.9 billion in
196 Niall Ferguson, Australian Financial Review, 11 Jun 2004
197 Banisadr, Darse tajrobeh, p. 152.
198 After the revolution, a study of money transfer in the Central Bank showed that the flight of money from the
country to the west dramatically increased two years before the revolution. Banisadr, interview by the author, 
22 January 2005.
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1973-74 to $9.9 billion in 1978-79. The armed forces increased from 191,000 to 
413,000 between 1972 and 1977 and whilst tens of thousands of American military 
personnel flooded the country, cementing Iran’s dependent relationship with the US.199 
As Abrahimian notes, “by 1977, Iran had the largest navy in the Persian Gulf, the most 
up-to-date air force in the Middle East, and the fifth largest military force in the 
world”.200 This was mainly a result of the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of “multipolarity”, 
which came about as a result of defeat in Vietnam and which aimed at developing 
regional middle powers under US auspices. Apart from the Kennedy era when some 
attention in some countries was paid to how people’s participation in the political 
domain might be a source of stability, America’s international policy did not seek 
stability through participation, and thus repression was chosen as the method for 
securing stability. Brazil, Indonesia, Zaire, and Iran were also chosen for this 
purpose.201 These countries were to provide stable regional conditions that would 
facilitate an orderly devolution of US power, therefore creating a “linkage policy” in 
which superpower “detente” would take place.202
Iran was singled out as having a special relationship with the US due to its strategic 
importance and proximity to the USSR. Thus, Iran became the single largest buyer of 
US military hardware. In 1973, the Shah proudly declared that “we can get anything 
non-atomic that the United States has”. The army’s function, apart from 
underwriting Iran’s choice of becoming the regional superpower, was also to repress 
domestic opposition. As US Senator Hubert Humphrey said in 1960, “do you know 
what the head of the Iranian army told one of our people? He said the army was in good 
shape, thanks to US aid—it was now capable of coping with the civilian population”.204 
The ramification of all this was a growing structural and psychological dependence of 
the Iranian state and its leaders on the US government.
The Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organisation (SAVAK) was created in 
1957 with the help of the CIA, FBI and MUSAD (Israeli intelligence agency) in order 
to carry out domestic repression and ensure social control. Estimates of the number of
199 Foran, Fragile Resistance”, p. 313.
200 See Abrahimian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 435-36.
201 Robert Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit o f Stability
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 135.
202 Ibid., p. 78.
203 Quoted in Litwak, Detente, p. 141.
204 Humphrey is quoted by Halliday, Iran, p. 75. See also ibid., 52, 68-71 and 92; and Abrahimian, Iran Between
Two Revolutions, p. 436.
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SAVAK operatives range widely, with the Shah placing it at 2000 and Eric Rouleau 
arguing it was as high as 200,000, perhaps coming closest in his estimate of 50,000 full­
time and up to three million part-time informers (or one in eleven Iranians). However, 
after the revolution, researchers found that these numbers were hugely exaggerated as 
the organisation operated with 60,000 people, both full and part-time. The operating 
field of SAVAK was censorship, screening state employees and the government-run 
trade unions, and directly confronting political crises and opponents of the regime. Its 
unlimited power gave it the authority to arrest suspects at will, without any time limit.
It routinely used torture as a means of interrogation. In the mid-1970s, Amnesty 
International reported that “no country in the world has a worse record on human rights 
than Iran”.206 Zavareei argues that the goals which SAVAK was pursuing “spread a 
deep sense of fear, suspicion, disbelief and apathy throughout the country”.207 In other 
words, it functioned to reduce society to a mass of fearful individuals who were unable 
to trust each other, and as a result, unlikely to cooperate in any serious collective action.
Government dependency
The government proper (cabinet ministries, civil service, Majles and political party 
system), though less coercive, was also organised to ensure stability through repression. 
The Shah as absolute ruler did not delegate much authority; even minor decisions had to 
be taken by him. Top government posts were recycled among a handful of his former 
classmates and confidants, who had authority over the lower parts of the pyramid of 
power but who were also totally dependent on the Shah. Below these ministers lay a 
vast civil service bureaucracy. The civil service grew from 150,000 civil servants in 
1963 to 304,000 and 800,000 civilian state employees in all, reaching down through the 
professional middle class into the poorly paid ranks of the service sector of the working 
class. Therefore “in the towns, the state expanded to the point that it hired as many as
A A Q
one out of two full-time employees”. Overall, the state employed about 10-12% of
the work force.209
205 Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion o f Power (London; Croom Helm, 1978) p. 146. Bayan sees the number of full­
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American Universities Field Staff, 1968), p. 186.
206 Amnesty International, Annual Report 1974-75.
207 Manizheh Zavareei, “Dependent capitalist development in Iran and the mass uprising of 1979” in Research in
Political Economy: A Research Manual, ed. by Paul Zarembka (CT: JAI, 1982), p. 152.
208 Abrahamian, Iran Between two Revolutions, p. 438.
209 For more information, see Moaddel, Class, Politics and Ideology, pp. 65-97.
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After the 1953 coup, the state tried to legitimise itself mainly through the mechanisms 
of the Majles and political parties, but failed since people were denied any role in state 
affairs and thus abstained from these institutions. In fact, after the overthrow of 
Mussadiq, the NF was banned, the Tudeh party severely suppressed and all elections 
became state managed. To present an image of constitutional monarchy, the fa?ade of 
the Majles and a party system had to be maintained; however, independent candidates 
were not allowed to run in elections and landlords and other members of the upper class 
filled the Majles. From 1954-70, around 80% of the senate was comprised of landlords.
In the mid-1950s, two parties were set up: the ruling Melliyun (Nationalist) Party led by 
prime minister Iqbal and the “oppositional” Mardom (People’s) Party headed by 
Minister of the Interior Asadollah Alam. These were popularly known as the “yes” and 
“yes-sir” parties. In 1975, the Shah transformed this dual party system into a de facto 
single party system, partly because of the power struggle within these two parties and 
partly because of the confidence he gained from the defeat and suppression of the 
opposition.211 By that point he had shed any pretence of being a constitutional 
monarch. As early as 1961, he wrote of himself, “if I were a dictator rather than a 
constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such
919as Hitler organised or such as you find today in Communist countries”.
The single dominant party was called the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party. All Iranians 
eligible to vote were ordered to participate in elections, left only with the options of 
leaving Iran or the threat of imprisonment if they refused. This caused many who were 
hoping for positive changes in the Shah’s policy to abandon any hope of reform. This 
party soon degenerated from ostensibly being a mass party to becoming a vehicle for 
personal advancement, and two years after its founding, it was largely dead. Ultimately, 
however, its existence illustrated the underlying legitimacy problem of the Shah’s state. 
It came as no surprise that Rastakhiz Party centres were among the first places to be 
attacked and destroyed by revolutionaries.
Structural changes in economy and class, 1953-78
210 Iqbal described his relation to the Shah as “the house-born slave of his majesty”. See Foran, Fragile Resistance,
p. 311.
211 On the early party system see Abrahimian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 419-21 and 440; and Katouzian,
The Political Economy, pp. 192-93, 197.
212 Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission For My Country (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 173. Keddie has pointed
out that after the Restakhiz Party was founded, the Shah recalled his autobiography and reissued it without the 
passage on one-party regimes as communist or fascist; see Roots o f  Revolution, p. 179.
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As has been argued above, both oil income and US aid to Iran were resumed after the 
1953 coup. This reactivated the developmental model of the 1930s and 1940s, which 
was based on traditional agricultural practices, light industry and the import of 
consumer goods. From 1958-60, excess in imports led to crises in the balance of 
payments; this was followed by political instability from 1960-63, during which time 
Khomeini emerged as the most outspoken critic of social discontent. However, from 
1963-73 we also observe the emergence of a capitalist economy as a result of the steady 
growth of oil revenues and land reforms, concomitant with the demise of feudalism.
This fuelled a deeper industrialisation process, which entailed investment in 
infrastructure and the development of more complex assembly-style manufacturing.
The oil boom in 1973 accelerated this process, and during these years a full-blown 
dependent capitalist development skyrocketed out of control.
Population growth and growth in Iran’s GNP had profound effects on the political 
mapping of the country. Population growth was steady and rapid, increasing from 14.6 
million in 1940 to 20.4 million in 1956 and from 27.1 million in 1966 to 33.6 million in
1975. This growth was unevenly distributed between urban and rural sectors, with the 
urban population increasing from 31% of the national population in 1956 to 47% in
1976. Urban-rural migration was mainly caused by the fast-growing income gap 
between cities and villages, which was itself caused by falling prices for agricultural 
products and a growing demand for urban services. From 1953-77, the GNP grew from 
$3 billion to $53 billion, exceeding population growth and therefore causing a drastic 
increase in per capita income from $166 a person in 1953 to $1,514 in 1977. This 
placed Iran among the medium-income countries. Between 1963 and 1978, the GDP 
grew at an average annual rate of 10%, a figure few countries surpassed.213 However, to 
understand the dependent side of this development, it is necessary to take a closer look 
at the impact of the distribution of these aggregate data across different sectors, classes 
and groups within the key sectors of the Iranian economy (agriculture, pastoralism, and 
capitalist and petty commodity manufacturing).
The decline of agriculture and urban growth
213 Misagh Parsa, Social Origins o f the Iranian Revolution (London, Rutgers University Press, 1989), p. 178.
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The most important change in agriculture after 1953 was “land reform”, the centrepiece 
of the Shah’s socio-economic programme known as the “White Revolution”. Large 
land ownership was abolished as a result of combined pressure from the Kennedy 
administration, which provided the condition for the emergence of the Second National 
Front, and the Shah’s desire to curb the power of landlords by creating a landholding 
peasantry which would be ever grateful to the regime. However, the government’s land 
redistribution plans were never fully implemented. 20 million acres (out of 42 million) 
were exempted from the land reform policy, including some of the most fertile lands in 
the country, which remained in the hands of large landowners. Army officers and 
government officials were given priority in purchasing of the remaining land, which 
was of a poorer quality. At the same time, land reform excluded half of all village 
families from receiving any plots because they lacked formal sharecropping agreements 
with landowners. This group was inevitably transformed into a rural proletariat living 
in severe poverty. Among those who obtained plots of land, over 72% acquired less 
than six acres, in all, approximately 76% of all peasants received less than seven acres, 
which is deemed the necessary minimum for subsistence.214 While land reform led to 
the rise of a small rural middle class from middle peasants, the living standard of the 
rural majority remained as bad as before the reform. Poor health and limited education 
remained the lot of the peasants. However, the penetration of the modernisation process 
and its cultural and political repercussions were affecting the social consciousness of the 
peasants, fuelling both their historical resentment towards state authorities and their 
demands for an increase in living standards. This is illustrated by the words of a young 
Kurdish peasant, who stated,
yes, we need schools and doctors, but they are just for the rich, I wish I 
didn’t even know doctors existed. Before, we were ignorant, but now we 
know that pills and shots can help us. But we can’t buy them, so we 
watch our children die from sickness as well as hunger. Before, the 
elders said that if a child died, it was the will of God («dast-I khuda), but 
now I think that it’s the will of the government (dast-i dowlat).215
Despite the fact that the agricultural sector still employed over 50% of the population, 
the contribution of agriculture to total capital formation declined throughout the 1970s.
214 Zabih, Iran’s Revolutionary Upheaval, (San Francisco: Alchemy Books, 1979), p. 118.
215 John Foran, Fragile Resistance (Connecticut: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), p. 322.
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In 1976, capital formation in the agriculture sector fell 22% from the previous year due 
to lack of investment.216 This led to huge imports of agricultural products, making Iran 
one of the leading importers of food and agricultural products in the Middle East.
The worsening conditions in rural areas resulted in a large-scale migration of young 
people from the countryside to urban areas. From the mid-1960s onwards, 
approximately one-quarter of a million peasants left for urban areas every year. The 
number of towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants increased from 249 in 1966, to 373 
in 1976. This exacerbated existing urban problems such as land speculation, housing 
shortages, growing inflation, and rocketing real estate prices.217 Between 1967 and 
1977, urban land prices increased by 2,000%. High rents prevented people from living 
in the central areas of large cities, resulting in the mushrooming of shantytowns on the 
outskirts of urban areas. In Tehran alone, 25 large shantytowns containing thousands of 
families had arisen.218 No official figures of the number of people in the shanty towns 
exist for this period, but estimates range from 500,000 to more than a million.219 The 
shanty towns became infamous for their poor living conditions: unsafe houses were 
generally built by family members; drinking water was inaccessible, as were electricity, 
public transportation, health care, education and garbage collection. As the government 
did not attempt to solve the water problem, private companies marked up the rate by 70
9 9 0times in comparison to the city. To highlight the inequity between rich and poor,
80% of Tehran’s budget was allocated to provide services for the wealthy inhabitants of 
northern Tehran.
The decline of the tribal system
As a matter of deliberate state policy, the tribal sector of Iranian society continued to 
shrink in size and experience massive hardship and poverty. Population estimates vary, 
but there is consensus of a drastic decrease under the Shah’s regime. In 1900, they 
constituted 25% of the population, but by the 1970s this had fallen to 6%; in other
991words, two-and-one-half million decreased to two million. Their hardship worsened
216 Bank-e Markzi-e Iran [Central Bank of Iran], Annual Report (Tehran, 1978), p. 95.
217 Ettela’at, 23 August 1977.
218 Ettela’at, 6 August 1977; Paymane Mojahed, no. 5, 1977.
2,9 F. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1980), p. 3.
220 Rastakhiz, 25 June 1978.
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after 1921, when sedentarisation policies were enforced through much stronger coercive 
mechanisms of implementation. Policy became more restrictive by taking land under 
tribal holding by “nationalizing” all pastoral land. Any resistance to such policies was 
crushed. One Iranian political economist, in fact, argued that the regime’s treatment of 
the tribal populations made the treatment of indigenous Americans pale in 
comparison.222
As a result of these policies, the tribal chiefs lost political power and social status, 
though some who were big landlords retained economic power by transforming 
themselves into businessmen, occupying top jobs in the bureaucracy or becoming 
military officers. Ordinary tribesmen, however, suffered continuously in new forms. 
Many became landless workers in the countryside or unskilled construction workers. 
These economic and class changes weakened tribal consciousness; “in short, horizontal 
ties of class tended to supplement the vertical sentiments of clan, tribe, sect and
99*^locality”. With regard to the national economy, sedentarisation elicited a drop in 
livestock breeding from 40% of agricultural production in the 1960s to 26% by around 
1970. Therefore, Iran’s ability to export non-oil products such as meat, wool and 
carpets declined. However, the Shah’s government was unable to eradicate the pastoral 
nomadic mode of production altogether.224
The industrial capitalist sector
The type of industrial growth which emerged from the 1920s onward reveals the 
dependent nature of Iran’s economic development. In the 1930s, Reza Shah’s attempt
99c
to industrialise Iran had “no strategy worthy of the name”. This trend continued 
throughout his son’s rule over Iran; modernisation and planning strategies were
99 £
elaborated arbitrarily on the Shah’s whim. In line with twentieth-century modernist 
despots, “modernisation” became another source of legitimacy for the Shah’s regime. 
However, what in fact followed under this banner was a dependent development, which 
was in total contrast to Mussadiq’s earlier policy of “negative equilibrium”.
222 Nasser Pakdaman’s remarks are cited in Katouzian, The Political Economy, p. 306. Foran sees this assessment as
an exaggeration, but still concedes that at the limit of repression it may be somewhat comparable.
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224 Bharier, Economic Development, pp. 131-35.
225 Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy o f Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979
(London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 79.
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76
On the surface, Iran’s industrialisation process appeared extremely impressive, with 
growth rates of 15% per annum between 1965 and 1976, twice that or more than the 
average of developing countries in general at the time. However, these figures are 
misleading on two accounts. The industry share of the GNP (approximately 18%) 
lagged behind that of the service sector (at 35%) and oil (at 35%) in 1977-78. In 
addition, manufactured non-oil exports made up a low of 2-3%, falling far behind 
countries such as India, where they constituted over 50%, Singapore (60%), and Mexico 
(33%).227
From 1975 onwards, Iranian industry was beset by a range of problems, including the 
lack of a skilled workforce in the form of technicians and management, limits to the 
growth of the internal market, poor quality products, high costs of production, crippling 
bureaucratic restrictions, artificial and state-guaranteed high profits (average profits 
ranged from 50% to 200%), lack of forward and backward linkages in the economy, 
endemic corruption and flight of capital. However, the main problem with modem 
industry was its structurally dependent development. It was inefficient and dependent 
on oil revenues, and entirely dependent on foreign joint ventures for capital, technology, 
management and inputs. In reality, it was nothing but “screwdriver” industries which 
assembled parts made in the west and added little to final products. The industrial 
sector used imported machines to assemble imported parts with imported technology 
and sold poor quality goods at high guaranteed prices, with most of the profits 
repatriated abroad. As Banisadr argued, the economy became “a sucking machine 
designed to funnel Iranian wealth and resources to foreign pockets”.229
Furthermore, the state’s capital allocation policies failed to broaden the industrial base 
and the upper class remained extremely small. In 1977, 128 families owned shares in 
265 of the 364 largest industries and financial institutions in the country.230 The number 
of working-class people increased by 100-150% from one million in 1956 to 
approximately two-and-one-half million, or 20-25% of Iran’s work force, in which 
between 600 to 900,000 labourers worked in plants with over ten workers, 280,000 in
227 Halliday, Iran, pp. 138, 148,161-62, quoted in Foran, Fragile Resistence, p. 326.
228 See Graham, Iran, pp. 88-94; Katouzian, The Political Economy, pp. 279; and Halliday, Iran, pp. 147, 166.
229 Quoted in Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 55.
230 H. Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-1982 (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 40; Parviz
Asheghian, “Comparative Efficiencies of Foreign Firms and Local Firms in Iran”, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 13 (1982), pp. 113-20; Foran, Fragile Resistance, p. 329.
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transport and just over one million in the construction sector. The aggregate figure 
for the service sector was 3.4 million people, which includes civil service workers as 
well as many professionals and students (who should be classified as urban middle 
class), merchants, shop assistants and people working in banks and offices. The 
educated middle class was another key class. The intelligentsia, as combined of 
teachers, students, artists, poets and writers, more than doubled from 1.6% to 3.5% 
between 1956 and 1972. During the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, this class firmly 
established itself within the capitalist mode of production.
The bazaar: centre of petty commodity production
With the expansion of the capitalist mode of production, the bazaar-based petty 
commodity mode of production contracted, along with its relatively independent guilds, 
which formed the bases of the country’s traditional civil society. Economic factors 
combined with the political manipulations of the regime to effect this, particularly since 
the bazaar had been one of the main bastions against the monarchic state in the 
twentieth century. Its role during the Constitutional Revolution, nationalisation of oil 
and 1963 uprisings was decisive and therefore the Pahlavi state tried to erode and 
diminish this threat. After a few attempts to confine the power of the guilds, the 
government eventually dissolved existing guilds through the Rastakhiz Party and set up 
its own. This was followed by a vigorous “anti-profiteering campaign” in which tens of 
thousands of shopkeepers were fined, exiled or jailed. Even the Tehran bazaar—the 
largest in the world—was threatened by physical destruction when the municipal 
government announced plans to build an eight-lane highway right through it.
During these years, the bazaar’s share of import was confined to just 30% of all imports 
and 15% of public sector credit. Due to the expansion of banks, modem shopping areas 
and chain stores, its share of the GDP dropped from 9.4% in 1963-64 to 5.7% in 1977- 
78. However, due to the bazaar's internal dynamics, it was able to find, expand and 
maintain niches of production and distribution. It has been argued that the bazaaris even
231 To have precise detail about the size of the working class, see Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution, p. 55; Bayat,
Workers and Revolution', Abrahimian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 434; and Abrahimian, Structural 
Causes, p. 22.
232 Willem Floor, “The guilds in Iran: an overview from the earliest beginnings till 1972”, Zetischrift der Deutschen
Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, 125, no. 1 (1975), pp. 110-11 and 115; Halliday, Iran, p. 20; Abrahimian, 
Structural Causes, pp. 24-25; and Abrahimian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 443.
233 Foran, Fragile Resistance, p. 335.
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“prospered during the period of capitalist development”.234 This could be seen as a 
consequence of the rise in oil prices and its inevitable effect on the bazaar economy.
But as Foran argues, it would be more accurate to say that bazaar merchants continued 
to exist, rather then prospering, especially relative to the capitalist sector.235 Still, with 
the high oil prices the bazaaris could expand their financial resources, which proved to 
be an important factor during the revolution as they were able to help strikers financially 
and therefore prolong the strikes.
New social and economic spaces were also created in the modernisation process, in 
which cities and the modem middle class were expanded and literacy rates were 
drastically increased in urban areas. Finally, this all happened in a political context in 
which the state denied the people any participation in the political process. Combined 
with these factors, the last necessary ingredient necessary for creating space for a full­
blown revolution was also emerging due to changes at the international level.
US presidential elections
In 1976, Jimmy Carter was elected US president on a platform of human rights as a 
result of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements and amid social and political 
crisis which culminated with the Watergate scandal in 1974 and the US defeat in 
Vietnam in 1975. US foreign policy henceforth would have to reflect a concern for 
human rights. Initially, Carter was a moderate advocate of prioritising moralistic 
considerations over strategic imperatives. This apparent change of policy alarmed the 
Shah, who increasingly during late 1960s and 1970s ruled Iran with an iron fist. It also 
encouraged opposition forces to take a more robust and explicit stand against the 
regime. In order to out-manoeuvre his rivals and avoid loosening his grip over society, 
the Shah acted promptly. Until this time, Iran had been viewed by social and political 
analysts as the prototype of a rapidly modernising and stable country. This consensus 
was hardly surprising, since almost all organised opposition groups were either crushed 
or subdued and SAVAK successfully controlled most sections of society. Additionally, 
the regime possessed the strongest army in the Middle East and enjoyed the total 
support of US and other western countries, as well as the friendship of the USSR.
234 Ibid., p. 347.
235 Ibid., p. 334.
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Considering the Shah’s poor human rights record, the Carter administration was divided 
in its reaction to Iran.236 Iran’s immense geopolitical and economic importance 
presented American policy makers with a very delicate dilemma. This ambiguity 
continued throughout the revolution. One faction, represented by Zbiniew Brezinzski 
(head of the National Security Council), was deeply sceptical about the consequences of 
sudden liberalisation. The other faction, led by the State Department, argued that 
liberalisation was an essential condition for the long-term stability of the country and 
would enhance the ability of the country to resist the spread of communism. This 
internal strife within the American government which developed with Carter’s election 
did not affect the view of the Shah. He understood that Carter was trying to revive J. F. 
Kennedy’s policy of seeking political stability in pro-American countries by widening 
their social base, decreasing political repression and increasing political participation.
He decided to jump before being pushed.
3
Islamic discourses on revolution: 
the political culture o f  opposition
The mere presence of disadvantageous economic conditions is insufficient to explain 
the causes and outcomes of the revolution, particularly since in almost all peripheral and 
semi-peripheral countries such conditions exist and rarely result in revolution. What 
distinguished Iran from other societies was rather the opposition’s new political 
discourse and its spread among multiple layers of social strata. This new political
236 Richard W. Cotam, “Arms sales and human rights: the case of Iran” in P. Brown and D. Maclean, eds. Human
Rights and US Foreign Policy (Lexington, MA, 1979), pp. 281-301.
237 See Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, Debacle: The American Failure in Iran (New York: Knopf, 1982), pp.
68-70.
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discourse developed while that of armed resistance proved its ineffectiveness within the 
revolutionary elite.
The emergence and failure of armed resistance
From Khomeini’s exile in 1964 until the revolution, opposition groups were ruthlessly 
silenced by brutal forms of repression which closed the legal avenues or protest 
available to them. Pockets of resistance remained, primarily outside Iran. The political 
clampdown forced some of the young generation to re-evaluate and question the 
effectiveness of traditional reformist approaches to political change. They began to 
seek inspiration not in the works and words of their reformist leaders, but rather in 
theories of guerrilla warfare, the works of Regis Debray, Che Guevara, Mao Tse-Tung, 
Frantz Fanon and others. By the late 1960s, therefore, we observe the radicalisation of 
political trends and the emergence of guerrilla groups.
Two such armed organisations were particularly important. The Mujaheddin-e Khalq-e 
Iran grew out of the Liberation Movement of Iran, which was close to the SNF. The 
group came to be recognised by its use of explosives and by a series of assassinations of 
Iranian and American military personnel. However, by the early 1970s, its leaders and 
all members of its central committee were arrested and put to death or imprisoned. The 
arrests weakened the organisation. A second and fatal blow was inflicted by the 
organisation itself in 1975, when a split occurred and the majority of its members 
promoted Marxism rather than Islam as its official ideology. Both factions were fatally 
weakened and lost their operational ability. However, the organisation’s daring attempt 
to challenge the censorship which was systematically constructed by the SAVAK 
earned them strong sympathy among the people, especially the young and 
Khomeini’s supporters.
The second organisation, the Sazaman-e Fedayeen-e Khalq-e Iran, was formed by the 
unification of three separate Marxist-Leninist groups. Its origins can be traced back to 
the mid-1960s, as most of its founders were originally young supporters of the Tudeh 
party who grew dissatisfied with its policies. In formulating their strategy, they
238 For their socio-economic and political views, see Organisation of the Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (OMKHI), “The
Concept of Total Resistance” (n.p., 1976); OMKHI, “The Friday Prayer”, (n.p., 1979); and OMKHI, “The 
Critical Problems of Our Movement” (n.p., 1979).
239 Mohsen Rafigdoost, “Khaateraate-e Mohsen Rafigdoost” [The memoir of Mohsen Rafigdoost] (Tehran, Markaze
Asnade Engelaabe Eslami, 1383 -  2005), p. 87.
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criticised other political organisations, mainly the SNF and Tudeh Party—the former for 
its reformist and subservient nature and the latter for being implementing Soviet 
policies in Iran. The organisation turned to armed struggle in 1971, a year after it was 
founded, and lost almost all of its founding members; by 1975, as its failure became 
apparent, it was unable to mobilise the masses to lead a guerrilla war. It was at this point 
that the group split in two, one group deciding to continue armed struggle, and the other 
shifting to political activity.240
The use of armed struggle by both organisations was partly a result of the intensity of 
political repression and partly due to the dominance of guerrilla-style struggle against 
imperialism and its domestic agents on a global scale. They were deeply inspired by the 
wars for independence in Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam. Nevertheless, their inability to 
recruit the masses and overthrow the regime in a guerrilla war created a false sense of 
security within the Shah’s regime and its western allies. This partly explains why 
American policy makers viewed the country as an island of stability in a troubled 
region. However, the radicalisation of political opposition was not confined to the 
armed activities of these organisations. More importantly, it was related to the 
politicisation of Islam and the radicalisation of some factions of the clergy and 
intellectuals who ultimately proved able to condition the nature of the coming 
revolution.
The politicisation of the clergy after the 1963 uprising
Historically, the main body of Shia scholars was among the quietist clergy who were the 
advocates of non-interference in politics. In 1949, Ayatollah Boroujerdi, the most 
celebrated marja taqlid or “source of emulation”241 forbade the ulama (clergy) to 
participate in political activities, a ban which remained in place until his death in 1961. 
Until his death, Khomeini lived under the towering power of Boroujerdi and it was 
assumed that he was in cordial relation with him. However, emerging information and 
recent research seriously challenges this perception. It not only indicates that 
Khomeini’s political tendencies date back to more than two decades earlier, but also 
verifies that he had had secret and a supportive relationship with Fedaeen-e Islam, a
240 See Y. Zarkar, Khaterat-e yek cherk dar zendan: hemase-ye moqavemat [The Memory of a Partisan in Prison:
Epic of Resistance] (n.p., 1974); The Fedayeen Organisation, Hasht Sal Mobarezeh-e Mosalehaneh [Eight 
Years of Armed Struggle] (Tehran, 1979) pp. 1-29; The Fedayeen Organisation, Tarikhcheh-i sazman-i cherik- 
ha-ye Fedayi [A Short History of the Fedayeen Guerillas] (Tehran, 1979), pp. 1-29.
241 The most learned religious leader who has the ultimate authority to interpret the Koranic laws.
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949terrorist organization, and Ayatollah Kashani, the head of the Majles under Mussadiq. 
Furthermore, it indicates that as a result of this relation, Boroujerdi and Khomeini had 
become far from cordial, and in the last years of Borujerdi’s life, he even declined to 
receive him 243
Nevertheless, Khomeini’s open political activity began with Borujerdi’s death, which 
opened the way for his direct involvement in politics. A number of his students 
followed him into politics. From the uprisings and Khomeini’s exile in 1963 we 
observe the politicisation of small groups of Khomeini’s students. Khomeini initially 
entered the world of politics as a reformer, still loyal to the monarchy—it was his 
banishment to Iraq that led to his radicalisation vis-a-vis the Shah’s regime. For years, 
however, he remained a reformist. It was only in early 1970 that for the first time he 
argued that the monarchic system was un-Islamic and introduced his alternative Islamic 
state based on the concept of Velayat-e faghih, (rule of the Jurist), which would become 
the ideological pillar of the future regime. At the time, all senior members of the clergy 
opposed this alternative regime. For instance, Ayatollah Khoei, another major 
clergyman, and superior to Khomeini, held a series of lectures refuting the concept.244 
At this point, however, these disputes were limited to a very small circle of scholars and 
students.
The ever-increasing dictatorial intensity of the state in the early 1970s led to the 
growing radicalisation of the masses, and thus to Khomeini’s growing popularity. In 
the absence of any strong opposing political institution or structure, his disciples 
successfully used the network of the bazaar and mosque to widen their pool of support. 
This alliance provided the opportunity for organisation, mobilisation and the 
recruitment of financial resources, some of the most important variables necessary for 
the transformation of discontent to mobilisation (see Chapter 2).245 However, 
Khomeini’s growing popularity cannot be explained merely on institutional and 
structural grounds, partly because these conditions were also present in the failed 1963
242 For detailed information, see Ayatollah Montazeri’s memoir (available online at
www.montazeri.com/html/books/khaterat/febrest.htm: see also Agence France-Presse, “Iranian cleric goes to 
battle in cyberspace”, New York Times on the Web, 17 December 2000); also see Hamid Ahmadi, Tahghighi 
dar bareye tarikhe enghelabe Iran [Researching the History of the Iranian Revolution], vol. 2 (Enghelabe 
Eslami publication, 2002 [1381]), pp. 592-98.
243 Hamid Ansari, Hadise bidari [The Tale of Awareness] (Ketabkhaneye Archive Vezarate Kharejeh-e Jomhooriye
Eslami, 1997 [1376]), p. 27, quoted from Ahmadi, Tahghighi dar baareye tarikhe enghelab-e Iran, p. 623.
Also see Montazeri’s memoir.
244 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
245 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 7.
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uprising. Instead, an argument can be made that there were three other causes of 
Khomeini’s ascendancy.
First, the National Front and Freedom Movement leaders, namely Karim Sanjabi and 
Mehdi Bazargan, failed to gauge the rapid change in the political culture and the depth 
of discontent among the public with regard to the monarchy. They therefore remained 
committed to reform, and still sought the Shah’s consent for the implementation of the 
1905 constitution. Second, after the formation of the second NF these groups 
elaborated a dichotomy between democracy and independence to such an extent that 
Bazargan argued that the source of all miseries in Iran was the absence of freedom. “As 
long as the issue of freedom is not resolved, the demand for independence will remain 
just a slogan.”246 The third and most important reason for Khomeini’s ascendance was 
the emergence and spread of Islamic discourse and its rapid move from the margins of 
politics to the centre. It was this change in values which was critical not only for 
translating structural conditions into political conditions that were conducive to 
revolution, but also for giving the movement its Islamic character.
The political culture of opposition
Using the non-deterministic theory outlined in Chapter Two, we can argue that uneven 
development and the domination of peripheral and semi-peripheral governments by core 
countries (which leads to an increase in the unequal distribution of wealth and political 
suppression), such as the conditions described in Chapter Three, do not automatically 
lead to revolution. While these relations at the macro level provide the structural 
conditions for revolution, it is vital that these objective conditions go through a type of 
subjectivation, which is conducive to revolution. To understand this it is important to 
understand the role of culture and to recognise its relative autonomy.247 Culture 
imposes its own input onto structural conditions, filtering structure and agency and 
interacting with them in various ways thus producing different results. The production 
of different results of the same structural conditions suggest that culture is an active 
entity, which does not merely transfer structural conditions to human agents, but also 
functions as a relatively autonomous mediator and interpreter. These theoretical
246 Mohammad Tavasoli was the first mayor of Tehran after the revolution. Mohammad Tavasoli, Soghoote dolate
Bazargan [The Collapse of Bazargan’s Government] (Tehran, n.d.), p. 104.
247 Archer, Culture and Agency, p. xi.
84
insights on culture, structure and agency enable us to analyse the importance of culture 
in the Iranian revolution.
However, there was no homogeneous culture represented in Iran’s pre-revolutionary 
opposition discourse. In fact, at least seven distinct value orientations can be 
distinguished within the opposition: Marxism, Khomeini’s political Islam, guerrilla 
group socialism (with Islamic and secular variants), Ali Shariati’s radical liberation 
theology, Motahari’s liberally oriented Islam, Bazargan’s liberal-democratic Islam, and 
Banisadr’s anti-authoritarian Islam as the “discourse of freedom”. These are discussed 
in more detail below.
Marxism
The Tudeh Party and Fedayeen-e Khalq were the most significant leftist organisations 
in Iran, both of which had high levels of activity and large numbers of supporters. 
Ideologically, these organisations interpreted Marxism mainly through a Stalinist lens. 
Although Marxism remained the ideological belief system of an elite minority, it also 
successfully recruited from among the modem middle and working classes. However, 
its effects on Iranian political culture in general and on Islamic organisations in 
particular were immense. Many Islamic groups not only constructed their 
organisational structure on Stalinist formulas; furthermore, they identified with 
numerous Marxist terminologies, principles and political agendas. Concepts such as 
class, politics, liberalism, democracy and imperialism were understood and defined in 
Stalinist terms. Mujaheddin-e Khalq was the most well known example of this; 
however, it was by no means confined to this organisation. The influence of Stalinism 
can even be traced to the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and its allies and, more 
importantly, to Khomeini himself when he cunningly championed the causes of the 
dispossessed and the stmggle against imperialism. By doing so, Khomeini disarmed the 
Stalinist left by appropriating their agenda and forcing them to follow him or, at best,
jag
making them incapable of actively opposing him.
KhomeinVs political Islam
248 Hamidian Naghi. Safar baa baalhaaye aarezoo [Journey on the Wings of a Wish]. Stockholm: Aarash, 2004.
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Khomeini’s political life began in 1961 with the death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi, before 
which he could not openly expose his political tendencies. Furthermore, it seemed that 
Khomeini indirectly endorsed a quietist approach by arguing that a “bad government is 
better than no government.. .the ulama always co-operate with the government if that is 
needed”.249 However, this approach was in contradiction with his clandestine political 
activities and secret involvement with Fedaeen-e Islam.
Also, it Boroujerdi’s dislike of Khomeini’s political stand was likely based on his deep 
suspicion of the clergy’s involvement in politics. That can be seen in his response to a 
clergy who wanted to enlist support for removing the Shah: “now you are saying that 
we should remove the shah, so, with whom we should replace him? Do you think if the 
clergy is in charge, then things will be better?” Then he pointed out at a clergyman in 
the room and said: “he is the same as doctor Iqbal (the prime minister)—only he has a 
beard and a turban”.250
In any case, after Borujerdi’s death Khomeini openly attacked the Pahlavi state for its 
shortcomings and failure to support the interests of both Iran and Islam. Although 
arrested and exiled during these years, he remained a reformist, criticising the state for 
violating the constitution. He continued his low profile political activities as a reformist 
for years after his exile. However, by the early 1970s his views had become radicalised. 
In 1971, from his exile in Iraq, Khomeini called for the overthrow of the regime and 
revitalised a hardly-known doctrine which had been developed in the nineteenth century 
by Mullah Ahmad Naraghi and Mohaghegh Korki251—a view which was marginalised 
and disregarded by the main body of Shia Scholars. With slight changes, he developed 
his own version of an Islamic state as Velayat-e faghih, or the rule of the jurist, as an 
alternative to monarchism. According to this doctrine, during the occultation of 
Mahdi, the affairs of Islamic society should be under the control of the clergy. 
Democracy had no place in this state; the people would be in no position to ratify laws 
since “Islamic government is the rule of divine law over people”.254 Furthermore, in 
this theory democracy was incompatible with Islamic government because it was 
believed that “people are imperfect and in need of perfection; hence, they need a ruler
249 Ruhollah M. Khomeini, “Kashfol-al-assrar” [The Discovery of Secrets] (n.p., 1943), p. 189.
250 Mohammad Reza Ahmaddi, Khaterate Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Gerami[ Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Geramis'
memoir] (Iran, Tehran: Markaze Asanade Enghelabe Eslami, 2002 [1381]), p. 129.
251 Jamileh Kadivar, Tahavole goftomaan-e siasi-e Shia dar Iran [The Transformation of Shia Political Discourse in
Iran] (Tehran: Entesharate tarhe no, n.d.), pp. 125-29 and 214-18.
252 The twelfth Shia imam who disappeared in the ninth century in order to bring justice, comparable with the
“second coming” of the Christian messiah.
253 Ruhollah Khomeini, Velayat-e Faghih [Rule of the Jurist] (1970 [1348]), pp. 61-63.
254 Valayat-e faqih  explained by Khomeini in Kayhaan International, 15 March 1981.
86
who is a just guardian [ghayem]”. Based on these grounds, Khomeini argued that
Islamic government differed from other forms. As he put it,
herein lies the difference between the Islamic government and the 
constitutional monarchy or republican government. In these regimes, 
people’s representatives or the king take charge of the legislation, 
whereas in Islam this power is the prerogative of God.256
God is believed to exercise his prerogative through the clergy, who are obliged to rule 
over the people, who are viewed as orphans who are incapable of deciding their own 
interests.
Velayat-e faghih is fundamentally a rational concept... as it is (rational) 
to appoint a ghayem [legal guardian] for an orphan. There is no 
difference between having a ghayem for an orphan or a ghayem for a 
nation since they are similar in regard to duty and situation.257
Thus, in such a system, the clergy are in charge of the state’s main affairs258 as they are 
the legitimate successors of the Prophet. Only the vali-ye faghih (the jurist) has the 
authority to declare laws since he is deemed to be a just ruler with the fullest and most 
accurate understanding of Islam. However, as soon as Khomeini introduced this
doctrine, the senior Ayatollah Khoei criticised it as baseless:
for the clergy there can be no reason to ever prove velayat—having 
jurisdiction—at the time of occultation [of the Mahdi]. Velayat is only in 
the domain of the prophet and [twelve Shia] Imams. The clergy not only
255 Khomeini, Velayat-e faghih, p. 64.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid., p. 65.
258 Ibid., pp. 60-93, 151-85 and 192.
259 Ibid., pp. 65 and 92-93.
260 Ibid., pp. 21, 53, 59-60, 65, 179, 189, and 192. It should be noted that In Islam, the Koran is the first source of
Islamic jurisprudence and the Sunnah the second. The word “sunnah” has come to denote the way the Prophet 
Muhammad lived
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does not have velayat in public affairs, but also has no authority in 
hesbieh261 affairs”.262
However, it should be noted that in the 1970s Khomeini’s interpretation of Islamic 
government was not widely known or disseminated outside small theological circles and 
amongst some students outside Iran.263 Instead, what was more known and widely 
distributed was his severe criticism of the Shah’s regime, which focused on its 
corruption, army expenditure, relations with the west, neglect of agriculture, creation of 
shantytowns, pseudo-elections and constitutional violations. Khomeini promised 
unspecified Islamic solutions to these problems.264
In 1974, on a visit to Iraq, Banisadr criticised Khomeini’s version of Islamic 
government and told him that people would not come into the streets to replace one 
dictator with another. Khomeini’s response was apologetic, arguing that he just wanted 
to open a gate (Fath-al-Baab) for further debate about the nature of Islamic government. 
He argued that people like him and Motahari (Khomeini’s most celebrated disciple and 
a well-known intellectual clergyman) should accept the task of elaborating a theory of 
the Islamic state.265
During the 1979 revolution, however, we observe a reversal in Khomeini’s views about 
the nature of the Islamic state and its relation to society as a whole. This was illustrated 
particularly in his views of both women and democracy. Years earlier, Khomeini had 
stated that “anytime you brought women into administrative departments (edaaraaf), 
offices were paralysed.. .The clergy should notice that in some conferences, it has been 
said that steps are taken towards equalising the rights of men and women”. However, 
later in Paris he repeatedly made contradictory arguments. For example, he said that 
“Islam is not only in favour of women’s freedom; furthermore, this religion is the
261 In classic Sharia, hesbieh affairs are those that it would displease God to abandon (such as the promotion of virtue
and prevention of vices), but that no particular person or group has been appointed to implement. In other 
words, it is the public duty of believers to fulfil them.
262 Ayatollah Alozma Khoei, Altangih f i  sharhe orvatol-vosghaa [Tagriraat, notes from the lectures of Mirza Ali
Garavi Tabrizi] (Qom, n.d.), p. 424.
263 Jafari, interview, 9 September 2004. Jafari was a leader of the student organisation in Europe from 1971-78 and
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264 Abrahimian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 445, 478, and 532.
265 Banisadr, interview 24 January 2005.
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founder of women’s freedom in all dimensions”267 and that “women in Islamic 
government are as free as men and are equal with them. Islam freed women from being 
men’s slave and made them equal with men.”268
In other words, by this time, Khomeini had begun to advocate a democratic discourse of 
Islam and disseminate his views on the subject on a national and international scale. 
Evidence of this change can also be seen in proclamations he made during the 
revolution, which made him the central representative of Islam as a discourse of 
freedom. For example, in 1978 he stated that the “Islamic state is a democratic state, 
with its real meaning. However, I will not have any responsibility in the government, 
and as I am acting now, when an Islamic state is established, I will take the role of 
giving guidance”.269 He claimed that the clergy would follow suit: “the clergy will not 
rule. They observe and give guidance to the people in charge. This government in all 
levels will be based on people’s vote and will be observed, assessed and criticised by 
the public”.270 In this discourse, freedom was the principle underlying the state: “the 
first thing which exists for human is the freedom of expression”271 and “Islam is the 
religion of progress and democracy, in its true sense”.272 Similarly, in 1978 he claimed 
that “responsibilities should be in the hands of people, and any wise man recognises that 
it is he who should take his destiny into his own hands” 273 On another occasion, he 
argued that “the Iranian regime will become a democratic system which will lead to the 
stability of the region. Capital will return to Iran and be used in the interest of the 
people”.274 In a final example, Khomeini said that “we want to realise the declaration of 
human rights [in our country], we want to be free, we want to have independence and 
freedom in our country”.
It is important to be aware that Khomeini’s views on the nature of the Islamic state 
during and immediately after the revolution shaped public perceptions of him. In 1978
267 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 6 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e
Eslami, 1378/1999), p 578.
268 Interview with The Guardian 10 July 1978; Mansour Doostkaam and Hayedeh Jalaali, eds. Paris: Imam
and...(Enteshaaraate Payaame Aazaadi, 1979 [1358]), p. 78.
269 Ruhollah Khomeini, interview in France, quoted from A. H. Banisadr, Khyanat be omid [Betrayal of Hope] (n.p.,
1981), p. 348.
270 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 4 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e
Eslami, 1999 [1378]), p 160.
271 Khomeini, speech of 5 August 1978 in Doostkaam and Jalaali, Paris, Imam and p. 168.
272 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 5 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e Eslami, 1999
[1378]), p 353.
273 Quoted from Motahari, Mosahebehaaee pyraamone enghelabe Eslami.
274 Interview with Swiss TV, cited in Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 190.
275 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 2 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e
Eslami, 1984), p. 242.
89
and early 1979, he became the main spokesperson for Islam as a discourse of freedom. 
However, these democratic views were formulated by a small team of consultants, 
including E. Yazdi, S. Ghotbzadeh and Banisadr. Khomeini’s position as a marja 
(‘source of emulation’) meant that in many cases it was taken for granted by Shia 
Moslems that he was utterly honest and dignified. This made his later statements while 
in political power all the more spectacular, particularly as he modelled his politics on a 
Machiavellian doctrine in which ends justify means: “we want to establish Islam”, he
argued, “so it is possible that in the past I have said something and today I say 
something else and tomorrow say something different. It does not make any sense that 
if I have said something before to remain loyal to my word.”277 One might seriously 
wonder, if Khomeini had made this statement during the revolution while he still 
required the support of intellectuals and the popular majority, how might they have 
reacted?
One consequence of Khomeini’s pragmatic approach to politics was that he made 
numerous contradictory statements, and many thus refute one another. What, really, did 
Khomeini believe in? In fact, the contradictions in his work have made it possible for 
competing factions within the Iranian regime to resort to Khomeini’s statements in 
order to support their political positions. Khomeini spoke constantly of Islam and the 
sacrifices that should be made for it, but in all his speeches and declarations there is not 
one place where he defines Islam itself. In fact, when viewed in historical context, 
Khomeini actually represented two opposing representations of Islam: one as a 
discourse of freedom (during the revolution and in Paris) and another as a discourse of 
power (emerging after he returned to Iran and strengthening at the height of the struggle 
between Banisadr and the IRP from June 1981 onward). While Khomeini advocated 
democratic Islam, there are no contradictions in his views as presented in interviews, 
statements and speeches. However, as soon as he expressed a discourse of non- 
democratic Islam and Velayate faghih, it is possible to identify different types of 
contradictions in his statements, both in the language he used and his actual actions.
276 There are debates about whether Machiavelli, as the founder of modem politics, advocated his own arguments or
simply intended to expose existing political practices and hence the hypocrisy of the rulers. In this case, these 
debates are irrelevant, as the separation of ethics from politics has become a cornerstone of modem politics. 
For the original argument, see Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988).
277 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 18 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e
Eslami, 1999 [1378]), p 178.
90
Hence, the roots contradiction in his statements can be traced back to his relationship to 
these opposing discourses.
This can also explain why, during the time that he interpreted Islam according to 
democratic principles, he entered into dialogues with national and international publics 
in the form of interviews. He gave numerous and extensive interviews before he 
returned to Iran; but after returning, apart from the first few days, he granted only one 
interview (to Oriana Fallaci, an Italian journalist). After this, he never accepted 
numerous invitations for interviews. Therefore, during this period we are left with his 
monologues with the public in the form of speeches and statements.
Mujaheddin-e Khalq (Warriors of the People)
The ideology of this organisation was eclectic and tried to synthesise Islamic belief with 
the scientific thought of Marxism. It argued that Marxism was a “complex ideology” 
and divided it into “philosophical” and “scientific” components, rejecting the former 
and accepting the latter. It argued, “we say ‘no’ to Marxist philosophy, especially to 
atheism. But we say ‘yes’ to Marxist social thought, particularly to its analysis of 
feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism”.278 In the view of this organisation, Islam had 
been diluted through history by “corrupt merchants”, “oppressive landlords”, and 
“repressive khalifs” (rulers) in order to suit their interests. Its dynamic message had 
been distorted and replaced by static Greek philosophy. The Warriors developed their 
own school of thought in interpreting the Koran, thus challenging the monopoly of the 
clergy. In particular, they treated the Koran as an historical document rather than as
970God’s word and eternal truth. The political reflection of this interpretation of the 
Koran within Marxist thought led them to the conclusion that imperialism, especially 
American imperialism, had dominated Iran in order to exploit its natural resources and 
dump western consumer products. Simultaneously, they argued that capitalism, led by 
the Shah’s family, the comprador bourgeoisie and the old landlords-tumed- 
entrepreneurs had succeeded in supplanting feudalism, thus incorporating the country
278 Taarikhcheh jaryaan-e kudeta vaa khate-e konuni-ey sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-Iran [A Short History, the
Coup Incident and the Present Policy of the People’s Mujaheddin Organisation of Iran] (n.p., 1978), pp. 10-12.
279 Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1989), p. 97. They criticised the Shia
clergy, who, though unlike Sunni clergy in theory have kept the gates of ljtehad (deducting rules from religious 
sources) open, in practice have been unable to explore it and therefore have failed to grasp the real essence of 
Koranic dynamism. See Cheguneh Quran Biamuzim [How to study the Koran, vol. 1] (n.p., 1980), p. 65.
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into the world economic system and dominating it through large repressive institutions 
such as the army, the bureaucracy and the secret police.
The Mujaheddin condemned the Shah’s regime for being an American agent, enthroned 
by the 1953 American-led coup. It saw the regime as drowned in corruption and 
wasting scarce resources in order to enrich a small elite at the expense of the 
impoverishment of the masses. Socially, it condemned the Pahlavi regime for its failure 
to tackle the illiteracy problem, bad housing, medical inadequacy, rising unemployment, 
and the widening gap between rich and poor. Culturally, it accused the regime of 
systematically undermining religious values through the spread of consumerism, the 
encouragement of possessive individualism, racism (especially the glorification of the 
Aryan race) and cultural imperialism. In the later stages of their formation, during the 
mid 1970s, they were deeply affected by the views of a young rising intellectual with a 
rebellious spirit, Ali Shariati.
Shariati’s radical liberation theology
Ali Shariati had such a profound effect on the ideological formation of the Iranian 
revolution that he was celebrated as the “teacher of revolution”. However, as will be 
discussed shortly, this description is somewhat exaggerated and Shariati’s political 
principles differ to some extent from the guiding principles of the revolution. Still, 
frequent arrests and imprisonment in solitary confinement failed to break or contain 
him, and this failure only added to his charisma. Shariati had tremendous ability to 
speak and write Persian innovatively and creatively, employing and intertwining 
mythical, intellectual and religious knowledge. He intellectualised religious passion in 
combination with using cold rationality to pursue his ideals of egalitarianism and 
freedom and recruiting western knowledge to reactivate historical Islamic and Iranian 
knowledge. He was completely devoted to his beliefs and led a daring attack on 
traditional, rigid interpretations of Islam by attempting to develop a progressive and 
dynamic reading of Islam. His early death in 1977 at the age of forty-four (which was 
at the time widely believed to be the work of SAVAK) transformed him into a mythical 
character and charismatic intellectual. Even Khomeini, despite his strong opposition to 
Shariati’s views, never dared to criticise him publicly.
280 Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, p. 97.
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Shariati’s family background also had an added effect to his popularity. His mother 
came from a small land-owning family and his father from a long line of highly 
educated scholarly clerics. His father, who was submersed in Erfaan (mystic 
philosophy), broke with the tradition and left his ancestral village Mazinan, which was
^Oj
located at the edge of the desert, for the city. An unconventional cleric, he gave up 
his turban and became famous for his liberal-mindedness and political activity. Shariati 
was deeply affected by his father’s intellectual influence in his early years, particularly 
as his father held discussion groups where his friends studied and discussed modem 
thinkers. During the nationalisation of oil movement, when Shariati was a teenager, he 
enthusiastically supported Mussadiq and the NF, later taking part in demonstrations 
supporting Mussadiq at the Teachers College where he studied. After the 1953 coup, he
989and others in the discussion group felt that the clergy had betrayed Mussadiq. In the 
same year he earned his diploma and became a village teacher, and simultaneously 
entered Mashhad University to study modem languages. Within the next three years he 
earned his MA and spent eight months in prison with his father and the other members 
of the discussion group, who had been accused of trying to reactivate the NF. He also 
married the sister of a Tudeh Party student leader who had been killed by the Shah’s 
security forces. During this time, Shariati translated some books from Arabic and 
French.
In 1959, as the best student in his college, he won an Iranian government scholarship to 
study for a PhD in sociology at the Sorbonne University. He entered Paris at the height 
of the Algerian revolution and soon became involved in the political struggles of other 
Third World countries. At the Sorbonne, he was affected by highly respected scholars 
like Henry Corbin, a highly regarded Orientalist, and attended lectures by Roger Garudy 
(an ideologue of the French Communist Party who initiated a dialogue between 
Marxism and Christianity) and George Politzer. He also attended lectures by George 
Gurvitch (the founding father of dialectical sociology) for five years and became known 
as an expert on Gurvitch’s thought. However, the most profound effect on Shariati was 
made by Louis Massignon, a celebrated French Orientalist. Shariati had so much 
respect and affection for him that Massignon’s death was for him an irreplaceable loss, 
which constantly increased.
281 Ali Shariati, Kavir [Desert] (Tehran, 1977 [1355]), p. 5
282 Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, p. 106.
283 Shariati, Kavir, p. 76.
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During his last year in France, Shariati met Banisadr, an economist member of the 
National Front who was sent by the Freedom Movement to replace him. Through 
debate they came to the conclusion that the Islam which was “represented by the clergy 
was a finger-deep ocean in which it was impossible to swim”.284 Hence, they decided to 
clarify whether the clergy were representing Islam in its authentic form and if this were 
the case, then “to abandon their attempt to present Islam as a modem alternative 
doctrine.”285 After all, as Shariati, remarked in a typical sarcastic way, “we did not get 
advantage of worldly delights, [so] we might as well find out whether it was worth such 
sacrifices”. They concluded that Islam was a progressive and liberating belief system, 
but that its message had become alienated and obscured by the Islam of the clergy.
The decision was hence taken to reconstruct Islam and divide this task between 
themselves. Shariati decided to undertake the task of critical study of the practice of 
Islam, while Banisadr was to develop an alternative interpretation of Islam through 
studying Islamic primary sources.286 Shariati began his job immediately and after 
finishing his PhD returned to Iran, but he was arrested at the Iranian border and 
subsequently imprisoned for six months. After his release, he was denied a lectureship 
and instead taught at a secondary school while conducting his research. Eventually, 
however, he became a university lecturer of Islamology at Mashad University. He was 
then invited to Tehran to take up a permanent position at the Husseinieh-e Ear shad, a 
religious centre which was set up by anti-regime philanthropists and democratically 
minded Muslim elites. The next three years proved to be by far the most fruitful time of 
his life. His lectures soon attracted enormous interest, mainly among students and the 
educated class in general, but lay people would also listen to his long lectures, which 
sometimes lasted more than five hours. His lectures and writings were later published 
in more than forty volumes.
Shariati’s revolutionary theology argued that the engine of history is God’s will, by 
which he meant the inner desire of humans to achieve both a higher stage of 
consciousness and class struggle. He saw human history as the history of struggle of 
religion against religion: the religion of the oppressed against the religion of oppressors, 
the religious of monotheism against polytheism, and he distinguished between two 
types of Islam. “It is necessary”, he wrote,
284 Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian, p. 129.
285 Ibid., p. 130.
286 Banisadr, interview, 21 January 2005.
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to explain what we mean by Islam... [Do we mean] the Islam of justice 
and proper leadership; not that of the rulers, the aristocracy and the upper 
class? [Or] the Islam of freedom, progress and consciousness; not that of 
slavery, captivity and passivity? The Islam of the mojahed (the warrior 
for the cause); not that of the clergy? The Islam of virtue, personal 
responsibility and protest; not that of religious dissimulation, (clerical) 
intercession and (divine) intervention? The Islam of struggle for faith, 
society, and scientific knowledge; not that of surrender, dogmatism and 
uncritical imitation (taqlid) of the clergy?287
For him, Shiism suffered the same fate: after emerging from protest against the 
illegitimate usurping power of khalifs (kings), it eventually lost its revolutionary edge as 
it became the religion of the upper class. He believed that the official clergy alienated 
Shiism from its origins by expropriating, institutionalising and contaminating it with 
static Hellenic philosophy, and like Sunnism, turned it into a rigid dogma and dead
<}OQ
scriptural text. Therefore, Shariati posited two types of Shiism. “Safavid Shiism” 
was an alienated form of Shiism: “the religion of feudal landlords and big merchants; 
the religion, which legitimises the royal family, large landowners and wealthy upper 
classes. In other words, a religion of mourning, passivity and obedience regarding 
authorities.” “Alavid Shiism”, the original Shiism, was the religion of dispossessed, a 
revolutionary Shiism which struggled against exploiters and aimed at creating a just 
society.289 He argued that the official clergy, as ideological members of the upper class, 
had turned Islam from a religion of life into one of death and mourning.
Using Max Weber’s theory of the role of ideas in effecting social change, he argued that 
turning Islam from a “negative force” into a “positive one” required a new interpretation 
that would interpret Islam as a set of rational and dynamic beliefs. This task lay in the 
hands of intellectuals, whose duty it was to initiate an Islamic “renaissance” which 
would inevitably diminish the theological and cultural causes of “religious and clerical 
despotism”. In brief, Shariati intended to continue the long-delayed Islamic
287 Ali Shariati, Darsha-ey Islamshenasi [Lessons on Islamology, Lesson II] (Tehran, 1978), pp. 98-99.
288 Referring to the Safavid dynasty, which ruled Iran from 1501 for more than two centuries, during which Shiism
became an imposed official religion of the countiy.
289 Ali was the first Shia Imam and fourth Khalif after Mohammed’s death in the seventh century AD. He was
assassinated by opponents at the age of sixty-three.
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Renaissance by redefining Islam in a progressive way so that it could be used in 
struggles against both imperialism and domestic despotism.
However, Shariati had an ambiguous ideological and political relationship to 
democracy. On the one hand, he advocated the idea of freedom and believed in free 
will and choice. On the other hand, he rejected democracy in the short-term, arguing 
that advocating democracy in Iran at that stage would lead to the election of a 
conservative, self-serving dictator,290 and prescribed what he called “guided 
democracy”. In his view, Iran during the 1950s and 1960s did not resemble France at 
the time of the French revolution, but rather the late feudal era on the eve of the 
Renaissance. And yet he strongly opposed religious dictatorship, arguing that
a religious state is a state in which, instead of a political elite, a religious 
elite [clergy] occupies political and state positions. In other words, a 
religious state is a government of clergy over people. One of the natural 
phenomena of such a state is despotism, because the clergyman sees 
himself as God’s successor on Earth. In this case, people have neither 
the right to express their views nor to criticise nor to oppose the 
leader...[such leader] is an irresponsible ruler, and that is the source of 
despotism and dictatorship.
Shariati’s position on freedom is more understandable on an ontological level as the 
“possibility to rebel against embedded determinism and escape the causality chain, 
which has created and manages the universe and life”.292 He understood determinism in 
the form of four “prisons” that confine human freedom: “nature”, “society”, “history” 
and “self’. It is only through the development of consciousness and self-awareness that 
we are able to break away from these prisons. This type of freedom is therefore 
essentially accompanied by self-consciousness and responsibility, which is why he was 
as critical of “western styles” of freedom as he was of domestic despotism. He saw 
such freedoms as being irresponsible:
290 Ali Shariati, Resalat-e- rawshanfekr bara-ye sakhtane-e Jaam ’eh [The Intellegentsia’s Task in the Reconstruction
of Society] (Tehran, 1979), pp. 6-8.
291 Ali Shariati, Majmooeh asar 22: mahab alayhe mazhb [Collected Works, vol. 22: Religion against religion]
(Tehran: Ghalam Publishing Co., 1990 [1368], p. 197.
292 Ali Shariati, Majmooeh asar 14 [History and Understanding of Religion] (Tehran: Ghalam Publishing Co., 1990
[1368], p. 19.
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intellectual suffocation and monopolisation and being [forced] to think 
within the official belief system will inevitably lead to the death of ideas 
and the deprivation of society from its talents and innovations. No crime 
against humanity could be worse than that. However, the absolute [type] 
of western liberalism has created problems which have seriously 
concerned thinkers and reformers, some of whom have even lost faith in 
this system. This is because when a society is absolutely free to do 
whatever it wants to do, then such society is threatened with
293corruption.
In other words, he saw this style of individual freedom as preventing individuals from 
developing social freedom and “social consciousnesses”.294
Thus, in order to escape both dictatorship and “absolute liberalism and absolute 
democracy”, Shariati advocated the idea of “responsible liberalism” or “responsible 
reformism”.295 This is a form of “guided democracy” which is rooted in the belief that 
while an Islamic state is based on “consent” and the principle of “council”,296 it was 
impossible to realise in tribal societies. This is based on the thesis that in “mass” 
psychology, the “emotion coefficient” is stronger than the “intellectual coefficient”; in 
other words, the uneducated masses are easy prey for propaganda and could easily be
9Q7manipulated by leaders of authority. A transition period is thus needed for a society
• 7QRto democratise under a “committed and revolutionary leadership”.
Shariati’s approach to freedom, government and politics was located well within the 
classical tradition of political philosophy, starting from Aristotle and ending with 
Rousseau, as the main question dominating his political philosophy was, “who should 
rule?” In modem political philosophy, while this question remains important, it is 
accompanied by the more important question of “how should one rule?”299 This 
intellectual contradiction has made it possible for critics to justifiably question 
Shariati’s democratic credentials. What he called “guided democracy” is in effect
293 Ali Shariati, Majmooeh asar 30: Eslam-Shenasi [Islamology] (Bee Ja Bita), p. 598.
294 Ali Shariatei, Majmooeh asar 20: Che Bayad Kard [What is to Be Done?] (Bee Ja Bita), p. 239.
295 Shariati, Asar 30, p. 599.
296 Ali Shariati, Majmooeh asar 29: MiadbBaa Ebrahim [Rendevous with Abraham] (Bee Ja Bita), p. 312.
297 Ibid.
298 Ali Shariati, Majmooeh asar 5: Maa va Eghbal [Us and Iqbal] (Tehran: Husseinieh Ershad publishing Co.), p. 48.
299 Allen Reneau, “Auschwitz namordeh ast” [Auschwitz is not dead], Nameye Farhang Magazine, no. 43, 2003
[1381].
nothing but a polite term for benevolent despotism,300 and runs contrary to his praise for 
the democratic principles which the Prophet observed according to the guidance
1A1
embedded in the Koran.
This intellectual contradiction was heightened by his political positions. Shariati was 
firmly committed to Mussadiq, the Iranian prime minister from 1951-53 and a leader 
with impeccable democratic credentials. He also vehemently denied accusations that he 
did not believe in democracy.302 However, it is obvious that his theory—particularly 
the mechanism which he suggests for negotiating the transitory stage—was not properly 
worked out and that dictatorial tendencies could potentially be extracted from it. 
Whether he lacked time and resources to improve his ideas (he spent much of his most 
creative life either in solitary prison or in hiding), or whether these contradictions were 
deeply embedded in his belief system, his theory is problematic. First, the success of 
the transition from guided to actual democracy depends on leaders who are incorruptible 
and immune to the seduction of power; in other words, leaders who have achieved the 
state of sainthood. Such trust in leadership in the absence of mechanisms of check and 
balance is deeply irrational and dangerous and could only be expected from masses 
which are politically and intellectually malleable. Also, such total trust can only exist 
as long as the masses fail to develop intellectually. Thus, any change in the status quo 
which affects the ratio of this zero-sum relation would be seen as a threat to the power 
of the authorities, something that has to be controlled if not suppressed. This would 
make the development of freedoms impossible. Because such a development is the pre­
condition for political and intellectual maturity, the method of guided democracy is 
incompatible with its goal.
The Shah’s regime initially turned a blind eye to Shariati’s attempts to disseminate his 
ideas; from its point of view, analysing the political situation within a cold-war 
scenario, Marxism posed the greatest threat to the Shah’s pro-western policy. Hence, 
the non-Marxist aspects of Shariati’s work could help the regime sway potentially 
Marxist students and universities would cease to be recruiting grounds for Marxist 
organisations. In addition, Shariati took an anti-clerical stance which suited the purpose 
of the regime to weaken the clergy’s grip over society. Shariati, too, was aware of this
300 Ali Rahnama, Mosalmani dar jostejooye naakoja abad, zendeginameye Ali Sahriati [A Muslim in Search of
Nowhereland: The Life of Ali Shariati], transl. by Kiomarse Gergeloo (Tehran, 2003 [1381]), p. 329.
301 See Ali Shariai, Selection or Election, transl. by Ali Asghar Ghassemy (Tehran: Hosseniyeh Ershad and Hamdami
Publishers, 1979). It can also be found online at http://www.shariati.com/.
302 Ali Shariati, Majmooeh aasaar [Collected Works], vol. 12, (Tehran: Husseinieh Ershaad, 1982 [1361]), p. 132.
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and was cunningly able to exploit it as a venue to disseminate his ideas.
Nevertheless, Shariati was arrested and spent eighteen months in solitary confinement, 
an was released on house arrest only at the private request of the Algerian 
government.304 In 1975, he managed to leave Iran for England, but died soon after his 
arrival at the age of forty-four. Shariati did not see the revolution of which he was later 
known as the teacher.305
Soon after Shariati’s death, the social base for his ideas became widespread. Initially 
university students provided his core of support, but they were later joined by many 
young clergy and members of all social strata. His popularity during the 1979 
revolution was so extensive that his books and cassettes sold in hundreds of thousands, 
his famous phrases were written on revolutionary placards and his name included in the 
slogans chanted by millions of demonstrators. Despite his openly anti-clerical stand, 
the clerical regime found it extremely difficult to openly criticise him, even at the height 
of its strength. Khomeini realised the deep-seated support for Shariati even among his 
own followers and therefore remained silent in public. However he indirectly attacked 
Shariati as a “divisive phenomenon”, the introduction of whose ideas was eluded to as a 
pre-planned Satanic plot aimed at breaking up the unity and common cause of Muslims, 
thus sapping their energy.306
MotaharVs democratic belief system
Motahari, Khomeini’s most celebrated disciple, was bom in 1919 in Mashad and 
pursued his religious studies in Qom. He soon became known as one of the best 
students in all the Qom seminaries and was favoured by many scholars, including 
Khomeini himself. After qualifying as a Mujtahid (an authority in religious 
knowledge), he taught theology at Tehran University. He was arrested and released 
soon after the 1963 uprising. He became a prominent member of the Society of 
Monthly Talks for the Propagation of the True Path of Religion, which was founded in
303 Hamid Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh [Lessons of Experience: Abol-Hassan Banisadr’s Memoir in Conversation with
Hamid Ahmadi] (Enghelabe Eslami Zeitung, 2003 [1380]), pp. 125-27.
304 During his years in France he was well known among Algerian intellectuals for his committed support of their
cause. Among them was H. Boumedienne, who later became Algeria’s president.
305 In May 1981, just weeks before Banisadr was overthrown and totalitarian forces monopolised the government,
Shariati’s wife stated in an interview that “if he [Shariati] were alive he would certainly be in prison”. 
Interview with Pouron Shariat Razavi, Mojahed, 1981, No. 122, 27 May.
306 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour, vol. 2, pp. 236 and 417.
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response to the crisis affecting urban youth and which sought to combine Islamic values 
with modem society.
In the late 1960s Motahari was instrumental in establishing the Husseinieh-e Earshad 
(see above). He was its leading speaker until Shariati was invited and overshadowed 
him. He disapproved of Shariati’s interpretation of Islam, especially his anti-clerical 
stance and reinterpretation of Islam through western philosophy, above all Marxism, 
and eventually decided to leave the Husseinieh. In 1975, he was again briefly arrested 
for his anti-regime stance. He continued his intellectual activities through writing and 
lectures. He actively participated in the revolution, but was assassinated in 1979 by a 
member of the radical religious group Forqan, which advocated a violent interpretation 
of Shariati’s ideology.
Motahari’s attempt to ideologically renovate Islam is a reflection of an Islamic jurist’s 
attempt to revive Islam as a dynamic ideology able to respond, absorb and 
accommodate crisis in Islamic societies undergoing processes of modernisation. He 
tried to create a holistic and progressive view of Islam in the modem world that would 
be able to counter Marxism, which was gradually becoming a dominant ideology 
amongst many educated youth. He was a prolific writer and wrote numerous books. 
However, much of Motahari’s work should be understood from the context of his 
ideological opposition to Shariati. His work differs from Shariati’s mainly on three 
grounds.
First, Shariati tried to revolutionise Islam and bring about socio-political change 
through its re-interpretation. Motahari, on the other hand, tried to reform Islam and 
make it compatible with modem life. Both recognised the failure of traditional Islam to 
corresponding sufficiently with modernisation processes and both therefore aspired to 
an Islamic Renaissance. However, while Shariati aimed to achieve this through a 
radical intellectual process, Motahari aimed at achieving it through slow reform.
Second, Shariati borrowed numerous concepts and ideas from western thinkers and 
ideologies and tried to read Islam through these concepts. Motahari not only saw this 
intellectual importation as needless since Islam was a complete set of beliefs in itself, 
but also argued that the injection of foreign concepts damaged the very principle of
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Islam.307 Finally, Shariati viewed the Hellenised clergy as the main source of Islam’s 
contamination, which had led to its passivity, dogmatism and inability to reform itself. 
He therefore envisioned an Islam without clergy. However, Motahari argued that while 
the clergy as a religious class could be seen as “diseased”, the solution was to cure the 
problem rather than cast it aside. In other words, Motahari argued that Islam should be 
guarded against what he called the “eclectic school”, which in his opinion combined 
certain principles of communism with aspects of existentialism and Islamic concepts 
and jargon. According to him, such a discourse was un-Islamic and was therefore 
incapable of presenting an independent school, which would return to Moslems their
1AO
sense of identity. Still, his criticism of Shariati’s position on the clergy was 
accompanied by his criticism of clergy who tried to monopolise the government and 
state. He argued that clergy should not become part of the government on either 
individual or collective levels. “The clergy should maintain its position, which is to 
give guidance and advise and struggle against deviation and corruption in government 
and states.”309 He hence opposed Velayate faghih, saying “it is not people’s 
understanding that the clergy rule and run the country.. .this concept belongs to
A
Sunnism. In Shiism we have never had such a concept.”
Motahari’s commitment to democracy was unwavering. He argued that Islam was a
religion of freedom for everyone in society. He based this argument on the treatment of
freedom in the Koran and on Mohammed’s political and social life; verses such as
1^1“surely We guided him in the way, whether he be thankful or unthankful” and “let
1 1A
whosoever will, believe, and whosoever will, disbelieve”. Just before his 
assassination in 1979, having witnessed the growth of intolerance under the Islamic
307 However, this approach seems to be contradictory with what is considered to be legitimate and illegitimate
knowledge in Houzeh (religious schools). Traditional Islamic thought is heavily affected by Greek philosophy, 
especially the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, which is taught in religious seminars as part of Islamic 
philosophy. In effect, in Houzeh two kinds of philosophy are taught: western and Islamic. However, what is 
considered western is the philosophy which was developed from the Enlightenment onward, extending to 
modem and post-modern western philosophy. Aristotelian philosophy (Falsefeye Mashaei) is one of the two 
main schools of Islamic philosophy, Intuitivism (Eshragh) being the other. In other words, Islamic religious 
teaching does not differentiate much between the philosophy of Aristotle and Intuitivism to such an extend that 
Aristotle is considered the first master, Farabi the second and Sohrevardi the third. Interview by the author 
with Hassan Rezaei, 28 June 2005.
308 Motahari, Mosahebehaayee piramoone enghleabe Eslami, pp. 14-15 and 162-23.
309 Motahari, M., Piraamoone Enghelaabe eslami [Around the Islamic Revolution] (Daftare Enteshaaraate Eslami,
vaabasteh be jaame’eh modaressine hozeye elmieh Qom: Bita), p. 26.
310 Motahari, M. Piraamoone Enghelaabe eslami, p. 67.
311 Koran, 76: 29.
312 Koran, 18:29.
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regime, he became more forceful in arguing for the vital importance of democracy as a 
safeguard to prevent the revolution’s deviation towards despotism:313
everyone must have freedom of thought and expression, both in speech 
and writing, and only in this form will our Islamic Revolution continue 
on the road of victory... .[o]nly if an environment of freedom is 
created.. ..only on such a healthy ground will Islam be able to send down 
more roots [to provide a free atmosphere]. This is the only way to 
confront opposing ideas; otherwise, if we want to control thought, we 
shall have defeated Islam and the Islamic Republic.314
Before the revolution, Motahari’s works had been overshadowed by the sudden rise of 
Shariati. His social base at the time was mainly confined to the Tolaab (theology 
students), religious university students and traditional middle-class youth. However, 
after his death his popularity penetrated deeper into the urban social strata. The clerical 
regime celebrated his thoughts as being representative of ideological Islam, while his
W c
belief about the interrelation of Islam and democracy was cast aside and censored.
Bazargan’s liberal-democratic Islam316
Mehdi Bazargan was bom in 1907 into an Azeri family which later immigrated to 
Tehran. He was among the first group of Iranians sent to study in France in the 1930s. 
He returned to Iran seven years later as an engineer and physicist and taught at Tehran 
University. As a political moderate, he became part of one of the few religious-based 
groups to support Mussadiq in the 1950s. During the nationalisation of oil in 1951, he
314 Motahari, Mosaahebehaayee Pyraamone Enghelabe Eslami, quoted in H. Afshar, ed., Iran: A Revolution in
Turmoil (New York: Macmillan Press, 1985), pp. 217-18.
315 Nevertheless, in the power struggle which broke out between the conservative and reformist factions of the regime
after Khatami’s election in 1998, the reformists revived his arguments relating to democracy.
316 It is important to notice that the word “liberal”, during the revolution, was introduced to the political culture in
Iran by the Tudeh party. It was used as a libel against the democratically oriented elites and was 
interchangeably with words like “capitalist”, “westernised” and “westoxicated”. The Tudeh party resorted to 
this terminology in order to justify its opposition with Bazargan and Banisadr government. Soon after that IRP 
borrowed the term and used in the same fashion as the Tudeh party. However as much as Bazargan did not see 
any problem with this libel, Banisadr did and in detailed interviews and speeches argued that historically and 
philosophically speaking liberalism by definition can be adjusted, both, to authoritarian and democratic 
systems and it is not inherently democratic. Hence as much as he saw himself a democrat, he did not see 
himself a liberal.
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headed the oil nationalisation committee and was close to Mussadiq. He spent three 
years in prison after the 1953 coup. In 1961, in conjunction with the progressive and 
democratically minded clergy Ayatollah Taleqani, he founded a moderate religious 
party called the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), which advocated the 
implementation of the 1906 Constitution. In 1964 he was arrested again and sentenced 
to ten years imprisonment.
In 1978-79 the LMI emerged as one of the many political coalitions, which facilitated 
the collapse of the Pahlavi regime. Bazargan’s popularity was such that Khomeini 
appointed him as Prime minister to head the provisional revolutionary government after 
the Shah’s overthrow. However, nine months later he was forced to resign when radical 
Moslem students occupied the American embassy in Tehran. His group was one of the 
very few which were allowed to remain semi-active in the opposition, though he and his 
followers were constantly harassed and their activity severely hampered by the regime. 
At the end of his life he became more vociferous in his opposition to the government.
He died in 1995.
Bazargan was distinguished as a prominent Islamist for his democratic and humanist 
interpretation of Islam. In his theology, because God willed individuals free in their 
judgments and decisions, therefore freedom of choice is the coordinating mechanism of
1^7the relationship between God and individual human beings. As individuals are bom 
free, if they are then forced into compliance their beliefs and the mechanisms used to
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coerce them are meaningless. God does not wish to impose Her/His view of what is 
good upon individuals since coercion would negate their God-given freedom of choice. 
Any policy that violates the principle of “non-coercion” therefore opposes the basic
1 I Q
principle that God defines in the Koran: “there can be no coercion in religion”.
However, the limit of this freedom of choice is others’ freedom and no individual can 
violate the freedom of others. Doing so would violate one of the most pronounced 
principles of Islam regarding the relation between the individual and society: “no one 
can do harm to any other person and no one can be subjected to harm by any other 
person”.320
317 Mehdi Bazargan, Bazyabi-ye Arzesh-ha [The Rediscovery of Values, Vol. 3] (Tehran: n.p., 1983), p. 132.
3,8 Ibid., p. 78.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid., p. 118.
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According to Bazargan, God commanded the Prophet to “consult with the people on 
issues and policies” that concerned their lives.321 Therefore, it is also necessary for an 
Islamic government to consult the people. Bazargan argued that it was obvious that 
“political democracy is the cornerstone of Islamic political thought” since “one 
thousand years before the emergence of the concept of democracy in the West, the 
government of the people by the people was practised in the days of the Prophet”.
In economic terms, Bazargan can be classified as a mild socialist, gradually becoming 
an advocate of a “mixed economy”. In this theory private property was viewed as 
Islamic as long as it was accumulated legally and legitimately and according to Islamic 
yardsticks. The combination of wage labour and the means of production in the 
process of factory production were viewed as a successful and happy marriage that 
would lead to the implementation of democracy and the development of freedom, equity 
and social justice.324 He opposed wide income disparities, viewing them as un-Islamic. 
In the mixed economy, one of the duties of the government was to help the public sector 
and iron out difficulties which the market could not cope with, such as public welfare 
and services.
Prior to the revolution, Bazargan’s social base was confined to university students and 
the religious middle class. However, during the revolution, his popularity crossed class 
and ethnic lines, and as he was the most popular Moslem intellectual Khomeini had to 
endorse him for the premiership. After his resignation 1979, his popularity remained 
considerable enough that while they threatened him and arrested his associates, the 
ruling regime never imprisoned him.
Banisadr’s Islam as a discourse of freedom
Abol-Hassan Banisadr was bom in 1933 in Hamadan (west Iran). His father was a 
respected religious scholar from a small land-owning family. During the period of oil 
nationalisation, he actively supported Mussadiq. In early 1960, while studying 
economics and Islamic law in Tehran University, Banisadr became the leader of the 
student branch of the NF. When Ali Amini was appointed the Shah’s liberal prime-
321 Ibid., p. 12.
322 Bazargaan, Bazyabi-ye arzesh-ha, p. 117.
323 See Abol-Hassan Banisadr, Eslam va kaar [Islam and Labour] (Tehran: Entesharate Engelabe Eslami, 1980
[1358]).
324 Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, Iran After the Revolution (London: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1995), p. 85.
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minister in 1961, he tried to recruit the young Banisadr into his government by offering 
him a job as deputy mayor of Tehran, which Banisadr refused. After Amirn’s 
collapse he was arrested along with many others, but was released six months after.
This time the Shah himself tried to recruit him and his older brother by offering them 
ministerial positions, which Banisadr again refused.326
Soon after, he left Iran for France in order to continue his intellectual and political 
activity. In 1964 he became the honorary president of the Confederation of 
International Students Unions in London. He worked towards a PhD in economics at 
the Sorbonne University whilst continuing his studies in sociology and Islamic 
philosophy. A few years after arriving in France, he began to advocate overthrowing 
the Shah’s regime and establishing an Islamic government. He wrote extensively about 
Islamic views on politics, economy and society and for a while was an active member 
of the Confederation of Iranian Students (the expatriate branch of the NF).
As mentioned earlier, it was here that he met Shariati, and where they cooperatively 
undertook the task of creating an Islamic doctrine that would be compatible with the 
needs of the modem world. According to Banisadr, they divided the work of 
reconstructing Islam. Shariati assumed responsibility for attacking traditional Islam, 
whilst Banisadr worked on reconstructing it in order to establish a revitalised Islamic 
doctrine. Later, as mentioned already, Banisadr met Khomeini in Iraq and criticised 
his conception of Islamic government. Khomeini replied that he simply intended to 
open a gate (fath-al-baab) for further debates and proposals, which people like Banisadr 
and Motahari could use to propose a comprehensive programme for an Islamic state.
At Khomeini’s request, Banisadr wrote a book entitled Principles o f  Islamic Republic, 
in which he defined an Islamic state based on democratic principles.
When Khomeini was expelled from Iraq in 1978, he stayed with Banisadr for a time in 
Paris. It was here that Banisadr became one of Khomeini’s closest associates. In 1979, 
after the Shah was overthrown, Banisadr became a member of the Revolutionary
325 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 97.
326 Ibid., p. 98.
327 Ibid., p. 106.
328 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
329 Ibid.
330 Banisadr has repeated this on many occasions, the last of which can be found in Enghelabe Eslami, No. 458, 8-21
March 1999.
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Council. Later he also became Minister of Finance, then Foreign Minister, and in 1980 
he was elected as the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Banisadr used this 
office to oppose the IRP’s attempts to control the state, but he was forced out of office 
in June 1981 through a creeping coup, and went into hiding. Shortly after, he made a 
dramatic escape to France, where he presently resides and continues his political and 
intellectual activities.
Banisadr made the most significant contributions to the construction of the revolution’s 
“Islamic ideology” and developed a systematic and coherent Islamic discourse. He 
paid particular attention to the role that violence plays in political, economic, social and 
cultural relations:
“Every state is founded on force”. This remark by Trotsky, in a way 
summarises the history of civilisation. Max Weber also shares the 
definition in principle: “command and obedience are the necessary 
preconditions of the existence of the state. The state only can become a 
viable and continuous entity, if it has the control of external means 
(physical force) and inner justification (individual or institutional
• I ' l  i
legitimacy).
Banisadr’s aspiration, however, is to diminish the centrality of violence (physical force) 
in any ideological claim to political salvation. This is because he sees the presence of 
physical force as an external reason for the loss of freedom. In Equilibriums, one of his 
major works, he defines the history of mankind as a series of attempts to attain freedom:
The entire course of human history has been spent in trying to be 
released from religious despotism. The only way for emancipation is 
that which God Himself put at man’s disposal. Other than God, no one 
has the right to consider his thought of absolute certitude. No one has 
the right to force himself and others to obey it.
331 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, p. 78.
332 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, Movazeneha [Equilibriums] (Tehran: Entesharate Enghelab Eslami, 1980 [1358]), p. 36.
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He thus argues that the precondition for achieving freedom and avoiding the 
replacement of one kind of despotism with another is the complete negation of the use 
of force. This is because even thoughts which mobilise social forces in order to 
establish freedom may be turned into means of legitimising power.333 In developing his 
theory of equilibriums, he argued that a certain kind of equilibrium is operative in every 
type of theoretical proposition, political or otherwise. This equilibrium is predicated on 
certain modes of relationships among the constituent forces of every theoretical
• • 334proposition.
In this paradigm, there are three types of equilibrium: relationships of human to God 
(negative), human to human (positive), and human to the universe (simultaneously 
positive and negative). In a “negative equilibrium”, such as that of the relation of 
humans to God, there is an absence of force, power relations and tyranny; therefore, 
outcomes are always positive and constructive. Banisadr argues that Islam operates 
according to this equilibrium, which he also calls a “unitary (monotheistic) relationship” 
(Rabetey-e Tohidi). It is based on the principle of Tawhid, understood as the unification 
of humans with God, with other humans and with nature. According to him, the 
concept reflects human freedom and the absence of all types of power relations.
Tawhid refers to a lack of separation between everything existing, a unity of self and 
other, individual and society, God and human, human and nature; it disrupts these 
dichotomies and makes them untrue. Consequently, Tawhid is the “motion toward a 
great and multi-faceted revolution, which leads to the establishment of new social 
relations and new relations with nature and the individual self. In such relations, nature, 
society and the thinking mind are not factors that limit human freedom, but that expand 
them”.336
Any kind of relationship, however, which is not based on Tawhidi relations or negative 
equilibrium brings in force as a factor and inevitably becomes inimical and friction- 
provoking. In Islam, all relationships are extensions of the God-human relationship,
333 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
334 Ibid., p. 1.
335 A. H. Banisadr, Human Rights in Islam (Arab Encyclopedia House, 1987), p. 11.
336 A.H. Banisadr, The Guiding Principles o f  Islam [Osoole Raahnamaaye Eslam] (Germany: Enteshaaraate
Engelaabe Eslami, 1997 [1371]), p. 18.
337 Ibid., p. 3.
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as humans are created free with an inner disposition towards unity. Therefore, the 
God-human paradigm, in which there is no force, friction, tyranny or exploitation, 
should be the basis for any other relationship, be it political, social, cultural or 
economic. In this way, Banisadr shares the Marxist objective of a classless society, but 
argues that it is impossible to achieve within a Marxist discourse:
Should we want to move from fictional and mythological solutions to a 
scientific solution, we will have to accept a system that is regulated on 
the basis of relationship with God and thus gives all human beings 
unlimited possibilities for growth (because in the man-God relationship 
possibilities are unlimited); and that is precisely the solution that Islam 
offers.339
Banisadr believes in the possibility of a total elimination of dominance, as the most 
emphatic expression of physical force, in social relationships. However, relationships 
in the modem world are based on a “positive equilibrium” and therefore by their nature 
exploitative and conflictual. Within this paradigm, two separate units confront each 
other with equal or unequal force.340 Banisadr argues that power relations of any kind 
are anti-Islamic and will lead to confrontation. The elimination of violence is also 
unachievable within western ideologies, which, while preaching ideals of equality, still 
postulate relationships of obedience and dominance to attain that goal. They are 
therefore inevitably nullified by the very relationship they wish to establish.341 Banisadr 
also argues that there are ideological movements which embrace both negative and 
positive equilibriums, but that these are founded on a belief that minds and actions have 
a identity separate from God. This, he argues, leads to a multiplicity of identity.342
This theory of equilibriums is apparent in his writing on Islam and economics, which is 
best reflected in two of his most important books, Oil and Dominance (1974) and 
Economy o f Tawhid (1976). In these he disputes the traditional definition of economics
338 Ibid., p. 12.
339 Ibid., p. 16.
340 Ibid., p. 14.
341 Ibid., p. 43.
342 Ibid., pp. 43 and 54.
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as “the science of struggle against scarcity”.343 In his view, because God created 
enough of everything, scarcity is not a natural phenomenon but a social one.344 
Economics should thus be the science of struggling against an artificially created 
scarcity. He rejects the primacy of capital in economic production, redefining this 
instead as a form of violence. In his argument every institutional human grouping has 
four essential concentrations of violence upon which human groups are founded—in the 
economic sphere, capital; in politics, power; in society, social relations based on 
physical force; and in religion (or ideology), systems of belief that sustain such relations 
of power.345 As long as such relationships function within a “positive equilibrium” 
there is no escape from relations of power and exploitation, which are intrinsic to each 
of these domains. Economics based on “positive balances” inevitably leads to the 
exploitation of the majority by a minority. Such relations, which allow the 
accumulation of capital, have also caused a massive waste of human energy by 
balancing opposing forces and have denied a majority of people the most basic rights: 
the right to work and to produce.346 Banisadr’s proposition for escaping such tyrannical 
relations is to return to “the natural”,347 the state of being in which material values are 
important only to the degree that they are transubstantiated into spiritual values. 
However, this is only possible through a relation that is based on “negative equilibrium” 
which transforms material gains into spiritual virtues. It is only through this type of 
equilibrium that we can reach a total negation of the very idea of domination.349 It is 
only through Islamic economy that the relation of power disappears, since
[it] opens the closed circuit and makes it possible for humanity to regain 
the spirituality that has been denied it. This economics is the science of 
struggling against systems that are founded on physical violence, adding 
scarcity upon scarcity.350
If Shariati’s role was decisive for giving an Islamic identity to the revolution, then 
Banisadr was decisive in giving Islam a democratic character after the revolution by 
presenting Islam as a discourse of freedom in the above manner. As will be discussed,
343 Banisadr, Eqtesad-e Towhidi [Tawhid Economics] (Enteshaaraate Amir Kabir, 1980 [1359]), p. 1.
344 Ibid., p. iv.
345 Hamid Dabashi, Theology o f  Discontent (New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 382.
346 Ibid.
347 Banisadr, Eqtesad-e Towhidi, p. iv.
348 Dabashi, Theology o f  Discontent, p. 382.
349 Banisadr, Eqtesad-e Towhidi, p. 44.
350 Ibid., p. ix.
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at the height of the tension between democratic and totalitarian forces struggling for 
power of the post-revolutionary state, Rafsanjani (then head of the Majles) drew an 
ideological line of conflict on this basis, stating that “in Iran we have two types of 
Islam: the Islam of Banisadr and the Islam of the Feyziyeh” (the latter referred to the 
theology school in Qom where Khomeini taught, in other words implying Khomeini’s 
interpretation of Islam).351 It should be noted that prior to the revolution, Banisadr’s 
work was known only to Moslem students outside Iran and to a small circle of religious 
intellectuals. During the revolution, however, his works (both recorded speeches and 
books) became widely available and some of his books like Economy o f Tawhid and 
Cult o f  Personality “became some of the best sellers in the country.” He also 
founded a newspaper, Enghelabe Eslami (Islamic Revolution), which Mohammad Jafari
'lf'5
argues soon became the most popular and widely read paper in Iranian history. He 
used his public speaking talents to increase his social base from the young, educated 
middle class to include members of the working class and peasantry, and the popularity 
of his ideas led to his election as the first president of the country in 1980 with over 
76% of the vote.
Diversity of oppositional discourses
Hence, within the broad opposition to the Shah during the 1960s and 1970s we can 
identify a multiplicity of Islamic discourses which eventually provided an alternative 
system of government to the Pahlavi regime. As has been argued already, the cultural 
and political groundwork for the revolution was prepared by Moslem intellectuals who 
aimed at breaking away from the dichotomy of choice between the clergy and the 
monarchy, or between tradition and westernisation (or as Al-e Ahmad called it, 
“westoxication”). They elaborated a “third way”, which could only be made possible 
by introducing an alternative, democratic interpretation of Islam. Such an interpretation 
would not only make it possible for Iran to enter the modem era without facing an 
identity crisis, but would make it possible to view identity as a dynamic process, which 
was based on specific values and devoid of dogmatic and rigid interpretations of the 
religion.
351 Hashemi Rafsanjani, speech in Friday prayer, Tehran University, May 1980.
352 Jafari, interview, 9 September 2004.
353 Ibid
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The increasing popularity of these discourses, however, was affected by external 
variables as much as by the internal merits of the discourses themselves. The new 
alternative might have failed to gain popularity, at least in the short and medium terms, 
had the Shah’s regime begun to reform itself and recognise the democratic rights of the 
people. In other words, as Bazargan argued, the Shah became the “negative leader of 
the revolution” by becoming an authoritarian and repressive ruler, succeeding in uniting 
disparate groups with different—if not opposing—sets of beliefs against himself. The 
development of the new discourse hence provided cultural conditions not only for the 
expression of discontent with inequality and political repression, but provided an 
alternative discourse to that of the ruling regime. The variables necessary for a 
successful revolution, at least in its first stage, were at work and the explosive 
combination of socio-economic and cultural forces only needed ignition to start the 
process.
However, in order to understand the socio-economic conditions which provided both 
the background and conditions for mobilisation and organisation, it is necessary to 
briefly look at the socio-economic changes, which Iranian society experienced during 
the period preceding the revolution: urbanisation, industrialisation, and the expansion of 
working and modem middle classes, universities and civil society. These changes 
happened next to the further impoverishment of rural areas and a rapid increase in 
shanty towns. In other words, prior to the revolution Iranian society was a classic 
example of unequal development in a third world country governed by an authoritarian 
political structure.
I l l
4Revolutionary process:
From “nights o f  poem” to the overthrow
In the early 1970s, a few years before his death, Ali Shariati predicted the coming 
revolution and the formation of its Islamic discourse, while Banisadr articulated the 
democratic characteristics of the future Islamic state. However, western intelligence, 
political and academic organisations as a whole were unaware that pre-revolutionary 
conditions had developed. This failure to anticipate the revolution is partly explained 
by the fact that they functioned within a Cold War paradigm which blinded them to the 
emerging challenge to the monarchy. Another reason for this failure can be traced to 
the intellectual bases of academic analyses of the Third-World revolutions, which were 
dominated by modernist and structuralist theories. Revolution was defined as the 
violent overthrow of a state by its contender. It was assumed that this would take the 
form of armed struggle and be led by a vanguard party, which would receive support 
from an external superpower (primarily the USSR). The massive suppression of armed 
organisations by the Shah’s regime, and thus the relative absence of these factors within 
Iranian society, prevented western intelligence organisations from recognising that in 
the late 1970s, Iran was a society on the verge of explosion.
By late 1977, the Shah's regime was entering a new phase, but the Shah remained totally 
unaware of its consequences and still believed in the invincibility of his regime. The 
Shah decided, or rather felt that he was being forced, to loosen his grip over Iranian 
society, and did so in a very limited way. He promised to create a free political 
atmosphere, forbid the use of torture in prisons and release many political prisoners. 
These limited changes led many in the opposition to believe that American support for 
the regime was no longer unconditional. This belief, real or not, fuelled the 
opposition’s political expectations and activities. Consequently, the opposition became 
more daring and began to publicly condemn a regime that they realised would be unable 
to retaliate freely.354 As a first step, the Writer’s Guild sent a letter signed by forty 
writers to Iran’s Prime minister. The letter was highly critical of the Shah’s regime and 
lamented its widespread repression, corruption and lack of freedom. Shortly after, 
dozens of professional associations were reactivated and new ones established, like the
354 Students o f the Imam’s Line, Asnad-e lanah-e jasusi [Documents from the Den of Spies], vol. 8, 25 July 1977, p.
178.
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Iranian Society for the Defence of Human Rights. The Writers Association organised 
ten nights of poetry reading (called the “Nights of Poem”), which was attended by 
between ten and fifteen thousand people and which initiated the first political gatherings 
which precipitated the revolution and which demanded the end of censorship.355
The death of Khomeini’s son and the first public gatherings of the revolution
In 1978, Khomeini’s elder son Mustafa died suddenly. This was attributed by some to 
the SAVAK. His funeral attracted a large gathering, and for the first time since the 
1963 uprising the police did not intervene. However, at this point the germinating 
political movement, led by students and secular intellectuals, was reformist in nature.
Its social base was therefore mainly confined to the small, modem middle class.
In July 1977, Richard Helms, a former CIA director and US Ambassador to Iran (also 
formerly a schoolmate of the Shah in Switzerland) was replaced by William Sullivan. 
Apart from the psychological effect of this change, its main importance was what it said 
about the changing policy of the US towards Iran. Sullivan welcomed the opening of 
the political atmosphere in Iran. Lacking insight into the social realities of Iranian 
political culture, however, he believed that the Shah’s regime was unassailable, and 
therefore that further liberalisation would pose no threat and should be implemented.
As pointed out already, it could be argued that his analysis was rooted in the dominant 
discourse of contemporary revolutions in which any threat to the regime would 
originate from underground vanguard military organisations and develop through a 
widespread armed, guerrilla-style struggle. As the Shah had succeeded in crushing such 
organisations, he was in a stronger position to loosen his grip and lessen political 
repression. Sullivan’s analysis encouraged Washington to increase pressure on the 
Shah for further liberalisation. However, to assure the Shah of America’s continual 
backing and demonstrate confidence in his analyst’s optimistic views of the regime’s 
stability, in 1978 Carter paid a visit to Iran in which he praised the Shah for creating an 
island of stability in a troubled region. However, by that time the opposition, which 
was initially reformist, poorly organised and supported by only a small section of 
society, was fast gaining momentum. It was becoming more coordinated and radical in 
its demands as it spread further into the urban social strata.
355 Naser Moazen, ed., Dah Shab [Ten Nights] (Tehran, 1978).
356 Public Paper of the President: Administration of Jimmy Carter (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 2221.
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The Shah writes against Khomeini
Structural circumstances by themselves can only provide conditions for revolution; they 
are insufficient for igniting and sustaining revolutionary process. This only occurs 
when agents, via the filter of culture, transform these objective conditions into 
subjective postulations which are conducive to revolution. Furthermore, the role of the 
character of people located in key structural positions, whether psychological 
framework or political knowledge and analysis, may also have lasting effects on the 
emergence, process and outcome of revolution in general. Marx elaborated this point in 
his detailed analysis of the character of Louis Bonaparte and its impact on the 1848 
socio-political upheavals in France.
There are currently two explanations of what actually set the wheel of the 1979 Iranian 
revolution in motion; two versions of why on 7 January 1978 the Shah ordered the 
Ministry of Information to write a humiliating letter about Khomeini. The first is a 
psychological explanation which argues that the Shah’s revengeful character ignited a 
process that marginalised or radicalised reformists and emboldened revolutionaries. In 
this account, as Bazargan argued, the Shah became the “negative leader” of the 
revolution. The second explanation concentrates on the Shah’s political decision­
making ability.
According to the psychological explanation, soon after the “Nights of Poem”, General 
Nassiri (then head of SAVAK) informed the Shah that Khomeini had made a speech on 
the occasion of his son’s death in which he claimed that his grief over his loss “paled in 
comparison to the grief he felt for all the crimes committed by the Pahlavi regime in
I C Q
Iran”. This infuriated the Shah, who had a habit of taking criticisms personally, to 
such an extent that he disregarded Khomeini’s religious status as a grand ayatollah and 
ordered an article to be written in order to humiliate him. He in fact rejected the first 
draft because it was not humiliating enough and only approved of a second, harsher
357 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire o f  Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1963). For a more
recent example, see Zhand P. Shakibi, The King, the Tsar, and the Shah: Agency and the Making o f  Revolution 
in Bourbon France, Romanov Russia and Pahlavi Iran (PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, 2001).
358 A. Milani, The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle o f  the Iranian Revolution (Washington, DC:
Mage Publishers, 2003), pp. 285-86.
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letter, which soothed his anger. The article was published in the newspaper Ettela ’at359
• • ■ • 360and portrayed Khomeini as an agent of colonialism, a traitor and of Indian descent.
However, this psychological explanation of this extraordinary historical occasion has
been challenged, primarily by Banisadr. According to him, after the regime collapsed
they found documents which revealed a different motive behind the action. The new
evidence suggests that the provocative action was not merely motivated by the Shah’s
revengeful character, but was rather a calculated political manoeuvre taken in order to
force Carter to ease pressure on the Shah to observe human rights in the conduct of his
government. The plan was to provoke the clergy into actions which he assumed would
be confined to Qom, the holy centre of Shia learning. That would then alarm Carter,
who would believe that his policy had enabled the intrusion of reactionary Moslems into
the political domain. Hence, the Shah could not only crack down on the protests, but
would also be assured that the US president would no longer pressure him to liberalise
^  1
his politics and could therefore pursue his policy of political repression. Ultimately, 
however, the publication of this letter proved to be one of the Shah’s most misguided 
decisions, as the protests were not confined to Qom, and the letter ignited a much larger 
revolutionary process. This second explanation seems to be more coherent, since while 
Khomeini made many inflammatory speeches against the Shah during his exile, the 
Shah had never reacted in such a way. It raises questions about why he responded so 
drastically to the speech of a father mourning the death of his son.
Initially, three non-political grand ayatollahs (Golpaygani, Shariatmadari and Mar’ashi) 
demanded the revocation of the article, but to no avail.362 Two days after the letter was 
published, the clergy organised a peaceful demonstration in Qom in which dozens of 
protesters were killed and many more injured as a result of violent police 
intervention.363 This disproportionate use of violence proved to be the point when the 
revolution entered the offensive stage.
359 Ettela 'at, 7 January 1978.
360 This was used in a derogatory way to suggest that he was “not Iranian”.
361 Banisadr, interview, 21 Januaiy 2005. Banisadr’s version of events has also been verified by Ehsan Naraghi, a
prominent Iranian sociologist who met the Shah on numerous occasions during the revolution. See “Shah va 
enghelabe Eslami” [The Shah and the Islamic Revolution], GooyaNews, 11 Feburary 2005 [23 Bahman 1383], 
accessed online at http://mag.goova.eom/politics/archives/023582.php#more.
362 Asnad, vol. 12, June 1978, p. 119 (“Iran in 1977-78: The Internal Scene”) [from AET to SDW], quoted in Milani,
The Making o f Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 112.
363 It has been claimed that the police used live ammunition because Iran’s request for a supply of tear gas had been
delayed due to human rights activists in the US state department and only could get it by November 1978.
(See Milani, The Making o f  Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 113.) That explanation has serious problems. For 
instance, the claim conflicts with the heavy use of tear gas three days before of the massacre in the Eid-e Fetr
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The murder of demonstrators also provided an opportunity for the inventive use of 
religious symbols as an effective means to pursue the goals of the nascent revolution. 
The opposition was able to tap in into massive religious symbolism and rituals and in 
doing so transfer them into revolutionary means. For example, the clergy in Tabriz (one 
of the largest Iranian cities and home of Shariatmadari, the most prominent grand 
ayatollah inside Iran) organised a demonstration to commemorate the fortieth day after 
the incident in Qom, a religious mourning ritual that is customary in Shia tradition. The 
government again intervened and through the use of force prevented the 
commemoration from taking place. In response, people attacked banks, liquor houses 
and the headquarters of the Rastakhiz Party. The army again intervened, killing scores 
and arresting hundreds. The uprising in Tabriz inspired similar forty-day 
commemoration ceremonies throughout Iran. These commemorations in turn sparked 
uprisings in many cities, in which some clergy used the pulpits to implicitly attack the 
regime and the Shah himself. Each uprising ended in bloodshed, leading to further 
commemoration ceremonies for the martyred, which then led to subsequent uprisings.
During this process, as the government had systematically prevented the establishment 
of a political party structure or a legitimate physical space for political mobilisation, 
more and more mosques became centres of spontaneous mobilisation. It was this highly 
effective network of mobilisation which prevented the government from predicting the 
location of each new uprising. This was exacerbated by the speed at which unrest 
spread to regions throughout the country, a decisive factor in the regime’s inability to 
predict and contain protest. During this period, secular intellectuals were increasingly 
sidelined as Islam became the main discourse of discontent, with Khomeini as its 
speaker. This is partly due to the reformist nature of most secular and nationalist 
groups, which were out of step with the radical nature of the uprising, and partly a result 
of their distance from the discourse itself. Religious intellectuals such as Ali Shariati 
developed terminology which was deeply embedded in Iranian and Islamic culture, 
hence redefining terms and presenting new concepts in familiar and non-threatening 
terms. Secular intellectuals, on the other hand, generally employed western 
terminology, which was unfamiliar and therefore threatening to the non-westemised
demonstration. It also assumes that a police state with constant student unrest did not have a stockpile of tear 
gas, that the US was the sole supplier of tear gas and that the government could not get it from anywhere else.
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segments of the population, the absolute majority of the public, who identified it with 
the half-century project of forced westernisation conducted by the Pahlavi dynasty.
Early responses to revolutionary activity
Here it is important to mention that the spontaneity and speed of the revolution not only 
took various intelligence services and opposition reformists by surprise; it also caught 
Khomeini by complete surprise. Until the closure of bazaars, Khomeini seemed to 
perceive the protest only as a short-lived rebellion, as prior to this he did not issue 
statements about the rising revolutionary events. For some years preceding the 
revolution, he was resigned to the belief that no drastic social change would happen 
during his lifetime. For example, even after he noticed that Jimmy Carter’s election 
provided the country with some opportunity for protest, he was not optimistic about its 
prospects. He even became embarrassed about repeating and justifying this point, 
saying, “when people get old and senility overtakes them, all of their faculties grow 
weak. Just as their bodily powers grow weak, their mental powers, spiritual powers, the 
ability to pray, and the quality of prayer also grow weak”.364 Even after he recognised 
the prevalence of protest, he still failed to realise its revolutionary character and 
growing intensity. When he called for a general strike following Black Friday he did 
not foresee the fast spread of the strike or the duress it would cause. While was entering 
into months of widespread strikes he was content with a few days of strikes: “nobody 
will die of hunger from several days of striking in shops and businesses, in submission 
to God.”365
The recognition of this factor can provide us with the answer to the question of why 
Khomeini, during revolution had to identify himself with a democratic discourse, which 
was in opposition to his earlier and long life views. The domination of democratic 
discourse was to such an extent that any wavering over that, for the leadership, could be 
seen as a political suicide. Hence Khomeini, in order to maintain his position in a 
revolution which had already created its own discourse, had to identify himself with this 
discourse in order to remain the leader of the revolution.
Kurzman, Charles, The Unthinkable Revoluion In Iran, (US. Harward University Press, 2004), p. 21
365 Ali Davani, Nehzate Rohaniyune Iran [The Movement o f the Clerics in Iran] (Tehran: Bonyade Farhange Emam 
Reza, n.d.), Vol. 8, p. 378.
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The geography of the uprising must be understood in relation to the increasing 
importance of religion at this time. The first major uprising occurred in Tabriz, and the 
first city where martial law was imposed was Isfahan. These two cities are among the 
most religious in Iran, both having large numbers of mosques and takyeh. After 
Tehran they were also among the most populous Iranian cities, which meant that the 
possibilities for mass protest were enhanced. Demonstrations continued despite the 
regime’s policy of coercive intervention. As demonstrators proved their resilience and 
perseverance against the army, the opposition movement gained confidence. Protestors 
began to transform their “hit and run” tactics into direct confrontations with the armed 
forces at demonstrations. The Shah, surprised that the demonstrations continued, began 
to implement carrot-and-stick policies: while the army violently suppressed the 
populace, the Shah promised further liberalisation. A Free Election Bill was submitted 
to the Majles, and elections were to take place by June 1979. The Shah released more 
prisoners and sacked Nassiri who was later replaced by a moderate officer, General 
Moqadam.
However, the Shah was still unable to assess the seriousness of the situation or locate its 
deep social causes. In various interviews with the press he dismissed the crisis, arguing 
that it was the result of an unholy but insignificant alliance between Islamic Marxists 
and “black reactionaries”. Imprisoned by his authoritarian regime and having 
surrounded himself with sycophants, the Shah had lost touch with social and political 
reality and increasingly retreated into a virtual reality. This can be seen in his last 
attempt to sell his ideology to the public soon after the crisis erupted, when he published 
a book entitled Towards the Great Civilization. In it, he argued that under his 
leadership every Iranian enjoyed “the most advanced political, economic and social 
rights (and based on such a principle) our democracy can be called a true 
democracy.. ..And since it has not been imitated from foreign versions, some people
O / ’ O
may not like certain aspects of it”. Four months after the Qom uprising, Sullivan (the
366 Takyehs are temporary religious centres that are erected every year for ten days during the month of Muharram.
Religious men, through self-flagellation, mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussein who, along with the male side 
of his family and companions, were martyred by Yazid, the Umavid Khalif in the seventh century. This is a 
highly charged time of religious passion, especially the last two days of Tasua and Ashura.) In 1975, there 
were 1,125 mosques and 140 takiya in East Azerbaijan. In Isfahan, there were 719 mosques and 89 takiyeh.
See Gozareshate Farhangi-e Iran (Tehran, 1975), p. 103.
367 For instance, Asadollah Alam, a childhood friend who soon became prime minister and spent most of his time as a
loyal court minister, was one of the very last people close enough to the Shah to feel secure, brave and 
observant enough to inform the Shah about the real world to some degree. His death in 1975 deprived the 
Shah of an extremely important source of information and advice.
368 Quoted in Parviz Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran, (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 103.
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US ambassador) began to change his opinion about the regime as he realised that the 
Shah was out of touch with the mood of the nation.369
Having someone with such a distorted belief at the helm of power in Iran, it was no 
surprise that the political crisis was followed by an economic one. Inflation became 
rampant. In order to reduce the cost of living, the government postponed its more 
ambitious plans, including the creation of a subway system in Tehran, and reduced its 
five-year plan by $3.5 billion. Though these measures helped to reduce inflation, they 
also hit urban development, reducing it from 32% to 7% from 1977-78. New 
immigrants from the rural areas were affected most severely by these cuts and were
3 7 0forced to live in shantytowns in miserable conditions. The knock-on effects of this 
policy were felt by bazaar merchants, who were dependent on government expenditure. 
This only added fuel to their political grievances.
On 19 August 1978, an arson fire at the Rex Cinema ended a relative lull in Abadan, the 
oil region’s main city. Over four hundred people were burnt alive. The government 
blamed the opposition for this savage mass murder; however, the opposition and the
371people pointed to the government. This sparked a new wave of revolutionary protest. 
On 27 August, in order to appease the clergy, the Shah appointed Sharif Emami (who 
was part of a clergy family) as the new prime minister. However, he failed to realise 
that Emami was also reputed for being a senior member of the Freemasons, which 
overshadowed his family background. Emami soon granted wide-ranging concessions 
to the opposition. He dismissed many politicians and army generals who were believed
377to have a connection with Bahais, shut down casinos and gambling houses, freed
369 Asnad, vol. 12, 21 May 1978, p. 108. (“Public reaction to the Shah’s interview”) quoted in Milani, Iran's Islamic
Revolution, p. 115.
370 Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran, p. 104.
371 After the revolution, after much delay and as a result of constant protest by the families of the dead, the
Revolutionaiy Court was forced to set a trial for finding the perpetrators of the crime. However, it soon 
became clear that the court was withholding vital information. This became more obvious when Takaboli 
Zadeh, one of the main participants, confessed to his role in the crime. In his confession and subsequent letters 
he sent to leaders, among them Ayatollah Khomeini, he stated that the plan and support for setting the cinema 
on fire came from Ali Akbar Parvaresh and Siavash (who soon became MPs and leading members of the IRP). 
See Enghelabe Eslami, no. 109, p. 8. For an extensively detailed research about the event, see Chashm Andaz 
Magazine, 1378, no. 20 (Spring). It seems the event was conducted with the intention of increasing the level of 
urban participation in the revolution and other cities in the oil-rich region, which until then had been 
considered low.
372 In 1844 a new militant religion founded by A.H. Shirazi, titled as Bab emerged in Iran, which led to a violent
insurrection by its followers. Amir Kabir, Naser-Al-Din Shah’s first premier, eventually smashed that and 
executed Bab. As a result, in 1863, Bahaism sprang out of Babism but renounced any desire for political and 
earthly power. In exchange they were granted relative immunity from persecution during the Qajar dynasty. 
This relative immunity continued under various governments until the mid-1950s. However, under the Shah’s 
rule, members gained the special trust of the Shah to the extent that, according to Assadollah Alam, the Shah’s
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many political prisoners, and substantially increased the salaries of government 
employees. However, these concessions were too little too late, especially as they were 
implemented by one of the hate figures of the regime and seen as confirmation of the 
government’s corruption, guilt and weakness.
“Flowers for bullets”: a new revolutionary method
At the end of Ramadan (the month of fasting) in 1978, thousands of people gathered at 
Geytaryeh, an open space used for this particular event, in north Tehran for the Eide- 
Fitre prayer to mark the end of the fast. After the prayer, the worshipers demonstrated 
against the Shah’s regime in the nearby streets then moved to the centre of Tehran. 
Initially, the army intervened and tried to disperse the demonstrators with bayonets and 
tear gas, but let the demonstration go ahead after being overwhelmed by the number of 
participants. It soon attracted tens of thousands of bystanders and grew into the largest 
demonstration since the 1960s, with over one-quarter of a million participants. The 
most unique aspect of this demonstration, one which set the tune for subsequent 
demonstrations and distinguished it from other mass movements of its time, was the 
revolutionaries’ spontaneous adoption of revolutionary methods, which were 
“amazingly non-violent in...tactics and orientation, despite extraordinary levels of 
provocation and incitement designed to induce violence”.373 Demonstrators offered 
flowers to soldiers, called them brothers and asked them to refrain from killing their 
brothers. Two of the most famous such slogans were, “Baradate arteshi chera baradar 
koshi?” (oh! army brother, why are you killing your brother?) and “Artesh baradare 
mast, shah doshmane mast” (the army is our brother and the Shah is our enemy). This 
approach to interacting with the army, which had not been used before, proved to be an 
extremely successful method and was continued throughout the revolution.
closest companion, half of the Shah’s cabinet were Bahai, as was his special doctor, General Ayadi. See 
Assadollah Alam, Yadashthaaye Alam [Alam’s Notes], vol. 3 (Tehran, Enteshaaraate Maziar), p. 166. This 
closeness to the Shah and special privilege increased public suspicion of Bahais. After the revolution, as the 
top rank of Bahais escaped to the West, the middle and lower ranks were left behind. These were the ones who 
paid the price for their leaders’ close connection to the Shah and the fanaticism of the ruling regime; many 
suffered severely, were forced out of their jobs or imprisoned; some were executed and eventually many were 
forced to emigrate.
373 Interview of professor Richard Falk at Princeton University with MERIP, 1 February 1979.
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The success of this method, which decreased the number of casualties and later came to 
be known as the “victory of flowers over bullets”, can be explained by a number of 
factors. First, demonstrators identified the Shah, not the soldiers under his command, as 
their enemy and could distinguish between the two. In this way they challenged 
soldiers’ loyalty to the Shah by calling them “brother” and using passionate slogans to 
ask why they were killing their brothers while the Shah was their common enemy. 
Second, the method exposed lies embedded in official propaganda distributed within the 
army, which demonised the demonstrators, portraying them as non-Iranians, unruly 
thugs who entered Iran from the Soviet Union in order to cause chaos. Third, the 
soldiers’ fear for their own security was removed. This feeling of personal security 
provided more space for reflecting upon their actions in the street. Fourth, the non­
violent and non-provocative behaviour of the demonstrators made it psychologically 
extremely difficult for soldiers to open fire on them.
This early demonstration also reflected a significant change in the composition of 
participants. The crowd now consisted of “incongruous elements”: dissident students in 
jeans, religious and secular individuals, working and middle class, traditional and 
modem, veiled and unveiled women, and merchants in suits.374 It was thus impossible 
for the Shah to claim that his opponents were “black reactionaries” and “communist 
agitators”. The Eide-Fitre demonstration was followed by another two days after, in 
which an ever larger number of people participated. By this time demonstrators had 
begun to express their demands in two slogans, which were to became popular during 
the revolution and which would leave a permanent mark on its identity: “Neither East, 
nor West—Islamic Republic” and “Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic”. For 
the first time in the twentieth century, although still not specifically articulated, Islam 
emerged as a democratic discourse, intertwined with the demand for freedom both on 
individual and national levels.
Black Friday: revolution overtakes reform
By this time, the Shah had become alarmed by the intensity of demonstrations, and after 
some hesitation on 7 September 1978 imposed martial law in Tehran and eleven other 
major cities. He appointed the hawkish General Oveisi as governor of Tehran, who was
374 Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran, p. 106.
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nicknamed the “Butcher of Tehran” after he ordered the killing of demonstrators in the 
1963 uprising during his time as military governor of Tehran. As martial law 
commander, he immediately issued arrest warrants for the main opposition leaders, 
forbade demonstrations, shut down newspapers and imposed severe censorship. 
Nevertheless, a demonstration was organised for the following morning, 8 September. 
Many people were still unaware of the declaration of the martial law, while for others 
the declaration incited them to challenge the regime. They gathered at Jaleh Square, a 
small square in east Tehran. After initial warnings to disperse, the army opened fire on 
the crowd with heavy machine guns, killing and injuring hundreds of demonstrators 
and creating a “carnage of destruction”376 which resembled a firing squad.377
This massacre, which came to be known as “Black Friday”, was a turning point in the 
making of the revolution. It not only eradicated any ambiguity regarding the position of 
the movement, leaving moderates with the choice of either being marginalised or 
joining the radical part of the movement, but also exposed the consequences of the 
regime’s oppressive policies since the Shah was left with no moderate leaders to 
negotiate with. His ruthless political suppression over the preceding twenty-five years 
not only destroyed political parties which were struggling for the restoration of the 1905 
constitution, but had also destroyed independent professional associations, labour
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unions and grass roots organisations, or the foundations for a modem civil society.
The barren political landscape which he created by suppressing moderate secular and 
religious parties and groups could only be filled by radicals. Furthermore, Black Friday 
drew a line of blood between the remnants of moderation and the Shah’s regime. No 
moderate leader, however popular, could cross this line without being accused of being 
a traitor. Previous calls for overthrowing the regime gained much greater consensus, 
and moderates were forced to conform.
375 The actual number of dead is disputed. The opposition claimed over 3,000 were killed, The American embassy
stated the number of casualties 200 (Falk, interview, 1979) while military authorities claimed that the number 
of dead was 87 with 205 wounded (Abrahiminan, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 516). Based on my own 
observation of the event, which lasted for six hours, hundreds whom were either killed or injured. The highest 
number of casualties was inflicted in the first few minutes, when tens of demonstrators were shot down by a 50 
mm machine gun of a Russian made armoured vehicle. There were tens of bodies, of mainly women, laying in 
front of the army unit at the south of the entry to the square.
376 Abrahiminan, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 516.
377 J. Guyers, “Liberation is the Main Casualty”, The Guardian, 17 September 1978.
378 The bazaar, its guilds and some sections of the clergy which historically maintained relative autonomy vis-£-vis
the state form the traditional part of civil society in Iran.
379 National Front leaders who escaped arrest after the massacre told foreign correspondents that it made any
reconciliation policy with the regime impossible. See Guyers, “Liberation.”
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The Shah, however, remained unaware of the complexity of the situation and after the 
massacre continued using his policy of carrot-and-stick. On the one hand, the SAVAK 
arrested many leaders of the National Front and Freedom Movement, increased media 
censorship, and extended martial law to other cities. On the other hand, however, it 
freed 1,400 political prisoners, including some of Khomeini’s supporters. The Shah 
also restricted the power of SAVAK and promised lavish financial support to families 
of the victims of the Cinema Rex fire and Black Friday massacre. Perhaps the 
shrewdest action was Emami’s decision to convince the Shah to ask the Iraqi 
government to expel Khomeini, and to give his approval to the French government 
when Khomeini decided to go to Paris. This political move, however, was ultimately 
short-sighted as he failed to consider the influential presence of Moslem intellectuals in 
France who, as it will be argued, not only prevented the Iranian government from 
achieving its goal, but also turned the situation to their advantage.
Khomeini in Paris
After Emami’s attempts to pacify the situation failed, he asked the Iraqi government to 
expel Khomeini. Having come from a clerical family, Emami had good knowledge of 
traditional clergy. Being familiar with Khomeini’s ideas and their regressive nature, he 
decided to expose his backward ideas to the media and the Iranian people in order to 
lose any chance of leadership. He also decided that the mere fact of Khomeini’s 
presence in Paris would seriously weaken his religious credentials. In his cabinet
0 0 1
meetings, he sarcastically referred to Khomeini as the “Parisian Ayatollah”.
After Khomeini was expelled from Iraq, he unsuccessfully tried to go to Kuwait and 
other Arab countries. However, after initial hesitation, he accepted Ebrahim Yazdi’s 
suggestion of going to France.382 This decision was also largely imposed on him by the 
Iranian government, but its effect was opposite of what the Shah expected. Paris put 
Khomeini at the centre of world attention and he not only gained popularity in Iran and 
the Islamic world, but also garnered major support among western intellectuals and 
public opinion.
380 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005. Also see Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 159 and William Sullivan, Mission to
Iran (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1981).
381 Ahmad Salamatian, interview by the author, 20 May 2005. Salamatian was the first MP from Isfahan in the first
parliament after the revolution.
382 “Poshte sahneye enghelab dar Paris" [Behind the scenes of revolution in Paris: dialogue with Ebrahim Yazdi],
Iran Farda Magazine, 1999 [1378], p. 52.
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This seemingly shrewd move by the Shah’s government was counter-effective because 
the Iranian government did not consider the influence of western-educated Moslem 
intellectuals, such as Banisadr, Yazdi and Qotbzadeh, who had gathered around 
Khomeini in Paris. They aimed to use the opportunity to elaborate the guiding 
principles of the revolution and present Khomeini as the representative of Islam as the 
discourse of freedom. By doing so, they would prevent the regime from defaming the 
leader of the revolution and distracting it from its initial goal of overthrowing the 
Shah’s regime, and would also commit Khomeini to the democratic principles which he 
was to advocate. After all, it was believed that a grand ayatollah and “source of 
emulation” (Marja-e taqleed) who had become the leader of a revolution and who held 
a status as close as possible to sainthood could not and would not declare in principles 
something that was in opposition to his beliefs. This belief proved to be a catastrophic 
mistake. However, Khomeini’s representation of Islam in Paris, which was based on 
democratic principles, was so convincing that it even sharpened divisions within the US 
government over how to handle the situation. Sullivan opposed the deputy commander 
of NATO in Europe, General Huyser, who was sent to Iran because he believed that 
Khomeini should not be opposed and that his rule would lead to democracy in Iran. 
Therefore, as has been demonstrated, the Shah’s decision to exile Khomeini 
inadvertently helped the revolution to reach its focal point and increased its dynamism 
drastically.
America’s failure to assess the situation correctly
The US intelligence services were also unable to assess the rapidly changing situation in 
Iran. For example, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) predicted that “the Shah is
‘l O f
expected to remain actively in power for the next ten years”. These remarkable 
failures to assess the situation happened in the face of the rapid spread of revolutionary 
activity, the increasing involvement of all sectors of the urban strata, and even 
penetration into some rural areas. More importantly, by this time the revolutionaries
383 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
384 When Carter recalled General Huyser, NATO’s vice commander who was in Iran to implement American
government policy, he criticised him, asking why he and Ambassador Sullivan, despite differences, did not 
follow the instruction. Huyser “pointed out that both he and Sullivan had read the same dispatches from the 
White House and the State Department; but Sullivan thought we should not oppose Khomeini’s take-over 
because his rule would lead to democracy, whereas Huyser thought it would lead to catastrophe”. Jimmy 
Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam, 1982), p. 449.
385 Quoted in Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran (New York: Tauris, 1985), p. 92.
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had introduced a new tactic in their struggle against the Shah’s regime, one which 
largely determined the outcome of the revolution: strikes.
Strikes as a decisive method of revolution
In autumn of 1978, the revolution entered a new phase in which strikes were used as a 
tactical weapon to weaken the regime. The first strike, in which 700 oil refinery 
workers in Tehran struck to demand higher wages, impacted the nerve system of the 
regime. It was obvious both to the regime and the opposition that the demands were not 
solely confined to higher wages, but had broader political motivations as well. This 
point has been lost in most research, as it has interpreted the events at their face value. 
The strikers initially made purely economic demands and abstained from making 
political ones mainly because society as a whole was still living under constant fear as 
many still viewed the regime as invincible. The strikers were fearful that assigning any 
political motivation to their action would give the state a reason to crack down. 
However, the very act of striking in a country which had not experienced strikes for a 
generation reveals the political nature of the action.
As the workers gained confidence, they explicitly transformed their economic demands 
into political ones. Strikes soon sprung up in other industrial centres in Abadan, Tabriz, 
Isfahan and Shiraz.386 Those by oil and electricity workers proved the most effective as 
they deprived the regime of its oil revenue and caused blackouts that disrupted the 
regime’s propaganda machine. All this accentuated the perception that the regime was 
weak and vulnerable. Teachers also went on strike and students helped to transform 
thousands of schools into mobilisation centres. Local street demonstrations became a 
daily occurrence.
At this time, evidence of corruption increased. In one case, on 16 September, nearly 
fifteen thousand people died in an earthquake in Tabas, a region in north-eastern Iran. 
The regime’s response was ridden with corruption and mismanagement, and contrasted 
with the highly organised and efficient rescue operation conducted by revolutionary 
groups. This was perceived as another illustration of the inadequacy of the existing 
government and competence of the future regime. In a separate incident, on 18 
September, employees of the Central Bank of Iran published a list of 177 prominent
386 Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran, p. 119.
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people who, within a few months, had taken over $2 billion out of the country, 
including the Prime minister and the former Prime minister, General Oveisi. The 
revelation of this document was highly damaging and showed that even the Shah’s 
closest allies had no confidence the regime would survive.
The strikes continued despite promises of major pay rises from the Prime minister, and 
even spread to banks and government employees. Workers’ demands expanded from 
pay rises to demands for political freedom, the end of censorship, the end of martial law 
and the release of all political prisoners. Prosperous bazaar merchants and shopkeepers 
gave considerable financial help to the strikers in order to ease the hardship on their 
families. Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious decree) in which he made it permissible for 
the clergy to give half of all religious tithes to the families of those on strike.387 After 
Black Friday, the lull in political demonstrations ended with the commemoration of the 
fortieth day of the massacre, in which unrest occurred in most places in Iran and in 
which more were killed. Instead of spreading terror, the killings created anger. The 
murdered demonstrators became the Revolution’s martyrs and symbols of resistance. 
Therefore, the more martyrs, the more widespread the revolution became, and the 
revolutionaries became more determined to overthrow the regime.
The Shah’s attempt to appease the moderate opposition
As Sharif Emami failed to curtail the strikes and disorder, the Shah approached a 
number of moderate secular opposition leaders in desperation. To prevent the collapse 
of the regime, he tried to co-opt into key governmental positions popular NF leaders, 
the most prominent being Karim Sanjabi, former Education Minister for Mussadiq and 
the leader of the NF. He initially accepted the premiership on the condition that 
Khomeini consented, flying to France in order to obtain his permission. After meeting 
Khomeini in Paris, however, he rejected the Shah’s offer and formed a pact with 
Khomeini in which they agreed that “the Nationalist-Islamic Movement of Iran will not 
approve of any form of government” and that “in accordance with the precepts of Islam, 
democracy, and independence, the future political system of Iran will be determined
387 Ruhollah Khomeini, Neda-ye haq [A Collection of Imam Khomeini’s Declarations, Interviews and Speeches, vol. 
1] (Tehran, 1979), p. 16.
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through a national referendum”. This historic declaration, in which the secular 
nationalists formed a de facto alliance with the clergy, completed the historical alliance 
of the clergy, merchants and secular nationalists.
The Shah, who seemed always two steps behind events, still followed his carrot-and- 
stick policies, continuing his policy of appeasement. Politically, he sacrificed his 
closest ally, General Nasiri, who was recalled from his position as Iran’s Ambassador to 
Pakistan and indicted for torturing political prisoners. The Shah also ordered the arrest 
of Hoveyda, the former Prime minister, who as one of his most obedient servants had 
served him for fourteen years. He also promised the release of all political prisoners.
On 30 October, Ayatollahs Taleghani and Montazeri, the most prominent prisoners, 
were released; more than a hundred thousand people attended the rally to celebrate their 
freedom. However, by November it was obvious that Emami had failed to end the 
strikes and prevent public disturbances. Demonstration and disorder were by that time 
daily occurrences. The alliance between the clergy, bazaar and intelligentsia now 
broadened to include workers, thus crossing class and ethnic barriers to make the 
revolution a national phenomenon.
By this time, the main body of government bureaucracy, one of the main pillars of the 
state, had joined hands with the middle and working classes to strike against the regime. 
The other two main pillars of the Pahlavi state were also crumbling. The rich and 
prosperous industrialists, having sensed the collapse, were the very first who to leave 
Iran, transferring their wealth out of the country in advance. The Shah was left to 
defend his throne with his last pillar of power: the army.
Iron fist waving an olive branch: inconsistency and policy failure
On 5 October 1978, some small crowds in Tehran rioted and burnt down several 
government buildings and other targets. Emami subsequently resigned as prime 
minister, and the Shah imposed a military government headed by General G. R. Azhari,
388 Banisadr, in Khyanat be omid, states that it was he who wrote the declaration (see p. 345). To see the text, see 
also Shaopour Bakhtiar, Si va haft roozpas az si va haft sal [Thirty-seven Days After Thirty-seven Years] 
(Paris: Radiyr Iran, 1981), p. 143.
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the chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces. On 6 October, the Shah made a historical 
statement on national television, admitting to past mistakes, saying,
the revolution of the Iranian people cannot be disapproved by 
m e... .Once again, before the Iranian people, I swear that I will not repeat 
past mistakes and I assure you that previous mistakes, lawlessness, 
oppression and corruption will not happen again.. ..I, too, have heard the 
voice of your revolution.389
However, had he truly done so, the imposition of a military government would have 
been a contradiction rather than a logical conclusion of his analysis. Furthermore, his 
admission had a devastating effect on the army’s loyalty, especially at the rank-and-file 
level. The Shah’s admission of the regime’s past failures and his argument that they 
were the cause of just revolution once again neutralised official state propaganda, which 
systematically portrayed it as a foreign-inspired revolt. This admission created a 
massive crack within the belief system of the army, where the Shah had been perceived 
as an infallible figure, a form of semi-God who would demand unquestionable loyalty. 
The three principles of God, Shah and Country underpinned the army’s ideology. Every 
attempt was made to indoctrinate this ideology produced and consumed by the 
military.390
The inconsistency of this two-pronged policy of iron fist and olive branch can be 
explained as an attempt to drive a wedge between revolutionaries in the streets and their 
leaders, as well as between moderate and radical opposition. However, the 
inconsistency only served to legitimised the unrest, hearten the opposition and 
dishearten the armed forces. The Shah’s conciliatory speech and the imposition of a 
military government did create a short-lived silence, but one that can be characterised as 
the lull before the storm.
389 Mehdi Bazargan, Moshkelat va masa 'el-e awalin sal-e enghelab [The Problems and Issues of the First Year of the
Revolution (Tehran: Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran, 1983), pp. 207-08.
390 The Shah’s speech was broadcast at night. The morning after, I returned to my army unit in Isfahan and was
amazed by the shocked faces of many military personnel in all ranks, from officers to soldiers. After all, until 
the previous day we had been reminded that the demonstrators were not Iranians and entered Iran from its 
northern border (i.e., the USSR).
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When NF leader Karim Sanjabi returned to Iran from France in late 1978, he declared 
that “the present monarchy did not fulfil the requirements of the laws and the Shariah 
[religious laws] because it was tyrannical, corrupt [and] incapable of resisting foreign 
pressure”. For him a referendum was the only way to establish a “national government
I Q  1
based on the principles of Islam, democracy and national sovereignty”. He was soon 
after arrested by the military government. In meanwhile, in response to the Shah’s plea, 
Khomeini asked Iranians not to give another chance to the “satanic Shah who has 
already admitted to being a traitor.” He asked workers to intensify the strikes and 
demonstrations and urged the further undermining of the last remaining pillar of the 
state, the army, calling for soldiers to desert.392 A massive show of force was the only 
option remaining for the Shah if he wanted to save his monarchy. He reportedly told his 
loyal forces that he would crush the opposition even if he had to kill a hundred thousand 
people.393
In the meantime American policy makers, who had been caught by total surprise by the 
upheaval in Iran, were divided on how do define and deal with the events. This 
confusion had a profound effect on the Shah, who was therefore unable to make an 
independent decision about his own course of action.
America’s policy bewilderment and its effect on the Shah’s regime
The Shah was both psychologically and politically dependant on American support, and 
so hesitated in applying systematic force to quell the revolutionary movement because 
of the mixed signals he was receiving from the White House. The day after he imposed 
military government, Brezinzski (with Carter’s authorisation) assured the Shah that the 
US supported any decision he thought necessary to forestall the revolution, including 
the use of force.394 However, the iron-fist policy approach was not to the liking of 
Secretary of State George Ball or to Ambassador Sullivan, who were both trying to 
adjust themselves to the rapidly changing realities in Iran. Sullivan opposed the 
instalment of a military government, and though he had earlier opposed any overture to 
Khomeini, three days after the imposition of General Azhari as the military prime
391 Sanjabi, quoted in Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran, p. 110.
392 Khomeini, Neda-ye haq, vol. 1, pp. 20-23.
393 Banisadr (interview, 22 January 2005) referred to the documents which were found after the revolution.
394 Zbigniew Brezinzski, Power and Principle (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 365.
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minister, he changed his mind.395 He asked decision makers in Washington to “think 
the unthinkable” in case the military government failed. In this scenario, he advocated a 
plan for a post-Shah regime in which senior army officers would leave Iran and a 
successor regime would emerge as the result of co-operation between younger army 
officers and the clergy.396
However, revolutionary events continued to unfold irrespective of what the Shah and 
US had in mind. People’s adaptability and inventiveness in revitalising and creating 
new non-violent revolutionary methods assumed yet another tactical manifestation. 
When the military government forbade assembly after dusk, the people went onto their 
rooftops at the time of curfew and as a sign of protest shouted, “Allah Akbar” [God is 
Greatest]. This peaceful show of force and unity, the shouts of millions of people in 
the midst of a total blackout, had an electrifying effect on the population and the army
TQ7
by turning Tehran into the largest chorus in the world. It both emboldened the 
revolutionaries and demoralised the government.
The Ashura demonstration: a revolutionary show of strength
By 2 December 1978, at the beginning of the holy month of Muharram, thousands of 
Iranians had already lost their lives or had been injured in protests. The holiest days of 
the year, Tasua and Ashura, were approaching and tension was high. The government 
knew that the only way to forestall the traditional religious processions, which they 
feared would turn into political demonstrations, would be to use heavy force and create 
more bloodshed, a policy for which the Shah needed total US support. The Shah, being 
aware of a rift between Carter’s advisors, asked Carter for a written permission that the 
latter would not provide.
The opposition organised two rallies on these days; the government agreed to let the 
demonstrations go ahead and promised that the army would stay in its barracks as long 
as the opposition guaranteed the demonstrations would remain peaceful. These two 
demonstrations turned out to be the biggest demonstrations ever observed. In Tehran (a 
city with a population of six million), well over three million people joined a protest
395 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 439.
396 Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 202.
397 See Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran, p. 113 and Milani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 123.
398 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
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that was remarkably organised and peaceful. The demonstrators came from all walks of 
life: men, women, rich, poor, while collar, blue collar. As Pierre Blanchet reportedly 
said to Michel Foucault, referring to the Ashura demonstration, “(if you) take away 
young children, the disabled, the old and a proportion of women who stayed at home, 
you will see that the whole of Tehran was in the streets”.399 At the end of the 
demonstration they produced a manifesto in seventeen articles, which proposed a 
compromise between Islamist and nationalist forces. It did not directly call for the 
overthrow of the Shah, but asked for the establishment of an Islamic government and 
the emancipation of women and made other demands.400 Opposition leaders and much 
of the international press saw these massive demonstrations as a walking referendum for 
dismantling the Shah’s rule.401
A study of eight hundred slogans which were used during these demonstrations reveals 
that hatred for the Shah was the unifying factor: 505 slogans were directed against him, 
20% of which were pro-Khomeini and 30% of which called for an Islamic 
government.402 Slogans of “Neither West nor East, but Islamic Republic” and 
“Independence, Democracy, Islamic Republic” dominated throughout the entire 
revolutionary period. Juxtaposing the non-violent and peaceful methods adopted by 
revolutionaries with statements made by revolutionary leaders (above all, Khomeini) 
and the dominant slogans and mottos adopted by millions of participants during this 
period indicates that the method, goal and identity of the revolution was defined through 
Islam as a discourse of freedom.
These massive demonstrations forced the Shah to realise that the Azhari military 
government had failed. Once again he resorted to an iron-fist policy, realising that at 
this stage nothing short of a massacre of revolutionaries would save his throne. Again 
he asked for America’s guidance. Sullivan was instructed to inform the Shah that 
military force should be used as a last resort if the reinstallation of a civilian 
government failed.403 Left with no alternative, the Shah tried unsuccessfully to form a 
national reconciliation government. No opposition leaders, including moderates, were 
prepared to give the Shah a second chance. Khomeini and his advisors had adopted an
399 Kritzman, Michael Foucault, p. 214.
400 Milani, Iran’s Islamic Revolution, p. 123.
401 See, e.g., the New York Times, Washington Post, Guardian, Times, and Le Monde, 13 December 1978.
402 Mohammad Moqtader, “Barresi-ye sho’arha-ye enghelab” [Review of the slogans of the revolutionary period]
Ketab-e Jam-eh [Book of Society], vol. 13, pp. 20-21.
403 Brezinzski, Power and Principle, pp. 375-78; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster Press,
1983), pp. 332-33.
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uncompromising stand which made it impossible for other leaders to take alternative 
positions without being labelled as traitors. Furthermore, the memories of the 1953 
coup were still fresh and the army still intact, with those of the highest rank loyal to the 
Shah.
Guadalupe Conference
In January 1979, when Western leaders met in Guadalupe, Iran’s future was high on the 
agenda. Carter astonished French and German leaders (though had British backing) 
when he informed them that, in his view, the days of Shah’s regime were numbered and 
that he had decided to replace it with a military one; ultimately, the Shah would have to 
leave Iran.404 Nevertheless, Carter still did not contemplate working with Khomeini. 
After Sanjabi refused to become Prime minister, the position was offered to Bakhtiar, a 
former junior minister under Mussadiq and then vice-president of the NF in Iran. He 
accepted the premiership, but did not consult other members of the front, thus revealing 
that after many years of political activity he was not much of a team player 405 While 
some moderate religious leaders like Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari gave Bakhtiar their 
implicit conditional support, the NF therefore immediately expelled him.
In order for Bakhtiar’s government to have any success, the Shah had to leave 
temporarily and relegate to him control of the army and SAVAK. To gain popular 
support, Bakhtiar announced that the Shah would leave for a vacation and then 
abolished the SAVAK, the most feared and hated organisation in Iran. He also ended 
censorship of the press, which meant that after more than fifty days of striking, 
journalists could return to work. On 4 January, twelve days before the Shah’s 
departure, General Huyser, the Deputy of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 
was sent on an ambiguous mission to Iran, which reflected the sense of confusion in 
Washington.406 His initial tasks were to keep the army’s integrity intact after the Shah’s 
departure, prevent the army from staging a coup, ensure the army’s support for
404 There are numerous sources in which they refer to the “Guadalupe Conference” and the controversy surrounding
it, but these are based on secondary sources at best and speculations at worst. However, Vallery Giscard 
d’Estang (then president of France) provides a primary source since he was present in the meeting. He can also 
be considered as a reliable source as he did not have any strong political interest or motive for his statement.
405 Ahmad Salamatian, interview by the author, 25 May 2005.
406 See General R. E. Huyser, Mission to Iran, vol. 2, introduction by A. M. Haig (Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1986).
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Bakhtiar’s government, and if necessary stage a coup if it failed.407 It is doubtful that 
one of the stated goals of Huyser in his mission in Iran was to prevent the army from 
carrying out a coup against Bakhtiar. The Shah, in order to prevent a military coup 
against himself, had systematically introduced policies to inculcate deep-seated hostility 
to prevent any cooperation between commanders of the army, police, gendarmerie and 
air force.408
After thirty-seven years of rule and much speculation, the “rarest of leaders, an 
unconditional ally”409—the Shah—left Iran, never to return. He later claimed that he was 
thrown out of the country like a “dead mouse”.410 His departure was another historical 
moment in the revolution as it ended the era of monarchical rule which had dominated 
Iranian politics and culture for over two millennia.411
As the news of the Shah’s departure spread, millions of people poured into the streets in 
explosive jubilation, dancing through traffic, holding aloft photographs of Khomeini 
and banknotes from which they had cut out the Shah’s image. Civilians exchanged 
hugs and kisses with soldiers and showered them with flowers and dried fruits, toppling 
statues of the Shah and replacing them with Khomeini’s portrait412 However, although 
this spontaneous outpouring further broke the morale of army officers and heartened the 
opposition, it did not benefit Bakhtiar’s government in any way. He continued to seek 
legitimacy; he cut off relations with Israel, recognised the clergy as the leaders of the 
revolution, released all political prisoners, and promised to generously compensate both 
prisoners and those killed during the revolution 413 However, these measures were 
considered too little too late. The revolutionaries would not concede to anything less 
than the overthrow of the regime. Then arose a further political problem: the head of 
the Regency Council, Jalal Tehrani (established by the Shah on 13 January 1979) had 
resigned in a meeting with Khomeini and left the Council in disarray.
407 Letter from Carter to Haig, ibid., p. 18. Also according to Anthony Parson, the British Ambassador, the principle
mission of Huyser was to nip in the bud any attempt by generals to stage a pro-Shah coup. See The Pride and 
the Fall, 1974-1979 (London, 1984), pp. 433-44.
408 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, Vol. 2, p. 579.
409 Henry Kissinger, cited in Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980,
(New York: Pantheon, 1988).
410 Associated Press, Paris, 8 December 1979.
4,1 Time Magazine, 29 January 1979. If one could argue that, historically speaking, the monarchy drove its legitimacy 
as the defender of Iran’s independence against outside powers, then it might be possible to argue that the 
historical source of legitimacy, hence, the function of monarchy came to an end with the British backed 1920 
coup, when the Shah’s father took power in Iran. This function faltered on the last kings o f the Qajar dynasty, 
but drastically ended by Reza Shah gaining power through foreign support.
412 The Guardian, The Times, Washington Post, 17 January 1979; Newsweek, 29 January 1979, p. 39.
413 Kayhan and Etelaa 'at, 6 January 1979. See also Bakhtiar, Si va haft, pp. 154-70.
133
History, opportunity and agency in structural change
This was a major turning point in the revolution in which the role of human agency 
could impact the structural conditions and lead the revolution to a very different 
outcome. Socio-political process and rapid social upheavals are often not neat, orderly 
and predictable; there is no clear-cut relationship between infrastructure and 
superstructure, as theorised in the Marxist tradition, and squabbles over which aspects 
of social reality should be considered infra- or supra-structure are misleading. Different 
dimensions of social reality are ambiguous, and given certain conditions, can either 
function as infra- or superstructure and affect, if not condition, other variables. With 
this in mind, we can examine how, at certain historical junctions, agency may become 
more autonomous and condition the consequence of structural conditions. Bakhtiar’s 
position may be seen as the first such historical juncture in the Iranian revolution.
Bakhtiar realised that he needed Khomeini’s consent if he was to have any chance of 
remaining prime minister and therefore tried to contact him through several different 
channels. On one occasion he sent his nephew, Abbas Qoli Bakhtiar the Minister of 
Industry, to meet Banisadr in Paris in the hope that Khomeini would accept his 
premiership. Banisadr rejected the idea, accusing Bakhtiar of violating his earlier 
position and having moved against the NF’s code of practice by failing to consult any 
members of the front before taking the premiership. Nevertheless, Banisadr proposed 
that Bakhtiar resign as the Shah’s Prime minister and Khomeini appoint him as Prime 
minister of a revolutionary government.414 They agreed to suggest the idea to 
Khomeini and Bakhtiar.415 While Khomeini accepted Banisadr’s plan416 and Bakhtiar 
himself initially prepared a draft letter on behalf of Khomeini to himself,417 he failed to 
undersign the final draft418 and argued that if he accepted the proposal the army would 
overthrow him.419 Brezinzski, (the head of Carter’s national security) and General 
Gharebaghi, (the chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces) later revealed that Bakhtiar
414 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 153.
415 Ibid., pp. 153-54.
4.6 Ibid., p. 154.
4.7 Mehdi Bazargan, Bazargan (Memoirs): Sixty Years o f  Service and Opposition, vol. 2, ed. by Col. Gholamreza
Nejati (Tehran: Rasa Publications, 1996), pp. 314-15. Amir Entezam, Bazargan’s deputy minister met 
Bazargan and convinced Bakhtiar to resign. See also Amir Entezam Aansooye, Eteham, Khaterate Abas Amir 
Entezam [The other side of accusation: the memoir of Abas Amir Entezam] (Tehran: Nashre Ney, fifth 
printing, n.d.), Vol. 1, p. 143.
418 See the interview of Ahmad Haj Seyd Javadi with the media, Keyhan, 4 March 1979 [13 esfand 1357].
419 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 154.
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actually rejected the proposal not out of a fear of coup, but because Carter opposed it. 
According to their recollections, Bakhtiar contacted Carter and asked his permission to 
fulfil the proposal, but Carter refused (another blunder by Carter, which was caused by 
his lack of understanding of the political situation in Iran).
However, this could be seen as an excuse rather than a reason. Carter, through Huyser, 
was certain of the Iranian army’s loyalty to Bakhtiar: “General Huyser met with the 
military leaders and reported that they indeed supported Bakhtiar”.420 Hence, Bakhtiar’s 
change of mind can be explained by Carter’s refusal to accept the proposal, when he 
informed Brezinzski and other members of his government that “we should tell Bakhtiar 
that we will not accommodate any more to the left; we support the military in their 
position and their effort to maintain stability, but we are not in favor of bringing 
Khomeini and his people to the government”.421 Bakhtiar, however, did not need to 
seek Carter’s permission. Had he ignored the US president’s opinion and taken the 
political initiative to accept Banisadr’s proposal, he would have left Carter with no 
option but to give his grudging consent to an agreement which was already sealed and 
declared.422 Opposing Bakhtiar’s initiation would have deprived Carter of any leverage 
to influence the political process in Iran. In other words, this alternative scenario might 
have been made possible with the decision of a single agent, Bakhtiar. He might have 
remained Prime minister, overseeing a free election for the establishment of a 
revolutionary government.423 In turn, Khomeini (who by then had repeatedly promised
420 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 445.
421 Brezinzski, Power and Principle, p. 387. General Gharabaghi, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces during
this period, also indicated what Carter was referring to when he revealed that Bakhtiar told him, “his 
[Khomeini’s] envoys in Tehran had suggested to me that I resign and they gave me assurances that Ayatollah 
Khomeini will appoint me as his prime minister. However, their words can not be trusted”. See Arteshbod 
Gharabaghi, Haghayegh dar bareye bohraan-e Iran [The Truth about the Iranian Crisis] (Sazemaan-e chaap va 
entesharate soheil, 1984), p. 306. However, we know that the Shah had left Iran on 16 January and Carter’s 
order to reject cooperating with Khomeini came on 19 January, the date when Gharabaghi revealed Bakhtiar’s 
dialogue with him. Thus, Bakhtiar’s rejection of the proposal should have come after Carter’s order. Still, 
Banisadr argues that Bakhtiar did not tell Gharabaghi and Carter the whole truth, since, as pointed out already, 
it was Bakhtiar who initially sent his nephew to him in Paris, and it was Banisadr who made the suggestion that 
if Bakhtiar resigned, Khomeini will appoint him as his prime minister. See Abol-Hassan Banisadr, America 
and the Iranian Revolution, first book (Paris: Enteshaaraate Enghelabe Eslami, 1989 [1367]), pp. 395-96 and 
426-27.
422 The example of contemporary Iraq is also revealing. In it we can see the possibilities for such initiations even by a
council whose members have been hand-picked by Americans, which rejects America’s choice of president for 
the caretaker government and, against fierce opposition from America, chooses its own candidate and makes it 
impossible for America to reject him.
423 According to Bazargan’s memoir [Mehdi Bazargan, Bazargan (Memoirs): Sixty Years o f Service and Opposition,
vol. 2, ed. by Col. Gholamreza Nejati (Tehran: Rasa Publications, 1996), p 348], even the Americans (W. 
Sullivan, the ambassador and John P. Stempel, the chief of the political department in the American embassy) 
had conceded to transfer the regime via a referendum. However, the only difference was that the American 
government suggested that such a referendum should be carried out via Bakhtiar’s government and Bazargan 
and Mousavi Adebili were suggesting that it should be done with their cooperation, asking people for
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not to become the leader and who later signed the first draft of the constitution which 
gave him and the clergy almost no power over state and government) would have had to 
return to Qom and been left with no option but to honour his promises. Also, and as 
importantly, having been endorsed as Khomeini’s Prime minister, Bakhtiar could have 
prevented the pro-revolution mutiny that emerged within the armed forces and which 
led to its collapse. As a result, the clergy would have been deprived of the opportunity 
of creating revolutionary guards, committees and revolutionary courts, which became 
the institutional backbone for the establishment of the new theocratic despotism, just as 
they would have been deprived of the opportunity to organise and mobilise their forces 
using state resources. Furthermore, given Iran’s military superiority before its collapse 
and prior to the occupation of the American embassy in 1979, Iraqi president Saddam 
Hussein would have found it difficult to attack Iran. The Iran-Iraq war proved to be a 
decisive condition for the success of the IRP’s bid for state control.
Still, Bakhtiar contacted Mehdi Bazargan, then head of the secret Revolutionary 
Council, to mediate a meeting with Khomeini. Bazargan convinced Khomeini to pay 
him a visit not because he was the Prime minister, but rather an ordinary Iranian citizen. 
However, the night before his flight to Paris, Banisadr convinced Khomeini that such a 
meeting would legitimise Bakhtiar’s premiership.424 Khomeini changed the conditions 
for the meeting, stating that Bakhtiar had to resign prior to rather than following the 
meeting. Bakhtiar did not agree. A few days after Bakhtiar’s negotiations with 
Khomeini failed, an army unit attacked a demonstration in the centre of Tehran, killing 
and injuring over a hundred people. This closed any possible agreement between 
Bakhtiar and the revolutionaries; Khomeini asserted that “after this massacre, Bakhtiar 
is a criminal and murderer, and even if he resigns it means nothing. He must be arrested 
and tried for the crime he has committed” 425
This historical conjecture reaffirms an important argument that “nothing is inevitable in 
the birth of or the course of revolution and the failure to examine the process itself 
blinds the analyst to the trajectories not taken, the possibilities contained in the 
revolutionary moment rather than the inevitable outcomes”.426 One could argue that in
participation and also observing the election itself. Obviously this problem would be solved if Khomeini 
would appoint Bakhtiar as his prime minister.
424 Banisadr, interview, 21 January 2005.
425 Ebrahim Yazdi, Akharin talash, ha dar akharin roozha [The Last Attempts in the Last Days] (Tehran: Ghalam
Publishing Co., 1984 [1363]), p. 172.
426 Leiden and Schmitt, The Politics o f Violence, p. 73.
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February 1979, for a brief period of two weeks, Bakhtiar was in a position to 
significantly affect the outcome of the revolution.
In the meantime, demonstrations and strikes continued to intensify. In addition to 
numerous daily demonstrations on Arbaeen (the fortieth day of Ashura), demonstrations 
all over Iran grew to an unprecedented size. Demonstrators began to demand 
Khomeini’s return to Iran, a demand that Bakhtiar could no longer delay. Khomeini 
returned to Iran on 1 February 1979, which became one of the most jubilant days in 
contemporary Iranian history. Millions of Iranians lined the streets and hundreds of 
thousands gathered at Behest Zahra (Tehran’s main cemetery) in the southern outskirts 
of the city, where Khomeini paid his respect to the martyrs of the revolution and made a 
famous speech in which he first made it clear that he was the “strong man” of Iran:
I will strike my fists at the mouth of this government. From now on, it is 
I who will name the government on behalf of the nation.. .on behalf of 
the people I will name the government.. ..The Shah has destroyed the 
cities and built beautiful cemeteries for us., .we will not let the US bring 
back the Shah.427
This speech, when Khomeini says he will name the government, was the first open sign 
of his dictatorial tendencies. It was only after a whisper from Motahari that he corrected 
himself and added that he would do it on behalf of the people. However, very few saw 
it as such since it was made at the height of the revolution, when a strong leadership 
was in dire need and the statement was easily interpreted as Khomeini’s decisiveness to 
stand against the Shah’s brutal regime. He also tried to draw a wedge between the Shah 
and the army by asking soldiers whether they wanted to be at the service of America or 
the people of Iran. It was a cunning move, based psychologically in earlier popular and 
spontaneous calls for the army to join the nation in revolution.
The dual government
427 Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations o f Imam Khomeini, transl. by Hamid Algar 
(Berkley, 1981), p. 259; also see article by Allen in The Daily Telegraph, 2 February 1979.
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On 7 February 1979, Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister on the 
suggestion of the Council of Revolution. His duty would be to run the country during 
the transition period, administer four national referendums for transforming the regime 
into an Islamic republic, form a constitutional parliament, ratify the new constitution 
and elect members of a new parliament based on the new constitution.428 Bakhtiar, 
however, refused to recognise Bazargan, though most of his ministers were refused 
entry into government buildings by their own staff. The only state instrument that 
remained Bakhtiar’s was the army. Here, too, support for him was rapidly crumbling 
both at the top level and among the rank-and-file. Bazargan and his men were in 
constant contact with the generals, seeking their support for the government and their 
commitment to oppose a coup.429 Morale was low and army desertion and disobedience 
were rapidly increasing; roughly 100 desertions occurred daily.430
Six days after the formation of Bazargan’s government a group of homafaran (air force 
technicians) went to Khomeini’s headquarters and hailed him as leader. A picture of 
this meeting was published in all newspapers, undermining what little credibility was 
left of Bakhtiar’s Government. Soon after, thousands of army personnel staged pro- 
Khomeini rallies in which hundreds were arrested. General Huyser failed to carry out 
his mission to stage a coup in the event that Bakhtiar’s government was defeated. 
According to Banisadr, this was caused by the US government’s lack of understanding 
of army generals’ psychology. Those who until this point had served under the Shah of 
Iran now saw that an American general had taken control of the army; a humiliation for 
nationalist generals who until then thought they were serving the nation through their 
loyalty to the Shah.431 As a result, Huyser’s disobedience became widespread among 
generals. Huyser himself failed to see the reasons behind his generals’ lack of 
enthusiasm to carry out his orders; in his memoir, he constantly criticises Iranian 
generals for disobeying orders. However, the fact was that most generals were refusing 
to carry orders, which would led to the bloodshed of their compatriots under the orders 
of an American general, who had entered the country without a visa and taken the
428 A. A. Amid Zanjani, Gozideye ketabe enghelabe Eslami va reeshehaye aan [Selections on the Islamic Revolution
and Its Roots] (Sazamane chap va entesharate vezarate farhange va ershade Eslami, 1998 [1375], p. 300.
429 Ebrahime Nabavi’s interview with Amir Enezam, Bazargan’s deputy prime minister, Ja 'meh newspaper, 1998, no.
52; see also Sullivan, Mission to Iran.
430 Milani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 130.
431 Banisadr, interview, 21 January 2005.
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Iranian armed forces under his command.432 This disobedience was reinforced by a 
letter from Khomeini addressed to army generals, in which he gave the impression that 
there would be a general amnesty for army officers and soldiers on the condition that 
they leave Bakhtiar’s doomed government to its fate 433 While he in fact did not grant 
such amnesty, this impression deceived the generals who, like many others, did not 
believe that a religious person of the highest status would “play politics” with them. 
They soon discovered the depths of this deception, however, when a few days after the 
collapse of the Pahlavi regime four were executed without trial. These executions 
marked the beginning of a new phase of repression of army personnel in which 
hundreds were executed and thousands were either imprisoned or dismissed from the 
armed forces.
The final collapse of the Shah’s regime
The ancien regime entered its final stage with the breakdown of discipline in the air 
force. On 10 February, homafaran at the Doshan Tappeh air base staged a pro- 
Khomeini demonstration, which was attacked by a unit of Garde Javidan (Immortals), 
the backbone of the Shah’s army. The homafaran fiercely resisted this attack and were 
helped by thousands of civilians and some remnants of the Mujaheddin and Fadaeen 
organisations.434 Revolutionaries managed to break into the base’s arsenal to arm 
themselves and as a result forced the Immortals to retreat. They then attacked Evin 
Prison (Iran’s “Bastille”) and the SAVAK headquarters. Garabaghi, the army Chief of 
Staff, declared the army’s neutrality. However, by then most army barracks had been 
attacked and weapons confiscated with little or no military resistance. The spontaneity 
of this uprising, the speed with which it spread and the scale of mass participation 
deprived any single organisation of a monopolising role. As the revolutionaries had 
already ransacked the barracks, the White House instructed Sullivan to give the army
432 See Huyser, Mission to Tehran, p. 19 for his admission that he entered Iran without a visa and for instances of
Huyser’s complaints about Iraninan generals’ inability to carry out his orders and cooperate see: pp. 45-46, 55- 
56,61-62
433 This letter was given to Dariush Foruhar, the leader of the Iran Party, on his visit to Paris so he could deliver the
letter to the army generals. Banisadr has provided the author with a copy of the letter. Banisadr, interview, 21 
January 2005.
434 It seems there has been a large degree of exaggeration regarding the effect of armed organisations in the final
stage of the revolution. The number of active armed Marxist members or organisations all over Iran was no 
more than 50-60, of which 15-20 were Tudeh supporters with no military experience. See Ahmadi, Darse 
tajrobeh, p. 414.
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America’s consent to stage a coup. Sullivan “gave a colourful, but unprintable, 
reply”.435
As pointed out already, Bazargan argued, the Shah had been the leader of the revolution 
in a negative sense: he had succeeded in uniting the entire nation against him. This 
phenomenon can be partly explained as a result of political repression and deep-seated 
economic and social inequalities. However, the psychological factor was also important 
in creating deep-seated feelings of personal hatred against him. Because he gained and 
sustained his position as a result of the 1953 coup, for the majority he personified 
national humiliation. This feeling of hatred between the people and the Shah was two 
sided: despite his declared desire for creating a great civilisation, he despised his 
subjects, whom he never treated as citizens, and therefore systematically underestimated 
their role in overthrowing his regime.
This disdain was visible not only in the authoritarian nature of his regime, but became 
more pronounced in his final statements. For example, after he was forced to leave the 
country, which some of his most loyal generals perceived as being thrown out “like a 
dead mouse”,436 he refused to accept that the uprising was a genuine home-grown 
revolution and hence blamed America for his fate.437 This lack of respect for Iranians 
could be partly explained by his own inferiority complex. He knew that he had gained 
power through an American-British coup and that his role was simply to escape from 
Iran and return after the coup had succeeded. When General Huyser entered Iran, the 
Shah—known as the most powerful man of the country, who had titled himself the 
“king of the kings”, had no say in whether the general could enter the country, let alone 
being able to prevent him from putting the generals under his control. His reaction to 
Huyser’s presence to Iran was illustrated by a single question he asked General 
Qarabaghi, his Commander in Chief: “do you know what the Americans are up to?”438 
This approach, especially by a person who perceived himself as the strongest man in 
Iran and the Middle East, reveals that the Shah was deeply aware of his powerlessness.
435 Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 342, quoted in Milani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 133.
436 Before the parody of the trial which preceded his execution, General Amir Hussein Rabii, commander in chief of
the Iranian air force, was questioned about the role played by General Huyser. He replied to his judges, 
“General Huyser threw the emperor out of the country like a dead mouse”. See ‘Thrown Out Like a Dead 
Mouse”, Time Magazine, 17 December 1979, accessed online at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0.9171.920699.00.html?promoid=googlep.
437 See Mohammad Reza Shah, interview with David Frost, March 1979.
438 Milani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 127.
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It is not difficult to imagine that he saw himself as a leaf floating over a stormy sea, 
fearfully wondering where the events would take him.
The revolution also expressed the West’s failure to understand Iran and thus represented 
its error of judgement. This failure is illustrated in the words of an Iranian journalist 
when he told Robin Wright,
you thought you understood Iran because the Shah spoke English and 
because his cabinet had read Shakespeare.. ..You thought he was good 
because you could see a reflection of yourself in him. But he 
understood Iran as little as you did, and that’s why you both failed.439
With the Shah in Egypt, his Prime minister in hiding, the US government in a state of 
shock and pondering its future role in Iran, Khomeini at the height of his popularity, and 
Bazargan, a liberal-minded prime minister at the head of the provisional government 
with a liberal cabinet blessed by Khomeini and supported by the Revolutionary 
Council,440 it seemed a new chapter in this ancient land was opening. The land of 
historical monarchies and kings was turning its face away from a long line of despots, 
believing that after two failed attempts at revolution, this time freedom was within its 
grasp.
439 Wright, quoted in Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran, p. 127.
440 33% of cabinet ministers were from the National Front and 50% nationalist Moslems.
5The end o f  consensus and the emergence 
o f  struggle between revolutionary elites
The collapse of the ancien regime in February 1978 led to the wide spread of political 
freedoms: of the press, of parties and demonstrations, and the emergence of councils in 
many levels of social strata; in other words, the very things advocated by the leaders of 
the revolution, above all by Khomeini. Most importantly, the ruling elites were thus far 
united in implementing the principles of democratic Islam. For instance, when Banisadr 
insisted that the first draft of the democratically based constitution should be ratified by 
the constitutional parliament before going to a referendum, Rafsanjani, who later 
emerged as a leading figure in the totalitarian front, warned Banisadr that this would 
allow clergy with archaic mentalities into the parliament and that they would do away 
with the constitution.441 Both the Revolutionary Council and the provisional 
government were openly committed to preventing this from happening.
However, in following months it became obvious that consensus over the nature of the 
future state was crumbling. This became most apparent when a group of Khomeini’s 
associates, drawn mainly from the clergy, founded the IRP on the Algerian-single party 
model with Khomeini’s implicit consent 442 In order to legitimise this aim, the party 
revitalised Khomeini’s concept of Islamic government, Velayat-e faghih (rule of the 
jurist) which had been ignored even by its founder since its articulation in 1973. This 
split marked the emergence of two political fronts which were grounded in two 
opposing discourses of Islam. Islam as a “discourse of freedom” was represented by 
those who had committed themselves to freedom as the stated goal of the revolution, 
namely, by Bazargan’s government and more systematically by Banisadr. Islam as a 
“discourse of power” was represented mainly by the IRP and its satellite religious and 
clerical organisations and groups. The struggle between these two fronts was to 
dominate the political and socio-economical scene of Iran for the next two-and-one-half 
years, when the impeachment of Banisadr in June 1981 signalled the final defeat of the 
democratic camp.
441 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
442 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran [Storming the Crisis] (Tehran: Moaseseye Farhangee Honari-ye Taher-
Leyla, 1999 [1378]), pp. 15-16.
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The two phases of the struggle
This struggle can be understood as having two phases. In the first phase, as has already 
been argued, the ruling elite fractioned into democratic and totalitarian camps shortly 
after Bazargan’s appointment as Prime minister. During this phase the provisional 
government gradually lost its power within the state to the IRP and its allies. The phase 
lasted for nine months and ended with Bazargan’s resignation over the occupation of the 
American embassy by a newly formed student group called Daneshjooyan-e Khate 
Emam (Followers of the Imam’s Line). Phase two, which lasted for seventeen months, 
began with Banisadr’s presidency and ended in June 1981. This phase differed widely 
from the first in a number of ways. Mainly, the president’s theoretical framework 
regarding revolution and related issues shaped his approach to the country’s 
independence (i.e., the type of desired relationship with the US), bureaucracy and the 
economy, which brought their differences to the fore. Second, while Bazargan was 
forced to resign and quietly removed due to IRP interference behind the scenes,
Banisadr was more autonomous—even though the IRP had mobilised all its available 
resources and was in a much stronger political position. In fact, after failing to dislodge 
the president, it needed for Khomeini to abandon his apparent neutrality and directly 
intervene against Banisadr by taking the lead to remove him.
Phase one: the provisional government
After the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, the country was in chaos. However, unlike in 
similar cases (e.g., the fall of Baghdad to American forces in 2003) the collapse of the 
state did not lead to the plundering of national and private property. In fact, far from it; 
social violence decreased significantly, even despite the release of all prisoners. 
However, political violence against the remnants of the Pahlavi regime was soon 
initiated simultaneously by the revolutionary courts and by Stalinist organisations in 
different parts of the country, especially in Kurdistan. Finally, Hezbollahis (also called 
“club wielders”) aimed to disrupt the gatherings and demonstrations of their opponents.
The use of violence against participants in the revolution was initiated mainly by groups 
on the Stalinist and Maoist left, primarily Fedaeen-e Khalq, the Kurdish Democratic 
Party and Koomeleh in Kurdistan. These organisations, which used the 1917 Russian 
Revolution as a model, believed that Khomeini, whom they believed to be the Kerensky
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of the revolution, had to be removed. Just as the bridge between the first Russian 
revolution to Lenin’s October Revolution was through civil war, so they believed that a 
civil war in Iran would hasten the “second revolution”.443 Well over 300,000 small 
weapons had fallen into the hands of the people, many into the hands of radical groups. 
Hence, violent centrifugal movements in different regions of the country, led by these 
organisations, challenged what was left of the government. The collapse and 
demoralisation of the security forces had only increased the prospect of victory for these 
movements.
The economic situation was no better than the political one. Bank reserves were almost 
nonexistent as the last of the Shah’s supporters drained their resources when they 
escaped to the West. The entire reserve of the country dropped to around $50 
million 444 Many strikers were reluctant to resume work, oil production was low, major 
industries were either idle or working at low productivity, and with the collapse of many 
economic sectors (especially construction) unemployment was high. While real estate 
prices and rent in major cities fell as a result of the departure of foreign workers and the 
Shah’s elite, inflation was rampant in other sectors of the economy.
In these circumstances, Bazargan headed a government that drew its mandate and 
legitimacy from Khomeini, the Revolutionary Council and the public. Khomeini, in 
order to fulfil his promise that he would not assume a leadership position, left Tehran 
soon after returning to Iran and retreated to Qom. Bazargan’s government symbolised 
both Iranian nationalism and democratic-modemist Islam 445 Bazargan and most of his 
ministers were internationally known and respected; they had high levels of managerial 
skills and controlled the bureaucracy and the armed forces. Above, all the government 
received the support of all sections of society from modem middle and working classes 
as well as from the bazaar.446 The government was given six tasks, among them 
revitalising the economy, ratifying the constitution and transferring power to the 
democratically elected president.447 Initially, it had unprecedented advantages. 
However, it gradually became clear that his government was unable to carry out its
443 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005. Also see the memoir of Naghi Hamidian, a member of the Fedaeen Khalq,
Safar baa baalhaaye aarezoo [Journey on the Wings of a Wish] (Stockholm: Aarash, 2004).
444 Ibid.
445 In his first message to the Iranian people after accepting the premiership, we can see how explicitly he defined
Islam based on democratic principles; ibid., p. 466.
446 See Mehdi Bazargan, Bes 'at va daulat [Mission and State] (Tehran, 1981), pp. 8-50 and Shur-ye enqelab va
daulat-e movaqat [The Islamic Revolutionary Council and the Provisional Government] (Tehran, 1983), pp. 
39-40.
447 Bazargan, Memoirs, p. 471.
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mission. This was partly a result of ideological belief, which drastically weakened its 
performance and provided ample space for its opponents. Five major tactical 
weaknesses can also be considered in the explanation.
First, at a theoretical level, Bazargan and the Freedom Movement more generally 
privileged the project to establish domestic democracy at the cost of the country’s 
independence (as had the NF after Mussadiq).448 Therefore, they failed to address 
public sensitivities regarding Iran’s relationship with dominant foreign powers, 
particularly its relation with America. This created a political vacuum which was soon 
filled by radical organisations that did seem to take this concern into account. The 
occupation of the American embassy, which initially enjoyed massive public support 
and which forced Bazargan to resign, depicted Khomeini as the uncompromising leader 
of the country’s independence. The occupation therefore had a disastrous impact on the 
democratic front. It also had international consequences, which led to the election of 
Ronald Reagan and further militarisation of American foreign policy after a short period 
of respite caused by the Vietnam defeat.
Second, Bazargan failed to realise that drastic changes were needed in order to 
transform Iran’s despotic socio-bureaucratic structure into a democratic one. This 
became another cause of contention between Bazargan and the future president, as 
Banisadr constantly warned of an urgent need to carry out major reforms. This had a 
detrimental effect on the democratic front as it weakened cooperation within the 
government, and can mainly be explained on ideological grounds. Throughout his long 
political life, Bazargan advocated reforms rather than revolutionary changes. In 
numerous and lengthy interviews, he criticised those who demanded the complete 
destruction of the ancien regime; he asked people to forget about the revolution and 
provide him with opportunities for reforming the system. This view is illustrated in 
many of his policies and statements. For example, in one of his speeches he said, “don’t 
expect me to act in the manner of [Khomeini], who, head down, moves ahead like a 
bulldozer, crushing rocks, roots and stones in his path. I am a delicate passenger car 
and must ride on a smooth, surfaced road”.449 As a result, however, he failed to take 
important decisions at the height of the revolutionary atmosphere and thus created an 
ideological and socio-political vacuum.
448 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, pp. 192-93.
449 Bazargan, Memoirs, p. 469. For further understanding his reformist approach see, Bazargan, Avalin saal ’e ’
enghelab, pp. 33, 230-34.
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Third, this vacuum created an open field of action for both the radical left and Islamic 
militants. Also, the absence of revolutionary sentiments and policy in the provisional 
government provided Khoemini space to violate the pledges he had made during the 
revolution, in which he committed himself no to interfere in the affairs of the state.450 
The provisional government’s failure to take obvious and necessary steps to improve 
the post-revolutionary political and economic situation therefore legitimised 
Khomeini’s interference, which was manifested in two ways. Overtly, he ordered the 
government to carry out certain duties, like cutting off diplomatic relations with South 
Africa. More importantly, he offered both open and covert support for the newly- 
established revolutionary institutions. As these institutions gradually increased in 
strength and confidence they challenged Bazargan’s government, deprived it of its 
functions and eventually became vehicles for carrying the totalitarian forces into power. 
However it should be mentioned that many of these revolutionary organisations, 
primarily the Revolutionary Guards, and Construction Jihad in villages were initially 
established by Bazargan’s government. However, despite protests by Banisadr and 
others like Ayatollah Lahouti, a leading Ayatollah during the revolution, and Mustafa 
Chamran, Bazargan’s defense minister,451 about the threat of hegemony that they would 
post for the revolution,452 were later lost to the IRP. It was only years after that 
Bazargan began to recognise this mistake, saying that “the Constrution jihad, which was 
established by the initiation of executive consultant minister and Interim Government, 
soon turned to be a development, executive and propaganda branch of the Islamic 
Republic Party in villages”.453 Furthe rmore, he decided that in order to prevent constant 
criticism of the IRP, it would be prudent to take them in and offer them jobs. For that 
reason he offered deputy postions in the ministries of defence and education and the 
ministry of internal affairs to Khamenei, Bahonar and Rafsanjani, which they accepted 
without hesitation. Banisadr strongly opposed these appointments and argued that by 
presenting them with positions of power, they would never leave them. Bazargan, 
however, believed that once they were in these positions and saw the problems facing 
these ministeries they would leave voluntarily.454 He believed they shared his lack of
450 See Khomeini’s 1979 interview in Paris, quoted in Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 348; also the interview with an
NBC reporter on November 1978 [20 Aban 1357] in Motahari, Imam va mosahebehaayee, p. 201.
451 See Mehdi Bazargan, Engelab dar do Harekat [Revolution to two movements] (Tehran, 1984 [1363]), p. 141.
452 In various speeches and articles Banisadr openly opposed the establishment of these organisations. See also
Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
453 Bazargan, Enghelab dar do Harekat, p. 146.
454 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
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attraction to power, a characteristic which Bazargan had demonstrated during his entire 
political life. This, however, proved to be a naive analysis of the IRP leaders’ interests.
Fourth, the Stalinist left (i.e., the Tudeh Party and Fadaeen) became an important factor 
in weakening Bazargan’s government and the democratic front in general.
Ideologically, they viewed the provisional government as a representative of the liberal 
bourgeoisie and did not share its views on political freedoms.455 The political reflection 
of their ideology represented itself in two seemingly opposing ways, which ended up 
pursuing the same goals. The Fedaeen and other radical left organisations, mainly in 
Kurdistan, resorted to armed struggle, challenging the authority of the provisional 
government in order to hijack the Iranian Revolution as they believed Lenin once did 
with the Russian Revolution. The introduction of violence into the political process 
weakened the democratic government and provided further justification for the 
fundamentalists’ use of violence. This effect can be summarised by Khomeini’s 
statement, which he made after some members of the armed forces were at the hands of 
Kurish guerrilla orgnisations, in which he publicly defended the removal of freedom 
from the political process, stating, “we gave them freedom, they misused it, that was a 
mistake so we took it back. We can not be mild mannered when it come to these wild 
beasts. No paper of theirs will be allowed to be distributed anywhere in the country, we 
will destroy all writings. With people who behave like that one has to be decisive and 
we are going to be.. .”.456 Other leftist groups were also implicated. While the Tudeh 
Party avoided armed struggle, it became a fierce opponent of the democratic front and 
by siding with the IRP provided much-needed political and organisational expertise to 
inexperienced pro-Khomeini religious groups in their struggle against the democratic 
front.
Fifth, fearful of a repetition of the 1953 coup and weary of the IRP’s interference in 
governmental affairs, Bazargan made two tactical decisions which provided the 
totalitarian front with a golden opportunity to control leverages that enabled them to 
gain control of the state. First, he consented to the establishment of the Revolutionary 
Guard, an institution that was soon after hijacked by the IRP, who established 
hegemony over it by putting their members in charge. This institution played a decisive 
role in the defeat of the democratic front. Second, Bazargan agreed to establish
455 See Hamidian, Safar baa baalhaaye aarezoo.
456 Khomeini’s meeting with the Council of Experts’ members, 27 May 1979 [6 khordad 1358] in Khomeini, Sahifeh-
ye nour, vol. 5, p. 78.
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temporary Revolutionary Courts, which were supposed to “fast track” the handling of 
crimes committed under the Shah’s regime. These courts, despite their temporary and 
illegal status, in fact became permanent and played a major role in re-establishing the 
post-revolutionary rule of terror by executing and imprisoning thousands of Iranians for 
their participation in the revolution. Bazargan also hoped to limit the IRP’s meddling in 
governmental affairs by offering clergy jobs at ministerial levels in the government, 
hoping that they would resign when they faced problems. While at the beginning they 
were fearful of accepting responsibility, they in fact learned and tasted power.
Revolutionary institutions and their decisive role in the struggle
In order to analyse the mechanism of the emerging struggle between the two camps, it is 
important to understand how these and other revolutionary institutions—the Council of 
the Revolution, Committees of Revolution, Revolutionary Guard, Foundation of the 
Disinherited and Revolutionary Courts—were established and gradually dominated by 
the IRP and its allies. It was through these institutions, together comprising a “mini­
state”, that the IRP was able to effectively challenge the democratic camp.
Shoray-e Enghelab (Council of the Revolution)
Bazargan originally founded this council at Khomeini’s request in order to organise the 
struggle against the Pahlavi regime. However, after the revolution new members were 
added to the council and it became a legislative power for removing legal obstacles to 
the provisional government. Originally, eight out of seventeen members of the council 
came from the clerical establishment, but did not necessarily share the same views. The 
most charismatic and influential of these was Ayatollah Taleghani, who had strong 
democratic views and who closely rivalled Khomeini in popularity. Ayatollah 
Motahari, although advocating the involvement of clergy in the government,457 also had 
strong democratic credentials. When Bazargan appointed some democratic members
457 Jafari, interview, 9 September 2004.
458 The Revolutionary Council members included the following. Ayatollah Beheshti was Khomeini’s representative
in Tehran and the chief negotiator with army, Bakhtyar’s government and Americans during the revolution; he 
was killed in a much disputed explosion with more than eighty other members of the IRP in June 1981. 
Ayatollah Talegani, the most popular clergyman in Iran, died few months after the revolution. Ayatollah 
Motahari, a professor of theology in Tehran university and Khomeini’s disciple, was assassinated by Forqan, a 
radical Islamic and anti-clerical organisation. Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili was the chief prosecutor of Tehran 
in the first years of the revolution. Others include Ayatollah Kani, the head of Islamic Committees; Hojat-ol- 
Eslam Hashemi-ye- Rafasanjani, the first speaker of the parliament and president of the republic for two terms 
until 1997; and Ayatollah Bahonar, prime minister under Rajaei’s presidency who was killed in another
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of the council to his cabinet, however, the balance of power within the council shifted 
towards clergy members of the IRP and their non-clerical allies. The Council of 
Revolution acted as an interim parliament, passing legislation covering areas from 
socioeconomic to political affairs, and provided a legislative instrument for the IRP in 
its attempt to monopolise power.
Komiteha-ye Enghelab (Committees of the Revolution)
During the revolution, local committees were formed to organise local protests against 
the regime. However, after the regime collapsed and army barracks were ransacked, 
these committees armed themselves and in the absence of a police force became 
vigilante groups which arrested people suspected of collaborating with the old regime 
(particularly by expropriating property). Bazargan tried to either dissolve or incorporate 
them into the newly reorganised police force, but it soon became obvious that the 
committees provided the IRP with another institutional method for weakening 
Bazargan’s government. These committees were soon headed by local members of the 
clergy and received Khomeini’s blessing. Bazargan nevertheless argued that they were 
ridden with corrupt elements and asked for their dissolution. In response, Ayatollah 
Mahdavi Kani, the head of the Revolutionary Committees, told Banisadr, “we have 
purged forty thousand out of forty-five thousand and still the purge continues”.
Banisadr responded, “so you confess that the Revolutionary Committees are absolutely 
corrupt”.459 Khomeini, aware of the role the committees played in weakening other 
political parties, stated that committees need purging and not dissolution. In November 
1979, Khomeini ordered some committees to be dissolved, placing the rest under the 
supervision of fourteen regional districts in Tehran which were headed by loyal clergy. 
Bazargan never gained the control of these committees.
Sepaah-e Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard)
Ironically, Bazargan’s government created this institution in order to balance the power 
of the army. Banisadr strongly opposed the creation of the guard, warning that it and
disputed explosion. The non-clerical members were Habibollha Peyman, a prominent Moslem intellectual 
who, during the struggle, supported the fundamentalists in their struggle against the democratic camp; Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh, a political activist, one of Khomeini’s main advisors in Paris and the head of the media after the 
revolution who was later accused of conspiring against the regime and executed; Jalal-e- Musavi, who was 
Beheshti’s main adviser; and Banisadr, a prominent Islamic intellectual who became the first elected president 
in Iran and now livies in exile in Paris.
459 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 96.
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other newly established revolutionary establishments would become instruments of an 
emerging despotism.460 This warning went unheeded by the provisional government. 
The Revolutionary Guard (RG) soon fell out of the control of the government. Abu 
Sharif, the founder of the RG, was quietly forced to resign, and Mohsen Rezaee (a pro- 
IRP man) was put in charge. By using state resources, the RG succeeded in establishing 
the foundations for its own army. While the IRP failed in its attempts to dismantle the 
army, during the war it strengthened the RG and turned it from a group of small units 
playing a marginal role into a strong, national force for social control.
Bonyaad-e Mostazafeen (Foundation of the Disinherited)
This foundation inherited the massive wealth of the Pahlavi Foundation, which 
consisted of a conglomeration of hundreds of companies, factories, buildings and 
substantial investment in the West. It soon added to this wealth expropriated firms, 
factories and land, and became the largest financial institution in the Middle East. This 
institution, which soon became plagued with corruption,461 provided considerable 
financial resources for financing the IRP’s activities.462
Revolutionary Courts
These courts, ordered by Khomeini, surpassed the normal procedures of the judiciary 
system. They were staffed from the very beginning by Khomeini’s men and exercised 
ruthless punishment on the remnants of the ancien regime, despite the fact that 
Khomeini had promised amnesty to the Shah’s generals in the final month of the 
revolution.463 In closed sessions, the courts ordered summary executions of officers and 
other officials of the Shah’s regime. Some six hundred officials were executed within 
the first nine months.464 The secular and religious left as a whole praised the 
decisiveness of the courts, not realising that many of their number would also soon
460 Ibid., pp. 85-86 and 91-92.
461 The first allegation of corruption consisted of over eight hundred cases which referred to the court, but as soon as
Banisadr was overthrown the charges were dropped. Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005. See also Mizan 
and Enghelabe Eslami newspapers during April and May 1980 when various articles discussed the allegations.
462 This organisation, which now controls 40% of the Iranian economy, still remains out of the government’s control,
and next to its duties provides the financial backing for Ayatollah Khamenei, the present head of the Iranian 
regime.
463 Banisadr has provided the author with a copy of the letter, which Ayatollah Khomeini wrote regarding the
amnesty to the army generals and which Dariush Foruhar, the leader of the Iran Party, delivered to them.
464 Asnad, vol. 16, 10 October 1979, p. 148.
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become victims of these courts. The revolutionary courts proved to be instrumental in 
the IRP's attempt to monopolise power by spreading terror throughout society.
The IRP’s penetration of state institutions
The IRP did not confine itself to the mere creation of this parallel state, but also 
expanded its influence within the state by taking control of various organizations which 
were set up after the revolution. The most important of these organisations were 
purging commissions, Islamic associations and representatives of the Imam. The 
Hey ’atha-ey Paksazi (Purging Commissions) originally were established six months 
after the collapse of the Pahlavi regime. The Revolutionary Council took the decision 
with the goal of identifying and purging Pahlavi collaborators.465 These commissions 
were first active in individual government organisations, however, their role was soon 
extended to remove any actual or potential threats to the dominance of the clergy. By 
the end of July 1980 there were some 150 purge committees operating all over Iran, 
which resulted in the discharge of tens of thousands of experts. In the education system 
alone, some 20,000 teachers were fired.466 Islamic associations, on the other hand, 
spontaneously emerged after the revolution within the state administrative, industrial 
and educational apparatus. However, as with other newly established institutions, the 
IRP struggled to dominate them and after major purges transformed them into 
instruments of struggle against Banisadr and the democratic camp in general.467 They 
were also used for control and propaganda purposes. Finally, a few months after the 
revolution, in order to institutionalise his power over the state Khomeini chose loyal 
clergymen and provided them with extended authority to “Islamicise” state institutions. 
They were known as Namayandegan-e Emam, or the Representatives of the Imam.
This soon provided another platform for the IRP to interfere in the affairs of the 
provisional government.
The rise of the IRP and creation of a “state within a state”
465 The decision was taken on 4 September 1979. See Enghelabe Eslami, no. 594.
466 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban fo r  the Crown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 144.
467 Mir Hussein Musavi, prime minister during Khamenei’s presidency from 1981-88, praised them for their
particular services they carried out against “liberals” and “Banisadr”. See Jomhuree-ye Eslami, 30 January 
1983.
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The political and ideological force behind all these newly established institutions was 
the Islamic Republic Party. However it should be pointed out that at its inception, the 
party aimed to be an overarching party, which represented most political factions and
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intellectual tendencies. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that this aim was 
incompatible with attempts to gain and control political power. This led to a change in 
direction, and the IRP was soon the strongest non-democratic party, soon bringing 
smaller fundamentalist groups under its control. Later it was claimed that the party was 
created in part to avoid the clergy’s loss of power to secular intellectuals, as had 
happened during the Constitutional Revolution.469 Khomeini also lacked both 
disciplined cadres and a clear political agenda for the future regime; the IRP was to 
provide both.
The party was founded by Beheshti, Rafsanjani, Khamenei and other clerics and laymen 
a week after the collapse of the monarchy. It became a meeting point for dispersed 
supporters of Khomeini from all areas of society, from workplaces, cities and towns, 
cutting across classes. It also soon came to dominate the newly established 
revolutionary institutions, with which it had a mutual relationship: the institutions 
needed political legitimacy, while the party needed an institutional base for its power.470 
Furthermore, it utilised the massive network of 80,000 mosques within the country, 
which then became dominated by active and young supporters of Khomeini. In most 
cases, clergy who opposed these developments were sidelined.
The party’s political goals for implementing Islamic principles in political, cultural and 
socio-economic areas were ambiguous. The causes of this ambiguity were located in 
the structure of the party itself. It lacked both coherent leadership and defined views on 
socio-economic and political issues, and therefore suffered from a deficit of a 
comprehensive programme. For instance, it failed to declare its position in relation to 
issues of labour, capital, land and ownership. It also fell short of having an efficient 
structure and trained cadres. However, in order to solidify the clergy’s control over the 
state, the IRP introduced and ratified the doctrine of Velayat-e faghih in the Assembly 
of Experts. This was effectively a legal coup which changed the first draft of the 
constitution structurally and legitimised the clergy’s strong influence within it, while
468 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 103.
469 See the letters of IRP leaders to Khomeini on 17 February 1980 [28 bahman 1358], quoted in Rafsanjani, Oboor
az bohran and Rafsanjani, Daftar-e nashr-e maaref-e engelab, p. 12.
470 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 103.
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weakening people’s power. Furthermore, it helped the party maintain its ambiguous 
stance on socio-economic issues, as by this time the IRP had become dependent on the 
leader’s view on these matters. The party soon received Khomeini’s implicit blessing 
by the appointment of its leaders to high offices within the government. From February 
to November 1979, we thus observe the creation of a state within a state, which 
gradually paralysed the government. As IRP interference mounted, Bazargan defined 
his government as a “knife without a blade”.471 Within this ever-expanding mini-state, 
the IRP functioned as a command-control centre, employing the Komitehs as its police 
force, the Revolutionary Guards as its army and the Foundation of the Disinherited as 
its main source of revenue.
In brief, through this mini-state the IRP undermined the provisional government’s 
attempt to establish law and order and gradually prevented the government from 
fulfilling its other functions. In a communication with the American embassy, Amir 
Entezaam, Bazargan’s deputy prime minister informed the Americans that “Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the Komitehs, and the revolutionary guards are campaigning against the 
government”.472 Bazargan described Iran as a country with “thousands of sheriffs”. 
Still failing to realise the real intention behind the constant obstacles which were put 
forward by these institutions, he naively assumed that “progress” was the shared goal. 
He tried to convince those institutions that development was contingent on having a 
single source of power, quoting from Napoleon that one bad commander is better then 
two good ones.473 Nevertheless, his entire plea for respect of the law fell on deaf ears.
The power of this mini-state, however, had its limits. Although the provisional 
government proved to be more and more ineffective, it still had considerable power and 
the IRP lacked control of major economic and political levers such as the Central Bank 
and the oil and foreign ministries. Furthermore, Khomeini, who still presented himself 
as neutral and above day-to-day politics, could not directly intervene and remove 
Bazargan without seriously jeopardising his own position, since he had appointed 
Bazargan and made it a religious obligation for his followers to support the government.
The occupation of the American embassy and its effect on internal politics
471 See Oriana Fallaci, “Everybody wants to be the boss”, The New York Times Magazine, 28 October 1979.
472 Asnad, vol. 10, 8 July 1979, p.78 (from the AET to Vance).
473 Milani, Iran’s Islamic Revolution, p. 150.
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In the context of Khomeini’s inability to remove Bazargan and the IRP’s inability to 
directly confront the provisional government, the occupation of the American embassy 
had immense importance for the internal politics of Iran. The occupation, conducted by 
the Students of the Imam’s Line, included the hostage-taking of fifty-two American 
diplomats for 444 days.474 It had four major consequences on domestic politics, in 
particular, the development of the revolution. First, it created conditions for 
considerable structural changes in the proposed constitution, particularly the imposition 
of Velayat-e faqih , which transferred a basically democratic constitution into an eclectic 
one which assigned and legitimised extended authority to clergy at the helm of political 
power. Second, it exposed the provisional government’s failure to address concerns 
about the country’s independence, particularly in terms of its relationship with the US, a 
country which had for twenty-five years supported the Shah’s oppressive and 
authoritarian rule over Iran and which, as a result, accumulated massive public hostility 
against itself. This political vacuum was filled by radical student actions (i.e., the 
embassy occupation), while the IRP portrayed itself as champion of the country’s 
independence and on this basis legitimised its opposition to Bazargan’s government. 
Third, the embassy occupation forced Bazargan’s government to resign and therefore 
provided conditions for the IRP to extend its hegemony over the state. Finally, the 
international sanctions, which were imposed as a response to the hostage-taking, 
provided the external conditions for Iraq’s invasion of Iran, which in turn had drastic 
effects on Iranian politics and the politics of the region as a whole.
While Bazargan’s resignation and the constitutional amendments were the first 
consequences of the occupation, it is also important to understand how the first 
referendum, which was intended to determine the nature of the future regime, provided 
political legitimacy for the constitution. The first task, which the government undertook 
was to carry out a controversial referendum on the nature of the future regime. After a 
long controversy over how the referendum should be conducted, a proposal allowing 
people to choose between multiple forms of government was declined and it was 
decided that people must choose between whether they want to have an Islamic republic 
or not. Initially, the Revolutionary Council voted unanimously, and with the support of 
the provisional government, to call the post-revolutionary state an “Islamic Democratic
474 The students initially took sixty-six personnel hostage; however, soon after Banisadr negotiated the release of all 
female and African-American hostages.
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Republic”.475 Khomeini opposed this idea on the grounds that since Islam is democratic, 
there was no need to add the word ‘democratic’. Voter turnout for the referendum was 
extremely high; over 95% of those eligible to vote participated, of which 98.2% voted 
‘yes’ to the Islamic Republic. Only a few small secular groups boycotted the 
referendum. The public gave its overwhelming support for creating an Islamic state 
which would be defined within the framework of the constitution.
It is important to analyse the political struggle between the two competing political 
camps from the vantage point of the embassy occupation. The occupation proved to be 
a decisive political factor which to a large extent determined the outcome of this 
struggle. The chronological study of the constitution’s development largely verifies the 
impact of the hostage-taking on the constitution.
The political struggle over the constitution
The task of writing the first draft of the constitution started during the revolution, soon 
after Khomeini arrived in Paris, and continued in Iran with the commission of five 
Islamic and secular intellectuals with strong democratic credentials476 and who were in 
constant consultation with grand ayatollahs. With a few minor amendments, 
Khomeini477 endorsed it on 18 June 1979 and asked that it be put to a referendum.478 
On two further occasions, he publicly gave his approval to the first draft. In a speech to 
revolutionary guards, for example, he declared, “we must support and confirm the 
constitution so that it will be as Islam requires. It must be approved quickly. It is a 
blueprint made by the government and this blueprint is correct”.479 Also, the
475 Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution o f  Iran, transl. by John O’Kane (London: I. B. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1997), p.
293.
476 The five civil jurists were Naser Katuzian, Mohammad Ja’fari Langarudi, Ahmad Sadr hajj Seyyed Javadi and
Abbas Minachi. See unterview of Kayhan newspaper with Hassan Habibi, 1 September 1979. Finally, the 
preliminary draft was published on 28 and 29 June 1979. See the Kayhan interview with Yadollah Sahabi, also 
see Sanjabi, Umidha, p. 331. It should also be pointed out that Hassan Habibi, one of the participants in 
writing the constitution, closely associated himself with the IRP shortly after Bazargan’s resignation and 
became its candidate against Banisadr. He continued to work closely with totalitarian forces, to the extent that 
during Rafsanjani’s presidency he became his senior advisor and also the speaker for his government for some 
years.
477 “The Imam and a few of the grand ayatollahs had seen it, read it and approved of it, despite their wishing to make
a few insignificant improvements.” See Yadollah Sahabi, interview in Kayhan, 16 March 1979. See also 
Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
478 Banisadr, interview, 21 January 2005.
479 Kayhan, 18 June 1979 [28 khordad 1358].
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preliminary draft received unanimous approval from the Revolutionary Council, which 
declared it to be the official preliminary draft.480
It is notable that leading members of the IRP were members of the council which 
approved the draft. As stated already, this draft contained no mention of Velayat-e 
faqih,m  which later became the main ideological pillar and source of legitimacy of the 
regime. Furthermore, there was no special place reserved for Islamic jurists, except on 
the Guardian Council, where they were a minority.482 In this first draft the council did 
not have an automatic right to judge whether the laws passed in the parliament were in 
accordance with Islamic laws and had to be invited to act. In other words, they had no 
special rights and the resolution of the Council of Guardians could only become valid if 
passed by a two-thirds majority in the parliament. In this draft, the president—not 
jurists—headed the state.484
As discussed already, Khomeini’s overt approval of the preliminary draft was consistent 
with the political position he adopted in Paris, where he in various ways had stated that 
“the criterion in Islam is the people’s vote”. This gave the impression that he had 
renounced the concept of Velayat-e faghih. In response to whether he would consider 
accepting any position in the government, he declared, “personal desire, age, and my 
health do not allow me to personally have a role in running the country after the fall of
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the current system”. He only wanted to be the “spiritual leader of the nation”. 
Furthermore, soon after he arrived in Iran he left the capital and moved to Qom, which 
reaffirmed his earlier commitment to remain a religious scholar and spiritual leader.
Soon after the first draft of the constitution was published, the opinion gained ground 
amongst some elites around Khomeini that there was no need for the Constituent 
Assembly and that the draft should be put forward for a referendum. Khomeini initially 
backed the idea, but members of the Council of Revolution were divided on the
480 Sahabi, interview in Kayhan; also Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
481 It should be mentioned that when Khomeini was in Paris, Sadeqi (later president of the congress which examined
and criticised the preliminary draft of the constitution) publicly talked in favour of Velayat-e faghih', Khomeini 
even refused to meet him. Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
482 The Guardian Council consisted of five Ayatollahs, six civil jurists, three judges and three professors. See the first
draft of the constitution, Article 142, available online at: http://enehelabe- 
eslami.com/ketab/Ghanun Asasi/Ghanun Asasi.pdf.
483 The first draft of the Constitution, Articl: 146; also see Schirazi, Constitution, pp. 22-24.
484 Ibid, article 75.
485 Associated Press, 7 November 1978. This point of view has been verified by numerous sources, including
Banisadr and Karim Sanjabi (leader of the National Front).
486 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
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issue. Most of its clergy members, including Beheshti, Rafsanjani and Khamenei 
supported the referendum, while secular intellectuals supported its preliminary 
ratification by the assembly. In order to resolve the disagreement, the council members 
met Khomeini in Qom. In this meeting, members of the council such as Bazargan and 
Banisadr (i.e., mostly non-clergy and democratic members) argued that since Khomeini 
had appointed Bazargan as prime minister and decreed him the task of preparing for the
Aon
election of the Constituent Assembly, the commitment should be upheld. To this 
point, clergy members like Rafsanjani, who soon became fierce advocates of Velayat-e 
faghih, warned Banisadr, Bazargan and others that ratifying the constitution in a 
Constituent Assembly would lead to such a “‘regressive constitution that you will bite 
your fingers from regret”. In the Council of Revolution, Rafsanjani made the same 
argument more forcefully: “you keep repeating [the desire] for a Constituent Assembly. 
Who do you think will fill the Assembly? A fistful of fanatic, brain-dead and backward 
[clergy] who will [shit] into this constitution”.489 Ayatollah Beheshti also warned 
Bazargan and Banisadr of this possibility 490
Nevertheless, the council members remained divided in Qom and Khomeini himself had 
no opinion about the matter.491 His abstention in this case challenges the argument that 
he was already committed to his doctrine of Velayat-e faghih during this period. He had 
endorsed the first draft of the constitution and declined the opportunity of going through 
an assembly, which could accommodate Velayat-e faghih into the constitution. A 
compromise solution was proposed by Ayatollah Taleghani, a well-known advocate of 
democratic Islam and the Friday Prayer of Tehran, whose popularity rivalled 
Khomeini’s. He proposed that the Constituent Assembly be replaced by a much smaller 
‘Assembly of Experts’, comprised of seventy-three members, which would have a 
limited amount of time (two months) to ratify the constitution 492 This proposal gained 
Khomeini’s support.493
487 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 316; Sanjabi, Umidha, p. 324. The only laymen in favour of Khomeini’s proposal
were Qotbzadeh and Morteza Katira’i, while Bazargan, Banisadr, Hashem Sabaghian and Haj Seyyed Javadi 
were against it.
488 Ezatollah Sahabi, Dar shoraye enghelab che gozasht [What happened in the Council of Revolution] Iran Farda
Monthly, No. 52, May 1999 [Farvardin 1378], pp. 6-7.
489 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh , p. 199.
490 Karim Sanjabi, Umidha va na-umidha [Hopes and Disappointments] (London: Nashr-e Ketab, 1989), p. 333.
491 Sahabi, Dar shoraye, pp. 6-7.
492 It seems that it was Ayatollah Taleqani who suggested the original idea as a compromise solution between the
supporters of the Constituent Assembly for the ratification of the first draft and the supporters of a direct 
referendum of the first draft by passing the assembly. The idea was that the assembly stick to the first draft and 
in effect do nothing but approve it. See Schirazi, Constitution, p. 29.
493 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 200.
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It is significant that to this point, the most prominent leaders of the IRP were advocates 
of a democratic regime without Vali-ye faqih at the head of the state. Beheshti, its most 
prominent leader, said that “Islam is a religion of freedom”494 and in another interview 
stated that “in an Islamic state there is no dictatorship”.495 Later, he said that in Islam “a 
genuine and fundamental relationship exists between freedom and religious belief’,496 
which he promised would be maintained in the Islamic Republic. Just a few weeks 
earlier, Hassan Ayat, a leading member of the IRP Central Committee said, “in Islam 
we know of no case, whether under the Prophet or the first caliphs or under the 
infallible Imams, where the people’s free expression of opinion was suppressed”.497 He 
further emphasised that if the activities of parties and groups remained open then ‘not 
only [will there] be freedom of expression, of political parties and freedom of assembly, 
but the Islamic state itself will guarantee the security of the persons and groups 
involved’.498 In accordance with these statements, IRP leaders supported the first draft 
of the constitution and warned that fanatical clergy would impose their own 
conservative version of Islam if an assembly was established.
The introduction of Velayat-e faghih
Within a few weeks of its establishment, however, IRP leaders within the Assembly of 
Experts had made a complete U-turn and become advocates of Velayat-e faghih. The 
cause of this U-turn has yet to be explored, and while it decidedly affected the outcome 
of the revolution, it has been seriously under-researched. It is a problematic area for 
research as there are few hard facts available. However, we know for certain that the 
doctrine was introduced by Ayat, who had previously advocated a democratic form of 
Islamic government. He himself boasted of his role in its introduction when he tried to 
defend himself against critics by arguing, “since I was the one who caused the 
ratification of the principle of Velayat-e faghih, [they] are trying to take revenge on 
me”.499 Rafsanjani implicitly verified this by arguing that “[Ayat], after the revolution, 
as the deputy head of the Assembly of Experts, had a decisive role in the ratification of
494 Etela 'at, 19 March 1979.
495 Kayhan, 24 January 1979.
496 Kayhan, 6 March 1979.
497 See Muzzafar, Avaleen reis jomhoor, p. 157.
498 Kayhan, 22 February 1979.
499 Seyed Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili, ed., Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand [The Crisis of Fourteen Esfand] (Tehran:
Nejat Publishing Co., 1364 [1985]), p. 357.
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Velayat-e faghih”.500 Ayat’s role has also been verified by both Banisadr and 
Montazeri.501
The question remains, why would Ayat change his position so drastically, and why did 
other IRP leaders follow suit? Again, given the limited information we cannot be 
certain, but we do know that he was an arch opponent of Mussadiq and close 
associate of Muzafar Baghaei, the leader of the Zahmatkeshan Party, which in 
collaboration with British intelligence services played a decisive role in the coup d’etat 
against Mussadiq in 1953,503 and that Ayat tried to keep this relationship secret.504 We 
also know that the constitution, which was based on Velayat-e faghih, was developed in 
Baghaei’s party and that opposition to its content within the party was so great that it 
brought the party to the verge of collapse and forced Baghaei to resign.505 It is beyond 
the scope of this research to explain why Baghaei and Ayat, who were not known for 
religious commitments supported an unknown doctrine which in effect would legalise 
the absolute power of a religious leader.506
The struggle over Velayat-e faghih in the Assembly of Experts
The Assembly of Experts was different than originally anticipated, since fundamentalist 
clergy and their non-clergy supporters dominated its membership. This was partly
500 Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 228.
501 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005. Also see Montazeri’s memoir, accessed online at
http://www.montazeri.com/ htm/books/khaterat/febrest.htm.
502 Soon after Banisadr’s removal, Ayat published a book in which he demonstrated his animosity towards Mussadiq.
He became even more critical of him than those who directly conducted the 1953 coup against Mussadiq. See 
Hassan Ayat, Chehreye vaage ’eye Mosadeq-al-Saltaneh [The real face of Mosadeq-al-Saltaneh] (Iran-Qom: 
Daftare Enteshaaraate Eslami ye Jaame’eh Modaresine Hozeye Elmieh Qom, 1981 [1360]).
503 There are various sources to verity this relation. Hamid Ahmadi, an Iranian historian, gathered in-depth details
regarding this relationship, in which one can see numerous sources of verification from Ervand Abrahamian to 
Banisadr. Hamid Ahmadi, Tahghighi dar bareye tarikhe enghelabe Iran [Researching the history of the 
Iranian Revolution], Vol. 2 (Frankfurt: Enghelabe Eslami Publications, 2002 [1381]), pp. 557-91.
504 Sahabi, Dar shoraye, p. 7.
505 Dr Baghaei, Ankeh na goft [The one who said no] (Rafi Zadeh, 1984 [1363]), pp. 7-16.
506 This doctrine was introduced by Hassan Ayat, a leading member of the IRP and a close associate to M. Baqaee, a
collaborator with the CIA and MI6 in the 1953 coup. Ayat’s close links to Muzafar-e-Baqaee was well known. 
Bagaee, as the leader of the Hezb-e Zahmatkeshan (Working People’s Party) in the vital months before the 
1953 coup, deserted Mussaiq’s camp, joined royalist forces and supported the CIA-engineered coup against 
Mussadiq. The British introduced Baqaee to Americans as a trusted collaborator. During this time Ayat served 
as a contact between the Americans and followers of Ayatollah Abolghasem Kashani, a clergyman who had 
also changed sides and supported the 1953 coup. Also, two other Baqaee supporters, Mohammad Kiavash and 
Mohammad Rashidian, were ardent supporters of Velayat-e faghih and argued that the leader should be the 
commander-in-chief. See Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 10. Schirazi, in Constitution, (p. 43) quotes the same 
thing from Banisadr. The names of two other members of the Working People’s Party are quoted from 
Eghelabe Eslami-Dar Hejrat, No. 462.
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because the election was marred by fraud and irregularities507 and partly because many 
of the views of the conservative clergy were as yet unknown. The U-turn by IRP 
leaders at the outset of the Assembly and the proposition and eventual ratification of 
Velayat-e faghih into the constitution became a matter of controversy and speculation. 
Beheshti, the party leader who a few weeks prior had advocated democracy, then 
explicitly rejected it and became the firm supporter of Velayat-e faghih. In defence of 
Article 5, which he himself formulated and which clarifies the ideological foundation 
for Velayat-e faghih, he stated that “in the present system, the leadership and legislation 
cannot be left to the majority at any given moment. This would contradict the 
ideological character of the Islamic Republic”.508 This made it possible to cast aside the 
first draft of the constitution and re-write another. This alerted Bazargan’s government 
of the IRP’s attempt to monopolise power and he told the Assembly, “my hope is that 
the Assembly of Experts will change some cases so the state will not become 
monopolised”.509 However, Khomeini came to the defense of the IRP, stating, “the first 
draft [of the constitution] is nothing, you have to give your vote and present your 
view”.510
The initial proposition for Velayat-e faghih granted the leader sixteen rights511 and 
essentially granted the vali faghih (clergy leader) absolute power over the state. 
Banisadr strongly protested the proposition by stating that “this is not velayat faghih—
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the Rule of Jurist—it is making God out of the jurist”. This proposal, how ever, did 
not pass easily in the assembly. Opposition came from a small but strong and 
increasingly organised minority group of democratic members, which increasingly 
challenged the idea both within and outside the assembly. Banisadr stated his
507 Grand Ayatollah Qomi called the election an “unimaginable betrayal” {Kayhan, 7 August 1979); Grand Ayatollah
Shariatmadari boycotted it and asked for it to be annulled {Khalq-e-Mosalman, 21 October 1979). Also, five 
radical Islamic organisations (Mujaheddin-e-Khalq, OMMAT [the Militant Muslim Movement], SASH 
[Islamic Organisation of Councils] and JAMA [Revolutionary Organisation of Muslim People of Iran] wrote 
an open letter to Khomeini and protested the electoral frauds.
508 Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran.
509 Etela 'at News Paper, 17 August 1979.
510 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 8 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e
Eslami, 1999 [1378]), p. 213.
511 Ahmadi, History o f  Iran, p. 549.
512 It should be pointed out that all Shia sources of emulation {marja-e Taqlid) contemporary with Khomeini were
opposed to Velayate Faghih. When in 1972 Khomeini ended his lectures on Velayat-e Faghih, Ayatollah 
Khoee, who was acclaimed as the most knowledgeable of Shia clergy, gave lectures rejecting the concept (see 
Enghelabe Eslami, no. 465). Also, the other “sources of emulation” (Ayatollah Shariatmadari, Ayatollah 
Khonsaari, Ayatollah Golpaygaani, Ayatollah Najafee Marashee, Ayatollah Qomi and Ayatollah Shirazi) were 
all against the concept of Velayat-e faghih.
513 Quoted from an interview of Rashidian, member of the IRP Central Committee and Assembly of Experts. See
Nashrieh Hokoomate Eslami [ Journal of Islamic State], Orgaane Dabirkhaaneh Majless Khebregaan, 11, no. 
39 (Spring 1979 [1358]), p. 198.
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opposition to any form of dictatorship, whether from the clergy or from God.514 He 
warned the clergy that if they continued to follow to this path, then they would prove to 
the nation that “they were out to appropriate everything for themselves”.515 
Rahmatollah Maraghei, the main leader of the Hezbe Jomhoory-e Khalq-e Mosalman 
(Moslem People’s Republican Party), objected to attempts to remove the source of 
sovereignty from the people. He argued that he was not opposed to the idea that 
Velayat-e faghih was the sovereignty of Islam, but was against the idea that “a special 
social class should make a monopoly out of Islam for itself’.516 His party saw the 
proposal as an attempt to set up a dictatorial regime.517 Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi 
passionately opposed the proposition: “for God’s sake, do not do that [ratify Velayate 
Faqih\. This is not in the interest of Islam. We have already ratified the sovereignty of 
the people, do not turn this into a hollow lion”.518 Ayatollah Taleghani, after voting 
against Article 5 which comprised the principle of Velayate Faqih, stated, “my fear is 
that the level of this constitution will be lower than seventy years ago” [when the first 
Constitution was ratified].519
Furthermore, as the one whose popularity rivalled Khomeini, he used the Friday prayer 
of Tehran, as an opportunity to strongly attack IRP and their attempts to monopolise 
power: “leave people alone, let people take responsibility, through away despotism, 
which is under the cover of religion”. Later on he directly attacked IRP, saying “no 
party or group should take a bigger share for itself and try to take the control of
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government”. However, the sudden death of Ayatollah Talegani in 1980, who had 
coordinated with Banisadr to directly criticise the IRP’s attempt to legitimise the power 
of clergy over the state, inflicted a heavy blow on the democratic camp.522
Alarmed by the growing tendency of the IRP towards religious despotism, opposition 
also grew outside the assembly. The strongest and most effective statements were made 
by Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Zanjani. Shariatmadari opposed a
514 Mohammad Javade Muzzafar, ed., Avalin Reis Jomhoos [The First President] (Tehran: Chap publishing Co., 2000
[1378]), p. 91.
515 Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran.
516 Ibid.
517 Khalq-e-Mosalman, 25 November 1979.
518 Mashroohe Mozaakeraate Majless Baresiye Nahaaeeye Ghaanoone Asaasi Jomhooriye Eslaami Iran [Details of
the Majles’ negotiations of the final study of the Islamic Constitution of Iran] (Tehran: Ravabete Omoomiye 
Majles, 1985 [1364]), p. 1152.
519 Ayatollah Taleghani, Az Azadi taa Shahaadat [From Freedom until Martydom] (Tehran: Resa Publishing
Company, 1980 [1359]), p. 488.
520 Taleghani’s last Friday prayer sermon, 8 September 1980 [17 Shahrivar 1359],
521 Keyhan, 17 November 1979.
522 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
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concept of Velayat-e faqih which would challenge the sovereignty of the people. He 
stated that “power and sovereignty are rooted in the people, and the national referendum 
and election of Assembly of Experts are proof, therefore, that the members of the 
assembly cannot violate this right in any way”.523 Grand Ayatollah Qomi also opposed 
the proposition of Velayat-e faghih on religious grounds524 and the five above- 
mentioned radical Islamic groups criticised the proposal and suggested forming a 
system of councils instead. Even Ayatollah Motahari, Khomeini’s most celebrated 
student, opposed the doctrine. “It is not people’s understanding that the clergy rule and 
run the country.. .this concept belongs to the Sunni world. In Shiism we have never had 
such a concept”.525
Nationalists and some leftist groups also raised concerns. Demonstrations grew outside 
the assembly, protesting the violation of the mandate, and thus prompted the provisional 
government to take action. In mid-October 1979, the Council of Ministers passed a 
majority vote to dissolve the Assembly of Experts, arguing that it had violated its 
authority and rewritten the constitution instead of making adjustments to it; it had also 
been granted two extensions beyond its two-month deadline. Assuming that Khomeini 
would be against the resolution, the ministers decided to release it to the press 
immediately. Bazargan, however, persistently argued that they should first seek 
Khomeini’s consent. The resolution was quietly dropped when Khomeini threatened 
Bazargan and his ministers. In this case, once again, Bazargan demonstrated the 
weakness of his leadership by making the decision a fa it accompli instead of making it a 
public issue. The latter would have made it extremely difficult for Khomeini to oppose 
it without violating his seemingly neutral stand, but asking for Khomeini’s permission 
provided him with an opportunity to prevent the decision without losing face.
The occupation of American embassy disarms the opponents of Velayat-e faghih
523 Khalq-e Mosalman, 18 October 1979.
524 Khalq-e Mosalman, 7 October 1979.
525 M. Motahari, Piraamoone Enghelaabe eslami [Around the Islamic Revolution] (Qom: Daftare Enteshaaraate
Eslami, vaabasteh be jaame’eh modaressine hozeye elmieh Qom: BITA, n.d.), p. 67.
526 Hassan Nazih, who was present at the meeting, recounted that Khomeini told Bazargan he would give him a punch
in the mouth. Quoted in Schirazi, Constitution, p. 56. Amir Entezam, his deputy, also verified the plan; see 
Amir Entezam, Aansooye Eteham, Khaterate Abas Amir Entezam, pp. 243-44. Soon after initiating the move, 
he was arrested on allegedly spying for the Americans; since then he has suffered extremely harsh treatment 
(Enghelabe Eslami-Dar Hejrat, 1994, No. 334-35). Three years ago he was briefly released but rearrested as 
he continued openly to criticise the regime. Frequent arrests and release proved to be the norm of his political 
life.
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The wave of protest against the way the Assembly was handling the first draft mounted, 
and the IRP and its allies found themselves under increasing pressure. However, the 
breakthrough, which relieved the pressure, came from outside the Assembly. The 
occupation of the American embassy and hostage-taking of American diplomats in 
October 1979 created an atmosphere of euphoria and excitement. Radical Islamic and 
Marxist groups enthusiastically supported the move, which enhanced Khomeini’s anti­
imperialist image, thus pressuring these groups to accept his leadership and silence their 
opposition to the constitution. The initial proposition of Velayat-e faghih, which gave 
absolute power to the leader, eventually moderated by the arguments of democratic 
forces. In the revised version, while the leader still possessed the highest authority in 
the land, he was deprived of any executive power and his power was confined to 
observing and endorsing state matters.527 This was stipulated in Article 110, according 
to which the leader had supervisory authority in all three branches of the state, but no 
executive powers. For example, according to this article the leader is the commander- 
in-chief of the army; however, his power would be limited to appointing the chief of 
staff and military commanders, which he could not do independently as appointees had 
to be proposed by the Defence Council first. The leader had neither a legislative 
function, nor any direct judicial powers.529 He was confined to appointments or giving
flA
consent to “key leaders”; he could also be deposed. Democratic forces within the 
Assembly of Experts had successfully reduced the absolute power of the leader to make 
room for the sovereignty of people.
This version of the constitution also recognised some legitimacy of the people’s power. 
It advocated the formation of local councils to deal with local issues,531 guaranteed a 
considerable amount of freedom to the media, and recognised the existence of 
political parties and their activities, so long as they recognised the Islamic system and 
rejected the use of violence. It also recognised the legitimacy of parliament as a 
legislative institution, whose members would be elected through free general
527 Ahmadi, History o f  Iran, p. 535.
528 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
529 Schirazi, Constitution, p. 13. This is why it could be argued that all of the governmental acts accomplished by
Khomeini were illegal, since according to the letter of the law he had no executive power. In order for 
Khomeini to exercise absolute power, during his reign he violated the constitution more than 200 times. Still, 
just before his death in 1988, in order to legalise constant violations, ordered the constitution to be revised to 
give “absolute” power to the leader.
530 Iranian constitution, Article 111.
531 Iranian constitution, Article 100.
532 Iranian constitution, Article 175.
533 Iranian constitution, Article 26.
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elections;534the president, the second most important leader of the country, was also to 
be elected by the people.
Therefore, in the end, the struggle between democratic and IRP forces on a 
constitutional level resulted in the ratification of a contradictory and eclectic 
constitution. On the one hand, the constitution recognised many democratic rights, like 
the free election of the president and members of the parliament. However, on the other 
hand it gave substantial power to an un-elected leader to control these institutions and 
curtail their authorityr. In other words, it recognised two sources of conflicting 
sovereignty: the people and the Islamic Jurist. This was, however, far from a simple 
internal struggle. The occupation of the American embassy played a decisive role in 
determining its outcome; hence, further attention should also be paid to this political 
move.
The occupation of the American embassy
After the collapse of the Pahlavi Regime, Iran’s “special relationship” with the US 
collapsed. However, Iran’s geopolitical location was too strategic for America to 
ignore. Iran was the second largest oil producing country in OPEC, possessed the 
strongest military power in the Middle East and was the only oil producer to share a 
long border with the USSR; US firms also owned a large share of the Iranian market. 
Similarly, Iran did not need a hostile relationship with America. It could maintain its 
position of criticising US foreign policy, especially in regard to the Middle East and oil, 
from a human rights perspective, without letting its opposition lead to the violation of 
international laws. After all, its armed forces as well as many industries were to a large 
extent dependent on American technology and expertise.
However, America’s continuous support of the Shah both before and during the 
revolution and its role in the coup against Mussadiq left a psychological scar on the 
collective consciousness of the Iranian people and created a hostile attitude towards 
American intervention in national affairs. In order for the two governments to avoid 
any deterioration of relations, and to provide Bazargan's government with the
534 Iranian constitution, Article 62.
535 Iranian constitution, Article 114.
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opportunity to improve its relationship with the US without provoking public 
opposition, trust-building actions were urgently needed. However, mutual and 
avoidable mistakes turned things from bad to worse. Bazargan’s position regarding the 
relation with America lacked a critical edge and he was unable to formulate a response 
to the demands of public opinion, while still making sure that America recognised the 
total change of political circumstances regarding its Middle Eastern and oil policy. The 
US government also failed to recognise the depth of changes which had taken place in 
Iranian society and to pursue policies which sufficiently responded to its previous 
failures to recognise the demands of public opinion.
Disregarding these factors, the provisional government tried to normalise US-Iranian 
relations. In Bazargan’s view, not all treaties with America were detrimental to Iranian 
interests. He argued, for example, that “those aspects of our military treaties that were 
not based on the Shah’s ambition or on his quest to become the gendarme of the region 
should not and will not be abrogated. After all, not all treaties reflected the Shah’s 
ambition”.536 Ebrahim Yazdi, his Foreign Minister, and his deputy Amir Entesam, 
made similar arguments. This line of argument was difficult to maintain, however, as 
popular anti-American feelings were intensified by the government’s failure to address 
them and also by the further development of anti-American discourse. Anti- 
Americanism was in fact a measurement by which political organisations, both Islamist 
and leftist, would gauge their revolutionary level. These organisations demanded the 
suspension of all military transactions, the abrogation of all bilateral treaties, and the 
dismissal of all American advisers. Radical groups like the Fadaeen and Mujaheddin 
asked for the abolition of the army,537 and even the IRP joined the queue by stating their 
mistrust of the army both explicitly and implicitly.
In such a hostile environment, what Bazargan needed from America was a policy of 
“truth and reconciliation”. This would include an admission of the role the US played 
in the overthrow of Mussadiq’s democratically elected government, and therefore of its 
role in depriving Iran of the chance for independent development through democratic 
means; an admission of its support for the Shah during his reign and of providing him 
the necessary means for suppressing democratic rights and mass discontent; an apology 
for constantly interfering in Iranian affairs, and finally an explicit recognition of the
536 Mardom, 11 June 1979 [7 Khordad 1358].
537 The slogan which was constantly repeated by these organisations was arteshe zede khalghi, monhal bayad gardad
[the anti-masses (people) army should be dissolved].
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Islamic Revolution.538 However, still bitterly mourning the loss of Iran, the US refused 
to take such a stance and followed an ambivalent policy towards Iran. This provoked 
Amir Entezam, who advocated the normalisation of relations with America, to accuse 
the US of playing a game of “wait-and-see”.539
It should be noted that until November 1979, despite mass hostility towards US policy, 
it was not a national issue. Internal issues such as the status of freedoms, the economy 
and the rights of ethnic groups were more predominant in domestic discourse. In these 
conditions, Bazargan accepted the new US ambassador and Khomeini agreed to meet 
the US representative.540 However, this initiative was repealed when the US Senate 
passed a resolution condemning Iran for its summary executions.541 This forced the 
provisional government to announce that Robert Cuttler, the ‘incoming’ ambassador, 
was no longer welcome, and Khomeini’s office cancelled his meeting with the US 
government’s representative.
However, Iran’s relationship with America soon became a decisive factor in Iranian 
politics after America admitted the terminally ill Shah to the US, which sent the clearest 
signal of US hostility against the Iranian Revolution and the new government.
The admission of the Shah to America
On 22 October 1979, the American government admitted the Shah, who was then 
suffering from cancer, to the US. The decision had disastrous consequences both for 
Carter’s government and the democratic movement in Iran. Carter had in fact already 
been warned by L. Bruce Laingen, the American charge d’affaires in Tehran, who 
predicted that the move could lead to the seizure of the American embassy and destroy 
any chance of improving relations with Iran. In response, some senior officials in 
Washington had already assured American embassy workers in Iran that the Shah’s
538 Later, the short version of this policy was adopted by Clinton and his foreign minister, Madeleine Albright, when
they apologised for America’s role in the 1953 coup and ordered the CIA to release documents that shed more 
light on the CIA’s role in the coup.
539 Asnad, Vol. 10, 9 August 1979, pp. 96-99.
540 Milani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 164. See also Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
541 It is misleading to view this resolution as humanitarian, since the very same senate and senators who passed the
resolution had for more than two decades turned a blind eye to the executions, torture and imprisonment of 
thousands of Iranians under the Shah’s regime.
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admission would be so inflammatory that no one would be “dumb enough” to allow
Why then did Carter make such a “dumb” decision? Even his administration was 
divided over the issue. On the one hand, the Secretary of State opposed the Shah’s 
admission, arguing, “whatever chance existed [of] establishing relations with the new 
government would be surely destroyed if the Shah came to the States”.543 On the other 
hand, Brezinzski, the National Security Adviser, held an opposing view: “we must show 
our strength and loyalty to an old friend, even if it means personal danger to a group of 
very vulnerable Americans”.544 Carter himself was aware of the probable 
consequences. “What are you guys going to advise me to do”, he asked, “if they 
overrun our embassy and take our people hostage?”545
Nevertheless, forces outside of the US government also played an instrumental role in 
compelling Carter to change his earlier decision of refusing the Shah entry. Soon after 
the Shah left Iran to go to America, as was already planned. However, he posponed his 
travels and instead went to Egypt,546 where he was welcomed by Egyptian president 
Anvar-Sadat. When he decided to continue on to the US, it became clear that 
circumstances had changed and the initial invitation was no longer valid. Hence, after 
leaving Egypt he went to the Bahamas and soon after left for Mexico. Frustrated by the 
US’s refusal to grant him entry to the country, he openly criticised the government’s 
treatment of him, hence putting pressure on Carter to admit him. He was well aware 
that he had influential friends in the US who were trying to bring him in. Ashraf, the 
Shah’s sister, had initially met David Rockefeller, the Shah’s banker, and his long-time 
aid Joseph Vemer Reed and asked them to intervene.547 This was unnecessary, since as 
soon as the Shah entered the Bahamas, Henry Kissinger and Rockefeller called Carter 
and asked him to admit the Shah to the country.548 However, were it not for his
542 William J. Daugherty, “Jimmy Carter and the 1979 Decision to Admit the Shah into the United States”, American
Diplomacy, 16 March.
543 Mansour Farhang, “US policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran” in Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., The United
States and the Middle East: A Search fo r  New Perspectives (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1993), pp. 151-58.
544 Ibid., p. 154.
545 Quoted in Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: the Last Year o f  the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam, 1982), p. 5.
Quoted in Milani, Iran’s Islamic Revolution.
546 It seems that the Shah postponed his travel to the US in the hope of a repetition of the 1953 coup, after which he
was able to return to the country three days after his escape. However, as it became clear that would not be the 
case, he continued travelling to the US.
547 Robert Parry, Secrecy and Privilege: Rise O f The Bush Dynasty From Watergate To Iraq (US: Media Consortium,
2004), p. 86.
548 William J. Dugherty, American Diplomacy. 16 March 2003
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diagnosis of cancer (until then kept discreet), his connections might not have been 
effective. Even so, much arm-wrestling was needed to make the plan a reality.
The controversy over the Shah’s medical treatment
While controversy over the advice for the Shah’s treatment has yet to be resolved, it is 
clear that the decision to admit him to the US could not have been made solely on 
humanitarian grounds. It is known that Rockefeller sent an American specialist, Dr. 
Benjamin Kean, to examine the Shah. He concluded that Mexico was well-suited to 
treat the ailing shah.549 Furthermore, the Shah’s French doctors had kept his cancer 
diagnosis from the French government to continue his treatment in Mexico, and his 
personal physician lived in Canada.550 However, the State Department’s report to the 
president drew the opposite conclusion, arguing that the Shah was “at the point of 
death” and “could only be treated in New York”.551 The claims and counter claims for 
this historical decision continue, and present a challenge for scholarly work. As long as 
all the data which are related to this event are not released, then a thorough 
understanding of the causes of this decision is impossible. However, we know that 
Carter admitted the Shah to the US on medical grounds without seeking a second 
opinion, and that his decision contradicted an earlier declaration made by his state 
secretary to Iranian foreign minister Ebrahim Yazdi that the Shah would not be 
permitted onto US soil. When Yazdi was informed that Carter had decided to admit 
him, he told Cyrus Vance that Carter was “playing with fire”.552
How else can Carter’s decision to admit the Shah be explained? Some have argued that 
he did not want to be accused of abandoning an old dying ally in the upcoming 
presidential election. However, this seems unlikely as Carter had not only initially 
resisted the idea and only reluctantly accepted it, but forced the dying Shah out of the 
country a month after his admission, when he was even more ill and elections were 
closer. A third explanation is that Chase Manhattan bank, with the help of Kissinger
549 Dr. Kean's suit against the journal Science also confirmed that he advised that the Shah could have been treated in
Mexico. See New York Times, 26 May 1981, p. 2; William J. Daugherty, American Diplomacy.
550 Robert Parry, “The Original October Surprise (2)”, Consortium News, 27 October 2006); Banisadr, My Turn to
Speak, p. 24.
551 “Why Carter Admitted the Shah,” New York Times Magazine, 28 May 1981, p. 36; also see Roy A. Chilas, Jr.,
“The Iranian Drama”, The Libertarian Review, February 1980, pp.26-37; Lawrence K. Altman, “The Shah's 
Health: A Political Gamble,” New York Times Magazine, 28 May 1981, p. 50; Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The 
Last Year o f  the Carter Presidency (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982), p. 31.
552 Farhang, “US policy”, p. 155.
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and Rockefeller, pressured Carter to admit the Shah in order to provoke what they 
predicted would be a violent reaction within Iran. This would have enabled them to 
declare Iran a lawless country, freeze Iran’s assets in America and hence recouperate 
debts that they presumed revolutionary Iran would not be able to repay.553 However, 
international lawyers advised the bank that this was an unworkable plan, and it later 
created aother in which Iranian funds could have been frozen by the President.554
However, while this explains Rockefeller’s pressure on Carter, it does not explain 
Kissinger’s, who had no financial interest in the bank. Here, Kissnger’s approach to 
foreign policy might provides us with some clues. As a strong critic of America’s 
“insular” mentality and relatively pragmatist approach to foreign policy, he became an 
advocate of interventionist foreign policy and believed that such a policy required 
public support. For example, in the final years of the Vietnam war, this approach made 
it possible for Kissinger to extend military intervention to neighbouring countries like 
Cambodia and Laos.555 However, the defeat in Vietnam shifted public opinion in favour 
of a non-militaristic and more isolationist approach to foreign policy. Carter’s election 
was an indicator of this change. However, the toppling of the Shah in one of the most 
strategically important regions of the world, along with the US government’s apparent 
inability to support him, provided Kissinger’s group with the opportunity to demand a 
more aggressive foreign policy. However, this policy required the support of both 
Democrat and Republican voters. Hence, it is argued that Kissinger saw the reaction of 
revolutionaries in Iran to the Shah’s admission as a potential source of this incentive. If 
this was the motivation behind Kissinger’s pressure to admit the Shah into America, he 
succeeded. As a result of the occupation of the American Embassy, the American 
political mood underwent a sea change: “The Ayatollah and the street mobs.. .have done 
this country a hell of a favor. And I don't mean by practically guaranteeing the 
reelection of Jimmy Carter. The Iranians’ contribution lies in prodding the United States 
into a renaissance of national pride and unity we feared had evaporated.”556 It is within 
context that we can see the importance of Yassar Arafat’s warning to Banisadr at the 
outset of the hostage taking, when he told him that the action would re-awake a giant,
553 Milani, Iran’s Islamic Revolution, p. 165.
554 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 23.
555 For more on Kissinger’s approach to foreign policy, see Noam Chomsky, Introduction and Chapter Two in
Virginia Brodine and Mark Selden (eds), The Kissinger-Nixon Ddoctrine in Asia (New York and London:
Harper and Row, 1972); Gregory Cleva, Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy
(Lewinsburg: Bucknell University Press, 1989); Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (London: Faber and
Faber, 1992); Christopher Hitchens, The Trial o f  Henry Kissinger (London and New York: Verso, 2001).
556 James Brady, New York Post, 17 December 1979, p. 26.
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cc 7which had gone to sleep after Vietnam. Banisadr had already reached the same 
conclusion, which explains his constant criticism of the occupation, his open warnings 
to the public that the embassy occupation provided conditions for the resurgence of an 
aggressive American foreign policy,558 and his later accusation that its occupiers were 
actually advancing American interests. “These people”, he said, “are under the cover of 
attacking America serving America’s policy”.559
The Shah’s admission to the US exemplifies the pivotal effect of international factors in 
conditioning the outcome of a domestic struggle between two political factions. As 
predicted, it touched the public nerve and reawakened not only the bitter memories of 
the 1953 coup, but also created fear of its repetition. The reaction of the provisional 
government, which condemned the move but failed to take the lead in expressing the 
deep anger, added to growing dissatisfaction from within and outside the government.560 
The Shah’s admission was interpreted by most political organisations as an attempt by 
an aggressive imperialist power seeking to reassert its authority over Iran. Bazargan’s 
government, which was under daily criticism for its lenient policy towards America, 
committed another blunder. On 2 November 1979, just a few days after the admission 
of the Shah, Bazargan and Yazdi met Brezinzski in Algeria. The meeting, which was 
meant to take place in total secrecy, was publicised by an American Republican 
senator.561 It created an uproar and the government was increasingly criticised for 
hosting its “number one enemy”.
How the American Embassy was occupied
One newly formed radical Islamic group, the Students of the Imam’s Line, decided to 
take matters into its own hands. Its decision to occupy the American embassy was 
taken first in its Central Committee of five, then approved by a larger group of fifteen 
members.562 According to this report two of the five were in favour of occupying the 
USSR embassy and three in favour of occupying the American one. Sheikholislam
557 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
558 See Abol-Hassan Banisadr, “Roozha bar reise jomhoor chegooneh migozarad” [How the days of the president
pass by]. Enghelabe Eslami, 5 October 1979 and 17 October 1979 [13 mehr 1358 and 25 mehr 1358].
559 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, editorial, Enghelabe Eslami, 5 July 1979 [14 tir 1358].
560 Jomhooriey Eslami and Keyhan newspapers, the latter o f which was the official paper of the IRP and the former of
which was also under the indirect control of the IRP, played a leading role in this attack. Tudeh party 
newspapers provided an ideological base for the attack.
561 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 23.
562 Enghelabe Eslami-Dar Hejrat, No. 457.
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Mussavi Khoeiniha, the group’s spiritual leader, approved the decision. It is unknown 
whether Khomeini was aware of the plan. Khoeiniha argues that the students 
intentionally withheld information about the operation from him as he could not consent 
to it, but Asghar Zadeh, one of the group’s main leaders, recently argued that he was 
informed of the scheme in advance.564 Two days after the US-Iranian meeting, 
revolutionary guards in civilian attire attacked the American embassy and then turned it 
over to students,565 who occupied it, taking sixty-six American personnel hostage.566
Bazargan immediately condemned the move and tried to secure their unconditional 
release, arguing that it was in violation of international law and civilised norms of 
diplomacy. He defended his meeting with Brezinzski, arguing that even Khomeini was 
aware of it.567 Khomeini’s reaction, however, was in total contrast with Bazargan’s. 
Though he agreed to force the students out of the embassy in the first hours of the 
occupation,568 a few hours later his son, Ahmad Khomeini stated that his father 
endorsed the action. For the first few days he kept publicly quiet about the event, 
weighing the possible political consequences of the act. Finally, he came out with a 
stormy statement in support of the students, calling the occupation “Iran’s second 
revolution, more important than the first”.569 The ostensible initial goal was to keep the 
hostages for a few days, until the US government expelled the Shah from America.570 It 
was the realisation of how effective it could be in disarming intellectuals, called 
“liberals”571 (which prepared the path for the domination of the state by the clergy) and 
Khomeini’s personal desire to determine the outcome of America’s presidential 
election, which prolonged the hostage-taking episode to 444 days.
Bazargan’s resignation
563 Milani, Iran’s Islamic Revolution, p. 166.
564 Enghelabe Eslami-Dar Hejrat, no. 455.
565 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 219.
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depriving the American government from freezing the money, which is still frozen after twenty-five years.
567 Bazargan, Bes 'at va daulat, p. 290.
568 Banisadr, interview, 14 May 2004.
569 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 10 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e Eslami,
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570 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 218.
571 To see the effect of the Stalinist left’s political culture on fundamentalist and conservative Islamic forces, one just
has to look at the usage of the word “liberal” by these groups. Democratic forces as a whole, and despite their 
considerable differences of viewpoint regarding economy, politics and culture, were collapsed into a single 
category of “liberal”. The left used this term in a derogatory sense, equating them with capitalism, pro- 
Americanism and sexual promiscuity. The term was soon adopted by the totalitarian religious camp and used 
against Moslem intellectuals, who opposed the domination of the state by these forces.
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As argued already, Khomeini could not single-handedly force Bazargan out of office.
He therefore made strategic use of Bazargan’s increasing unpopularity to force his 
resignation. Although he had consented in advance to the planned meeting, Khomeini 
did not back Bazargan after the event. His lack of support, the embassy occupation and 
Bazargan’s failure to release the hostages provided the conditions for his forced 
resignation without Khomeini’s intervention. The fact that a few hundred students 
could so easily ignore Bazargan’s demand to release the hostages made the weakness of 
his government even more apparent. He felt left with no option but to resign.
Although Banisadr was one of Bazargan’s strongest critics, he tried to stop him from
C79
resigning. Nevertheless, on 6 November 1979, Bazargan resigned. Later he admitted 
to Banisadr, “the hostage-taking was nothing but a ploy to get rid of me, but I didn’t 
realise it right away”.
Bazargan’s resignation was a clear victory for the IRP and its allies, as it paved the way 
for their takeover of the state. The Stalinist left was also jubilant to see Bazargan’s 
government fall; they had regarded it as pro-western and a representative of the 
bourgeoisie and did not realise that eventually they too would pay a heavy price for 
their uncompromising animosity towards the democratic forces. The rise of mass 
executions, torture and imprisonment of leftist party members soon after the final defeat 
of the democratic camp was testimony to their miscalculation.
The students who occupied the embassy originally assumed that the takeover would not 
last more than a few days since their prime objective—to force Bazargan's 
resignation—had been achieved. However, the IRP soon realised the decisive role that 
the hostage-taking could play in their bid for control of the state and therefore used all 
of its power to prevent the hostages’ early release. This also became apparent to the US 
government when an Iranian statesman perceptively informed Vance, one year before 
the hostages were released, that “you will not get your hostages until Khomeini has put 
all the institutions of the Islamic Revolution into practice”.574
572 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 22.
573 Ibid.
574 Warren Christopher, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct o f  a Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press,
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When the embassy was occupied, American personnel shredded all the internal 
documents on site. However, the hostage takers painstakingly pieced together the 
shredded documents and published them in sixty-five volumes under the title 
Documents o f the Spy Nest. These documents contain information about a wide range 
of issues from American interventionist policy towards Iran to its relationship with 
Israel, the Arab states and the USSR. Most importantly for Iran’s domestic political 
struggles, however, they contained psychological and political profiles of and 
communications with Iranian politicians and intellectuals. By releasing this information 
about their contacts and negotiations with embassy staff, the students used these as an 
extremely effective method for discrediting democratic opponents of Velayat-e faghih. 
Any contact with the embassy was equated with spying, which either led to 
punishments of arrest or forced exile. Interestingly, the documents were used 
selectively. Although Beheshti, Rafsanjani and Khamenee had also been contacted by 
the embassy, not a single document was released about them. Rather, the students
znc
released only documents relating to moderate and democrat leaders.
The first victim of this well-orchestrated campaign was Amir Entaezam, Bazargan’s 
deputy and the government’s spokesman, who was one of the architects of the plan to 
dissolve the Assembly of Experts for overstepping its mandate and re-writing the 
constitution. He was tricked into returning to the country, arrested and received a life 
sentence in prison from the Revolutionary Tribunal. Hundreds more democratic leaders 
were defamed and either arrested or forced to leave the country. Bazargan vainly tried 
to take the students to the court, charging them with ruining the reputation of 
honourable men and depriving them of the chance to defend themselves. However, 
because these politicians and intellectuals were amongst the strongest critics of 
introducing Velayat-e faghih into the new constitution, personal accusations soon 
extended to their political views. This clarified that by then, opponents of the doctrine 
could be accused of harbouring pro-American views, if not directly collaborating with 
American policy makers. Banisadr strongly criticised this method and warned of the 
upcoming despotism, saying that “this mudslinging and reading out of documents in 
media, and then immediate attack on people’s houses, is not only incompatible with 
Islam, but also provides the conditions for despotism”. The IRP, however, gave its 
total support: “the students have given a new life to the body of revolution. It is only
575 Banisadr, interview, 14 May 2004.
576 Banisadr, editorial, Enghelabe Eslami, 25 December 1979 [04 day 1358].
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through exposure and revelation that the revolution can be protected against flood of
c n n
conspiracies.” These opposing points of view turned the Council of Revolution into a 
field of struggle between Banisadr and the IRP. According to Ezatollah Sahabi, a 
member of the Council of Revolution and Freedom Movement, “the issue of hostage 
taking was a constant struggle between the clergy in the Council of Revolution and 
Banisadr. The clergy argued that [as the result of the hostage taking] a wave has began 
to roll and that we must ride on it. However, Banisadr was in favour of a serious, 
decisive, explicit and practical encounter [with the students]. The clergy were not, and
C»7Q
Banisadr had a quarrel with them.” Later, Khoeinihaa, the leader of the Students of 
the Imam’s Line, pointed to Banisadr’s position on the students as a justification of 
incompetence. “Banisadr opposed the occupation of the spies’ nest [American 
embassy] by the Students of the Imam’s Line”, he said. “He used every possible means 
to break this movement.”579
The Left’s ideological disarmament
By this time the IRP had become champions of any anti-American policy, which had 
historically been the main rallying cry of the left, and thus not only sidelined leftist 
political groups but also forced them to follow. The country was in a state of euphoria, 
making opposition to the hostage-taking extremely difficult. At this time, only a few 
leaders dared to speak publicly against the action. The most celebrated of these was
C O A  C Q 1
Banisadr, who condemned the act as inhumane, immoral and illegal; in vain, he 
tried to change the students’ minds. Immediately after the occupation he wrote articles 
condemning the occupation and went to the students, making the same point that “the 
truth is, after taking Americans as hostages, it is Iran that has become the hostage of the 
Americans”.582 After the fall of the provisional government, Khomeini asked Banisadr 
to accept the premiership. Banisadr refused the offer on two grounds: firstly, he did not 
want to become the prime minister as a result of the occupation of an embassy, and 
secondly, he was weary of Khomeini’s intervention in governmental affairs and argued
577 Jomhooriye Eslami 1 December 1979 [10 azar 1358].
578 Ezatollah Sahabi, interview in Iran Farda Magazine, Farvardin 1378, no. 52, p. 9.
579 Ardebili, ed., Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand [The Crisis of Fourteen Esfand] (Tehran: Nejat Publishing Co., 1985
[1364]), p. 708.
580 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, interview, Tehran Times, 31 August 1980 [09 shahrivar 1359].
581 Later, Hassan Ayat, one of the key people who engineered Banisadr’s downfall, criticised Banisadr for using these
terms regarding the hostage-taking and saw it as one of the reasons that he had to be removed. See Ardebili, 
Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 348.
582 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, interview, Tehran Times, 31 August 1980 [9 shahrivar 1359],
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that one could not run a country with such interference. However, he did accepted 
the post of Foreign Minister which was offered to him by the Revolutionary Council on 
the condition that he be given the authority to resolve the hostage situation. He asked 
Ahmad Salamatian to be his special envoy to the UN. Salamatian accepted the job, also 
on the condition that both the Revolutionary Council and Ayatollah Khomeini 
consented to resolve the issue. However, Khomeini’s son conditioned Khomeini’s 
approval on not negotiating with the American envoy at the UN. To be certain that he 
had total support from the leaders, Salamatian approached Ayatollah Montazeri, who 
gave his blessing but warned that Khomeini might sabotage of the mission, saying it 
would succeed if “Sir [Khomeini] does not pee in our pot and bowl”.584 So Salamatian 
travelled to America and after weeks of diplomatic activity succeeded in securing a
f o r
Security Council meeting despite opposition from America. Banisadr simply had to 
go to New York to ratify the agreement in the Security Council; however, a few hours 
before he left, Khomeini broadcast an announcement over the radio that Iran would not
fOf
be attending the meeting. By this time, the reason for failing to solve the hostage 
crisis had successfully become clear; that “gradually the hostages became an instrument 
for political use and achieving power”.587
Thus it was that an historical opportunity to resolve the hostage crisis was lost to 
personal rivalries, including within the democratic front itself. This drastically 
weakened the front and provided favourable conditions for Iraq’s invasion, particularly 
as a result of sanctions and political isolation. According to Salamatian, Lavasani, the 
Iranian diplomat in Washington DC, misinformed Khomeini by sending him a telegram 
stating that Salamatian had negotiated with Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State. 
Lavasani was part of a group which was trying to prevent Banisadr’s election to the
fOO
presidency. In its view, if Banisadr succeeded in freeing the American hostages on 
Iranian terms, it would enhance his chances of being elected. Furthermore, Qotbzadeh, 
the head of the national media, highlighted a report by the Associated Press which 
argued that the Security Council meeting was a great victory for America. Khomeini, 
whose main source of information was not reports by foreign affairs experts or
583 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 189.
584 Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005.
585 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
586 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 24.
587 Interview with Kazem Sami, Bazargan’s Health Minister and the leader of JAMA (The Islamic Movement of
Iran’s Moslems) Enghelabe Eslami, 25 January 1981 [05 bahman 1359].
588 Salamatian argued that the most important members o f this group were Kharazi (the current foreign minister) and
Yazdi, the leader of the Freedom Movement. Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005.
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diplomats but Iranian National TV, the BBC and the Voice of America, then had a
C O Q
sufficient excuse to prevent Banisadr from travelling to the UN. Qotbzadeh, who was 
planning to run for president, also had a shared interest to prevent Banisadr from 
resolving the crisis.590 Banisadr resigned in protest and, when he became aware of 
Qotbzadeh’s role in his failure, suggested that Qotbzadeh should become Foreign 
Minister and take responsibility for resolving the issue himself.591
Here we observe another historical conjecture, which reaffirms the importance of 
contingency in revolutionary process. It also demonstrates how personal rivalries can 
impact upon the outcome of social movements. Theories which fail to provide space for 
the consideration of such rivalries and their effect on political struggle suffer from blind 
spots which render it difficult to consider other possible outcomes in the process of 
revolution and therefore understand its short, medium or long-term outcome. Had 
Banisadr succeeded in ratifying the negotiation, for example, how might it have affected 
the release of American hostages, the freezing of $12 billion of Iranian savings in 
American banks, the imposition of international sanctions, and the Iraqi invasion of 
Iran, which led to the militarisation of domestic and international politics and kept the 
pro-Banisadr nationalist army at the country’s borders? In other words, because the 
prolongation of the embassy occupation provided the conditions for drastic changes in 
the resources and opportunities available to both political fronts, it is difficult to 
imagine how totalitarian forces could have mustered such resources and opportunities to 
defeat the democratic front had the hostages been released sooner.
Referendum for the ratification of the constitution
The ratification of Article 110, which introduced and legalised the power of Velayat-e 
faghih, needed 49 votes and passed with 51 in the Assembly of Experts. Ayatollah A.
K. Haeri, the founder of Qom religious schools and a man with indisputable religious 
authority, opposed the doctrine but declined to speak out against it in the assembly, 
reasoning his heart problem. While enough members to prevent its ratification had 
already agreed to vote against it, many later changed their positions.592 At this point, 
the hostage crisis bore its first fruit of success for the IRP in the national referendum for
591 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
592 For more information see Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, pp. 200-02.
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the constitution. However, the opposition was divided and largely silenced over the 
issue. The referendum took place on 3 December 1979, almost a month after the 
hostage crisis had begun. The available data regarding voter participation in this 
referendum suggests that there was growing dissatisfaction with IRP policies and the 
general direction the revolution was taking. Out of 21 million eligible voters, under 16 
million people actually voted (though 98% of these gave their approval). While this 
percentage might ordinarily indicate high levels of participation, in the context of the 
revolutionary mobilisation within a country in which before few months earlier over 20 
million people had cast their votes for the Islamic Republic, the statistics suggest that 
Khomeini had already begun to lose popularity.
Shariatmadari and his party (MPRP) remained the main force opposing the constitution; 
he even issued a fatwa (religious decree) boycotting the election. In clashes between 
Shariatmadari and Khomeini supporters in Qom, one of Shariatmadari’s bodyguards 
was shot dead. Khomeini predicted severe reactions from Shariatmadari supporters in 
Azerbaijan and immediately paid a visit to Shariatmadari, condemning the killing. This 
did not, however, prevent a massive demonstration in Tabriz, the Azerbaijan centre, at 
which protestors captured the radio and television centre and demanded an end to 
censorship and an annulment of the constitution. The IRP, still insecure in its position, 
had to compromise and grant Shariatmadari special powers in the Azerbaijan region, 
promising that in all decisions regarding Azerbaijan he would be consulted first.594 This 
promise was soon broken, which led to further unrest.
However, by this time the IRP was ready to counter the crisis. Revolutionary guards 
closed down the MPRP headquarters in Tabriz. Again, the strategic interpretation of 
documents found in the American embassy proved to be more decisive than any other 
political weapon in this struggle. MPRP leaders were defamed, arrested or escaped and 
were accused of spying and other charges. The Revolutionary Courts charged and 
condemned their leader and sentences were quickly carried out. Shariatmadari was put 
under immense pressure to dissociate himself from the MPRP as other branches of the 
party were closed down. His response contains in it a description of the tactics being 
used by the IRP to delegitimise their opposition:
593 The data was published by the Iranian home office (Vezarat-e Keshvar) and Basnidar discussed its implications in
his articles. More notably, he discussed it in an historical meeting with Khomeini and IRP leaders after 14 
Esfand. See Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, pp. 230-36.
594 Milani, Iran’s Islamic Revolution, p. 174.
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The point I should tell you, dear gentlemen, is that with the current 
policy of the regime, there is no need on the part of the founders of the 
party to dissolve it because the regime, by labelling political parties as 
American, Zionist, and un-Islamic, will gradually dissolve them all.595
Soon after, his party was indeed dissolved and in 1982, a year after Banisadr’s 
impeachment, he was placed under house arrest.
The failure of Bazargan’s government
Despite the influence of the embassy occupation, the collapse of Bazargan’s 
government could not have been brought about solely through external pressures. The 
main reasons were internal. Although Bazargan and many of his ministers remained 
popular during the embassy occupation, their socio-political and economic policies 
caused frustration, especially amongst the young revolutionary section of Iranian 
society. The pivotal internal factors which led to the government’s decline were its 
reformist ideology and policies, and its consequent failure to recognise new socio­
political and economic demands that were stimulated and politicised by the revolution.
Bazargan, a sincere believer in democratic values and their compatibility with Islam, 
proved to be a rare religious and political leader for whom political activity was not 
aimed at gaining power but rather at establishing freedom and democracy for his 
country. At the same time, he never believed that these goals could be achieved via 
revolution. For him, revolution would achieve nothing. For example, three months 
before the end of the Shah’s regime, in an interview with Hasanein Heikal, a renowned 
Egyptian political writer, he said, “you are living in a fantasy world; you think the Shah 
will be gone, he will never leave [be overthrown]”.596 Ultimately, though, it emerged 
that he was the one living in a fantasy world, refusing to acknowledge the revolution 
even after the fact and remaining doggedly reformist, ignoring the expectations which 
arose as a result of one of the greatest twentieth-century revolutions. In addition, his
595 Ettela'at 12 December 1979 [20 azar 1358], p. 12.
596 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 250.
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non-critical, lenient and cordial relationship with America became a source of 
contention, leading many to believe that he was the “wrong man at the wrong time”.
The discrepancy between Bazargan’s reformism and social revolution created a political 
gap between people’s expectations and the government’s actions. This widened into a 
chasm as he continued to ignore social realities, particularly the growing frustration of 
the revolutionary youth. This vacuum was filled by both radical and opportunist 
political organisations (from religious to Marxist). The radical nature of many such 
organisations was reflected in their views regarding land, property, labour and above all 
Iran’s relation with America—the very domains, which Bazargan’s government 
continued to ignore.
By this time, the IRP and above all Khomeini were able to successfully fill this vacuum, 
championing the “barefoot” and dispossessed, and the anti-American stand. The latter 
had such social and political legitimacy that it became the means of measuring the 
revolutionary capacity of all organisations. It is thus that the occupation of the 
American embassy by the IRP camp enabled the IRP to gain the lead in the political 
struggle for power. Not only was it able to neutralise accusations of leniency towards 
America, but it also became viewed as a vanguard of anti-imperialist politics. This 
deprived its political rivals on the left of their most powerful ideological and political 
weapon, and also meant that leftist organisations were forced to agree with the IRP, 
which gave the latter a stronger base for political mobilisation.
In brief, the collapse of Bazargan’s government weakened the democratic camp and 
exposed its internal fragmentation and subsequent inability to outmanoeuvre the IRP. 
However, the political atmosphere remained relatively open since, despite the closure of 
over twenty-three newspapers, there were many others that challenged the party’s 
attempt to control the media and other parties. Still, nine months after the overthrow of 
the Shah and despite the IRP’s attempts to gain control of the state, the democratic front 
was strong enough to force the IRP into a bitter struggle for Iranian hearts and minds. 
The result of this challenge would be decided in the forthcoming presidential elections.
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6Leadership o f the revolution: the struggles for principle and power
Following the successful legitimation of the clergy’s power within the constitution, the 
presidential elections were the next litmus test of the IRP’s strategy in outmanoeuvring 
and undermining the democratic camp. The significance of the election results lay in 
the fact that they indicated public sentiment regarding the direction that the revolution 
should take. If the results showed support for the IRP, the party would be able to extend 
its power from the parallel government and “mini-state” it had created in the 
revolutionary institutions to the government proper via legal means, thus legalising its 
authoritarian rule. In 1980, a post-revolutionary country which lacked an 
institutionalised party politics suddenly found itself with 108 presidential candidates on 
the first election ballot, only ten of which were considered to be serious contenders. 
From the outset, Banisadr was viewed as the most serious contender from the 
democratic front. All the surveys, even those conducted before the hostage-taking,
CQ7
indicated that he was the top candidate. At first, Banisadr had been hesitant to run for
C Q Q
the presidency, though he was acutely aware of the IRP’s aim to control the state via 
legal means. Nevertheless, he conditioned his candidacy on whether Bazargan would 
run since he did not want to divide votes within the democratic front. He therefore 
refrained from nominating himself for the candidacy until the final hours, when the 
home minister, Sabaghian, informed him that Bazargan had decided not to run.599
The most prominent contender from the IRP camp was Ayatollah Beheshti, leader of 
the IRP, whom Khomeini ultimately prevented from running. It has been argued that 
Khomeini imposed the ban as he did not want a member of the clergy to run for
597 Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005. After returning to Iran, with the help of Banisadr, he established a survey
group for studying public opinion in Iran.
598 A group of his advisors met him, advising him to nominate himself for the presidency. Salamatian, his senior
advisor and Isfahan’s future MP, told him, “these gentlemen have prepared the ground for their legal despotic 
rule. They [also] have prepared Beheshti as their presidential candidate; furthermore, they have written their 
constitution and ratified it. They also control the Revolutionary Guards, Revolutionary Committees and 
Revolutionary Courts, control villages via the Construction Jihad Organisation, and have the clergy on their 
side. So if they can control the government and oil money, then no one would be able to challenge them”. 
Banisadr expressed his hesitation, saying, “in truth, you want me to become the candidate of death”. In the 
end, Salamatian said on behalf of the others, “we make you the candidate of danger, unfortunately the situation 
is in a way that this is the only way to pull the revolution from the throat of these gentlemen”. Ahmadi, Darse 
tajrobeh, pp. 248-49. Salamatian argues that the main reason he wanted Banisadr to stand for the presidency 
was because according to the constitution, only the president would be elected directly by the people, and this 
would provide legitimacy for the position which no other leader had. Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005.
599 Jafari, interview, 9 September 2004; Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
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presidency.600 This argument seems unsustainable since we know that after Banisadr's 
impeachment and Rajaei’s brief presidency, all successive presidents were clergymen. 
Also, the election result indicated that no IRP candidate had a reasonable chance of 
winning. This verifies Banisadr’s argument that one of the reasons Khomeini did not let 
Beheshti run was his awareness of the latter’s unpopularity. His defeat would have 
revealed the clergy’s unpopularity and undermined its political legitimacy.601
Another argument sheds more light on why Khomeini forbade Beheshti’s candidacy. 
Khomeini was aware of America’s aim to establish a stable regime in Iran via a 
coalition of the clergy and the army. Furthermore, he also was aware that for 
America, Beheshti—not Khomeini—was the favoured candidate for this role.603 Out of 
fear of being side-lined, he had every interest to prevent Beheshti from occupying a 
position which potentially would have threatened his. He was particularly cognizant 
that Beheshti, after supporting the introduction of Velayat-e faghih, still proposed an 
amendment in which the leader could assign his rights to others, primarily the president, 
thereby opening a legal route for increasing his power.604 Although Khomeini may 
have been able to benefit from letting Beheshti run for president, insofar as his defeat at 
the polls would disrupt US plans to install Beheshti as the strong man of Iran, this 
benefit would have come at a cost: Beheshti’s defeat, in public eyes, would be 
interpreted as the clergy’s failure to control the state. This Khomeini could not afford as 
he aimed to bring the clergy to power (though he was still not in a position to impose 
his version of government on the people.
It was thus that Jala-el Din Farsi, another IRP ideologue, was nominated as the party’s 
candidate. However, and despite Banisadr’s protest, he too was soon forced to 
withdraw (since the constitution required that presidential candidates should be Iranian 
by birth, whereas he was Afghani).605 The IRP therefore nominated Hassan Habibi, a 
well-known Moslem intellectual, as its candidate. While he had relatively little time to 
mount a campaign, this disadvantage was outweighed by the massive support he 
received from both the party and its allies and their propaganda machine. Habibi was 
backed by Beheshti, Rafsanjani, Khamenei and other IRP leaders, which had a positive
600 See Milani, Iran’s Iranian Revolution, p. 174; Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran, p. 148.
601 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
602 There are numerous documents in this regard, for instance, see Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 332-33.
603 Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: Norton Press, 1981).
604 Iranian Constitution, Article 110; also Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
605 Banisadr argued against this because he believed that Afghans were another Iranian ethnic group, which was
separated from Iran by Britain in the nineteenth centuiy. Ibid.
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corollary effect on IRP supporters.606 Furthermore, he also received support from the 
Freedom Movement (FM) and Tudeh party.607 The FM’s personal rivalry with Banisadr 
pushed it, in this case, to ally itself with the IRP, even while it was aware of the latter’s 
plans to control all leverages of state power.
This lack of solidarity reflected the main problem with the democratic camp. Its roots 
go back to Banisadr’s long-standing criticism of Bazargan’s government for its 
reformism and lack of sensitivity regarding the country’s lack of independence, which 
had, as he argued, given the IRP the opportunity to portray itself as the champion of the 
country’s independence against foreign powers, especially America.608 Equally as 
importantly, the FM found it hard to digest the fact that Banisadr, returning to Iran after 
nearly sixteen yeas of exile, refused to join the party, in fact bypassing all established 
political parties and organisations and discarding the resources available to promote his 
campaign. The possibility that Banisadr could be elected president despite the active 
opposition of political parties and organisations like the IRP, Mujaheddin Enghelabe 
Eslami, Mujaheddin Khalq, Tudeh Party, Fedaeen, Omatis and Freedom Movement, 
created unrivalled jealousy towards in others who perceived themselves to occupy such 
a position.609
Nevertheless, the IRP’s change of candidate was of secondary importance compared 
with its party unity and solidarity. The majority of IRP supporters were inclined to vote 
for any candidate nominated and blessed by the IRP leadership. It is thus difficult to 
speculate about whether the candidacy of Beheshti or Farsi would have made a real 
difference in the outcome of the election unless we argue that some IRP supporters 
would have abstained from the election. This would have been impossible for religious 
voters, as Khomeini made participation a religious obligation. As the bulk of IRP 
supporters were practising Moslems, mass abstention would have been unlikely. Still, 
even if sections of the IRP electorate had abstained, it would have been insignificant 
considering the boycott of the election by other political group (primarily Kurdish and 
Mujaheddin organisations) and the number of the people who actually cast votes in the 
election.
606 See Jomhooriy-e Eslami papers from December 1979 to January 1980.
607 Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005.
608 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
609 Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005. Hassan Yousefi Esh’kevari, Dar Takaapooye Aazaadi [Struggle for
freedom] (Tehran: Ghalam Publishing, [1379] n .d .), p. 387.
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Khomeini also banned the candidature of Masoud Rajavi, the leader of the Mujaheddin, 
arguing that since Rajavi had boycotted the constitutional election, he could not now 
uphold its results and run in the presidential election. Nevertheless, Banisadr protested 
this and argued, “if the issue is having not voted for the constitution, then everyone’s 
birth certificate should be cheked.”610 The final candidate of any political weight was 
secular nationalist Admiral Ahmad Madani, the governor-general of Kuhuzestan (the 
country’s oil region). His was a platform of law and order and his power base was 
mainly confined to sectors of the modem middle and upper classes.
The IRP leadership was still certain that the initial election would be inconclusive and 
that it would go to a second round, by which time it would have sufficient time to 
organise a solid coalition in favour of its candidate.611 Despite Banisadr’s protest, and 
using its majority vote in the Council of Revolution, the IRP therefore decided that the 
election should be held in February, when many roads in rural areas were impassable, 
making it impossible for people in many villages to vote. More importantly, through 
this Khomeini tried to prevent Banisadr from running. He intervened at the eleventh 
hour; and the night before the election sent a message to the Council of Revolution 
informing them that the religious teachers of Qom wanted Banisadr to step down in 
favour of Habibi. Banisadr refused, saying,
this election should clarify one issue once and for all, which is whether
this nation has identified the guiding principle of revolution and its
implementation; [this principle is] freedom, independence and the
rediscovery of Islam as the discourse of freedom. Or whether the reverse
is true; that people are ignorant and have obeyed the clergy with closed
(\ 1eyes and are in favour of pious [clergy] despotism.
The result of the election, in other words, might be used as an important indicator of the 
importance of these principles in the voting behaviour of the electorate.
610 In Iranian elections, voters’ birth certificates get stamped so they could not vote again and to prove that they had 
voted.
6,1 Salamatian, interview, 24 May 2005.
612 “Sharhe zendeghiye Banisadr” [Banisadr’s life], accessed online at http://www.banisadr.com.fr/life/pdf7bani- 
san.pdf.
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The IRP candidate enjoyed the massive support of the party’s propaganda machinery 
and the use of governmental resources. Banisadr not only did not have this kind of 
support; furthermore, the IRP systematically tried to sabotage his presidential campaign, 
even using extreme tactics like the sudden closure of airports to interrupt his travel.
Also, “Banisadr was accused of secretly having travelled to Israel and having met Golda 
Meyer. Or that his father was a collaborator of General Zahedi in 1953 coup against 
Mussadiq. Or that he was a proxy of the French”.613 In addition, the national television 
and radio played a leading role in undermining Banisadr’s candidacy. “Banisadr has yet 
to officially be declared president, but the TV and radio have already started their 
opposition and confrontation with him. It is the continuation of their repulsive method 
of specifically opposing him during the presidential campaign”.614 However, local 
political associations spontaneously emerged and assumed responsibility for supporting 
Banisadr and compensating for his total lack of financial and organisational party 
resources and structure.
While the NF supported the secular nationalist Ahmad Madani, the FM and IRP chose 
to support Hassan Habibi.615 The emergence of these groups in such a short time helped 
in neutralising IRP work against Banisadr. Furthermore, he received support from 1800 
Islamic associations616 which were alarmed by the IRP’s despotic tendencies; they 
simply overwhelmed the IRP’s propaganda machine. Banisadr based his election 
platform on four principles: unity within Iran, economic reconstruction, security and 
spirituality.618 The defence of freedoms was to underpin all of these platforms; the 
freedom of all political organisations would be guaranteed, so long as the groups 
recognised “free debate” as the main method of political action (in contrast to the use of 
violence).619
613 Eric Rouleau, “Iran in search of a president”, Le Monde, 25 December 1980.
614 Amir Entezam, Aansooye Eteham, Khaterate Abas Amir Entezam [The Other Side o f Accusation], p. 107.
615 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 22; Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005.
6,6 Banisadr, “Roozha bar reise jomhoor chegooneh migozarad” [How the days of the president pass by], 1 September 
1980 [10 Shahrivar 1359].
617 After Banisadr’s election, these associations formed the nucleus of hundreds of offices all over Iran, called the 
“Offices of Cooperation and Coordination of People with the President” (OCCPP). It was the first time in Iran 
we observe a spontaneous political movement organising and structuring itself on a mass level and from below. 
The organisation, unlike the typical structure of dominant political parties, was not based on vertical diffusion 
of power, but horizontal. One could argue that the emergence and spread of these associations were indicators 
of a process in which democracy was becoming institutionalised.
6.8 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 23.
6.9 Ibid., p. 27.
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The election took place in February 1980, nearly a year after the revolution, and resulted 
in Banisadr’s election and thus the victory of his political camp. He was the most 
favoured candidate, gaining nearly 76% of the vote (10.75 million votes out of nearly 
14 million). Admiral Ahmad Madani, the nationalist candidate, gained just under 12% 
of the votes, and Habibi (the IRP candidate) just over 3% (474,859).620 This amounted 
to a severe political blow to the totalitarian camp. Furthermore, 96% of votes were cast 
for Banisadr, Madani, Fruhar, Sami and Qotbzadeh, who were all overtly opposed to the 
doctrine of Velayat-e faghih doctrine; in other words, the majority of the electorate had
fs) 1voted against the doctrine. Soon after his election, he stated that “this was not just an 
election but a revolution. Despite the TV and radio’s shameful violation of their 
supposed neutrality, as well as the big media and their deceitful propaganda against me 
which was advanced by IRP (in truth a fistful of fascist clergy, which pretend to be 
followers of the Imam) and despite a flood of accusations, the nation elected me”.622 
Unlike other candidates, Banisadr ran his campaign around a platform without using 
Khomeini to attract votes. He had already mentioned this to Khomeini: “I did not ask 
for any support for the presidency from [Khomeini], and I did not become the president 
as a result of [his] support”. Mohsen Milani, along with many other scholars, 
believes that Banisadr’s landslide victory can be “attributed more to his identification 
with Khomeini than to his own popularity. He lacked a solid base in Iran”.624 It is 
important to analyse and interrogate this claim, since if it is true it would imply that 
Banisadr’s intense political campaign, based on his doctrine of Islam as the discourse of 
freedom and his identification with the guiding principles of the revolution, was not the 
central reason for his victory. It would thus be the case that the political struggle within 
the elite during the presidential election was not over whether democratic rights should 
be the basis of the state’s legitimacy, but was rather a classic elite struggle over political 
power.
First, it was known that Khomeini was not in favour of Banisadr’s presidency. “In 
public spaces there are discussions about Khomeini’s discontent with Banisadr, who
620 M. J. Muzzaffar, Avaleen reis jomhoor [The First President] (Tehran: Enteshaaraat-e Kavir, 1378 [1999]), p. 16.
621 The number of votes cast for the these candidates were as follows: S. A. Madani -  2,224,554, Dariush Foruhar -
133,478, Kazem Sami -  89,270, and Sadegh Qotbzadeh -  48,547. See Enghelabe Eslami, No. 178, February 
1980.
622 Eric Rouleau, “Iran in search of a president”, Le Monde, 25 December 1980.
623 Ayatollah Eshraghi (Khomeini’s son-in-law) delivered a message from Khomeini to which Banisadr responded in
detail. The dialogue was scribed by Homa Rafi, Homa Ghaemi and Firoozeh Banisadr. See Banisadr, 
Naamehaa be Khomeini and others [Letters to Khomeini and Others] (Germany: Enghelabe Eslami Zeitung, 
2006 [1385]), pp. 78-79.
624 Milani, “Ascendance of Shi’i fundamentalism”. Years later, his views remained unchanged; see Milani, Iran’s
Iranian Revolution, p. 175.
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used to be seen as Khomeini’s spiritual son”.625 Years later, Khomeini admitted this, 
saying, “I swear to God I did not vote for Banisadr and accepted the views of 
friends”.626 We know that Khomeini actively wanted Banisadr to withdraw his 
nomination for the presidency and criticised him, primarily for his opposition to 
Velayat-e faghih and the participation of clergy in governmental affairs.627 It could be 
contested that political perception is more effective than political reality, and in public 
perception Khomeini did not oppose the candidacy of either Banisadr or the other main 
candidates. “I do not intend to either approve or disapprove of anyone”, he stated. “I
f/yo
ask all groups and parties not to assign any of their candidates to me.” This point 
does deserve some attention, as it could also be argued that public perception of 
Khomeini to this point identified him with the discourse of Islam that he had advocated 
in Paris, a discourse of democratic Islam. His popularity was contingent on his 
commitment to the principles enshrined in this discourse. Later, as Khomeini wavered 
on this commitment, his popularity began to decline. Hence, in order to argue that 
Banisadr’s overwhelming victory was made possible with Khomeini’s backing, it would 
be necessary to outline the “contingent relationship” between Khomeini’s popularity 
and the type of Islam he advocated. There is a major difference between Khomeini as a 
representative of Islam as a discourse of freedom, which was the dominant discourse 
during the revolution, and Islam as a discourse of power, which he gradually began to 
advocate after returning to Iran. Therefore, if the mere fact of Banisadr’s closeness to 
Khomeini is to be considered a factor in his election, it must be clarified, which 
Khomeini—Khomeini as democrat, or Khomeini as despot?
Second, as already mentioned, Khomeini never publicly approved or disapproved any of 
the presidential candidates. Just prior to the election, Banisadr strongly denied that 
Khomeini supported him, stating that to win the election he did not need his support or 
approval. Furthermore, he informed Khomeini that “if you want to interfere, or approve 
[of somebody], then I won’t be a candidate since the president should be able to stand 
on his own feet. If he can not gain public support on his own, when problems arise he
625 Eric Rouleau, “Iran in search of a president”, Le Monde, 25 December 1980.
626 Khomeini’s letter to Ayatollah Montazeri, 21 March 1989 [06 farvardin 1368] in Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye
nour [The Book of Light], vol. 21 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e Eslami, [1378] 1999), p. 331. 
Ayatollah Montazeri, however, argues that it is possible the letter was forged by Khomeini’s son, Ahmad. See 
Ayatollah Montazeri, Khaterate Ayatollah Montazeri [Montazeri’s Memoir] (Chaape Bahar, n.d.), p. 664.
627 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
628 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 6 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e
Eslami, 1999 [1378]), p. 578.
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will not be able to resolve them. The experience of Bazargan’s government is enough”.
f\*y oAccording to Banisadr, Khomeini said he had no intention of interfering.
Third, if closeness to Khomeini played an important role in the election, the IRP should 
have had a much better chance of winning. This was, after all, a party founded with 
Khomeini’s approval and support; a party which openly portrayed itself as the party 
that manifested Khomeini’s ideological beliefs. Similarly, Qotbzadeh’s631 close 
relationship with Khomeini did not help him in the election, as he ended up with only 
48,000 votes.632 Sadegh Tabatabaee, the brother of Khomeini’s daughter-in-law, only 
mustered just under 115,000. Furthermore, while during the presidential campaign 
all the candidates—even secular nationalist Madani634—tried to capitalise on their 
relationship to Khomeini by using his picture in their posters, Banisadr never used any
/ r o c
picture or words of Khomeini in his campaign. This decision was taken consciously; 
Banisadr was determined that if he were to be elected, his election should be based only
fsic.
on his platforms and agenda. Additionally, during the crucial final months of 
Banisadr’s presidency, according to surveys and foreign reports his popularity was 
greater than it had been at the time of his election. In fact, the more Khomeini lost
f / i n
popularity, the more popular Banisadr became.
Given these arguments, the causes of Banisadr’s popularity cannot be sought in his 
personal relationship with Khomeini. Rather, they can be located in his political and 
theological perspective. As an Islamic theorist, he was one of the founding fathers (and 
advocate, propagator and representative) of a new discourse of Islam emerging in Iran, 
which interpreted Islam as a discourse of freedom. This was a humanist, democratic 
Islam; an Islam which was compatible with modernisation, which could carry the nation
629 Muzzafar and Jomhoor, Avalm reis jomhoos, p. 89. These interviews with five main presidential candidates were
conducted before the election.
630 Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 15.
631 Qotbzadeh was one of the three closest Moslem intellectuals to Khomeini in Paris; he was appointed by Khomeini
as director of media and by the time of his candidacy for president was foreign minister.
632 Muzzafar and Jomhoor, Avalm reis jomhoos, p. 16.
633 Ibid.
634 His poster in Keyhan read,“madani at the service [of the people] and ready to die as the companion of Imam”, see
“Madani kaargozaar va yaare jaan bar kafe mardom”, Keyhan, 23 January 1980 [3.11.1358].
635 Even before the election, even while in Paris, and unlike others who published their photograph with Khomeini for
political purpsoe, there is not a single picture of Banisadr with Khomeini. This was because “Banisadr used to 
look at the journalists’ camera and remove any photos, which he was in [with Khomeini]”, Mohammad Javad 
Muzzafar and Avalin Reis Jomhoor, The First President (Tehran: Enteshaaraate Kavir, [1378] 2000), p. 89.
636 Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005. He was in charge of Banisadr’s presidential campaign.
637 Eric Rouleau, interview by the author, 9 June 2005. Also Dr Abdolsamad Taghizadeh, interview  by the
author, 3 August 2005. Taghizadeh was nominated for the Nobel Prize in medicine in 1973 and was 
director of the National University from 1979-80. He accompanied Banisadr on his visits to the Shiraz military 
base and the city itself. See the result of the national surveys on p. 50 of this dissertation.
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into the modem era, and adjust to the demands of progress in a modem world without 
suffering from a loss or crisis of identity. Banisadr communicated this new 
interpretation of the belief system through numerous books, many of which broke 
record sale, and a new newspaper (Enghelabe Eslami) that soon became the most 
popular in the country’s history. He also organised free public debates and gave 
numerous speeches throughout the country.640 These ideological successes, as well as a 
growing public fear of the hegemonic tendencies of the IRP and its allies, were a 
unifying force for large sections of society, crossing class and ethnicity, to vote for 
Banisadr. There seemed to be a widespread fear of religious dictatorship among the 
public, which viewed Banisadr as its antidote. In other words, the claim that Banisadr’s 
popularity was contingent on Khomeini’s support was developed after Banisadr’s 
removal. The question is, why?
Banisadr’s presidency: the plans and possibilities
Banisadr was the first post-revolutionary leader in Iran to gain legitimacy directly from 
the people, a fact he never ceased to emphasise in the ensuing political struggle with the 
IRP. He argued that one major implication of his landslide victory was that Iranians 
had rejected the IRP’s attempt to dominate the state. He argued he had therefore been 
given a mandate to “redress the revolution and rescue it from a fistful of fascist 
clerics”.641 In order to do so, he avoided establishing a political party based on 
hierarchical organisation, which in his view would aim to achieve and manage power, 
thereby curtailing individual and socio-political freedoms. In order to prevent the IRP’s 
ability to monopolise power, he argued that it was vital for the people to play a direct 
role in politics; he called this “the presence of people on the stage”. This would have a 
dual effect: it would prevent the hegemonisation of the state by the IRP and facilitate 
the emergence of new forms of political associations, which were formed 
spontaneously, organised horizontally, and oriented towards expanding freedoms 
instead of achieving power.642
638 Salamatian, ibid.
639 Banisadr, “Roozha”, September 1980 [4 Shahrivar 1359].
640 In the final month of Banisadr’s presidency, Enghelabe Eslami broke record sales in modem Iranian history. Over
half a million copies of the paper were sold daily. Jafari, interview, 9 September 2004. Despite the doubling 
of Iran’s population and literacy rate, this record yet to be broken.
641 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 97.
642 As was happening with the Offices of Cooperation and Coordination of People with the President (OCCPP).
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To reinforce this new type of political formation, he embark on a new form of public 
education to keep the public informed of his daily activities as a president. He wrote a 
daily column in Enghelabe Eslami called “How the day passes by for the President”, in 
which he reported on wide range of issues, including his duties, the problems he faced 
and the solutions he developed. He also gave summaries of the political and 
philosophical books he was reading and debating, as well as of his regular meetings 
with his mother, and furthermore used the column to expose the IRP’s attempts to 
interfere in the hostage crisis, war, and many other issues. The column proved to be 
extremely popular, as the public for the first time had a detailed glimpse into the 
corridors of power, including its plots and intrigues, and were constantly reminded that 
the only way of preventing the IRP’s attempts to control state power was their active 
presence in the political domain. During his presidency he repeated the necessity for 
openness in order to prevent the reemergence of despotism:
“the only time an Islamic government deserves its name is when there is no secret and 
people are aware of everything. I repeat, independence is not achievable without 
freedom and awareness”.643 He also said, “I have never been in favour of secretive 
methods. I will not be unfaithful to people and my country or to use them as means in 
power game with internal and external powers”.644 This was because he believed that 
“the worst thing would be if people are not aware of the realities and affairs of the 
country”.645 Later, in response to arguments that this sort of freedom was dangerous, he 
replied, “whatever harm freedom might cause, it will not be even one thousandth that of 
despotism. Without freedom one can not achieve independence, and without both of 
these, Islam will be hollow and without content”.646
Through these various media, Banisadr communicated with the people a comprehensive 
plan for Iran’s development, one that emphasised economic development within the 
framework of expanding political and social freedom. “Iran”, he counted, “had fifty- 
seven types of “dependent relations” which had to be broken” in order for the country to 
gain its independence.647 He argued that one of the main goals of the revolution was to 
bring Iran out of the cycle of dependent development and embark on independent 
development. Political and social freedoms were the preconditions and not the
643 Enghelabe Eslami, 30 May 1981 [9 khordadl360].
644 Enghelabe Eslami, 28 April 1981 [8 ordibehesht 1360].
645 Enghelabe Eslami, 12 February 1981 [23 bahman 1359].
646 Enghelabe Eslami, 23 May 1981 [2 khordad 1360],
647 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, Eghtesaade tawhidi [The Tawhid Economy] (Enteshaaraate Amir Kabir, 1980 [1359]), p.
56. Also interview with Banisadr, 22 January 2005.
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consequences, for the implementation and success of this plan. He argued, for example,
£AQ
that “freedom is the only method for defending Iran’s independence”; that “freedom 
for workers, farmers and the deprived is even more important than daily bread”;649 and 
that “Islamic revolution is in need of the expansion of freedoms”.650 In his view, even 
though the Pahlavi regime was overthrown, “the military, bureaucratic, economic, social 
and cultural order and institutions bequeathed by Pahlavi remained standing”.651 These 
institutions had been the social and economic foundations of dictatorship and would 
only function to preserve and reproduce themselves in the new regime. In order to 
develop a dynamic democracy, and to make a return to despotism impossible, it was 
necessary to transform the nation’s socio-economic and cultural institutions. As one of 
the first steps towards the institutionalisation of democracy, Iranian society “must 
overturn this structure from its foundations so that the establishment of the Islamic
(LC*)
Republic becomes possible”.
This was particularly important as the IRP began advocating the export of revolution 
through violent means; something which Banisadr forcefully opposed. He argued that 
according to Islam as a discourse of freedom, a war of aggression was forbidden. 
However, he complemented this by arguing that revolution was a universal 
phenomenon and that its “export” to other countries would be inevitable if Iran made 
itself a “model” for independent development within a democratic system. He believed 
that “if the revolution does not expand beyond the frontiers of Iran, then the counter­
revolution will enter”.653 This was yet another reason to strengthen both the democratic 
and developmental aspects of the revolution, as a means of extending its resonance 
outside national borders and thus guaranteeing its survival within.
Banisadr’s plans gave priority to the economy, which he thought would provide the 
basis for the country’s socio-politico and cultural system. The Shah’s economic 
policies, which had led to the creation of inflated city populations and high rates of 
rural-urban immigration, had to be reversed. Comprehensive structural reforms through 
massive investment in rural areas were planned. The long-neglected agricultural sector 
was to be revitalised, which meant the construction of a new and sufficient
648Enghelabe Eslami newspaper: 31 Janjuray 1981 [7 bahman 1359].
649 Enghelabe Eslami, 12 February 1981 [23 bahman 1359].
650 Enghelabe Eslami, 28 August 1979 [8 shahrivar 1358].
651 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, Eghtesaade tawhidi, p. 99.
652 Ettela'at, 16 February 1980 [27 bahman 1358].
653 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, Sad maghaleh [One Hundred Articles] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Enghelabe Eslami, 1980
[1359]), p. 69.; Banisadr, My Turn to Speak.
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infrastructure. The health, education and transport systems were to be developed, and 
industry was to be expanded and co-ordinated to increase and create efficiency. The 
inflated state bureaucracy was to be trimmed down by encouraging staff to undertake 
university courses and retrain for the new specialised jobs which would be created, with 
the incentive of better incomes. It was thus that the university system was to be 
expanded.654 During his short time in office as treasury minister, Banisadr’s economic 
plan had received strong public support. “A teacher said: ‘he is a capable economist 
and can solve our problems’, a bazaar merchant said: ‘he had reduced the interest rates 
from 14% to 4%’,.. .a worker in downtown Tehran (Halabi Abad) said: “he has 
promised us work and housing [and] that land belongs to those who work it.”655
However, for Banisadr, restructuring the system of oil production and distribution was 
central to his agenda. A systematic program was planned to decrease dependency on oil 
income. A back-up oil industry was planned, so that instead of exporting crude oil, 
refined oil products would be exported. The link between oil and the dollar would be 
broken and replaced with a basket of hard currencies.656 This would increase the 
country’s oil income and weaken America’s financial dominance, and thus its negative 
effect on the world economy in general, especially in non-western countries. To realise 
these goals, Banisadr decided that the price of oil should be based on economic rather 
than political factors. Aware of environmental disasters unfolding as the result of the 
use of oil for fuel,657 he argued that “oil is too polluting, as well as too precious, to be 
used as a fuel”. He argued that as long as the price of oil was kept low (as a result of 
the support of western governments from corrupt governments in the oil region), car 
manufacturers would not invest seriously in alternative and non-pollutive sources of 
energy. He sent Saraf, his oil minister, to inform OPEC ministers that “the Iranian 
revolution determines the price of oil should be $34 [in today’s value, over $100] a 
barrel”.659 Soon after, this demand was met.660 Still, he argued that exporting oil would 
only become mutually beneficial when the West exchanged oil for technology, so that
654 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, interview by the author, Doris Schroeder, Miltos Ladikas and Sarah Amsler, Versailles,
September 2003.
655 Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, 26-27 January 1980.
656 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
657 See Banisadr, Oil and Dominance.
658 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
659 In order to calculate the price of oil based on economic value, a parallel was drawn between the price of electricity
generated by atomic reactors and oil. If oil had to be sold according to its economical value, which would 
match the electricity produced by the reactors, then the price of oil should be raised to $34 a barrel. Banisadr, 
interview, 22 January 2005.
660 In order prevent the “second oil shock” from hurting the poor countries, Banisadr suggested that they should be
given subsidies by reducing oil price for their consumption.
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the historical backwardness of the Middle East could be overcome. It was not long 
before these plans prompted Henry Kissinger to argue that “America can not bear two 
Japans in Asia”.661
The main precondition for Banisadr being able to carry out this new programme was the 
curtailment and reduction of the mini-state of revolutionary institutions. The 
Revolutionary Guard would be absorbed into the regular army, the Revolutionary Court 
replaced by a regular court and the Revolutionary Committees dissolved, with part of 
them being incorporated into a new police force. Banisadr aimed to dismantle the 
influence of what he termed the “multiple centres of power” that had paralysed 
Bazargan’s government. In order for this to be successful, the cooperation of the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government was vital, and the clerics 
had to be prevented from interfering in governmental affairs.
Presidential oath: the precursor of coming challenges
At this point in January 1980, the parliamentary elections were two months away. 
According to the constitution, the president had to be sworn in before the first 
parliament met. There were no guidelines for a case in which the parliament was absent. 
Banisadr suggested that be sworn in before Khomeini, a suggestion that IRP leaders 
rejected on grounds of its unconstitutionality (an irony in light of their usual lack of 
constitutional concern). Rafsanjani suggested that in the interim “the president should 
.. .devote himself to study and to preparing for the presidency”.662 Eventually 
Khomeini, recovering from a heart attack and fearing that he might not survive and the 
country would be left in turmoil, agreed with Banisadr’s suggestion.663 It appeared that 
Banisadr was in a strong position to carry out his programme of reforms.
On 29 January 1981 Khomeini announced Banisadr as the representative of the 
people.664 His support was echoed by some other IRP leaders, though more 
pragmatically than substantively. From the outset, however, it became clear that 
Khomeini was not happy with Banisadr as president. For instance, Eric Rouleau, the 
only foreign journalist present in the ceremony, was amazed to observe Khomeini’s cold
661 Banisadr has occasionally has repeated this quotation since his presidency in 1980, as well as in his interview.
662 Bamdad newspaper, 30 January 1980 [10 bahman 1358].
663 Salamatian, interview, 24 May 2005.
664 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 99.
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and distant behaviour towards Banisadr.665 Furthermore, the ceremony of the 
presidential oath was censored by state radio and TV. In his acceptance speech Banisadr 
asserted that his legitimacy emanated from the people’s vote, but as this was not to the 
liking of the leader, it was screened out in the broadcast. At the time, Khomeini did not 
dare to take responsibility for the fiasco and forced Musavi Khoeiniha (then head of 
national television and radio) who had simply carried out his order, to resign.666 
However, the affair demonstrated the existence of two opposing points of view at the 
leadership level: one which perceived the people as the ultimate sovereign and source of 
legitimacy, and one which did not.
Still, Khomeini was neither willing nor was in a position to challenge him directly, and 
after Banisadr’s landslide victory, he was left with no option but to work with him 
temporarily. Banisadr formed his government and appointed Ahmad Salamatian as his 
prime minister. However, instead of publicly introducing the new government and 
leaving Khomeini no choice but to accept it, he first introduced the appointees to 
Khomeini (a mistake, as Salamatian now sees it667). Khomeini asked Banisadr to wait 
until after the parliamentary election to form his government. It later became clear why 
he did so. According to Rafsanjani, after the IRP’s crushing defeat in the presidential 
election, they went to Khomeini in a depressed mood, complaining that Banisadr’s 
election had ruined all their plans. Khomeini told them not to worry and to gain control 
of the parliament.668 He also told Ayatollah Mahalati the same.669
Thus Banisadr, instead of forming his government, on 7 February was appointed by 
Khomeini as chairman of the Revolutionary Council (more a ceremonial position than 
one of real authority, as he only had one vote and any decision had to be taken by
f\ 70majority vote). On 19 February he was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces and Revolutionary Guard. Banisadr was able to name his own appointees to run 
the state-owned media. His proposal to the Revolutionary Council to make the 
management of broadcasting neutral was approved. He took the decision to secure one
665 Eric Rouleau, interview by the author, 9 June 2005.
666 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, pp. 256-57. See also Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 12.
667 Salamatian, interview, 26 May 2005.
668 Rafsanjani, Friday sermon, June 1981. Also see Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 12 and Salamatian, interview, 26
May 2005.
669 “Then Seyd Abolfazl began to talk about Banisadr and criticised Banisadr’s work in the Assembly of Experts.
The Imam stated that it was not very important; that we should take the control of Majles, and that the 
president of the Islamic Republic has no power as all the power is under control of the government and 
Majles.” (Ayatollah Mahalati’s memoir, Keyhan, 28 June 2005 [ 07.04. 1384]
670 Salamatian, interview, 26 May 2005.
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hour of television time for Mehdi Bazargan, so that for the first time since his 
resignation he was given an opportunity to reply to his critics.
During this time, Banisadr continued to oppose the occupation of the American 
embassy, the strategic use of recovered documents to indict IRP opponents, and 
interference in governmental affairs, saying that “the presence of two governments in
A71Iran is unacceptable”. Later he argued that “thes tudents are behaving in a despotic 
manner and have created a government within government.”672 However, the students 
were emboldened by Khomeini and IRP support and continued to ignore Banisadr’s 
criticism. While frustrated, he stated that “the Students of the Imam’s Line should go 
back to their universities and continue their struggle while they study. They have no 
right to interfere in the affairs of government.”673
Banisadr did not confine his criticsm to words, but was able to take some action. In fact, 
when Naser Minachi, an NF leader, was arrested by the Information Ministry and 
accused of collaboration with the Americans (based on documentation found in the 
American embassy), Banisadr secured his release within twenty-four hours. He limited 
the student hostage takers’ interactions with the news media and criticised their 
occupation of the embassy, again calling it inhumane and illegal, and again accusing 
them of trying to form a “government within a government”.674 He repeated that by 
taking hostages, they had turned Iran into America’s hostage and argued that a genuine 
struggle against America’s dominance over Iran should take place in the universities, 
farms and factories.675
In an attempt to stabilise society and eliminate growing socio-economic insecurities, 
Banisadr asked Khomeini to issue general amnesty for everyone apart from those 
directly responsible for ordering killings or torture and those guilty of plundering the 
national wealth. Under his influence, Khomeini made a serious attempt to normalise the 
country in his message for the Iranian New Year. He called upon Iranians to make the 
new year “the year for the restoration of order and security”,676 asking specifically for 
discipline in the armed forces, civil service and factories. In order to eliminate the
671 Keyhan, 29 January 1981 [9 bahman 1359].
672 Ibid., 6 February 1981 [17 bahman 1358].
673 Ete ’la ’at, 16 February 1981 [27 bahman 1358].
674 Enghelaabe Eslami, Azar 21 1359, 18 December 1979,
675 Banisadr’s interview with Iranian National TV, Channel 1, 15 December 1979 [18 azar 1359].
676 “Iran’s Revolution: The First Year,” Middle East Report (MERIP), 88 (June 1980).
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shadowy power of the IRP, Banisadr needed to deprive the party and its allies of their 
power, which was being used to weaken the power of the state. He aimed to gradually 
eliminate such powers by first asking Khomeini to limit the action of the Revolutionary 
Courts to function within state law and eventually integrate them into the regular 
judicial system. All unauthorised seizure of property was banned, and Khomeini 
ordered an investigation of Banisadr’s allegation that there had been over 800 cases of 
corruption in the Foundation of the Disinherited during its handling of confiscated and 
nationalised property. Despite the success of these initial actions, however, Banisadr’s 
presidency suffered from a number of structural weaknesses within the constitution.
According to the constitution, while the president was the second highest leader in the 
country (the head of the executive branch of government and coordinator of the 
judiciary, legislature and executive), his actual powers did not reflect his formal
£ 7 7
political status. In prediction of Banisadr’s victory, the new constitution divided 
executive power in an attempt to diminish the threat of a strong president capable of
/ ''T O
challenging the clerical establishment. The president could choose his prime
£7Q
minister, but this choice had to be ratified by parliament. Ministers were chosen by
/■OA
the Prime minister and confirmed by the President, and while the president could
/O |
dismiss a minister, his choice of new minister needed parliamentary ratification. It 
was thus essential that the parliament worked with the president and not against him. If 
a president had an uncooperative parliament, then he had to turn to Khomeini, who 
rarely if ever offered support as part of a tactical game whose aim was to ensure that 
clerical power remained intact. For example, Banisadr asked Khomeini for a twelve-
£07
month period in which to carry out his mandate by accomplishing certain tasks. 
Khomeini never gave his total support for this and his opinions on the matters involved 
wavered constantly.
Parliamentary election
677 Iranian Constitution, Article 113.
678 It was only during Rafsanjani’s presidency that the position of premiership was removed and its power assigned to
the president.
679 Iranian Constitution, Article 113.
680 Ibid., p. 134.
681 Ibid., p. 136.
682 These included solving the US hostage crisis, reconstructing the armed forces, resolving ethnic problems
(especially regarding the Kurds) and stabilising the economy.
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The parliamentary election was thus crucial for Banisadr’s political survival. A 
cooperative parliament would enable the president to resolve the hostage crisis, choose 
his Prime minister and ministers, and marginalise the IRP by either absorbing the 
revolutionary institutions into the state or abolishing them. Through such measures, he 
could drastically weaken the totalitarian camp. Many factors seemed to favour a 
successful parliamentary campaign, perhaps the main one being Banisadr’s immense 
popularity. However, a premature sense of victory led to overconfidence in Banisadr’s 
camp, which resulted in a disorganised campaign by his supporters. Banisadr also 
refused to undersign a list of candidates that he would approve; at a time when many 
candidates’ political views were still unknown, this would have given direction to his 
supporters.683 He now concedes this was a major mistake.684 The Offices of 
Cooperation and Coordination of People with the President (OCCPP) tried to rectify 
this by developing a list of its favourite candidates, but its inexperience and lack of 
political knowledge led it to nominate candidates who, once in the parliament, joined 
the IRP faction. (Although the OCCPP managed to get 70 of its candidates to the 
Majles, all but two switched to the IRP faction. ) In addition, and more importantly 
the IRP manipulated the parliamentary elections through vote-rigging, and while 
Banisadr protested the action, he failed to insist on an enquiry into the allegations. This 
decision also decisively weakened the democratic camp and provided the IRP with 
crucial leverage to weaken Banisadr’s position and expand its purview within the state 
and government.
IRP leaders made daring attempts to take the control of the Majles by any means 
possible. Firstly, a two-stage voting system was introduced, thereby eliminating smaller 
parties and groups in the second round. The IRP introduced candidates for every seat 
and forged strategic alliances. They falsely claimed the blank endorsement of respected 
Islamic groups like the Combatant Clerics of Tehran and used its network of mosques 
and clerics, party workers and affiliated organisations to increase its voting pool. When 
such measures did not produce the desired results, they resorted to vote rigging.
This happened in a context in which their opponents in the democratic camp failed to 
unite themselves around a list of candidates, and groups such as the FM endorsed the
683 As already mentioned, things worsened for the democratic front since it failed to identify suitable candidates, the
oppressive reign of the Shah provided the circumstances for the political standpoints of many of the emerging
personalities to remain in the shadow and not be revealed to the public.
684 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
685 Enghelabe Eslami, No. 491, 12-25 June 2000; see also Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
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candidacy of some IRP leaders (e.g., Rafsanjani).686 Furthermore, the alienation of the 
public from many of the candidates and general disorganisation led to a very low 
turnout. This combination of factors led to the creation of an IRP-dominated Majles. 
Most parties and political organisations (including that of Khomeini’s older brother, 
Ayatollah Passandideh) accused the IRP of tampering with votes, and “NF leader Karim 
Sanjabi and sheikh Ali Tehrani submitted a letter of protest [against vote rigging] to the
C .Q "!
President.” In some cities, the manipulation of votes was so extensive that for 
example in the city of Hamadan, where the President received 90% of the votes, his 
political enemy Ali Mohammadi became the first MP of the city. Banisadr pushed for 
an investigation into the allegations of vote rigging, but Khomeini, who declared the
/ 'O O
elections fair, blocked his attempts. As a result Banisadr wrote an angry letter to 
Khomeini, referring to the IRP leaders’ effort to get to power and argued that “if the
/ O Q
goal was to achieve power, such a parliament will be the best for such a purpose”.
He had yet to learn that Khomeini had already supported IRP leaders in their attempt to 
take the control of Parliament. Soon after, Hassan Ayat revealed the parliament’s goal.: 
“as soon as the majles begins its work it will stand against the president”.690 Hence he 
decided not to confront him over the issue, fearing a repetition of the confrontation 
between Mussadiq and Ayatollah Kashani, which provided the conditions for 1953 
coup. Furthermore, he was aware of Saddam Hussein’s plan to attack Iran and decided 
to avoid creating any crisis, which might have encouraged Saddam to execute the 
plan.691
The first result of the two-stage voting filled only 96 of 270 seats. Public dissatisfaction 
was staggering: the turnout was just 6.1 million compared to the Presidential election 
(14 million) and the referendum on the Islamic Republic (20 million). The second 
round, which came after three postponements and immediately after the “Cultural 
Revolution”, filled another 120 seats. The remaining 54 seats were not filled until after 
Banisadr was overthrown in 1981.693 The IRP and its affiliated parties held the majority 
of seats (130 out of 234),694 And many unaffiliated representatives from small
686 Salamatian, interview, 25 May 2005.
687 Keyhan, 17 March 1980 [27 esfand 1358]
688 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 10.
689 Banisadr’s letter to Khomeini, 22 May 1980 [1 khordad 1359], Naamehaa be Khomeini and Others [letter to
Khomeini and others] (Germany: Enghelabe Eslami Zeitung, 2006 [1385], pp. 45-46.
690 Etela'at, 15 and 19 June 1980 [25 and2 9 khordad 1359],
691 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, pp. 264-65.
692 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 149.
693 Ervand Abrahimian, The Iranian Mojahedin (CT: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 61-62.
694 Majles-e Eslami-ye Iran, p. 199.
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provisional constituencies often sided with the IRP on critical issues. In addition, the 
FM, led by Bazargan, only put forward candidates for Tehran (where vote rigging was 
difficult), elected eight of their candidates including Bazargan, but they had included 
many IRP’s leaders in their list of candidacy.695 Members of nationalist parties won 
seats, as did Kazem Sami of the Revolutionary Movement of Iranian Muslims (JAMA). 
A democratic group and three well-known and respected members of the clergy 
(Golzaadeh-e-Ghafoori and Ayatollah Hassan Lahuti) made common cause with 
Banisadr and were elected.
When the parliament convened, Rafsanjani was elected as leader of the Majles. The 
credentials of liberal candidates opposed to the IRP, like Sanjabi and Gasemi, were 
immediately challenged. There were a few others from the democratic camp, such as 
Admiral Ahmad Madani and Khosrov Qashqa-i, who were charged with spying (again 
based on the documents found in the American Embassy) and were either arrested (and 
later released) or out of fear of arrest did not take their seats. In addition, the Kurdish 
candidates who were elected in the parts of the Kurdish region where the election took 
place were accused of participating in the civil war and so fearing arrest also declined 
their seats. The domination of the Majles by the IRP was the first explicit and major 
obstacle to Banisadr’s presidency. Once again, allegations of spying by Students of the 
Imam’s Line proved instrumental in preventing more opponents of the IRP from taking 
their seats.
The struggle over choosing the prime minister
Before the parliamentary election, Banisadr had tried to choose his prime minister, 
arguing that to carry out his mandate he needed a cooperative prime minister.
Khomeini did not consent, and the IRP’s domination of the Majles not only provided it 
with power to legislate, but also with the constitutional right to block the president’s 
choice of prime minister and thus to exercise influence on the appointment.
After the parliamentary election, Khomeini imposed a prime minister who opposed 
Banisadr. This was an old and well-tried tactic of leaders who aim at monopolising 
power; the Shah had also used similar tactics. This is because such an antagonistic 
relationship first of all removes any possibility of collaboration between high-ranking
695 Salamatian, interview, 24 May 2005.
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political figures which would threaten the position of the national leader, and makes 
them mutually dependent on the leader, who could then exercise his will over them. For 
that purpose, Khomeini initially tried to appoint Admiral Ahmad Madani, who stood 
second to Banisadr in the presidential election, as Prime minister; Banisadr rejected the 
proposal. (According to Banisadr, Khomeini also chose Madani because he was anti- 
Banisadr.696) Khomeini then approached Karim Sanjabi, the NF leader, offering him 
the position on the condition that he oppose Banisadr. This time, Sanjabi refused.697 
After the rejection of several other candidates by the Majles, Banisadr eventually 
conceded to Mir Salim, a member of the IRP’s Central Committee, whom he saw as a 
man of law and order. However, when Hezbollahis attacked a Mujaheddin meeting in 
June, Salim (then head of the national police and deputy minister of the interior) 
condemned the attack. This made him unacceptable to the IRP and its affiliated 
revolutionary institutions.
The open struggle between the IRP and Banisadr to appoint a prime minister continued 
throughout June and July, as the constitution required the consent of both the president 
and the parliament. At this point, the IRP and Khomeini reached a consensus on 
nominating Mohammad. A. Rajaei for the premiership. His opposition to Banisadr 
made him suitable to Khomeini, and his lack of intellectual and managerial ability made 
him an ideal tool in the hands of the IRP. Finally, on 27 July, Banisadr agreed to hold a 
closed parliamentary session in which a three-man committee from the House would 
adjudicate the candidates’ qualifications. On 8 August, the committee recommended 
Rajaei as prime minister. Banisadr, aware of Rajaei’s dependence on the IRP 
leadership, disapproved. He told Khomeini that this man was “brain dead”; Khomeini’s 
son-in-law went further and sarcastically told Khomeini that Banisadr was wrong in this
AOSevaluation since he “spoke with [Rajaei] and found that he has no brain at all”.
Khomeini was left with no argument to support Rajaei other than the fact that he was a 
Moslem. In response, Banisadr many times made the point that “if idiocy is what 
makes one to be a Moslem, then he is a Moslem”.699 However, the parliament 
overwhelmingly voted in Rajaei’s favour. As Bazargan and the foreign minister 
recognised the rise in upcoming danger, they openly opposed the imposition of Rajaei, 
saying, “we see that his ideas and thoughts are based on animosity, impatience and
696 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
697 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 17.
698 Ibid.
699 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 354.
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party favouritism. Furthermore, he is inattentive towards the position, rights and duties 
of the president.”700
Once again, however, international factors were to play a decisive role in domestic 
politics. In an interview with French intellectual Eric Rouleau, Banisadr revealed that
at the beginning of August we already had in our hands outlines of 
Saddam Hussein’s [war] plans, as well as detailed accounts of the 
conversations which had taken place in France among Iranian counter­
revolutionaries, Iraqi representatives, and American and Israeli military 
experts... .We had to pay dearly for these documents, which were bought 
in Paris.701
Banisadr, compelled by the same logic, which convinced him to not press charges of 
fraud in the parliamentary election, argued that during a time of looming war, bad 
government was better than no government at all. Therefore, when the parliament 
nominated Rajaei, Banisadr neither supported nor opposed him, though he knew that he
ncvywas an IRP candidate. Here we can Banisadr committed his another blunder, as fatal 
as the first one, as it made it possible for the IRP to penetrate the government and use 
state resources in order to organise and mobilise its forces.
Rajaei came from a humble background, finishing high school to become a street 
vendor and entering politics by supporting the Fedayeen Eslam, a small, underground, 
terrorist Islamic group. The group was responsible for assassinating several prominent 
Iranian statesmen and Ahamd Kasravi, a prominent Iranian intellectual, during the 
Shah’s time. Rajaei later became a school teacher before he was arrested and tortured 
by Shah’s regime. Banisadr, being aware of his poor understanding of political and 
economic affairs and obedience towards IRP leaders, made it known that Rajaei’s 
candidacy was imposed. From the outset Banisadr and Rajaei clashed; on one occasion 
Banisadr told him “you have been talking for an hour and you have lied twelve times”
700 Mizan, 28 February 1981 [9 bahman 1359].
701 Le Monde, 8 October 1980; also see Banisadr, My Turn, p. 13.
702 In order to see the close relationship between Rajaei and the IRP, see Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, pp. 45, 48, 54,
55, 59, 61, 62, 75, 89, 99 and 102.
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(this remark soon found its way to the press703). On many occasions, Banisadr 
reminded Rajaei that he lacked even basic knowledge of Iran and international affairs 
and gave him some of his own books to read so he could develop an understanding of 
necessary issues and concepts.704 Soon after, he told him, “you know nothing about 
economy and that is not a defect, as no one can know everything. However, it is a sin to 
make accusation against others, when they are based on your ingnorance”.705 Frustrated 
by Rajaei’s lack of intelligence and curiosity, in letters to him Banisadr constantly 
stated that a man of his ignorance should honour the office of the prime minister by 
resigning the post. Khomeini, being well aware of the truth of Banisadr’s arguments 
nevertheless again defended Rajaei, arguing that the prime minister may not have
70  f\knowledge, but that it was enough that he was maktabi. This line of reasoning 
highlighted and drew new battle lines between the two political fronts which had 
already been established by the IRP. Furthermore, Khomeini legitimised this and 
initiated a war of prioritisation, in which followers of “ideological Islam” (Maktabi) 
would be pitted against “expertise” (Takhasoos). This became a discourse whose 
language would express (and expose) differences in the philosophical assumptions, 
cultural knowledge and political objectives between the two fronts. The new discourse 
soon found its field of action in the nomination of ministers.
Takhasoos versus Maktabi
A new field of struggle had opened between democratic and totalitarian forces within 
the Iranian ruling elite. The IRP’s new discourse, now legitimised by Khomeini’s 
backing, elaborated a dichotomy between expertise and ideological belief. The IRP 
advocated prioritising ideological believers over experts, whereas expertise was the 
watchword for Banisadr’s camp.707 However, it would be misleading to take this 
struggle of prioritisation at face value or explain it merely on ideological terms.708 The 
struggle in fact did not have an ideological base, but a political one, and can be traced 
back to the paucity of expertise in the IRP. It is hard to imagine that the IRP would
703 Bakhash, Reign o f Ayatollahs, p. 107.
704 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
705 Kiomarse Saberi-e Foomani: Chegoonegiye Entekhabe Avalin Nokhostvazire Jomhooriye Eslami Iran va
Mokatebaate Rajaei va Banisadr [How the First Prime Minister of the IRI was Chosen, and Correspondence 
between Rajaei and Banisadr] (Tehran: Daftare Tahgigaat va Enteshaarate Ravabete Omoomiye Nokhostvaziri, 
1981 [1360]), pp. 104-5.
706 Maktabi or “doctrinaire” means belonging to the school of ideological Islam or Authentic ideological and was
used in opposition to “expertise”.
707 Here, an analogy with the Chinese Cultural Revolution is useful. Rajaei, like the Reds in the Chinese Revolution,
emphasised ideological commitment whereas Banisadr, like the Experts, focused on expertise.
708 See, for example, Milani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, pp. 176-77.
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have needed to develop this new discourse if it possessed the expertise to facilitate its 
bid for power. This deficit might also explain why the party initially aimed at power 
sharing and even included democratic leaders such as Ayatollah Taleghani and Banisadr 
in its list of candidates for the Assembly of Experts
The IRP’s lack of expertise ran throughout the organisation, from the top down. 
Khomeini, who was viewed as the party’s spiritual leader, was a well-known scholar in 
Islamic theology; however, the main body of his expertise was confined to theology and 
mystic philosophy. He lacked the necessary knowledge and expertise necessary for a 
leader who actively aimed to run the country (e.g., as pointed out by his first foreign 
minister Ebrahim Yazdi, “Khomeini knew nothing of international affairs”709). His lack 
of understanding of economics was no less severe, as illustrated by his response to 
Banisadr’s concerns about the deteriorating state of economy, to which he publicly 
replied, “[the] economy belongs to donkeys [fools]”.710 IRP leaders did not themselves 
score much higher than Khomeini. Even in their own field of theology, most leaders 
were considered middle or low-ranking. For these reasons, the sudden declaration of a 
war of ideology over expertise can be explained on political and not ideological 
grounds.
In order to overcome this serious obstacle to its political effectiveness, the IRP also 
recruited experience from the Tudeh party in their struggle against the democratic 
camp.711 The party taught the IRP “many of their political and journalistic tricks and 
tactics—first used during anti-liberal, anti-nationalist smear campaigns following the 
occupation of the American embassy, their coining of political slogans, and their 
models for political analysis from the Tudeh ideologues”.712 The Fedaeen, whose 
majority faction soon became Tudeh’s sister organisation, tirelessly campaigned against 
the democratic front, which it used to label “liberal”, justifying its campaign by arguing 
that “liberalism was a cover for imperialism”.713
709 Ebrahim Yazdi, interview with BBC Persian Service, 3 June 1999.
710 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
7,1 Frequent meetings took place between IRP leaders, Khomeini and Kianouri, the leader of the Tudeh Party. For 
more on meetings with Rafsanjani see Rafsanjani, Memoir, and Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005. Also, 
Banisadr has referred to Kianouri’s memoir in which he argued they were leading the IRP in their struggle 
against Banisadr. Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
712 Arjomand, Turban, p. 159.
713 Kar, no. 40, 3 January 1980 [13 day 1358].
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A few particular examples will demonstrate the ways in which the IRP garnered 
expertise from other groups. In one meeting, for example, Ayatollah Beheshti asked 
Kianouri, the Tudeh Party Leader, how to solve the problem of not having enough 
experts. In response, Kianouri explained how Lenin addressed the same issue: “when 
Lenin was informed that there was nobody who could fill the post of Central Bank 
director, he immediately appointed the Bank’s servant as its director”.714 This advice 
was in line with Stalin’s policy who argued that the criteria for the appointment of 
cadres should be based not on loyalty, but on obedience. “A dog”, he said, “is also
n  1 c
loyal. I demand obedience”. The IRP followed this advice. Thus, at this stage of the 
revolution, we suddenly observe the emergence of a new symbolic war in which 
obedient cadres were portrayed as “ideological believers”, while “experts” were 
perceived as “westernised” or even “westoxicated” elements of society that had been 
corrupted by western education and propaganda. This, it was believed, would give the 
party an opportunity to tap into the pool of obedient but not highly skilled or educated 
followers, who, like Rejaei, gained position not on merit but because of their loyalty to 
the party.
The democratic camp was aware of this new political reasoning and attempted to 
counter it, warning that it could have disastrous consequences. Banisadr challenged the 
dichotomy by arguing that when someone with neither expertise nor merit occupies a
71 ( \position, it implies that his or her ideological credentials are also questionable. In 
Banisadr’s view, it was matter of fact that no one could build the country without 
relevant knowledge and expertise. He therefore recommended the formation of a 
“cabinet of talents” in order to set the country on a path of rapid development. 
Throughout his presidency, both before and during the war, argued in various ways that 
“we need knowledge and expertise, and if we want to take action without [proper] 
knowledge and expertise, then it is certain that we will be defeated; [furthermore] it is 
impossible to ask people who have knowledge and expertise to fight, protect and built
717the country so those who have neither knowledge nor expertise [can] rule over you”.
He again asked for a policy to stop the brain drains, saying “we have to acknowledge a
714 Enghelabe Eslami, No. 598, 19 July to 1 August 2004, p. 12. Salamatian also verified this dialogue between the 
two but he refers to Lenin’s appointment of his driver to the central bank. Salamatian, interview, 9 May 2005.
7,5 Enghelabe Eslami, ibid.
716 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
717 Banisadr, “Roozha”, 10 October 1980 [18 mehr 1359].
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place for science in the Islamic Republic, so we not only prevent brain drain but reverse
7152it. How can we solve society’s problems, when [its] brains are leaving the country?”
One of the very first confrontations between Banisadr and Rajaei took place over hejab, 
as Rajaei attempted to make it compulsory for women working in ministerial offices
71Qand Banisadr prevented him from doing so. This proved to be one of Banisadr’s few 
successes, as by this time Khomeini had thrown his weight behind the IRP. In speeches 
and statements, Khomeini praised believers and scorned experts and intellectuals, 
labelling them gharbzadeh (westoxicated) and foreign agents. When Banisadr warned 
of an impending “brain drain” of hundreds of thousands of Iranian experts from the 
country, Khomeini’s public response was to say that “you are talking about brain drain; 
let these rotten brains leave”.720 As Banisadr continued to warn of the consequences, 
Khomeini remained unaffected, saying, “to hell with them”.721 Rajaei, certain of 
Khomeini’s support, explicitly quoted his statement that that ministers should be one 
hundred percent Islamic and revolutionary: “I am 100 % away from having a mixed 
cabinet. I believe the cabinet should be entirely made of revolutionaries in the line of 
Imam”.722 He opposed Banisadr’s nominees for ambiguous reasons. For example, 
when Banisadr suggested that Reza Sadr, Bazargan’s commerce minister, remain in his 
job as he had proven his effectiveness, Rajaei opposed him on the grounds that “the 
Imam has said Iranians should experience hardship, but that during sanctions Reza Sadr 
has been able to import goods preventing people from experience it”. This reasoning 
made even Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, his interior minister, to tell him “you were not
H'J'l
appointed as prime minister in order to give people hardship”. Banisadr, in turn, 
refused to accept most of Rajaei’s nominees, among them Ahmad Tavakoli, who after 
Banisadr became minister of labour. He based his opposition on the grounds that as a 
religious judge, he had initiated the stoning of several women in the north and ordered 
the imprisonment and arrest of factory workers who went on strike for low wages. The
718 Enghelab Eslami, 04 September 1980 [13 azar 1359].
719 Rajaei wished to enforce compulsory hejab in governmental offices but was unable to do so because of Banisadr’s
resistance. See Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 55. Soon as Rajaei became president in 1981, he implemented 
the policy. See Mahmood Aabedi Miaanji, Khaandanihaa az Zendegiye Yek Reisjomhoor [Interesting parts of 
the life of a president] (Iran: Enteshaaraate Noor-al-Sajaar, Winter 1981 [1360]), p. 126.
720 Soroush Magazine, no. 28, 10 November 1979 [19 aban 1358], p. 37.
721 Khomeini, Safmey-e noor, vol. 4, p. 112.
722 Enghelabe Eslami, 07 August 1980 [16 mordad 1359].
723 Banisadr’s letter to Ahmad Khomeini in Naamehaa be Khomeini, pp. 126-28. Mahdavi Kani was the interior
minister during Rajaei permiership and became interim prime minister after his assassination.
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most notorius case was his order to stone to death an eighteen-year-old girl while she
724was pregnant.
This led to a deadlock, which was partially resolved when Khomeini intervened, 
suggesting they fill the cabinet with nominees that both agreed upon. Rajaei presented 
Banisadr with a list of twenty-one cabinet members: all were in their thirties and forties; 
half a dozen were educated in American and British universities and the rest in Iran. 
None had demonstrated academic excellence during their education. A number were 
active in Islamic societies, a few had served short prison sentences for political 
activities, and five were involved in radical opposition groups to the Shah’s regime.
The common denominator amongst the candidates that all owed their rise to prominence
nj c
to IRP leaders (in fact, nine out of fifteen were IRP members ). Banisadr approved 
fourteen of the candidates, which he argued were barely acceptable, and rejected the 
rest. Parliament approved the proposed ministers in September 1980. However, 
struggles over the appointment of key ministers of education, foreign affairs, finance, 
commerce, labour and justice continued. Banisadr rejected at least six different 
candidates for minister of foreign affairs. By November, he had approved ministers for 
labour and justice, and in December a new minister of education was named.
Eventually, the following March, he approved the minister of commerce. The ministry 
of foreign Affairs was still vacant. In the last months of Banisadr’s presidency, in order 
to bypass his opposition, the parliament passed a special measure whereby the prime 
minister could appoint a caretaker to oversee the foreign ministry. Banisadr refused to 
authorise the bill. Therefore, the country had to function without a foreign minister for 
as long as his presidency lasted.
Banisadr’s refusal to allow the entire cabinet to be formally in the hands of the IRP did 
not mean that the IRP relinquished control. The Islamic committees which existed in 
the ministries provided vehicles through which the IRP could exert an influence via 
sympathetic under-secretaries. Throughout Banisadr’s presidency, the country was in 
socio-economic and political crisis, marked by the closure of universities under the 
pretext of the “Cultural Revolution”, the continuation of the American hostage
724 This case also was raised by Oriana Fallaci in her interviews with Khomeini, see The Times, 7 September 1979.
725 Dilip Hiro, Iran Under The Ayatollahs (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 163.
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situation, civil war (primarily in the Kurdish region), and above all Iraq’s invasion of 
Iran. Each of these will be discussed in turn below.
The “Cultural Revolution” and closure of universities
In the midst of the parliamentary election, the Revolutionary Council (dominated by the 
IRP) began to argue that Iranian universities suffered from a disease called 
“westoxication”. As during the occupation of the American embassy, Khomeini 
discarded the internal political conditions which made external interference possible and 
argued that “all our problems come from the USA”.726 He preached that all of the 
country’s problems of the preceding fifty years (i.e., during the Pahlavi reign, when 
forced westernisation was the guiding principle of state policy) could be traced back to 
universities, where liberals, academics and intellectuals were spreading the plague of
7 9 7westoxication. He accused universities of being dependent on foreign countries, 
westernising their students and allowing themselves to become arenas of a propaganda 
war carried out by left-wing students.728 Thus, it was argued, universities had to 
undergo a “cultural revolution”. The following day, universities throughout the country 
were attacked and closed down by IRP supporters.729 Banisadr, however, had already 
opposed this idea, asking “why so much insistence on closing universities, especially
7^ 0through occupation?” Days after, he added that “the cultural revolution does not need 
to close universities; what it needs is to re-activate idle brains. Where are scientific 
creativities? Where is the motivation to produce and innovate?”731 IRP leaders, being 
certain Khomeini was on their side, counterattacked. Khamenei stated that “the enemies
7^ 9of this revolution have entrenched themselves in universities”. Rafsanjani implicitly 
revealed the plans to attack the universities. “Pro-Islamic Republic students have long 
had enough of the tumult of (political) groups and have been constantly asking us to do 
something.”733
726 Kayhan, 6 November 1979.
727 Ayatollah Khomeini’s New Year message, Kayhan, 22 March 1980.
728 Kayhan, 2 February 1980.
729 Mehdi Bazargan, Moshkelat va masa 'el-e awalin sal-e enghelab [The Problems and Issues of the First Year of the
Revolution] (Tehran: Nezhat-e Azadi-ye Iran, 1983), p. 106.
730 Banisadr, “Roozha bar reise jomhoor chegooneh migozarad” [How the days of the president pass by], Enghelabe
Eslami, 20 April 1980 [31 farvardin 1359].
731 Banisadr, “Roozha bar reise jomhoor chegooneh migozarad” [How the days of the president pass by], Enghelabe
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732 Jomhooriy Eslami, 26 April 1980 [6 ordibehest 1359].
733 Keyhan, 22 April 1980 [2 ordibehesht 1359],
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The Revolutionary Council made the decision to close the universities in Banisadr’s 
absence, when he was on the battlefront in the south of the country; he was informed of 
it upon his return to Tehran. The president realised the real intention behind the closure 
and told Sheibani, who informed him of the plan to close universities in order to 
Islamicise them, “be explicit in what you are saying. What is the meaning of 
Islamisicing the universities? The first step of Islamicisation is for all of you to become 
Moslem and at least stop lying”.734 He had yet to learn that the aim of the movement to 
deprive Banisadr of his main source of organised support. Hassan Ayat had already 
informed IRP supporters that “after 14 Khordad, [universities] will not be open or have 
examinations. The universities will be shut down.. .it will be a very powerful attack, 
much stronger, so it will completely paralyse Banisadr.” Years later, the regime 
openly stated the reason for the attack: “in Ordibehesht 1359 [March 1980], the pro- 
Islamic Republic party occupied universities all over the country and, on the grounds of 
cultural revolution, all the universities were closed. As a result, the relatively superior 
position of Banisadr in universities was eliminated.”
The IRP had alleged that universities had become war rooms for armed radical political 
parties which used university premises to organise illegal activities. However, as has 
been argued, the main reasons for this action must be understood within the context of 
the IRP’s tactics for establishing its hegemony over state and society and hence 
removing Banisadr. The IRP had its own specific and interrelated interests in 
supporting this movement. An analogy can be drawn between the plan to close the 
universities and the war of “ideology” over “expertise”. It has already been argued that 
the political foundation for this struggle was a shortage of experts in the IRP camp and 
the IRP’s need to employ obedient followers. It was understandable why, in its bid to 
monopolise power, the party would promote this dichotomy and justify its appointment 
of poorly educated but loyal (as opposed to highly educated but critical) elites to 
positions of power. A similar argument can be made about the universities. The IRP 
camp had failed to secure any viable base in the universities, as the Students of the 
Imam’s Line constituted a small minority among students. Furthermore, the more they 
actually followed the IRP’s line the more isolated they became, and universities were 
dominated by different factions opposing the IRP. The IRP camp was well aware that
734 Hamid Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 113.
735 For details, see Etela'at, 15 June 1980 [25 khordad 1359] and 19 June 1980 [29 khordad 1359].
736 Iran, 22 July 2002 [31 tir 1381]. This paper is the official newspaper of the government.
737 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005
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universities, being strongholds of democratic forces, could be a major obstacle to their 
bid for power. Following Tudeh Party guidance, they had adopted Stalin’s 
characterisation of political culture in society. And as Banisadr revealed at the time, in 
general they believed that 10 % of scholars were pro-revolution, another 10 % were 
counter-revolutionary, and the remaining 80 % were indifferent. “Do you think”, he 
asked, “that those 80 % are dried wood”; i.e. that the had no belief?738 Therefore, in 
order to disarm institutionalised resistance (which also would have deprived the 
democratic front of its immense mobilisational ability, as well as physical space) the 
universities had to be shut down.
The role of crisis in political struggle
It is important to note that from the time of the revolution to the present day, Iran has 
systematically moved from one crisis to another; the state, in fact, seems to depend on 
this. Khatami’s government, on average, faced one crisis every nine days, most of 
which were created by different factions within conservatives.739 From the serial killing 
of writers to the closure of newspapers, from the arrest of intellectuals to dubious “wars 
on corruption”, as well as constant waves of war against bad hejabi (improperly veiled 
women), these crises have been used to gain political points or create foreign policy 
crises, especially with the US. This method of creating crisis for political leverage can 
be traced back to the years immediate following the revolution, when crisis was used to 
realise political goals. For example, soon after Stalinist organisations initiated a crisis 
in the form of civil war, and as soon after the fear of regime overthrow as a result of 
civil war, the totalitarian front learnt how crisis might be capitalised upon. Similarly, 
while the occupation of the American embassy was not meant to last more than a few 
days, it was extended in order to expand the IRP’s power. The same, as will be 
demonstrated, was true of the Iran-Iraq war. By March 1979, the occupation of the 
American embassy had lost its mobilising power and the Students of the Imam’s Line 
decided a new crisis needed to be created: it took shape in the push for the forced 
Islamicisation of universities.740 Later it was revealed that the attacks on universities
738 Enghelabe Eslami, 15 November 1980 [24 aban 1359].
739 Iran Daily 31 August 2004, accessed online at http://www.iran-dailv.com/1383/2076/html/focus.htm (accessed on
11 December 2006). Khatami was elected president of the country in 1997 and then again in 2001. However, 
his reformist government failed to deliver due to conservative pressure, his peculiar character and more 
importantly because the president lacked access to his main powerbase, the people.
740 Khosrow Sobhe, “Education in revolution: is Iran duplicating the Chinese Cultural Revolution?” Comparative
Education, 18, no. 3 (1982), pp. 271-280; Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
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and surge of this new form of crisis was not a spontaneous action by a section of 
students, but a well-organised attempt to remove the first president of the republic.
Ayat’s tape and the plot
This was revealed in a controversial tape secretly recording a speech by Ayat of the IRP 
Central Committee, the more important reason was to depose the president. Banisadr 
realised that the “Cultural Revolution” was in actuality intended to compel him into an 
early confrontation with Khomeini. He threatened to resign if the Council of 
Revolution proceeded with the plans. The IRP was still not in a position to face the 
consequences of the president’s resignation, so they agreed to postpone the closure until 
after university exams in June. Soon after, the president was informed of a plan to 
attack the universities.741 He informed the Council of Revolution and, after having 
received their support, asked both armed and unarmed political organisations to leave 
school premises within three days. Most organisations agreed to do so, but the Fedaeen 
Organisation, the majority faction who had approached Banisadr and recognised that the 
attack was a plot against him, had agreed to evacuate university premises but failed to
-  •  742do so on time.
The IRP and its allies in armed committees (Hezbollahis) planned to attack Tehran 
University, using those gathered outside as human shields. Banisadr realised that the 
plan would lead to considerable bloodshed and, in order to deprive the armed 
Hezbollahis of the opportunity to attack the universities, organised a massive peaceful 
rally for the day after initial attacks which had led to several deaths and hundreds of 
injuries. He issued a statement in which he asked members of the public to evacuate the 
streets around the universities, declaring that “any gathering and public violence within 
and outside universities will be considered a counter-revolutionary act.. .any gathering 
and attack on political centres is a plot against the revolution’s government”.743 This 
deprived the Hezbollahis from their necessary public shield. That same night, he 
attended a premises near Tehran University and prevented students who were leaving
741 Taghizadeh, interview 3 August 2005.
742 Farokh Negahdar, speaker of the Fadaeen Khalq [Devotees of the People], the largest Marxist organisation in Iran,
approached the president and confirmed Banisadr’s belief that the attack against the universities was aimed at 
him. Negahdar suggested that the organisation evacuate the university premises in order to prevent the IRP 
from achieving its goal. See Abol-Hassan Banisadr, L ’Esperance Trahie [Betryal of Hope] (Papyrus Editions, 
1982), pp. 124-29.) For the first time, Banisadr’s narrative of the attack on universities has been backed by 
Mehdi Fatah-poor, a leading member of the Fedaeen, which strongly opposed Banisadr during his presidency.
743 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 292.
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the campus from being attacked by the armed Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollahis 
surrounding the university, thereby preventing more bloodshed. The next day he led a 
large, peaceful march to Tehran University and prevented the IRP from declaring 
victory.
In this case, Banisadr politically out-manoeuvred IRP leaders. Both his methods and 
timely intervention enabled him to prevent the mass killing of students and to avoid 
direct confrontation with Khomeini over the “Cultural Revolution”. Ayat conceded that 
Banisadr’s cunning manoeuvres had foiled the plan. However, he also assured his small 
inner circle that there were definite intentions to remove Banisadr: “Tell the guys to 
stand firm and have no fear; the decision which has been taken is totally unchangeable, 
we have a plan that even Banisadr’s ancestors could not rescue him from”.744
The revealation of the tape and the fact that a leading member of the IRP spoke of a 
collective plot to remove the president created huge controversy in the country. In the 
tape he revealed a systematic approach to weaken and then remove the elected 
president. The first step was to reduce the considerable authority assigned to the 
president in the first draft of the constitution. “If the first draft of the constitution had 
been ratified, the revolution would have in principle been finished”, he said. “In this 
constitution we made the leader the commander of the armed forces.. .The president can 
only give and receive medals and receive the ambassadors.” Then he revealed the main 
function of the parliament: “as the majles begins its work it will stand against the 
president”. He continued, saying that the closure of universities was a move to remove 
Banisadr: “the universities will be shut down.. .it will be a very powerful attack, much 
stronger, so it will completely paralyse Banisadr”. He spoke of an unspecified plot, 
telling his disheartened audience, “tell everyone to stand strong and firm, and soon the 
wave will change.. .we have a plan so that even Banisadr’s father can not do a thing.
... .Banisadr is a danger for this revolution and in order to neutralise it, something 
should be done. We are not alone; the Imam is also with us.”745
Ayatollah Lahouti demanded that Ayat be put on trial.746 The IRP leaders were so 
panicked about the revelation that they disowned Ayat. “The speaker in this tape, who 
introduces himself as a proclaimer of the party, is one whose views have nothing to do
744 The transcript of the tape was published in Enghelabe Eslami, 19 June 1980 [29 khordad 1359]; see also Hiro,
Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p. 178 and Banisadr, L ’Esperance Trahie, p. 125.
745 For details, see Etela ’at, 15 June 1980 [25 khordad 1359] and 19 June 1980 [ 29 khordad 1359].
746 Keyhan, 23 June 1980 [2 tir 1359].
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with the views of the party.”747 Still, being certain of the party’s and Khomeini’s 
support, Ayat remained defiant, saying “Engelabe Eslami newspaper and other counter­
revolutionaries are spraying poison against me because it was I who ratified Velayate 
faghih, so they want to take a revenge. This tape is a document I am proud of. If this is 
a conspiracy, then I am proud of this conspiracy.”748 Amazingly, when the tape was 
played for Khomeini—including a part which claimed that Khomeini himself had 
participanted (“we are not alone, Imam is also with us”)—he ordered no investigation 
and charged no one. The leader’s reaction was confined to a sulk.749
Here, the president made a major mistake in failing to pursue charges against Ayat. It 
was obvious that the judiciary would not do so as they could have been implicated, but 
Banisadr’s decision is hard to understand as he had everything to gain and nothing to 
lose. What is equally as surprising, however, is that it is still claimed that Banisadr was 
opportunistic and supported the attack on universities.750 Those asserting this have not 
only disregarded information about who organised the attack and what its goal was, 
which was both explicitly revealed in Ayat’s tape and, years later, explicitly 
acknowledged by the regime. They have also neglected to conisder Banisadr’s 
persistent and open criticisms of the attack on the universities from its outset, in which 
he lambasted the Students of the Imam’s Line for imitating the methods and goals of the 
Stalinists (whom he called the “pseudo-left”751) and also for “raiding the 
universities”, which he saw as a “counter-revolutionary” act. He and his 
newspaper constantly criticised the closure of universities. “What would have happened 
if, under the banner of cultural revolution, we would not have shut down the universities
747 Jomhooriye Eslami, 16 June 1980 [26 khordad 1359].
748 Etela'at, 21 June 1359 [31 khordad 1359].
749 Jafari, interview, 9 September 2004.
750 Many experts have made this case in various ways. For example, see Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, pp. 143
and 241. The puzzling part of Aijomand’s analysis of the event is that although he is aware of the tape and 
concedes that it was a plot to remove Banisadr, he still finds Banisadr’s account of the attack, which verifies 
his view, as “not convincing”. Also, he defines Banisadr as a revolutionary ideologue who found it 
“impossible to resist the temptation of the appeal of the Cultural Revolution”. He fails to argue his case on 
both accounts. In the first account, by simply defining Banisadr’s explanation as “not convincing”, evidence 
should be produced to back the argument. Secondly, by stating that the president was tempted by the appeal of 
cultural revolution without identifying the source of temptation is an incomplete argument, if an argument at 
all. He should have been able to identify what would be “tempting” for Banisadr in a plot, which had aimed to 
remove him. Another example is Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 122, who criticises Banisadr for identifying 
himself with the attack on the universities, despite the fact that Banisadr called the attack on universities as 
“counter-revolutionary”. Fred Halliday argues that Banisadr played a “sinister role” in attacking the 
universities, though we have yet to learn what this was.
751 Banisadr, “Roozha,” 239, 23 April 1981 [3 ordibehesht 1359].
752 Ibid., 236, 21 May 1981 [31 ordibehesht 1359].
753 Ibid., 235, Shanbeh, 19 April 1981 [30 farvardin, 1359].
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and would not have created such a sorrowful state?” 754 These critiques, led by his 
paper, created a hostile backlash from the front led by the IRP. As argued by the 
Students of the Imam’s Line, “we condemn the judgement of the Enghelabe Eslami 
newspaper. The cultural revolution, which was the desire of the Imam, is insulted and
n e e
as a result of someone’s fantasy is being interpreted as conspiracy”. Even the 
Revolutionary Guards, which were not to interfere in politics, joined the opposition: 
“when newspapers like Enghelabe Eslami and Mizan. . .write against the closure of 
universities and the Cultural Revolution, then it is certain that counter-revolutionaries 
will dare to come out and present a challenge”. Many intellectuals were also critical. 
For example, Dr Soroush, who had been a leading member of the Council of the 
Cultural Revolution, responded sarcastically to Banisadr’s lament about the scientific 
damage done as a result of the closure of universities, saying, “we have yet to hear from 
those who had a thirst for knowledge and science that they regret the closure of 
universities”.757
The actual cost of the Cultural Revolution and closure of universities is hard to to 
overestimate. In terms of sheer numbers, universities were closed for nearly three years, 
during which time nearly 60,000 students and two-thirds of scholars were fired.758 In 
addition, the closure of universities deprived the democratic front in general and the 
president in particular from their most important source of organisation and 
mobilisation. This was one major factor, which contributed to the democratic front’s 
failure to mobilise its sources sufficiently during the last few months of Banisadr’s 
presidency.
The president challenges IRP leaders for making a pact
754 Enghelabe Eslami, 19 November 1980 [28 aban 1359].
755 Statement by Daftare Tah’kime Vahdat [The Office of Strengthening Unity] in Mousavi Ardebili, Ghaeleh
chahardahe esfand, p. 356.
756 Zakhireh’haaye Amperialism, Banisadr va Monaafegin [The Reserves of Imperialism, Banisadr and Hypocrites]
(Daftare Siasiye Sepaahe Pasdaran, 1360), p. 66.
757 Soroush Magazine, no. 6, 29 December 1980 [08 day 1359], p. 39. Recently, Dr Soroush has recognised the IRP’s
role in the closure of universities and has distanced himself and his role in the Cultural Revolution. He has 
also criticised those who have declared him solely responsible for what happened; see 
http://emruz. info/ShowItem.aspx?ID=7732&p= 1. However, Dr Mohamad Maleki, director o f Tehran 
university at the time, and Dr Sadeghe Ziba Kalam, a well-known Tehran university scholar and political 
activist at the time, have accused Dr Soroush of dishonesty, arguing that he was personally involved in Ihe 
removal and firing of many scholars. See Ham-Mihan, 23 June 2007 [2 tir 1386]. Also, some leading 
members of the largest Islamic organisation in universities, the Office to Foster Unity and Soroush’s formers 
students have criticised Soroush for not taking responsibility for his actions. See 
http://news.gooya.eu/politics/archives/2007/06/060570.php.
758 For details, see Mohamad Maleki, “The First Director of Tehran University after revolution”, Andishehye
Jame 'eh, no. 25, 2002 [1381].
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The exposure of Ayat’s tape was seriously embarrassing for IRP leaders, and the 
Council of Revolution called a meeting to resolve deep-seated differences within the 
leadership. The IRP leaders, who still avoided being perceived as aiming to monopolise 
power, were challenged by the president. He invited them to sign a pact, which would 
guarantee political organisations’ freedom of expression and activity, so long as they 
did not resort to violence and observed the rule of law. This was signed by both IRP 
and democratic leaders, including Banisadr and Bazargan. This put the IRP in a 
difficult position, since while the pact could become a disabling factor in their bid to 
monopolise power, if they violated it, they would be further exposed to the public. Still 
feeling confident in Khomeini’s implicit support, they violated the pact soon after 
signing it. However, although they could at the time violate the pact with impunity, this 
nevertheless cost them long-term legitimacy. Khomeini also violated the pact when two 
weeks after the closure of the universities he played a direct role in governmental affairs
'T /'A
and appointed seven people to the newly established Council of Cultural Revolution. 
This prompted the first direct encounter between Banisadr and Khomeini, when the
7 f \  1former accused the latter of committing an illegal act by appointing such a council.
Banisadr’s attempts to re-open the universities after the summer holiday failed and they 
remained closed in spite of his public protests. During the final months of his 
presidency, this proved to be an immensely important factor in shaping the outcome of 
the struggle between the two political fronts. As mentioned earlier, it deprived the 
democratic forces of the organisations provided by student groups to mobilise their 
forces, and also of the physical space in which to do so. The democratic front, however, 
had other challenges to deal with. In order to decrease rising international hostility 
against the revolution and end Iran’s political isolation, thus diminishing the weight of 
the international factor in influencing the country’s internal political conflict, Banisadr 
needed to resolve the hostage crisis as soon as possible.
Khomeini and the hostage-taking: from hesitation to certainty
759 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, pp. 358-59.
760 Most of their members were among the most well known supporters of the IRP, including A. K. Soroush, Rabani
Amlashi (a clergyman), Ali Shariatmadari (currently is one of the main leaders of the fundamentalist front), 
Hassan Habibi (who was the IRP’s presidential candidate and remained a faithful figure), Jalal-el-dine Farsi 
(one of the main ideologues of the totalitarian front, who later in a hunting row murdered a farmer and thus lost 
any future political activity), Mohammad J. Bahonar, who a year after became the prime minister and was 
assassinated after his appointment), and a liberal-minded Shams-e Al-e Ahmad, who resigned not long after.
761 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 277.
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Being alarmed by the possibility of Ronald Reagan's victory in the forthcoming US 
presidential election, Banisadr tried to convince Khomeini that continuing to hold 
American hostages in Iran was dangerous. He tried to convey that if Carter failed to 
free the hostages before the election, Reagan would be elected, with disastrous 
consequences on a world scale. Khomeini constantly wavered over the issue and as a 
whole did not show any desire to resolve it before the election. According to Banisadr,
<7/^
Khomeini changed his mind on the issue more than forty times. For example, after 
agreeing to Banisadr’s proposal that he to travel to the Security Council to make Iran’s 
case and provide conditions for the release of hostages, Khomeini reconsidered while 
Banisadr was on his way to the airport. He learnt from national radio that he was 
forbidden to travel—a move which led to his resignation as foreign minister.
Khomeini’s lack of desire to solve the problem became the single most enabling factor 
for students to defy the first elected president of the country with complete impunity. 
Such defiance would have been less likely had Khomeini supported the president.
Once again, this illustrates the effect of human agent on social process, particularly 
when individuals are located in key positions and can condition the outcome of social 
changes and the types of variables which affect the decision-making process. 
Khomeini’s severe lack of knowledge about international politics led to his 
personalisation of politics. Therefore, Banisadr’s warning about the negative, global 
repercussions of Reagan’s possible victory led him to the opposite conclusion from 
what Banisadr had intended. According to Banisadr, Khomeini believed that if he could 
prevent Carter from being re-elected, it would be a great personal victory as Carter had 
been his opponent during the revolution. He saw himself as the strongest leader in the 
Islamic world, one who had gained fame for his decisiveness during the revolution, who 
had against all odds uncompromisingly asserted that “the Shah must go”, and succeeded 
in dethroning him. Now he saw himself in a position to determine the outcome of a 
presidential election in America, a leading superpower—what victory could be 
better?763
762 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
763 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
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Rafsanjani came closest to admitting that hostages were used in order to intefere in the 
American presidential election, saying “we gave America a bloody nose, we interfered 
in their election and we disgraced them”.764 This argument was echoed by Gary Sick, 
Carter’s national security advisor, when he tried to explain why Khomeini did not 
release the hostages before the election:
Trying to explain why Khomeini held on as long as he did, why he didn’t 
release the hostages. Iran could have made its point, they could have 
gotten out, they could have even had all of his political benefits and none 
of the disadvantages. The only way that I can explain why they would 
have absorbed that much pain, why they would have risked that much in 
terms of Iran’s national interest, was specially that Khomeini wanted to 
bring down Carter, and I think that certainly that vengeance aspect of it, 
was very much part of the game.
That argument is reinforced when we see how Khomeini extended this method of 
approach to politics during the Iran-Iraq war. After Saddam Hussein failed to achieve 
his goal of defeating the Iranian army in a flashing victory and as the prospect of defeat 
loomed closer, on various occasions he asked for a ceasefire in agreement with all of 
Iran’s conditions. Khomeini added one last condition—that “Saddam must go”—a 
demand that could not be realised and which prolonged the war for years to come. 
Khomeini compared accepting the ceasefire to “taking a poison chalice”. Thus, one 
might argue that if Khomeini were unaware of the relationship between the hostages 
and the American presidential election, he might have well given his support for their 
release before the election.
At the same time, the IRP had its own agenda for holding the hostages, which 
reinforced Khomeini’s. As demonstrated earlier, the documents found in the American 
embassy were used against opponents of the IRP to organise a well-coordinated witch­
hunt in which many of the leaders of the democratic front were arrested, defamed, 
silenced or forced to leave the country. This witch-hunt also provided the conditions for 
the ratification of Velayat-e faghih and the withdrawal of extensive constitutional
764 The entire Friday sermon can be found in Monthly Par, no. 174, June 2000 [tir 1379].
765 “Hot Spots: Iran”, BBC documentary, 10 August 2004.
766 Khomeini’s historical letter of 18 July 1988, in which eight years after the war started he accepted the ceasefire,
saying he drank “the chalice of poison of ceasefire”.
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powers from the president, which were recognised in the first draft of the constitution.
In fact, when a student belonging to the Students of the Imam’s Line asked Ayatollah 
Beheshti to clarify the benefit of the embassy occupation, he replied, “its only benefit 
was that we could eliminate Banisadr from the scene”.767
The last serious attempt to release the hostages before the US election involved the co­
ordinated actions of Banisadr and Qotbzadeh, with the mediation of Kurt Waldheim, the 
UN Secretary-General in early February. They believed they were close to solving the 
issue, but Khomeini once again foiled their attempts when on 23 February he 
announced that the parliament would decide the fate of the hostages. Each attempt to 
persuade Khomeini of the strategic value of their release was undermined by IRP 
leaders at the eleventh hour. Banisadr also argued that powerful interests in 
Washington were deliberately blocking the resolution of the crisis as part of a plot to
n (L Q
undermine both him personally and the Iranian Revolution more generally. He asked 
the students to turn the hostages over to the Revolutionary Council, but they refused to 
do so. They also opposed his demand that the hostages be visited by a special five- 
member United Nations commission. Under the circumstances, the students could not 
have opposed the president’s demands without high-level backing. 150 of the students
7AQwho were occupying the embassy left in protest; 300 remained.
From organisation to mobilisation of the totalitarian front: the Kurdish Issue
The other major crisis which plagued Banisadr’s presidency was the resurgence of 
armed struggle by Kurdish and Stalinist organizations. This initially led to the outbreak 
of the first civil war after the revolution during Bazargan’s premiership. Armed 
political organisations took advantage of the post-revolutionary collapse of the army’s 
structure, discipline and morale. In March 1979, just a month after the collapse of the 
Pahlavi regime and at the outset of Bazargan’s premiership, having ignored the 
emergence of political and social freedoms and rejecting the democratic means 
available to them to make their political demands, two Kurdish organisations (the 
Kurdish Democratic and Komeleh parties) and the Fedaeen Khalgh took up an armed 
struggle against the police, gendarmes and soldiers. They attacked and captured the
767 Mohammad Jafari, Evin: Gah, nameye Panj Salo Andi [A Report of Over Five Years in Evin Prison] (Germany:
Barzavand Publishing Co., 2002 [1380]), p. 329.
768 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 117.
769 Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p. 149.
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gendarmerie in Sanandaj, the principal town in the Kurdish region, but failed to take the 
major army barracks outside the town.
After the consequent cease-fire, on Banisadr’s proposal, the town council organised the 
only free election ever to be held in Kurdistan, which was later going to be used as a 
model in other Kurdish towns. The result revealed that the armed Kurdish organisations 
did not in fact enjoy the popular support they claimed to have; three of eleven members
770of the city council were members or supporters of these parties. The uneasy cease­
fire continued and negotiations started. A council of three, appointed by the 
Revolutionary Council, introduced a plan for autonomy in Kurdistan, which was ratified
771by the Council. However, at the outset of Banisadr’s presidency, the plan was 
subverted when the Kurdish organisations terrorised the council members and forced 
the town council to resign.772 The process ground to a halt and the political situation 
worsened when the armed organisations broke the ceasefire, prevented the army column 
from the town’s airport from entering the town’s barrack, and attacked the army’s
7 7 “i
officers’ club in the town. However, the failure of their military campaign and 
fragmentation between their loosely formed coalitions774 ultimately led to the adoption 
of political rather than violent methods for pursuing their political demands.
This approach can be contrasted with the way that Khomeini and the IRP responded to 
the issue. During Bazargan’s premiership, Khomeini, fearful of the spread of civil war, 
had offered extensive autonomy for the region. But soon after, he decided that he 
wanted nothing to do with it, as he had learnt the usefulness of political crisis for the 
IRP’s political campaign.775 The civil war in Kurdistan legitimised the establishment 
and strengthening of the Revolutionary Guards and other institutions, which were 
instrumental in the victory of the totalitarian front. The war in Kurdistan, which had 
been ignited mainly by Kurdish organisations, did not end with their recognition of the 
futility of armed struggle. Rather, they were forced by Khomeini’s regime to continue 
fighting because Khomeini needed to impose a military solution.
770 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 238.
771 Ibid., p. 239.
772 In one of the cases of intimidation they threw a grenade into the yard of a council member. Banisadr, interview,
22 January 2005.
773 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, pp. 238-40.
774 According to Banisadr, when the army overran their main base, he was informed of the documents in which these
organisations (the Kurdish Democratic Party, Koomeleh and Fedaeen Khalgh) had agreed on how to divide the 
weapons and ammunition of the Sannadaj barracks. Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
775 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005
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This once again illustrates the conflict between two schools of thought, which reflect 
opposing approaches to revolution in particular, and politics in general. One front in the 
political struggle defined politics as a method to achieve and manage power by any 
means, while the other front understood it as a method to achieve and expand freedoms. 
Soon after the ceasefire in Kurdistan, the KDP and Komeleh party contacted Banisadr 
and offered to lay down their arms in return for amnesty. He informed Khomeini of
7 Hf\their suggestion and asked him to agree to give them total amnesty. Khomeini’s
777answer was dubious; he told him to “accept the offer, and then we’ll see”. Banisadr, 
alarmed, realised that after they laid down their arms Khomeini, intended to turn the 
gun against them. Thus, he faced the dilemma of either cooperating with Khomeini’s 
Machiavellian policy of using deceit for political success, or continue his policy of 
incorporating moral values into politics and risking the loss of political power. He 
decided not to disengage himself from his political principles and sent a message to A. 
R. Ghasemloo, the leader of the KDP, warning him “not to lay down their arms since if 
they do they will be killed”.778
The economy, another field of struggle between two camps
The economic domain was another arena for the struggle between the two camps. 
Initially, after the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, the economy was in a dire state. The 
construction sector that employed more than 650,000 people in 1977 came to a virtual 
halt. The industrial production sector, with more than 1.8 million employees in 1977, 
declined by 20 %. By 1980, more than 300,000 upper and upper-middle class citizens, 
as well as tens of thousands of foreign experts, had left the country. This exodus and 
the collapse of the tourist industry had a catastrophic effect on hotels and holiday 
resources, the theatre, air travel and advertising. In these sectors over 450,000 people 
lost their jobs.779 Unemployment rose from 1.3 million in 1978 to 2.2 million in early 
1980, or more than 20% of the work force. At the same time, new jobseekers were 
entering the labour market at the rate of 300,000 a year.
776 A. H. Banisadrls letter to Ayatollah Khomeini. Unpublished letter (1981).
777 Banisadr, interview, 21 January 2005.
778 Banisadr first exposed the event in a speech in Berlin on 11 April 1997. His argument was backed by
Sharafkandi, the successor of Qasemloo, the assassinated leader of the KDP; Sharafkandi himself was soon 
after assassinated in Berlin. The subsequent arrest of the assassins led to the famous Myconos trial in 1997. 
Banisadr provided the court with vital information which changed the course of events. According to his 
information, the Iranian leaders had issued an order for the assassination of Kurdish leaders. The German court 
not only convicted the terrorists but also recognised the role of Iranian leaders (Ayatollah Khamenei, leader of 
Iran; Rafsanjani, the president; Velayatee, the foreign minister; and Falahee, the intelligence minister) in 
ordering the assassinations. Also see Enghelabe Eslami-Dar Herjat, no. 252.
779 New Statesman, 8 February 1980, p. 202.
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As the country’s chief architect of economic policy, Banisadr undertook the task of 
revitalising and restructuring the economy. Initially he made rapid progress in the main 
sections of the economy, primarily the oil sector. Oil prices felt the heat of the 
revolution and Banisadr instituted a second “oil shock”. As mentioned already, he sent 
Saraf, the vice president in the treasury ministry, to the meeting of OPEC’s treasury 
ministers and demanded that the price of oil be doubled to $34 a barrel (over $100 in 
today’s terms), or what was calculated as the minimum economic value of oil. The 
popularity of the revolution in the Middle East prevented even pro-US countries such as 
Saudi Arabia from opposing the demand. Thus, Iran increased its oil income even 
though its oil exports were almost halved. The government terminated the contracts of 
over 1,600 foreign experts without any adverse effect on the oil industry. It also 
terminated its contracts for supplying oil to Western consortia. The country gradually 
became able to handle all aspects of the oil industry independently. Furthermore, 
Banisadr argued that oil should be sold to the West in exchange for the latter’s 
assistance in Iran’s industrial and agricultural development; he argued that as the West 
used oil for its own economic progress, it should help Iran overcome its economical and 
technological backwardness. In order to challenge the hegemony of dollar in the 
international market, he published a plan to sell oil not in dollars but a through a basket 
of hard currencies.780
He also identified the reconstruction of the country’s economic system as a vital factor 
in the institutionalisation of democracy as a matter of vital urgency, as a disintegrated, 
import-oriented and dependent economy would provide conditions for the reinstation of 
despotism. As he argued that education was the defining factor in this transformation, 
the education budget substantially increased, not only surpassing the budgets of 
previous and future governments, but also spending proportionally more of the 
governmental budget for education than the famous “seven dragons” in south-east 
Asia.781 Such investment, in his view, should be accompanied with re-structuring the 
country’s economic base from import-oriented to production oriented, and a
780 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005. Ironically, it was Saddam Hussein who during sanctions adopted
Banisadr’s policy regarding the sale of oil by other hard currencies as an act of defiance against the US. 
Banisadr believes that this policy set an example for other oil producing countries to follow and was thus the 
real motivation for the US attack on Iraq in 2003. In other words, this was not because of Saddam’s supposed 
possession of “weapons of mass destruction” or the brutality of his regime; the West had both supplied him 
with these weapons and turned a blind eye to his brutalities in the past.
781 Jaleh Vafa, interview, 16 March 2004. Vafa is a writer, historical researcher and a leading member of the Iranian
Islamic Association.
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simultaneous attempt to tackle poverty. In his doctrine, economic justice should not be 
seen as a “goal” of economic planning, but rather as an indicator (mizari) that must be 
included in any economic planning, because if it were limited to being a goal, as all 
types of experiment in all types of economic systems verify, it will become 
unrealisable.782
Banisadr introduced rapid economic changes based on this approach. For example, 
during his time as Finance Minister, he tackled severe housing shortages for the 
working and lower-middle classes by allowing tenants to deposit 30,000 tomans 
(£3000) in banks and in return to secure zero-interest-rate loans worth seven times as 
much, which would make it possible for them to purchase house. The scheme proved to 
be extremely popular and enabled hundreds of thousands of families to own houses or 
released home owners who had to pay high interest rates for houses they had already 
bought. In return, this stimulated the construction sector of the economy.
Also, in order to stimulate the productive sector of the economy, interest-free loans 
were offered to individuals to set up or expand farms and small industrial firms. 
Particular emphasis was placed on improving the agricultural sector in order to 
encourage the immigrant populations of shantytowns to return to their villages, and to 
increase agricultural production. To support the unemployed, the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Welfare offered unemployment loans to all those who had lost jobs due to 
the revolution. In the first four months of the scheme, nearly 170,000 people took out
* 7 0 1
such loans. The government also convinced factory bosses not to dismiss workers 
because of decreases in production. The minimum wage was increased by 167%.784 
Banisadr also engineered the nationalisation of the banks, partly in order to stem the 
flight of capital out of the country and partly to reorient and restructure the banks, as 
they were to play a vital role in his grand economic plan. Thus, instead of simply 
supplying resources for export and import, banks were reorganised to mainly provide 
financial assistance for domestic production.
Banisadr’s economic policies were opposed as well as sabotaged by the IRP, which 
wanted to prevent, at any cost to the country, a repetition of the success story of home 
loans and other plans, which had increased Banisadr’s popularity. For instance, in the
783 The Iranian, 26 July 1979, p. 6.
784 Enghgelabe Eslami-Dar Hejrat, no. 226.
220
import sector of the economy, Banisadr identified and targeted at least four layers of 
middlemen who had monopolised imports. Beginning with iron imports, import 
commissions elected by guilds were formed. This removed the possibility of financial 
corruption (e.g., bribery) and slashed iron prices throughout the country. Banisadr 
aimed to extend this policy to other main imports, but Rajaei reversed the policy soon 
after assuming his premiership. Another such intervention subverted Banisadr’s attempt 
to eliminate the black market for meat, where 93% of the population had to purchase 
their meat. The rest had limited access to heavily subsidised meat through a coupon 
system, which he abolished. The policy was highly successful and for the first time 
in a generation, the black market for meat disappeared and the price of meat levelled out 
in the country. However, the scheme was short-lived since the director general 
responsible was soon arrested by the Revolutionary Courts on dubious charges.787
Finally, the IRP did not let another of Banisadr’s radical economic policies enter even 
into its initial phase. He asked the Revolutionary Council to provide space for 
experimenting with a new economic practice, which had not been tried elsewhere, and 
that he be allowed to include a few of the factories which had been nationalised in his 
pilot project. These factories, which belonged to the government, would be given to 
workers who would elect a management union to run the factory, while the government 
would undertake responsibility for managing and refilling the used capital. In 
Banisadr’s view, this was an alternative to both private and state capital. The IRP 
opposed the plan since party organisations would become irrelevant; in the absence of 
both private and state capital, it would become impossible to mobilise the workforce
700
against either capitalists or the government.
During this time, despite economic sanctions, the war with Iraq, rising unemployment, a 
decline in industrial production and rising inflation, standards of living had increased in 
Iran. This is reflected in the Central Bank’s annual reports from 1358 (1979) and more 
importantly 1359 (1979-80). For the first time in the twentieth century, the average 
income of both urban and rural Iranian families exceeded their expenditure. According 
to the report, the year before the revolution (1356 [1977]), the average monthly income
785 The imports were controlled by the main importers, and then the imported commodity would be sold to a second
layer called “bonakdar”, who sold the goods to the main sellers. This layer would sell it to those in the last 
layer, who were minor sellers in the shops, before the goods were received in the hands of consumers.
786 Baisadr’s speech before Friday prayer at Tehran University, 3 June 1979.
787 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
788 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, pp. 225-26.
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of an urban family was 37394.83 rial and the average expenditure was 36517.4; the ratio 
of income to expenditure was 102.4%. In 1979, the average monthly income of an 
urban family was 42870.5 rial, while their expenditure was 44017.1. The ratio of 
income to expenditure was 97.4%. From March 1980 to December 1981, however, the 
average monthly income of an urban family was 50737.4 rial, and their expenditure 
45462 rial. Hence, the ratio of income to expenditure had increased to 111.6%.789 
The reconstruction and democratisation of the army
The revolution affected the military more than any other state institution. With the 
Shah’s collapse, the 285,000-strong army lost 60% of its personnel, a gendarmerie of 
75,000, 75% of its ranks and 20% of its air force of 100,000. In the words of General 
Qarani, the first Chief of Staff after the revolution, “I inherited an army that didn’t have 
a single soldier in Tehran”.790 These losses were soon compounded by the subsequent 
purge of thousands of military personnel (mainly above junior officer rank) and the 
imprisonment and execution of hundreds of officers.791 At the same time, a rebellious 
mood emerged in the lower ranks, expressed in their refusal to accept superior officers 
appointed by Bazargan. As a whole, the military suffered from both a steep decline in 
public esteem and the collapse of discipline; furthermore, most of its units were bogged 
down in the Kurdish region.
These were the circumstances under which Banisadr became commander in chief of the 
army. The discovery of attempted coups, executions and imprisonment of many 
officers only added misery to the misfortune of the armed forces. Leftist organisations 
and radical Islamic groups demanded its abolition. The IRP was the last and largest 
party to jump on the bandwagon. It made the same demand, but covertly, trying to take 
advantage of the situation not only by extending its influence within the army via the 
Revolutionary Courts and Islamic societies, but also by gradually replacing the state
789 To clarify this year’s average earning it should be pointed out that until the revolution, extensive military
expenditure and governmental budget were calculated as part of families’ income. However, in the first two 
years after the revolution, the military and governmental budgets were removed from the calculation. See 
Enghelabe Eslami, 4-7 July 2004 [13-16 mordad 1382]. The improvement in the standard of living can best be 
illustrated by the consumption of bread, the most important item in the diet o f the average Iranian. Daily 
consumption had decreased from 600 grams a day to 450 since the average Iranian could afford to consume 
more expensive items. The success story of the economy could also be exemplified by looking at the reserves 
of the Central Bank. The collapse of the Pahlavi regime and the flight of the Shah’s family and his clique to 
the West depleted reserves of foreign currency—the banks were left with just $46 million. However, by the 
time of Banisadr’s impeachment, despite the war and economic sanctions, the country’s reserves had increased 
to nearly $16 billion. Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
790 The Guardian, 5 March 1979.
791 See Afshar, Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil, p. 190.
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7Q7army with the Revolutionary Guards, whose loyalty to the IRP was more certain. 
Banisadr argued that the bulk of the army was patriotic, and that dissolving a well- 
trained and well-armed army in Iran’s geopolitical circumstances was tantamount to 
stupidity, if not betrayal.793 Yet he knew that without deep structural changes, the army 
presented a possible danger.
Thus the structural reforms aimed at democratising the army were intended to have two 
effects. In the short term, they were intended to eliminate the possibility of a military or 
military-backed coup d’etat. In the medium to long term, it was expected that reforms 
would stimulate improvements in the efficiency of the armed forces and turn the army 
into a university which would provide opportunities for furthering the education of 
army personnel. Thus, in order to democratise the army’s legal structure, the president 
would abolish “forty-eight unjust and inexplicable advantages and prerogatives 
inherited from the Shah”.794 Equally as importantly, he also abolished the principle of 
blind obedience, a major component of discipline under the ancien regime. In other 
words, he made it possible for army personnel to refuse orders that were unlawful or 
beyond the scope of military discipline. Furthermore, he decentralised power, formerly 
the monopoly of the Shah, so that responsibilities were divided and individual officers 
and soldiers within the chain of command received the necessary degrees of 
authority. This changed the relationship between military leadership and the rank and 
file. The head of state had to renounce all despotic power over the army, thus 
preventing the army from becoming the backbone of a new dictatorship. Also, Banisadr 
determined that the head of the state should not received a shred of legitimacy from the 
army and could not have a direct relationship with the armed forces except in
7QAexceptional circumstances such as instances of external aggression.
The IRP leaders opposed these changes, as they made it impossible to use the army to 
suppress civilians. However, the result of these reforms revealed itself when, in the 
face of all expert predictions of the army’s immediate collapse under Iraqi attack, and 
despite setbacks, purges, and the imprisonment and execution of hundreds of officers, 
the restructured military forces withstood the attack, entered a phase of attrition and 
eventually began to push the Iraqi army back. This successes, achieved despite a
792 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 15.
793 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005.
794 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 71.
795 Banisadr, interview, 22 Januaiy 2005.
796 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, pp. 111-12.
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chronic lack of spare parts and ammunition as well as international sanctions, confirmed 
the success of the president’s reforms. It also proved that the democratisation process 
had made the army into a more effective war machine that successfully championed 
Iran’s independence and territorial integrity. Moreover, for the first time in the history 
of modem Iran, the army became popular with the people. Therefore, the Iran-Iraq War 
became a testing ground for the new army.
7
Was democracy doomed? Explaining the outcome o f  the revolution
Here we can see how the interplay of external and internal factors conditioned the 
outcome of the struggle between the opposing camps. It has already been argued that 
economic sanctions and the political isolation caused by the hostage affair made Iran 
more vulnerable to the Iraqi threat. Khomeini demanded purges in the army, which 
were supported by IRP and Stalinist left; as Khamenei stated, “the Imam emphasises
707purging the ministries and the army”. As a result, General Zahir Nejad, the
7qo
commander of ground forces, revealed that “14,000 army personnel were purged”. In 
the air force alone more than 30% of officers were forced to retire.799 This was 
exacerabated by a coup attempt just a month before Iraqi invasion, involving some units 
of the armed forces, which led to the arrest of thousands and execution of 400 officers. 
Khomeini demanded the execution of everyone involved, saying “those who were 
involved in this last thing (the Nojeh coup) with their corrupt minds, all of them, based 
on the Koran, should be executed, without any exception. There is not one exception 
and nobody has a right to give amnesty to anyone”.800
During the hostage-taking, both international and internal conditions were particularly 
favourable for an Iraqi attack. Banisadr received detailed information about Iraq’s
797Khamenei’s Friday Sermon, 12 July 1980 [21 tir 1359].
798 Nakhoda Hamid Hamidi, Tahghigi dar baareh tarikhe Enghelab [A Study about the History of Revolution], p.
861.
799 Ibid.
800 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 12 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e Eslami, 1999
[1378]), p. 252.
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military plans several months before Saddam Hussein actually attacked in September
1980. He warned Khomeini that hostilities were imminent and asked him to stop the
IRP’s interference in army affairs.801 However, just as Stalin was certain that Germany
would not attack the Soviet Union, Khomeini also assured Banisadr that no country
would dare to attack Iran. He tried to convince Banisadr that army officers were
spreading rumours of the attack as part of “a manoeuvre on the part of the officers to
escape the mullahs”.802 IRP leaders were in tune with Khomeini; however, they thought
that Banisadr made claims that the US had encouraged Saddam to invade and “blow up
the threat posed by the US plot” in order “not only to prevent the IRP’s interference in
army affairs”, but also “to impose his men in key state positions”. After the invasion,
the frustrated president exposed what happened behind the scenes. “I did everything to
convince officials of the danger awaiting us”, he told a reporter. “I made
recommendations, I pleaded, begged, yelled, but in vain, nobody wanted to listen to 
804me .
On the Iraqi side, Saddam was also sure that the war would not last more than a week.
In fact, he was so confident that he had already invited more than one thousand 
reporters to Basra, planning to take them to Ahvaz, a major Iranian city near Iraq, to
O A C
celebrate his victory. Banisadr, through Yaser Arafat, warned Saddam of the 
consequence of attacking Iran and warned him,
You imagine that you can finish Iran with a lightning war because our 
army is disorganised. You dream of becoming the pre-eminent power in 
the region. This is all work of your imagination. You can start a war, 
but you can not decide its outcome. Why make the whole world a 
witness of our stupidity? If you start a war, you will be playing into the 
mullah’s hands and they will establish a religious dictatorship. If you
QA/r
want to prevent that, why this war?
Arafat informed Banisadr of Saddam’s arrogance, when he told him in response, “do 
not concern yourself about that. It will last only few days; it will be a simple
801 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 13.
802 Ibid., p. 70.
803 Jomhooriye Eslami, 30 August 1980 [8 Shahrivar 1359].
804 Eric Rouleau, “The War and the Struggle for the State”, MERJP Reports, no. 98 (July/August 1981), p. 4.
805 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 301.
806 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, pp. 70-71.
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exercise”. Most Western military analysts also shared Saddam’s views. A few 
months before the attack, it seemed that Saddam was not exaggerating—the combat 
capability of the Iranian army was at zero, the navy at 10% and the air force at 20% of 
full capacity.809
However, the war was not inevitable. Saddam previously had even made serious 
attempts to improve relations. Immediately after the revolution he sent a message to 
Khomeini in which he offered to publicly apologise to the Iranian leader for forcing 
Khomeini out of Iraq at the Shah’s request and declare the readiness of the Iraqi 
government to cooperate with the new Iranian regime if Khomeini accepted his 
apology. Assuming that Saddam’s regime would last no more than six months and 
believing that he simply sought legitimacy in order to save it, Khomeini refused the 
offer.810 However, nearly a year and a half later, Saddam not only found that he did not 
need Khomeini’s recognition, but also believed that he could finish his regime, impose 
his demands on Iran and position himself as the new Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 
nationalist and popular Egyptian leader.
Iraq invades Iran
Iraq attacked Iran on 22 September 1980. The main thrust of the attack was in 
Khusistan, the country’s main oil region, where the Iraqi army was 80 times stronger
O 1 f
than the Iranian. The invasion was led by twelve armoured and mechanised divisions 
using 2400 tanks, while in Khusetan, just 28 of 385 Iranian army tanks were
o n
operational and the entire officer corps of the division was incarcerated. Khomeini’s 
initial reaction echoed Stalin’s reaction to the news of the German attack; he was scared 
and shocked.814 Fearful of defeat, Khomeini invested Banisadr with “exclusive powers” 
to conduct the war and appointed him head of the Supreme Defence Council. IRP 
leaders met with Banisadr soon after the attack and offered their total support. They 
knew too well that they would be the first victims of a total defeat, as their role in 
dismantling the army, and the expulsion, arrest and execution of thousands of army
807 Ibid.
808 For example, see The Economist, 28 September 1980.
809 Banisadr’s letter to Khomeini, 19 January 1981 [29 day 1359] in Naamehaa be Khomeini, pp. 167-69.
810 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, pp. 265-66.
811 Banisadr, “Roozha”, 31 October 1981 [9 aban 1359].
812 Hamid Hamidi, Tahghigi dar baareh tarikhe Enghelab, p. 864.
8,3 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 84.
814 The day after the attack, Banisadr met Khomeini to give him the war report and recalls that Khomeini’s fingers 
were trembling of fear. Banisadr, interview, 24 Januaiy 2005.
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personnel was a well known fact. However, this display of unity did not last more than 
a few weeks. After initial setbacks and despite all predictions to the contrary, Iranian 
ground forces received significant support from the air force, which became formidable 
after Banisadr freed hundreds of pilots from prison. As the disorganised and shattered 
army was yet incapable of defending against the invasion, the task of confronting the 
Iraqi army fell solely on the air force, which was itself demoralised by purges and 
executions. However, the invasion both revived patriotic sentiment within the armed 
forces and enabled the president to stop executions, free military prisoners, and permit 
his generals to recall purged officers. The combination of these factors can be 
illustrated in the memory of one of the pilots:
After my expulsion from the air force I started to work as a poultry 
farmer. I was on my way home when I saw two Sukhoi airplane pass 
over my head and soon after I heard the sounds of explosion. I went 
home, shut myself in my room and cried hard for why not being able to 
use my expertise for my country. My wife came in and suggested that I 
call the air force and offer her and our children as hostages so that I 
could fly. I called Colonel Fakuri [then commander of the air force] and 
told him that I wanted to fight, and that if he didn’t trust me he could 
keep my family hostage. Without any hesitation, Fakuri said, “just bring
01 e
yourself here right now”.
Banisadr reported the drastic change of military morale to Khomeini: “the pilots in the 
air force and helicopters in the war effort not only sacrifice, but fight in a suicidal 
manner.. .everyday they tell each other that today is their day [of getting killed] and I 
become ashamed to look at them since I know tomorrow I might not be able to see 
them”. The president’s risk and the trust he placed in pilots, some of whom were 
waiting for execution in prisons and others who had been fired, paid off. Daring and 
innovative attacks on Iraqi armed forces brought the invasion to a halt and in some 
areas repelled Iraqi tanks, hence providing vital time for ground forces to organise 
themselves. However, in the absence of organised ground forces, the price of repelling 
the Iraqi army solely with the airforce and military helicopters was high. In the air
815 “Operation of Mehr the First”, Interview of Colonel Bigdeli with Radio France International, French section, 2
September 2000 [12 shahrivar 1379].
816 Banisadr, Naamehaa be Khomeini, p. 168.
227
force alone, almost half of its 1,200 pilots were either killed or went missing in 
action.817
However, making the Iranian army ready to confront the Iraqis proved to be a 
Herculean task, not only because of the disintegration of the army after the revolution, 
but just as importantly, the war showed the extensive damge that was done through 
corruption of the army. The armed forces’ successful resistance changed the orientation 
of fears within the IRP leadership; the fear of defeat was replaced with a fear of the 
army’s victory. The Revolutionary Guards numbered no more than 22,000; they were 
totally unfamiliar with classic warfare, badly organised and lightly armed, and had yet 
to become a worthy fighting force in this war. Banisadr’s organisational and structural 
changes within the army provided space and opportunity for military innovation and the 
development of new methods of warfare, he strongly defended the army against purges 
and threats by the IRP and Stalinist left, and his constant presence on the front led to his 
having unprecedented popularity within the army. In turn, the armed forces were 
motivated by patriotic fervour and by their unexpected resilience in defending the 
country. The army was shedding its imperial past and becoming a truly popular army: 
“the army, which was formerly hated, vilified and humiliated, has acquired incredible 
popularity during the Gulf War. It has been ‘cleared’ by demonstrating its fidelity to 
the regime and the homeland. It has, generally, fought honourably and often 
courageously in clearly unfavourable conditions”.818
The IRP leaders thus interpreted the army’s victory as Banisadr’s. With the fear of total 
defeat gone, the IRP more forcefully expressed its fear of military victory. From its 
point of view, this it was a logical fear as a military victory or a favourable ceasefire 
achieved by an army that they aimed to abolish would spoil its plans to monopolise 
power. These fears, which became visible in their political attitude, could not be kept 
from other political organisations. Dariush Forouhar, the leader of the Iran Party, 
became critical of the IRP attitute towards Banisadr and his war efforts. “Because of 
the ineptitude and damaging rivalries of the state authorities, which tried to monopolise
O 1 Q
the victories, they did not like success at the front.” Yadollah Sahabi, one of the most
817 Banisadr’s letter to Khomeini, 19 January 1981 [29 day 1359] in Naamehaa be Khomeini, pp. 167-69.
818 Rouleau, “The War and the Struggle for the State”, p. 3.
8,9 The statement of Hezbe Melat-e Iran [ Nation of Iran Party], 4 November 1980 [13.08.1359].
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respected leaders of the FM, came to Banisadr’s defence, saying “putting Banisadr 
under a barrage of accusations, although with the utmost of care he has revived the 
morale of the shattered armed forces and organised them in a way that can neutralise the 
enemy’s attack, is a violation of fairness and justice”.820 Later, Hussein Khomeini, 
Khomeini’s grandson, revealed, “I have debated with them [IRP] and they told me that 
even if we lose Khusezestan and even half of Iran, it is better than Banisadr winning this
Furthermore, in order to tilt Khomeini’s seemingly neutral stand toward its favour, the 
IRP played on Khomeini’s fear of challenges to his leadership. IRP leaders told 
Khomeini that “in either victory or defeat, Banisadr would ride to Tehran atop a tank 
and seize power”.822 The Stalinist left, mainly the Tudeh Party, which comprised the 
chief advisors to IRP, began drawing a parallel between Banisadr and Napoleon, 
accusing Banisadr of aiming to become the Napoleon of the Iranian revolution. They 
went even further, devising a slogan in which Banisadr was accused of being “Iran’s 
Pinochet”.823 Banisadr, who was cognizant of the effect of such talks on Khomeini, 
made a promise to Khomeini that he would resign after he ended the war. He submitted 
his resignition to Khomeini in a letter, saying that he could publicise it anytime he 
desired.
Thus, the IRP’s plan was to prolong the war. On 26 October 1980, Ayat explicitly 
predicted that the war would be protracted and that in its course the army would be 
disbanded and replaced by the Revolutionary Guards.824 The president reported the 
IRP’s intention to Khomeini, saying that they had “opened a front behind the lines.
They want to continue the war, but, not for victory by to bring Iran to defeat. They
c
think by such defeat they can finish off Banisadr”. It took fourteen years for the head 
of the Revolutionary Guards to verify Banisadr’s argument: “if we would not have 
continued this war, the state and revolution would not have become solidified. Those 
who argue that six years of the eight-year war were a waste.. .should know that if we
820 Enghelabe Eslami, 19 January 1981 [29 day 1359].
821 Enghelabe Eslami, 16 March 1981 [25 esfand 1359].
822 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, pp. 133-34.
823 The slogan repeated by Hezbollahis all over Iran was “sepahsalaar Pinochet, Iran shili nemisheh” (General
Pinochet, Iran will not become another Chile).
824 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 88.
825 Banisadr, Naamehaa be Khomeini, p. 195.
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would have ended the war, both the Islamic state and the revolution would have been 
diminished”.826
The armed forces came under fire not only from the Iraqi army but also from the IRP 
and its allies. While TV and radio stations were under control of the IRP, Banisadr was 
accused of intentional defeat in any failed military operation. This was the case, for 
instance, in the Hoveyzeh operation (the first major operation against Iraqi army). It 
was only after his removal that a Guards commander challenged this accusation: “I 
personally do not accept what is said about Banisadr in Hoveyzeh operation. Not only 
did Banisadr not aim to be defeated in Hoveyzeh; furthermore he could eliminate all his 
opponents with one victory. It is very simplistic to argue that Banisadr betrayed the 
operation. I was in the war room; Banisadr used all his prudence in order to make the
sonoperation a success”. Furthermore, successful operations were presented as victories 
of the Revolutionary Guards. Banisadr strongly criticised the IRP’s use of TV and 
radio, saying “behaving in this manner is more damaging than the enemy’s attack. The 
armed forces commanders came to me last night. They were furious, and said ‘we 
coordinate and cooperate [with the guards] because of you, and then the radio pays us 
back in such a disturbing manner.”828 Khomeini supported the IRP, however, and 
ignored the plight of the armed forces: “these are hezbollahis who are fighting on the 
fronts and sacrificing their sweet lives for the sake of Islam”.
Despite awareness of the limitations of overexaggerating the guards’ role in the 
victories, the IRP also drew on religious superstitions to underplay the role of the armed 
forces. IRP newspapers, for example, reported that Iraqi prisoners had witntessed a
Q-1A
rider on a white horse with a sword attacking and breaking Iraqi forces. Banisadr 
responded sharply to such stories, saying “to propagate and spread such stories in our 
time is intended to deny the role of the people. Those who make such stories in order to 
deceive forget to ask why, if such a story was true, it would not have been better for this 
horse to intervene from the first day [of the war] and prevent so much blood shed and
826 Rezaei’s speech in a congress for the commemoration of commanders and sixteen thousand martyrs of Khusestan,
28 February 2001 [10 esfand 1379].
827 Ali Shamkhani, Hemaseye Hoveyzeh [Epic o f  Hoveyzeh] (Iran, 1988 [1366]), p. 12. He was the commander of the
IRGC of Khusetan during this period and later he became Iran’s Minister of Defence.
828 Enghelabe Eslami, 25 May 1981 [4 khordad 1360].
829 Jomhooriye Eslami, 7 May 1981 [17 ordibehesht 1360].
830 The invisible rider on the white horse is assumed to be the twelfth Shia imam, who disappeared in the ninth
century in order to bring justice. As argued already, this might be compared with the “second coming” of the 
Christian messiah.
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destruction”.831 In addition to this, the arrest, humiliation and torutre of senior army 
officers added insult to injury.832 IRP supporters in the Majles accused pilots of being 
CIA agents;833 and ultimately Zahir Nejad, the commander of ground forces, decided to 
resign.834 Banisadr attempted to communicate this to the people: “today we are fighting 
on a few fronts: of rumour-makers, power-seeking opportunists, counter­
revolutionaries, political and economical problems, international and domestic, and 
finally on the military front”.835
The ideological war of experts (Takhasos) versus believers (Maktabi) resonated more 
with the war than in any other area. Martydom, as a military tactic, was interpreted by 
the IRP as a Maktabi method of struggle and years later became widespread. The 
president strongly criticised this approach from its very outset and prevented it from 
being used under his command. “We are responsible for the lives of these people”, he 
said. “It is preferable to appoint a commander who has knowledge and expertise as a 
commander, as well as belief in his work, so he prevents our children and brothers from 
being killed uselessly and for no reason. Yes, it is better to appoint these people rather 
than those who have no respect for human life. However, there are opportunists who 
are trying to conceal their ineptitude and lack of leadership knowledge under a garb of
• 017encouraging martydom”.
The inter-dependence of Iranian and American politics
By this time, several events had become intertwined: the war with Iraq, the outcome of 
the 1980 US presidential election, the fate of the American hostages, and the outcome of 
the internal struggle between the totalitarian and democratic factions of the ruling elite.
831 Enghelabe Eslami, 24 May 1981 [3 khordad 1360].
832 A. H. Banisadr, Khyanat be omid [Betrayal of Hope] (n.p., 1981), p. 85
833 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 93-94
834 “Operation of Mehr the First”.
835 Enghelabe Eslami, 30 August 1980 [8 shahrivar 1359],
836 See, for example, the memoir of Brigadier-General Eskandar Bir-Alvand in Etela 'at, 27 September 1997 [5 mehr
1376], p. 5. “We’d been told the Regiment of Imam Hussein, lovers of Imam Hussein, are coming to clean the 
mine fields. Until that day I had not heard of this regiment and was not aware of how they do things. Soon 
after two lorries filled with basijis (militia) arrived. As soon as they got off they hugged and kissed each other. 
It was a strange and breathtaking scene. They were crying so hard that the rest of fighters were affected and 
cried too. After they said farewell, they made a line next to the minefield. We still did not know what they are 
about to do. Silence covered everywhere and all the fighters were looking at basijis with tension and anxiety. 
One of them, who was around 20 years old, looked at the others and said, “may our bodies be sacrificed for the 
slain body of Imam Hussein. The Imam is waiting; do not keep him waiting for long”. Then he called the 
name of Hussein and ran towards the minefield, and the rest followed. Soon after I heard constant explosions 
and the mine field was covered with hellish fire.”
837 Enghelabe Eslami,-12 November 1980 [21.08.1359].
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Hence, a change in any of these variables would affect the development of others. The 
international factor was decisive not only in shaping the outcome of political struggle in 
Iran, but also proved to be influential in the outcome of the US election; in certain ways, 
these two struggles became intertwined. As the election approached its final phase, 
there was a general consensus among political analysts that the early release of the 
American hostages would be a decisive factor in Carter’s re-election, whereas a late 
release would benefit Reagan. Carter was well aware that the Iranian armed forces 
depended on US technology and were in dire need of spare parts and ammunition. On 
26 October 1979, nine days before the presidential election, he offered Iran military 
assistance. He suggested releasing $300 million worth of American spare parts for the
OIO
air force, which had already been paid for and were ready to be shipped. This 
shipment would not only increase air force fighting capability, but would also signal to 
Saddam Hussein that in view of the spirited resistance which his army had already 
encountered, the lifting of sanctions would lead to Iraq’s inevitable defeat. Carter also 
promised Banisadr that he would force Iraq to end the war if Iran released the
O^Q
hostages. Thus, Banisadr and Carter had a shared interest in releasing the hostages 
before the election, and there was a shared interest between the IRP and Reagan 
administration to delay. In this scenario, the release of the hostages could help Carter’s 
re-election; as a result, sanctions would be lifted, the war would end and Banisadr could 
maintain his position as president. This was a nightmare scenario both for the IRP and 
for the US Republican Party. The IRP thus had every incentive to prevent the arms-for- 
hostages negotiation from taking place and to prevent Carter’s re-election. It asserted 
its influence through the Majles, as by that time the Majles was in a position to decide 
the hostages’ fate.
The IRP deputies and their supporters in the Majles used two tactics to prevent the 
release of hostages before the US presidential election. First, it used delaying tactics to 
postpone discussion of Carter’s offer in the Majles. The day after the offer was made, 
twenty MPs stayed away from the Majles and the session was postponed for lack of a 
quorum. When the Majles reassembled on 2 November, two days before the election,
43 out of 228 deputies were still absent.840 Second, when the Majles finally voted on 
the issue, the conditions ratified by an overwhelming majority were such that the
838 Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, p. 170.
839 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, pp. 93-94.
840 Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, p. 322.
232
hostages could not be released before 4 November. While even substantial demands 
such as the cancellation of all financial claims against Iran, the release of Iran’s frozen 
assets and the promise of political and military non-intervention in Iranian affairs as 
conditions for the release could have been met by Carter in time, the demand that the 
properties belonging to the former Shah be returned to Iran was impossible for him to 
fulfil. The Majles was aware that this demand was beyond his constitutional power, a 
point which the American president himself had made when he had asked that the issue 
be settled by American courts. However, by then the day of the election drew near. 
Ultimately, Carter failed to secure the hostages’ release.
The “October Surprise” and the release of American hostages
On 21 January 1981, after 444 days in captivity, the hostages were finally released. On 
the very same day at the very same hour, Reagan took the oath of office:
They kept the hostages until the moment that Carter left the office after 
Reagan had entered. The hostages were taken to the airport, ready to 
take off. But the man in charge was looking at his watch and listening to 
the radio. When they announced that Carter had left the White House,
o41
then they had the permission to fly, to leave the Iranian airport.
This episode has led to claims that a clandestine agreement was struck between the 
Reagan administration and the Khomeini-IRP front, in which Iran agreed to postpone 
the release of the hostages until after the election in return for military supplies from the 
new administration.842 There is considerable debate over the validity of this claim.
841 Quoted from Ebrahim Yazdi, Bazargan’s foreign minister from 1979-80 in “Hot Spots: Iran”, BBC documentary,
10 August 2004.
842 There is a plethora of books and articles about the “October Surprise”, written by credible politicians and
researchers and published in credible journals and papers. For example, see Robert Parry, Secrecy and 
Privilege: Rise O f The Bush Dynasty From Watergate To Iraq (Media Consortium, 2004); Peter Kombluu, 
“Iran-Contra’s Untold Story”, Foreign Affairs, 1988, No. 72 ( Autumn), pp. 3-30; Barbara Honegger October 
Surprise (UK, Leicester, Tudor Publishers 1989); New York Times, 15 April 1991; New York Times, 22 
December 1991; David Brown and Guy Gugliotta, “ Carter’s Foiled October Surprise!” Washington Post, 21 
April 1991; New York Times, 2 September 1991; “Folks Back Home Do Give a Hoot How the ’80 Election 
Was Won”, Newsweek, 11 November 1991; Washington Post, 24 June 1987; Marx Hossenball “October 
Surprise! Redux” Miami Herald, 9 August 1987; The Nation, vol. 253, 9 September 1991; Christopher 
Hitchens “Minority Report”, Wall Street Journal, 24 October 1988; “October Surprise”, Wall Street Journal, 
27 November 1991; and Emerson Steven, “The Man Behind the ‘October Surprise’ Lie”. However, it was
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Unlike the “Irangate” scandal, which has been constituted as an established political 
fact, the committee appointed by the US Congress to investigate the “October surprise” 
claim concluded that it could neither affirm nor rule out the possibility that such a deal 
had taken place.843 This research argues that while we cannot accept this claim as an 
established fact, establishing its degree of viability has deep significance for the 
theoretical foundations of this and all other studies of the process and outcome of the 
Iranian revolution. It raises questions about whether the deliberate collaboration of 
some elements of the domestic revolutionary elite with some elements of the foreign 
elite might not simply function as a mere context but play a meaningful role in the 
revolutionary process. Disregarding it entirely risks the legitimation of considerable 
historical error.844
Therefore, we must approach questions about the “October Surprise” carefully, 
interrogating its foundations rather than disregarding it lock, stock and barrel or falling 
into the trap of conspiracy theory. This dissertation therefore introduces important 
statements regarding the relationship between the US and Iranian politicians made by 
academics and high-ranking political figures. It argues focuses on two key points, 
which have hitherto been neglected in the literature surrounding the issue. The first 
point concerns the Shah’s wealth, which had been an obstacle to Carter’s attempts to 
release the hostages. On 11 December, Behzad Nabavi, the chief Iranian negotiator, 
estimated the Shah’s assets in America at more than $56 billion. A few days before the 
presidential election, he bluntly asked the Americans to deposit $24 billion in a bank 
account as security for the Shah’s assets and frozen Iranian funds. Carter agreed, but 
Nabavi failed to respond. However, after the election, on 15 January, Nabavi made a 
complete U-turn: he not only dropped the $24 billion as a condition for the release, but
Gary Sick, Carter’s security advisor, who first made the claim on the American side; see Gary Sick, October 
Surprise: America's hostage in Iran and the election o f  Ronald Reagan (London: Tauris, 1991) and “The Case 
for a Conspiracy”, New York Times, 11 December 1991. On the Iranian side it was Banisadr who first made 
the claim after leaving Iran, on a BBC Interview on 29 July 1981. According to the former president, as he 
began to expose information during the Irangate investigation, the CIA contacted him three times and 
threatened him with assassination if he continued. Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
843 The Iran-Contra Affair, also known as “Irangate”, was a mid-1980s political scandal in the United States and Iran,
when Reagan’s administration sold arms to Iran in exchange for its hostages in Lebanoa
844 For example, in 1907 and 1915 two clandestine agreements were made in which Iran was divided between Russia
and Britain; however, this was only exposed after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Similarly, the 1953 coup 
d’dtat against Mussadiq was for years portrayed as a public uprising of the masses led by the Shah against 
Mussadiq. It took almost fifty years for the Clinton administration to officially admit the US government’s 
role in the coup and for the CIA to publish documents which provided hard evidence to show that the coup was 
engineered by the CIA, British intelligence, the Monarchists and some elements of influential clergy. There 
are similar cases in other countries, one of the most famous being the secret pact between Stalin and Hitler on 
dividing Poland during World War Two.
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also agreed to pay all of Iran’s external debts in cash.845 The question of the Shah’s 
wealth was dropped and buried under vague verbosity. The second point relates to 
weapons. As has already been argued, the Iranian armed forces suffered from severe 
shortages of ammunition and spare parts, and on 26 October Carter had offered to 
release large shipment of pre-paid supplies for the Iranian air force. However, on 22 
October (shortly after a sudden trip to the UN) Rajaei claimed that Iran needed neither 
American weapons nor spare parts. Two days later, on 24 October, Rafsanjani (then 
head of the Majles) told Eric Rouleau the same thing.846 These statements were made at 
a time when the Council of Revolution was attempting to buy weapons and spare parts
OAn
for the armed forces from the black market. They are striking in view of the fact that 
the final negotiation to release the hostages made no reference to military hardware, not 
even to the $300 million worth of spare parts that Carter had been willing to release. 
Given Iran’s heavy dependence on American military equipment, it would be have been 
logical to include the release of these spare parts in the agreement, particularly as the
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Americans had already agreed to it. These spare parts were never shipped to Iran.
These two facts might provide a credible basis for the claim of a clandestine agreement 
such as the “October Surprise”. However, for our purpose of theorising such 
collaboration and its effect on the process of revolution and the paths it might have 
taken, it is insufficient. More substantial evidence is needed in order to provide the 
empirical base of such theorisation.
The Algerian Agreement
An agreement to release the hostages was finally negotiated on 17 January in Algeria. It 
proved so detrimental to Iran that Carter later in his memoirs wrote that he felt pity for
845 Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005. Salamatian was the chief Iranian negotiator for the release of the American
hostages in the UN. See also Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 47.
846 Le Monde, 24 October 1980.
847 This, however, led to the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars. In one case, Dr A. Taghizadeh was given a
mission to secure spare parts, but during the exchange discovered that the boxes were filled with brakes. In 
this case, the $500 million given to him was saved. Dr Abdolsamad Taghizadeh, interview by the author, 3 
August 2005.
848 According to Banisadr, Rajaei's government did not include the release of spare parts because the IRP was fearful
of the army's victory and tried to delay the shipment of weapons to Iran as long as Banisadr was president, 
therefore depriving him of victory. Therefore, any shipment had to be postponed until after his removal. See 
My Turn to Speak, p. 186.
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the Iranians signing the agreement.849 Almost none of the Iranian demands were met.
Of the $12 billion Iranian assets in American banks which were released, $4 billion 
were retained by America against claims by 330 individuals and US companies, another 
$1.4 billion was to be held against international claims, and Iran had agreed to repay 
$3.7 billion to various firms and foreign banks (these loans were repaid far before 
maturity). Iran was therefore left with $2.3 billion. The agreement was signed nine 
hours before Reagan was sworn in; the plane carrying the hostages took off from Tehran 
airport a few hours later.850
IRP Leaders, who realised that no international agreement could have been made 
without Majles’ approval and the president’s signature, called it the “Algerian 
Declaration” and portrayed it as a great victory for Iran. Banisadr, however, thought 
otherwise and argued that the agreement had taken place without his knowledge. The 
previous day he had tried to prevent the signing of the agreement under these conditions 
and wrote to Khomeini:
“I told Ahmad [Khomeini’s son] that the whole thing was ending in 
complete loss and submission.. ..As much as I have understood, the 
constitution is being violated as well as the four conditions of 
[Khomeini]....They will not give Iran’s money and this is at the level of 
treachery. There is no reason to accept this. We are dishonouring the 
dignity and integrity of our country and revolution... .they are saying that
Of 1
you have agreed with it.. .this is not an agreement but submission.”
Behzad Nabavi, who signed the agreement, was well aware of his action when he 
compared himself with Vosugh-al-Doleh852 and made it known that he was ordered by 
Khomeini to do it.853
849 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid p. 161.
850 For more details see Robert Carswell, “Economic sanctions and the Iran experience”, Foreign Affairs, 60, no. 82
(Winter 1981), pp. 254-56; Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, pp. 171-73; Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, pp. 45- 
49; Bakhash, Reign o f Ayatollahs, pp. 150-52.
851 Banisadr’s letter to Khomeini, 19 January 1981 [29 day 1359], Naamehaa be Khomeini, pp. 234-36.
852 Vsough-al-Doleh was the Iranian prime minister who in 1919 signed an infamous agreement with Britain, which
would have effectively made Iran a British protectorate but failed to be implemented as a result of political 
rebellion within Iran and external opposition, manily by France and America.
853 Kiomarse Saberi (Gol Agha) stated, “when both [Nabavi and Rajei] returned from Jamaran [Khomeini’s house]
and as soon as [Nabavi] saw me from the end of the hall told me: ‘Saberi listen! You as a writer should be a 
witness! Tomorrow we have to do something and [as a result] people will call me Vosoogh-al-Doleh. But you 
have to be my witness that I am doing that because of the Imam’s order.” I told Nabavi that he should not give 
this name to reporters, but he did not listen to me and used the exact name.” Yaas-e-no, 20 January 1994 [30
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Signing the agreement not only cost the country financially, but also violated Article 
125 of the constitution; the agreement was incompatible with the ratification of the 
Majles regarding the hostages.854 The president consulted his legal advisors and on 10 
April 1980 drafted an indictment against Rajaei (his prime minister) and Nabavi (the
Of c
chief negotiator), which he submitted to the court. Nabavi asked for a closed 
parliamentary session, in which he argued that as he had signed the agreement with the 
support of the Majles and under Khomeini’s order, then the real target of the president 
was neither himself nor Rajaei, but rather that Banisadr aimed to put Beheshti and 
Rafsanjani and above all Khomeini himself on trial, since he and Rajaei had simply
o r /
executed their orders. He thus argued that the trial would not only lead to the
or«t
collapse of the government; ultimately, Khomeini would be implicated. Banisadr 
asked for a copy of the tape of Nabavi’s speech so that he could respond in the 
parliament, but Rafsanjani, in clear violation of the constitution, refused to provide him
or  o
with it. On 1 May, the president requested a national debate on the question of 
whether releasing the American diplomats in such a manner was “a great service or high 
treason”.859
As he failed to put Rajaei and Nabavi on the trial he went public, saying “I believe that 
silence, in the face of the violation of the constitution, the ratified laws of the Majles 
and the lack of observation of country’s interest is nothing but treachery.”860 “Not only 
me, but the entire nation, should know what the authorities have done to our 
independence and wealth.”861 And finally, “the government has tainted the national 
sovereignty. The Algeria agreement has violated many articles in the constitution. Not 
only Americans but also non-Americans have received money.” His newspaper also 
exposed the details of the agreement, pointing out that none of Iran’s demands had been 
met: the US had not apologised for its interference in Iran’s domestic politics, the 
Shah’s wealth had not been returned, and the country ended up facing hundreds of
day 1372], Later, he called the signing the agreement as the “only pride [eftekhaar] of his entire life”. See 
Majaleye Siasate Khareji [Foreign Policy Magazine], no. 3 (Autumn 1991 [1370]).
854 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 279.
855 Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 96.
856 Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005. Salamatian was then an MP and present at the session.
857 Salamatian, interview, 20 May 2005. Also see: Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 298.
858 Rafsanjani, Memoir, p. 110.
859 The Guardian, 1 May 1980.
860 Enghelabe Eslami, 4 May 1981 [14 khordad 1360],
861 Enghelabe Eslami, 20 May 1981 [30 ordibehesht 1360].
862 Enghelabe Eslami, 23 May 1981 [2 khordad 1360].
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lawsuits, many of them specious. (Salamatian argues that the overall financial loss 
totalled more than $30 billion.863)
Enghelabe Eslami played a leading role in exposing the details of this agreement, which 
infuriated IRP leaders and their allies. Rafsanjani criticised Enghelabe Eslami, saying it
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was “spreading the turmoil. The issue of hostages is nothing to do with them.” Once 
again the Revolutionary Guards made it known, despite Khomeini’s order, they 
interfere in politics as they wished. Mohsen Rezaei, the commander of the 
Revolutionary Guards, stated it was “criminal” for people to “make an issue out of 
hostages for the sake of their selfish and personal interests”.865 Banisadr’s exposure of 
the negotiation did not fall on deaf ears. A survey showed that 90% of Iranian people 
believed that the “Algerian Declaration” was detrimental to Iran’s national interest.866 
In response to criticisms, Nabavi argued, “put away your calculators. The purpose of 
the hostage affair was not to make or lose money; there were other stakes. The financial 
losses don’t count”.867 The nature of these “other stakes” was clarified by Rafsanjani, 
who stated that “parliament, the government and the judiciary are all working together 
with the Imam [Khomeini], and we are unanimous in saying that if the hostages had not 
been taken, the United States would have found some other way of forcing the Iraqi
O/'O
attack”. In other words, the hostage-taking had been used to legitimise control of the 
state and unify the power structure. As mentioned earlier, Beheshti pointed out more 
bluntly that “its only benefit was that we could eliminate Banisadr from the scene”.869
However, Banisadr’s continuing criticism was becoming too dangerous for the IRP and 
government. They used all possible means to silence him, to the extent that Ayatollah 
Montazeri, who was favoured as Khomeini’s successor, declared that talking about the 
hostages American was a treachery.870 Banisadr ’s response was: “treachery is the thing
R71that is being done, and [treachery] is not talking about it”. As the controversy 
continued, the country entered another crisis. At celebrations commemorating the 
anniversary of Mussadiq’s birth, for the first time the political confrontation between
863 Salamatian, interview, 25 May 2005.
864 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 73.
865 Payam-e Enghelab, 14 March 1981 [23 esfand 1359], p. 39.
866 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 49.
867 Ibid., 49.
868 Ibid., p. 49.
869 Jafari, Evin, p. 329.
870 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 182.
871 Ibid., p. 69.
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Banisadr and the IRP camp became explicit and the connection of Hezbollahis 
(popularly known as chomagdar or “club wielders”) with the IRP was exposed.
IRP and Hezbollahis: the link exposed
In the midst of the struggle over the Algerian Declaration, the approaching anniversary 
of Mussadiq’s birth intensified the tension between the two camps. Unlike the 
democratic front, the IRP and its allies viewed Mussadiq in extremely negative terms; to 
them, Mussadiq was a sinister secular leader who represented Iranian Nationalism. 
Banisadr was invited to speak at the commemoration ceremony. Khomeini asked him 
to abstain, but Banisadr accepted the invitation. Well over 100,000 people attended 
the rally at Tehran University, which Hezbollahis tried to interrupt. Banisadr was 
informed of the possibility of confrontation with Hezbollahis and had long been aware 
of the rising threat of attacks on political demonstrations. “If these attacks continue, 
then I will go to the people. Nothing is more dangerous for revolution than a few 
people who decide that they want to act in a revolutionary manner. That is not 
revolutionary, but counter-revolutionary.” His warnings were echoed by religious 
and political leaders, most notably Ayatollah Pasandide, Khomeini’s elder brother. 
“Respected gentlemen of judiciary system”, he said, “can’t you see the violation of
on A
people’s right, property and honour at the hands of disgraceful club-wielders?” Later
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he argued that “it seems the operations of club-wieders are organised.” Pasandide was 
referring to an open secret that the Hezbollahis were supported by the IRP. The IRP, 
however, not only denied these accusations, but even implicity denied the existence of 
such people.
Hence, the president requested protection, but the police sent were unprepared and 
unarmed. The fact that Rajaei’s government sent unarmed police to secure a rally that 
the president of the republic was to attend in person, when they had been warned of 
possible interruption by club-wielding hecklers, was a de facto refusal to provide legal 
protection. This illustrated the intensity of the struggle between Banisadr and the 
IRP.876
872 “Khomeini and the Opposition”, Middle East Report (MER1P), 104 (March-April 1982), pp. 16-17.
873 Enghelabe Eslami, 10 June 1980 [20 khordad 1359].
874 Enghelabe Eslami, 29 November 1980 [8 azar 1359],
875 Mizan, 3 March 1981 [12 esfand 1359].
876 For detailed information see Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, pp. 478-88.
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As expected, the unarmed police failed to eject the violent trouble-makers. The 
Hezbollahis severed the loudspeaker cables in parts of the university and violently
O'T'7
attacked people while calling Banisadr the “second Shah” and “Iran’s Pinochet”. In 
his speech, Banisadr stated, “when freedom has become so limited that even the 
president of a country cannot speak, then God help us.. .1 prefer to be killed at the 
criminal hands of these club-wielders in the hope that our country do away with such 
methods once for all.” Then he criticised the government and IRP, asking why 
despite numerous attacks on demonstrations during the preceding two years the 
authorities had failed to arrest a single person or asked the police to stop the 
disturbances. As the police failed to to do so, he asked the people themselves to eject 
the Hezbollahis from the university879 and said, “retaining your calm, evict these people 
and, if you arrest them, you should deliver them”.880 They did this successfully; the 
Hezbollahis were forced out and more than 140 were arrested by the people. However, 
he criticised violence: “Sir, do not beat [them], do not treat them the way they treat 
you.. .tell them not to beat them”.881
Although the Hezbollahis had systematically attacked demonstrations, this was the first 
time they had been successfully challenged and arrested. This resistance was a turning 
point in Banisadr’s presidency. Weapons and identity cards were seized, and Banisadr 
read out their names and organisational affiliations to the audience (excluding members
887of the Revolutionary Guard, so as not to affect the war effort ). It emerged that all 
belonged to different Revolutionary Committees or were IRP members.883 In one 
stroke, the president damaged the credibility of the country’s main revolutionary 
organisations, breaking the taboo of their infallibility. Furthermore, in this dramatic 
gesture he indicated that the hecklers, contrary to what had been maintained by the IRP, 
were not in fact groups of irresponsible riffraff, but organised groups led by the IRP. 
Adding insult to injury, without criticising Khomeini explicitly, his speech elaborated 
two types of leadership—dictatorial and democratic—and praised Mussadiq for being a 
devout advocate of the former and a leader who perceived himself both in words and
877 Ibid., p. 489.
878 Enghelabe Eslami, 4 February 1981 [15 bahman 1359].
879 For detailed information see Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 516.
880 Enghelabe Eslami, 7 March 1981 [16 esfand 1359].
881 Ibid.
882 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 314.
883 The Guardian, 9 March 1981.
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deeds as the people’s servant.884 The next day, the identity cards of the hecklers were 
published in Enghelabe Eslami.
The night after this event, Khomeini retreated and his office declared that he would not 
receive visitors for the next few days. This was a strong indication that the matter was 
being taken very seriously. The responses of the wounded IRP and its allies were as 
ferocious as the counter-offensive which started the day after. The Hezbollahis, who 
controlled the state media and had a number of newspapers, were pictured as innocent 
victims; Banisadr was denounced in Friday prayers all over the country. Rajaei called 
him a liar and argued that the president’s supporters had instigated the disturbances.885 
The IRP suddenly became conscious of the constitution, accusing the president of 
violating it by ordering the disrupters to be expelled from the university.886 In his 
Tehran Friday sermon Khamenei stated that “they have beaten believers and committed 
people”. Beheshti, the IRP’s strong man and head of the Supreme Court, implicitly 
supported this accusation, arguing that such a possibility could not be ruled out and that 
the president could be brought to trial like any other citizen. Four days after the 
Mussadiq’s anniversary, over 130 Revolutionary Court judges issued a statement, 
calling Banisadr a traitor and declaring his action the cause of “disunity, chaos and 
clashes”.888
However, Banisadr strongly countered these accusations and this time the Freedom 
Movement also offered support. E. Sahabi stated that “this attack was organised since
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morning”, and Mehdi Bazargan, then head of the FM in the parliament, criticised 
Rafsanjani for his reaction to the event: “now you are saying that it is the president who 
is entirely at fault? The little group of so called hezbollah, on 14 Esfand, not only
disrupted the ceremony, but were also the ones who started it. Is it right for the head of
the parliament to observe an approving silence about such events?”890 Still, the 
president strongly argued that the state media had turned to be like as in the Shah’s time 
and asked whether “the Pahlavis [Shah’s regime] are to be replaced in the Islamic
884 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 509.
885 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 151.
886 See the speech by Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili, general prosecutor, in Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p.
523.
887 Khamenei, Friday prayer sermon, 6 March 1981 [15 esfand 1359].
888 The Guardian, 18 and 20 March 1981.
889 Enghelabe Eslami, 10 March 1979 [19 esfand 1357].
890 Enghelabe Eslami, 12 March 1982 [21 esfand 1360].
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Republic by those wielding clubs”. As the judiciary, controlled by the IRP, made 
further moves to undermine the president’s case, he stated, “I stand firm and do not bow 
to injustice, even if I have to resign.. ..This is not a republic that I feel proud to be 
president o f ’. However, Salamatian criticises Banisadr’s handling of the event and 
failure to effectively pursue the case. In his view, Banisadr injured the enemy but failed 
to go for the kill by at least forcing some of the revolutionary units involved in the 
attack to be dissolved, thus making the IRP more dangerous.893
The result of the judiciary investigation into this event was published in nearly 1,000 
pages five years later when the totalitarian front felt secure in its power. In this 
extraordinary report, judiciary investigators for the first time admitted, approvingly and 
in much detail, how the IRP and revolutionary organisations planned and executed 
attacks against the democratic front. It argued,
if the 14 Esfand (September 1981) event would have taken place without 
the presence of revolutionary institutions and thundering cry of 
Hezbollah, and if the 25 Khordad (June 1981) event would pass without 
the attacks of the revolution’s devotees, if and if.. .for certain we would 
not be where we are now.894
Another point which makes this report more interesting is its open support for violent 
violations of law and order by the judiciary, an institution, which was supposed to 
observe law and order. However, even before the leaders and management of the event
QQC
were officially identified, Khomeini decided to directly intervene.
The last attempt at reconciliation
891 Enghelabe Eslami, 9 March 1981 [18 esfand 1359].
892 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 534.
893 Salamatian, interview, 25 May 2005.
894 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand. For more detail, see pp. 488-522.
895 When the president asked for witnesses of the event to provide the judiciary system with their observation, I went
to a judge and made a declaration. Before I left, I told the judge that I knew no matter what I said the verdict 
would already weigh against the president. This angered the judge, who pointed at a pile of witness papers and 
asked, if all witnesses support your observation, how could we possibly come out with the opposite verdict?
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Khomeini’s retreat ended on 15 March. Immediately after, he asked for a meeting of all 
leaders in order to find a way to end the struggle. Rafsanjani, Beheshti, Mousavi 
Ardebili and Rajaei represented the IRP; Ahmad Khomeini (Khomeini’s son) and 
Bazargan were the mediators, and Banisadr was the lone representative of the opposing 
faction. This historical meeting confirmed deep and irreconcilable divisions among the 
leaders and illustrates the importance of Khomeini’s position in deciding the outcome of 
the struggle.
Rafsanjani accused Banisadr of not recognising the legality of any state institutions 
other than the presidency and demanded that Banisadr acknowledge the legitimacy of 
other institutions like the Majles, the Guardian Council, and the government. Banisadr 
agreed and argued that Khomeini had violated the constitution by appointing Beheshti 
as chief justice and Ardebili as public prosecutor without consulting judges in judiciary 
system; therefore, he could not recognise them. He also argued that the entire Supreme 
Court had been appointed in violation of the constitution and that the prime minister had 
not only been imposed upon him (which was also unconstitutional), but that he had 
violated the constitution by signing a treacherous agreement with the US in Algeria, an 
act that caused significant political and financial damages to the country. The Prime 
minister should therefore resign and be put on trial. Banisadr further agreed that he did 
not recognise the Majles: the parliamentary elections had been rigged, and according to 
official data only represented 15% of Iranian voters. Therefore, the Council of 
Guardians was also illegitimate because half of its members had been picked by the
OQ/T
Majles and Supreme Court, in other words, by illegal organisations. Khomeini told 
Banisadr, “yes, you are an honest and naive man. But you were unfamiliar with the 
situation in Iran. You had come from Europe and did not know the situation; the clergy 
(ulama) were shrewd and took over”.897 Banisadr disagreed, arguing that all their 
positions were filled by Khomeini and not because of their merit. To prove this, he 
suggested that Khomeini declare his neutrality for one week, during which he would see 
that the IRP leaders would be unable even to attend their work.
The four-hour-long meeting ended with each participant being asked to submit his 
views in writing to Khomeini. The next day Khomeini issued a ten-point decree
896 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 232.
897 Ibid., p. 316.
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drawing up guidelines for the involved parties. He reaffirmed Banisadr as Commander 
in Chief and forbade the clergy to meddle in war affairs. He also banned all speeches or 
incendiary articles until the end of the war. Furthermore, he set up a tripartite 
conciliatory committee made up of members representing Khomeini, the IRP and 
Banisadr to investigate complaints of both sides. This body was also to act as a media 
watchdog to ensure it remained neutral in the conflict.898 Banisadr opposed the 
formation of this committee since it had powers which were unconstitutional, but 
committed other mistakes. He not only went along with a committee which he saw as 
unconstitutional, but furthermore, instead of appointing someone with calibre who 
could stand against the IRP (like Pasandideh or Ali Tehrani), he appointed the feeble 
Eshraghi, Khomeini’s son-in-law. Banisadr argues that he chose him because he was 
from Khomeini’s house so the public would know that he was not “his man” but 
Khomeini’s.899 Regardless of whom he chose, however, his appointee on the committee 
would be in the minority. Still, in order to prevent the committee from using its power 
to close down the country’s remaining newspapers, he wrote an open letter to the 
committee demanding that attacks on Banisadr by any paper should not be considered 
cause for condemning or closing any paper, arguing that such acts were “the precursor 
of the establishment of despotism”.900
However, as subsequent developments showed, this committee used its power to further 
erode the president’s power. It was part of what Banisadr called the “creeping coup 
d’etat which aimed to deprive him of authority. The committee did in fact increase the 
IRP’s influence on the government. Parallels can be drawn between this meeting and 
Bazargan's meeting with the IRP leadership in June 1979, when Khomeini seemingly 
tried to reconcile the two sides but in fact paved the way for the further domination of 
Bazargan’s government by the IRP. The practical results of the meeting were seen in 
the IRP’s attempt to further erode the remaining freedoms by closing down the 
opposition papers.
The struggle over printed media
898 For detail about the meeting, see Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, pp. 313-20; Hiro, Iran under Ayatollahs, p. 176;
Milani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 183; Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, pp. 153-54.
899 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
900 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 638.
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As radio and television were already controlled by the IRP, it was left to the print media 
to use the remaining freedoms to oppose this attempt to monopolise power. IRP allies 
instantly opposed this. Among them was Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, who stated that “for 
years others were in control of [governmental] posts. Are you that jealous that you 
don’t let us take control of it for a few years?”901 However, taking such control would 
have been impossible with a free media. Hence, gradual attempts were made to close 
the opposition press. The president, who from the outset had presented the struggle 
against the IRP not as a classic power struggle amongst elites but a struggle between 
democracy and despotism, had already ruled out any possible compromise for the sake 
of power: “my defence of freedom is my defence of independence and Islam. If they 
want to establish despotism under the name of Islam, then, what will be left of Islam? If 
I was not faithful to my belief, who better than me could adjust himself with the rule of 
force and despotism and ride the wave?”902 He persistently supported freedom of 
expression and of the media, saying “strangulation of media is the precondition for the 
establishment of despotism”,903 and when the IRP accused the opposition press of 
conspiracy, he responded, “criticism is not conspiracy, but requisite for preventing 
conspiracy.”904 This was because “the media has an overwhelming duty, which is to be 
critical”,905 an approach based on the belief that criticism is the cornerstone of Islam as 
a discourse of freedom. “Islam”, he said, “is a religion of criticism and protest”.906
Banisadr’s defence of freedoms found strong support within the public, expressed in 
various ways. By now the circulation of his paper had reached over 300,000 and his 
office was flooded daily with letters, indicating the level of trust people had placed in 
him. On one occasion, according to Jafari, his office was filled with 12,000 letters.907 
Support for his defence of freedoms also grew fast within the elite. Among them was a 
well-known clergyman, Mohammad Mojtahede Shabestari, who argued that “freedom 
of the press means that the press are free to oppose. Obviously to write the agreeable 
does not need freedom”.908 And Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari stated “to put pressure 
on the press, to threaten and to terrorise, is condemned in Islam.”909 Even during the
901 Kani’s speech 17 September 1980 [26 shahrivar 1359], Yaadnaameh Aboozare Zaman (Bonyaade Farhangiye
Taleghani baa hamkaariye sherkate enteshaar, 1981 [1360]) p. 298.
902 Enghelabe Eslami, 11 December 1980 [20 azar 1359].
903 Enghelabe Eslami, 8 April 1981 [19 farvardin 1360],
904 Keyhan, 18 April 1979 [29 farvardin 1358].
905 Enghelabe Eslami, 25 April 1981 [5 ordibehesht 1360],
906 Enghelabe Eslami, 22 November 1979 [1 azar 1358].
907 Etela'at, 25 August 1980 [3 shahrivar 1359].
908 Enghelabe Eslami, 11 April 1981 [22 farvardin 1360],
909 Soroush, 7 June 1981 [17 khordad 1358], p. 10.
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war, Banisadr had expressed deep concern about the entanglement of freedom. “In the 
history of Iran it is unprecedented that the leader, just as he is worried about war and 
enemy attack, is even more concerned about the attack of freedom-devouring wolves on 
the fundamental freedom of people, and uses all the power he has to prevent these them 
from destroying these freedoms”.910
Nevertheless, on 7 April 1981 the Prosecutor General charged Mizan (the country’s
second most popular paper and name of Bazargan’s Liberation Movement) with “libel,
slander, disturbing national security and false reporting”, ordered its closure and later
arrested its editor on the grounds of divulging military secrets.911 The day after, the
Interior Ministry introduced new measures aimed at further limiting freedom of the
printed media. It also informed political parties that they needed official permission for
their publications. All these moves were justified on the grounds that special measures
were necessary in wartime. Banisadr’s reaction was strong and uncompromising. He
had already predicted that the war would be used as a pretext to eliminate freedoms and
0 1 0warned that “freedoms can not be eliminated with the excuse of war”. Later, he
0 1 ^argued that protecting freedoms not only does not harm the war effort, but helps it.
In an interview with Enghelabe Eslami, he described the closure of Mizan as an 
“illegal” move which presented a serious threat to freedom. He also wrote a letter of 
protest to the prosecutor general, asking for the immediate release of its chief editor and 
the resumption of publication.914 Banisadr’s condemnation of the closure of the 
newspaper surprised some. After all, on the one had, he was a staunch opponent of 
Bazargan’s reformist government and its failure to understand the dynamics of 
revolution. On the other hand, during the presidential campaign the FM gave its 
support to the IRP candidate who stood against him. Hence, he found it necessary to 
explain his position: “to defend Mizan is not a defence of a political group, although this 
defence would be a holy task and the duty of the president. The defence is a defence of 
the revolution itself.” He further added, “the person whose newspaper is attacked under 
the pretext of being liberal was the first prime minister of the Islamic Republic. When a 
revolution reaches a state when power games and political liquidation become 
paramount, then it has returned to its pre-revolutionary state”.915
910 Enghelabe Eslami, 18 December 1980 [27 azar 1359].
911 The Guardian, 8 April 1981.
9,2 Enghelabe Eslami, 9 May 1981 [19 ordibehesht 1360].
913 Enghelabe Eslami, 31 May 1981 [10 khordad 1360].
914 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 585.
915 Enghelabe Eslami 19 November 1980 [28 aban 1359].
246
Enghelabe Eslami also mobilised fundraising to help Mizan post the bail. The public 
response indicated the popularity of his stand. Soon after, he gave an interview to 
Iranian and foreign reporters in which he argued that
the newspapers [in Iran] have an important task, which is to eliminate the 
historical deprivation of the public from correct information, as well as 
from the deprivation of free, rational debates.. .so we can compensate for 
several centuries of backwardness. We all have to stand firm and not let 
this [freedom] which is gained through revolution to be taken away.916
The humiliated IRP reacted, and Beheshti removed the judge who lifted the ban on 
Mizan. Banisadr publicly criticised this action: “with all the power that emanates from 
the people’s vote, I will stand against any violation of freedoms and people’s rights. 
Why, when I protest, have you removed a certain judge, [an act] which runs in violation 
of the constitution?”917
Banisadr’s campaign against the closure of Mizan mobilised the fragmented democratic 
camp, and the NF, Iran Party, and JAMA progressive clergy, among others, gave their 
support. This rare organised mobilisation, bolstered by widespread public support, 
forced the IRP to retreat, and Mizan reappeared on 26 April 1981. This demonstrated 
that the IRP’s advance was not unstoppable and that effective organisational 
mobilization, which activated the participation of the people, successfully blocked the 
IRP’s attempt to curtail freedom of the press. Nevertheless, the mobilisation of 
democratic forces was short-lived.
Torture and the establishment of multiple prisons
Even before Mussadiq’s anniversary event, Banisadr attacked the repressive tendencies 
of the newly-developed revolutionary institutions. He had criticised Ayatollah 
Khalkhali, the first sharia judge, for his summary exectutions. This frustrated the judge, 
as “Banisadr constantly kept repeating that Khalkhali does not have firmness
916 Ardebili., Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 642.
9,7 Keyhan, 30 May 1981 [9 khordad 1360].
247
[Ghaate ’eyat], but murderousness [Ghaateliat]”9'* Further, he publicly exposed the 
total disrepct of revolutionary courts for human life. “I have been given a document”, 
he stated, “which had 11 names on it, and at the bottom the judge [Ali Raazini] had 
written that the above 10 people should be executed. He did not even notice that there 
were 11 people on the list. They even did not have files; it was just that piece of paper 
[upon which names were written].”919 However, Banisadr’s most famous criticism was 
made at the February Ashura gathering in Tehran in front of more than a million people, 
where he warned of the danger of the return of monarchical despotism in a new form 
through use of repressive methods. He also exposed the use of torture in prisons, 
asking,
is it not a fact that according to our constitution, the use of torture is 
forbidden? Where and in which religion and in which type of Islam and 
Islamic country has the state had six different types of prisons? We have 
become worse than the former regime. Why are they not shut down?
They all should be shut down. Islam does not create so many different 
systems aimed at terrorisation. Why are committees not formed to 
investigate this? Why, within an Islamic regime, have the life and 
integrity of people become so worthless that people get arrested, and 
then disappear without a trace or are executed within the blink of an eye?
The judiciray system should stop being an instrument of power.
Hussein’s920 uprising was aimed against this approach, and that is why
Q 9  1
he was martyred.
Then, in order to counter accusations that he aimed to become “Iran’s Napoleon” 
(produced by the Tudeh Party and used by the IRP), he argued “if I would have sought 
despotic power, then everything would be easy; I just wouldn’t oppose with what is 
happening and certainly you could find nobody better than me to legitimate these
918 Sadegh Khalkhali, Khateraate Sheikh Sadeghe Khalkhali [Memoir of Sheikh Sadeghe Khalkhali] (Iran: Nashre
Saayeh, 2000 [1379]), p. 350.
919 Enghelabe Eslami, 16 August 1980 [25 mordad 1359].
920 Imam Hussein was the third Shia imam who, with a number of followers, rose against tyrannical, newly
established Omavid dynasty in the seventh century B.C. and were martyred by Yazid’s army (the Khalif at the 
time). Hussein’s martydom is seen by the Shia as the highest form of uprising for justice against tyranny.
921 Ardebili., Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 331.
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deeds”. He also argued that “in order to become stronger we need more freedom of
Q99expression; the presence of freedom, even in the war-front, is vital”.
Initially, the IRP implicitly confirmed this. Hojat-al-Eslam Rey Shahri stated that “If 
Banisadr’s understanding of torture is what in Islam we call hodood va taziraat 
(physical punishment923), then we don’t deny that, because these are orders in Islam”.924 
Ayatollah Mohamadi Gilani, a senior judge in the revolutionary courts, went further and 
argued that “if Mohaareb [combatant] repents after arrest, it will not be accepted and 
the punishment is stated in the Koran, to kill in the worst manner, to hang in the most 
disgraceful manner. Lashing [tazir] should cut the skin and the flesh and break the 
bone.”925 And Kochooee, the head of prisons, explicity accepted the existence of torture 
in prisons, but by different name, stating that “without any dobut violence should be
Q96used against drug traffickers, but that cannot be called torture”.
Nevertheless, both national shock and international embaraasment forced Khomeini to 
form an investigating committee to study the allegations of torture. Banisadr alone 
submitted 400 documents relating to torture and the committee studied over 3,620 files. 
Still, after more than five months of investigation, the committee declared that there was 
no torture in prisons. Mohammad Montazeri, one of the committee members, stated 
that instances of “physical maltreatment” were few and committed by “unauthorised 
people”. Khomeini went much further and argued that some political groups had
097tortured their own members to slander the regime. The president became aware of 
the content of report in advance when Ali Besharati, a member of the investigating 
committee, told him that the situation in prisons was much worse than the president had
922 Enghelabe Eslami, 19 November 1981 [29 Aban 1359]; see also Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, pp. 195-
97.
923 Hodud are considered fixed Sharia crimes/punishments as determined in the Koran, while Tazirat are
discretionary ones. Torture was issued based on Tazirat law and not Hodud, as it is only in Tazirat that 
whipping and lashing are sanctioned. However, cases of beating with cables and forcing prisoners to jump up 
and down after bleeding; depriving an infant of food in order to make a mother cooperate; burning with 
matches, lighters, or fuel; slow hanging; making prisoners stand for 10-15 days; using prisoner as balls, among 
other methods of torture, are not sanctioned by Tazirat. For more on the use of torture in Iranian prisons, see 
Katayoon Azarlee, Masloob [Crucified] (Forough publishing company, n.d.); Fariba Saabet, Yaadhaaye 
Zendart [Memories of Prision] (Association of Defence of Political Prisoners of Iran, 2004 [1383]); Iraj 
Mesdaaghi, Na Zistan, na Marg [Neither Existence nor Death] (Alfabet Maxima publishing company, n.d.); 
Naser Mohajer, Zendaan [Prison] (Nogteh Publishing, n.d.).
924 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 332.
925 Keyhan, 19 September 1980 [28 shahrivar 1359].
926 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 336.
927 Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, p. 177; Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, pp. 151-52.
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been told, but that the committee was authorised to state that torture did not exist.928 
Banisadr turned to using international pressure, and provided Amnesty International 
with 400 photos of torture and documents asking them to publish them without any 
hesitation,929 which they did. The issue of torture stayed on the public agenda due to 
these constant protests. Later, Khalkhali wrote that “Banisadr never ceased to use the 
issue of torture to criticise the revolutionary courts and never let it go”.930 And Beheshti 
at the time had tried to quiet Banisadr by the threat of a trial: “without any doubt, those
no i
who have spread the rumour of torture in prisons will be prosecuted”. As with his 
continuing criticism of Rajaei’s government and its handling of the American hostages, 
however, Banisadr’s strategy of “exposure and reminder” to counter the IRP’s practice 
of “silencing and forgetting” had a long-lasting effect. The IRP’s negative public image 
never recovered. The facts he presented were so vivid that counter-attacks were nearly 
impossible.
Further erosion of Banisadr’s legal power
In early June 1981 the IRP, via its supporters in the government, promoted bills aimed 
at further reducing the president’s power and permitting the prime minister to fill four 
key ministerial vacancies in his cabinet by nominating caretaker ministers without the 
need to obtain presidential approval. These proposals were in violation of the decree in 
which the judiciary system, government and Majles were forbidden to initiate actions 
detrimental to the president. Banisadr saw this as a continuation of the “creeping coup” 
which according to Ayat’s tape had begun from the closure of universiteis.
Furthermore, though Khomeini had promised Banisadr that he would prevent the bills 
from becoming law, he did not intervene and the Majles ratified them. Bazargan, 
now an MP and the leader of the Freedom Movement, described the bills as a ploy to 
force Banisadr to resign. Banisadr informed Rajaei that his attempt to appoint ministers 
without presidential consent had no legal base and that he had no intention of giving his
Q'X'Xconsent. Rajei argued that the president had no right to interfere in executive tsaks, 
but Kazem Sami, the leader of JAMA, argued that “if the president has no right to
928 Banisadr’s letter to Khomeini, Naamehaa be Khomeini.
929 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 107.
930 Khalkhali,Khateraate Sheikh Sadeghe Khalkhali, p. 313.
931 Enghelabe Eslami, 4 May 1981 [3 khordad 1360].
932 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, pp. 319-20.
933 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 684.
250
interfere in executive tasks, then why does the [constitutional] law see him as 
responsible?”934 The posts remained vacant as long as Banisadr remained president.
Once again, international factors became decisive in the struggle between the two 
political camps. While Banisadr’s legal power as president of the republic was being 
gradually eroded, his position as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces was being 
strengthened daily by success on the war front. In this period, the Iranian navy 
successfully defeated the Iraqi navy and the Iranian air force carried out its most 
spectacular raids against the Iraqi air force, drastically reducing its effectiveness.
Ground forces were also meeting with success. General Fallahi, the joint chief of staff, 
stated that within three months Iranian soldiers and revolutionary guards had regained 
40% of the Iranian territory, which had been occupied by Iraqi forces.935 By this time, 
military defeat was becoming a real possibility for Saddam Hussein. He therefore, with 
the mediation of non-aligned countries, agreed to Iran’s condition. Isidoro Malmierca 
Peoli, the Cuban Foreign Minister and head of the non-aligned informed the president 
of Iraq’s agreement with the terms for ending the war, as Arab oil countries offered to 
pay $25 billion in compensation.936
Therefore, despite political setbacks and the erosion of his power within the state 
apparatus, Banisadr’s position in May and June was stronger than it had previously 
been. Politically he had been able to expose the IRP's attempt to seize state power, and 
surveys showed that the public opposed it. The public had also been made aware that
QT7the hostages had been released in a manner detrimental to Iran's interest. On the 
commemoration of Mussadiq's birthday, Banisadr (particularly through his handling of 
the disruptive Hezbollahis) articulated what had hitherto been an open secret: that such 
violence was not the work of irresponsible thugs, but rather groups organised and 
managed by the IRP. To these political and military successes was added the 
diplomatic success of Saddam’s agreement to a cease-fire on Iran's conditions. This 
should have left Banisadr with ample space for political manoeuvre, allowing him to
934 Enghelabe Eslami, 14 December 1980 [23 azar 1359].
935 Enghelabe Eslami, 17 May 1981 [27 ordibehesht 1360].
936 Rafsanjani talks o f $60 billion compensation, which was offered more than a year after removal of Banisadr
(.Memoir, p. 502) and Banisadr talks about $25 billion (Memoir, pp. 309-10). Enghelabe Eslami-Dar Hejrat, 
6-19 day 1378 [27 December 1999-9 January 2000]. This was also verified by Rafsanjani in his Memoir, p. 
502.
937 Even the polls which were conducted by the Interior Ministry to counter the polls by Banisadr's office found that
92% of respondents were in agreement with Banisadr's stance in relation to the American hostages as they 
found the agreement beneficial to the US and detrimental to Iran.
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counter the IRP’s attempt to seize power, but it was not to be. Banisadr informed 
Khomeini, “if we intend to make peace, it is impossible to have a better offer than this
QIO
one”. Being aware of the IRP’s attempt to sabotage the ceasefire agreement, he 
warned the public of the possible continuation of war: “we should not let the destiny of 
this war become like the destiny of the hostage taking and end up with impoverished 
and distraught people.939
Initially, both Khomeini and the Supreme Defence Council agreed with the peace deal; 
though Khomeini told him to make peace but not to call it peace.940 Ayatollah 
Montazeri, Khomeini’s successor, also encouraged him to accept it.941 However, 
Banisadr argues that IRP leaders, including Beheshti, Rafsanjani and Khamenei, warned 
Khomeini that if peace were declared, Banisadr would gain such power that even 
Khomeini could not oppose him.942 This information is compatible with the IRP’s 
position regarding peace with Iraq. Soon after, Rafsanjani expressed his delight that 
Khomeini’s speech, in which he demanded Saddam’s removal, and pro-IRP and anti­
peace demonstrations, would in his view prevent Banisadr from making a peace deal.943 
Furthermore, IRP leaders declined to meet the leaders of Islamic countries to discuss
Banisadr was well aware that he would gain authority if he could ratify the peace deal. 
On 30 June 1981, while surrounded with enthusiastic pilots and other air-force 
personnel at Shiraz air base, he stated, “as soon as the war ends I will gain the strength
938 Letter to Khomeini, 11 May 1981 [21 ordibehesht 1360], Naamehaa be Khomeini, p. 416.
939 Enghelabe Eslami, 30 May 1981 [9khordad 1360].
940 Banisadr, interview with Radio Azadegan, 4 October 2006.
941 Enghelabe Eslami, 18 September 2001 [28 Shahrivar 1379]. Montazeri continued to favour the ceasefire and, after
the recapture of Khoramshah, said “we felt the armed forces, especially the army, had no desire to enter Iraq. 
They said, until now we fought to expel the enemy from our country, but if we want to enter Iraq that is 
conquest...they had no motivation [for such a task].” See Ayatollah Montazeri, Khaterate Ayatollah 
Montazeri [Montazeri’s Memoir] (Chaape Bahar, 2000 [1379]), pp. 589-91. He added: “send the message to 
Khomeini and ask him to choose peace” (Ibid., pp. 667-68).
942 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005. In this case Banisadr is the only person to present this view. However, his
claim is consistent with the fact that after the liberation of Khoramshahr city, while Khomeini had decided to 
end the war at that point, they were the ones who changed Khomeini’s mind. As Ahmad Khomeini stated, “in 
relation to the Khoramshahr issue Imam believed we are better to end the war now. However the people in 
charge of war wanted to reach Arvand-rood (Shat-al-Arab). Imam was completely against it” as he believed 
that it was “the best time to end the war”. Jomhooriye Eslami, 3 April 1995 [14 farvardin 1374]. Years later, 
however, Rafsanjani presented the opposite version, saying “Imam said it is wrong to stop the war now, we 
should continue”. Keyhan, 10 Feburary 2004 [21 bahman 1382]. However, this contradicts his own memoir, 
where he write that “Ahamd [Khomeini] came and said that Imam is not in favour of entering Iraq”.
Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran.
943 Rafsanjani, Memoir, p. 52.
944 Ibid., p. 108.
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of steel on the domestic front; with the full authority which emanates from your votes 
and will, I will stand against any violation of the freedoms and rights of the 
downtrodden Iranian people”.945 It was no surprise that Rajaei then openly stated that 
“we do not want a victory that is achieved by this army”,946 or that Khomeini’s 
grandson said, “I have heard them [IRP leaders] say that it is preferable to lose half of 
Iran than for Banisadr to become a ruler”.947
By this point, the IRP was preparing to continue the war by placing impossible 
conditions on the Iraqi regime. The president tried to interrupt this plan by once again 
going public: “talk that we want to continue the war to remove the Iraqi regime.. .might 
seem an interesting slogan. However, first of all, it will mobilise global public opinion 
against us. Secondly, no county will ever accept that we play the role of their guardian 
and custodian. Even if they wanted that, as we are revolutionaries, we should not accept 
it”. He then attacked the IRP, demanding that they “stop propagating deceitful 
slogans”.948 However, it is here that Banisadr committed another of his greatest 
political mistakes. He met Khomeini and informed him that, should a diplomatic 
solution to the war prove impossible, his generals had prepared the ground to eject the 
Iraqi army within four months.949 Upon learning of this meeting, Banisadr’s general 
Zahir Nejad, the commander of the ground forces, told him in insightful prediction, 
“within a week, Khomeini will finish you off and after that he will finish off the armed 
forces’ commanders. It is impossible that he let you return victor to Tehran”.950 
Previously, Brigader General Fakuri, commander of the airforce, had stated that “the 
gentlemen [IRP leaders] will not let the war end”. Shortly before Banisadr’s removal 
and after the failure of the IRP to stage a mass demonstration to celebrate the June 1963 
uprising, he came to a similar conclusion as Zahir Nejad: “Mr Khomeini has lost his 
capacity to mobilise the people, and hence he will resort to force and massacre”.951 
After Banisadr’s removal, Fallahi (commander of the armed forces) and Fakuri 
(commander of the air force) were killed in an air crash. Zahir Nejad, who intentionally
945 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 670.
946 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005; Salamatian, interview, 20 April 2005. Rajaei’s speech was delivered in
Sepahsalar Mosque, Tehran.
947 Financial Times, 17 March 1981.
948 Enghelabe Eslami, 9 May 1981 [19 ordibehesht 1360].
949 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, pp. 158-59.
950 Enghelabe Eslami, 3 October 1999 [11 mehr 1378].
951 Interview with Mohammad Jaffari, the chief editor of Enghelabe Eslami newspaper in 1979-81, with Radio
Azadegan, 4 November, 2005. In the same interview he also quotes from Fakuri’s wife: “After his (Fakuri) 
death, his wife goes to Ayatollah Karubi, the head of powerful Foundation of Martyr, in order to ask for 
investigation regarding the circumstances of his death. Karubi responsed by arguing:” Any kind of need, from 
financial to other needs, let us know so we take care of it. But do not follow this issue.”
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avoided air travel during the war, was forced to retire. Soon after, of the remaining ten 
military commandersat the highest level, eight were executed, imprisoned or 
banished.952
Khomeini’s unique position in determining the outcome of the struggle
Once again, it is clear that Khomeini played a pivotal position in shaping the direction 
of the revolution. While he had thus far legitimated the IRP’s legal and illegal levers of 
power, publicly he remained neutral. He was neither prepared to sacrifice Banisadr, as 
he still was trying to incorporate the president into the system, nor did he feel capable of 
doing so yet. He was well aware of Banisadr’s popularity within the public and the 
army and on various occasions he had recognised it. It had not been long since he had 
described Banisadr as his “spiritual son” and said things like: “the President rules over 
people’s hearts”953; “he has devoted his life to the people”;954 “he is from the people and 
the people are with him”;955 and “the people see him [Banisadr] as one of their own.”956 
In addition, he had already described Banisadr’s survival in two helicopter crashes as a 
signs of “the Grace of God”957 and a “miracle”.958
Nevertheless, the IRP was in dire need of Khomeini’s explicit and total support. Its lack 
of public support once again became apparent when the party called for a massive 
demonstration to celebrate the June 1963 uprising. Although the demonstration was 
strongly supported by Islamic and Stalinist organisations like Mujaheddin Enghelab 
Eslami, Tudeh and Fedaeen (the majority faction) in Tehran, they nevertheless only 
mustered a small number of participants. To cover up this embarrassment, the state 
media were used to provide an opposite image, and at Tehran University Khomeini’s 
son Ahmad talked about an overwhelming gathering. This was such an exaggeration 
that Dr Taghizadeh strongly criticised Ahamd Khomeini for lying. His justification for
952 Details of the execution of one, Attarian, have been revealed: “They brought Colonel Attarian for execution. The
colonel said, ‘We were supposed to be martyred on the [battlefield], so let us become a martyr here”. Then 
they brought a Nissan van, dropped them [the exectuted prisoners] in it and took them away.” Ahmadi, 
Tahghighi dar baareh trikhe Enghelabe, pp. 889-90.
953 Khomeini’s speech at the present of eight Islamic leaders, 28, April, 1981. His comments was stated in less than a
month before his removal and Rafsanjani expresses his displeasure of Khomeini’s support of Banisadr by 
refereeing to the unhappiness of his wife and Motahahri’s wife at Khomeini’s speech. See Rafsanjani, Oboor 
az bohran, p. 89.
954 Enghelabe Eslami, 28 .1359.
955 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], vol. 13 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e
Eslami, 1999 [1378]), p. 142.
956 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light], voL 8 (Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e
Eslami, 1999 [1378]), p 384.
957 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour, vol. 13, p. 109.
958 Ibid., p. 141.
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the lie also revealed the increasing atmosphere of censorship around Khomeini. He said, 
“if I would tell the truth [since Khomeini was listening to his speech], my father would 
have had a heart attack”.959
Thus, although the party was unpopular, it still systematically tried to monopolise 
power while systematically being exposed by the president. In order to compel 
Khomeini to support the group publicly, the IRP leaders wrote a letter which contained 
veiled threats, reminding Khomeini that from its inception the party had been 
established with his support and consent and that the leader should not leave it alone at 
its time of need.960 Later they went even further, and in another letter Rafsanjani 
criticised Khomeini’s seemingly neutral position, which allowed the IRP leaders to be 
hammered by their opponents, while Khomeini himself was “not taking any position 
and prefer[ed] to lead a comfortable life”.961 He then employed a reverse psychology to 
call Khomeini to direct action:
Sometimes I think that you are influenced by others’ propaganda and 
claims and you lack decisiveness and bluntness, which was your 
characteristic in guiding the revolution, while now you are taking a weak 
direction. Some people are seriously wondering why our decisive and
0 fS)blunt leader, regarding these vital issues, lacks decisiveness.
This desperate attempt to force Khomeini to take a lead against Banisadr and Banisadr’s 
attempt to convince Khomeini to either stay neutral or support his front demonstrates 
how Khomeini was able to act as a catalyst and have significant impact on the outcome 
of the revolution.
Still, the question remains: what put Khomeini in this position? His charismatic 
character, which emanated from his religious position and political life, is the most 
important factor, but not the only one. As has already been argued, even this 
charismatic quality was neither absolute nor unconditional. For the majority of the 
public, as was demonstrated during the last few months of Banisadr’s presidency,
959 Taghizadeh, interview by the author, London, 3 August 2005.
960 Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 13.
961 Ibid., p. 22.
962 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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Khomeini’s popularity was a dependent variable of the degree to which he advocated 
and upheld the guiding principles and goals of the revolution.
Khomeini’s unique position should also be considered in relationship to the position of 
the two competing political fronts in regard to resources, opportunity, organisation and 
collective action. The totalitarian front was able to function within a unified 
leadership; it was coherent and its followers, through a network of mosques and 
kommitehs, made effective use of its available resources. However, the democratic 
front failed in all these aspects. The closure of universities in the “cultural revolution” 
deprived it from both effective student organisation and physical space for mobilisation. 
More importantly, it lacked a cohesive leadership, as Banisadr was constrained by his 
decisions, the need to maintain national unity in wartime and by his illusive belief that 
Khomeini would only lend limited support to the totalitarian front. He therefore failed 
to provide effective leadership to the democratic camp at early stage of the struggle.
His loyalty towards Khomeini was based on a misplaced hope and a fallacious belief; he 
continued to hope that Khomeini, considering the unpopularity of the IRP, would take 
his side. Banisadr was aware that fierce public resistance to the IRP’s drive to 
monopolise power could result in massive bloodshed. He believed that Khomeini, as a 
religious leader, would want to avoid this and that he would therefore support Banisadr 
against the IRP. The country paid dearly for these hopes and beliefs, as Banisadr lost 
vital time and missed opportunities to effectively organise and mobilise the resources 
available to the democratic front.
Therefore, as Banisadr was trying to convince Khomeini to stay neutral, the totalitarian 
camp was desperately trying to bring Khomeini to its side.963 Eventually, Banisadr’s 
refusal to compromise on democratic principles (what he called the “principles of 
revolution”964) led Khomeini to throw his weight behind the IRP campaign.965
963 See the IRP leaders’ two letters to Khomeini of 2 February 1980 [28 Bahman 1358] and 14 Februaiy 1981 [25
Bahman 1359], in which they try to convince Khomeini to lend his support (Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, pp. 
14-26).
964 Banisadr’s letter to Khomeini. See Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 423.
965 However, the Students of the Imam's Line provided political justification for Khomeini's decision. They published
documents indicating that the CIA was in contact with Banisadr and that even one CIA agent offered him 
$1000 a month for one half-hour consultation on economic issues. The documents proved nothing; in fact, 
other documents that were published included A report from a spy, who described Banisadr as a “tireless 
debater” and argued that Banisadr would not cooperate with America in the US line. However, the IRP’s 
papers mistranslated the document and the word “not” lost its place in the Persian translation (while it was in 
the English version of the document, which was also published); therefore, in that report from the spy’s point 
of view Banisadr would cooperate with the US. See Hiro, Iran Under Ayatollahs, pp. 179-80; Keyhan, 15 June 
1981 [25 Khordad 1360]; Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, pp. 168-69.
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However, until the very last few days before Banisadr’s overthrow, Khomeini still 
applied both stick and carrot in an attempt to incorporate Banisadr into the system. In 
meanwhile, while Beheshti was threatening the president with a trial, Banisadr argued 
that he was not in a position to make such a threat as Beheshti himself occupied the 
position illegally. “According to law”, he argued, “a judge can not be a member of a 
party; hence, one can not be both head of the judiciary system and head of the Islamic 
Republic Party.”966 Beheshti challenged Banisadr to prove his claim, saying “based on 
what law, can the judge not be a member of a party? It seems that he talks about laws,
Q67which only exists in his mind.” Banisadr’s paper subsequently published the 
following: “Mr Beheshti! Based on this law, Article 52 of the principles of organisation 
of justice -  ‘in order to ensure the neutrality of and respect the dignity of judiciary, 
judges are forbidden to be members of political parties or groups, which are affiliated 
with them or to promote parties or publish newspapers or political magazine. The 
violation of the purports of this article will lead to prosecution by the high court and 
dismissal from judicial duties.”968
Khomeini sides with the totalitarian front
As mentioned earlier, in early June 1981 the IRP, via its supporters in the government, 
promoted two bills aimed at further reducing the president’s power and permitting the 
Prime minister to fill key ministerial vacancies in his cabinet by nominating caretaker 
ministers without the need to obtain presidential approval, a move that Banisadr saw as 
the continuation of a creeping coup. Furthermore, though Khomeini had promised 
Banisadr he would prevent the bills from becoming law, he did not interfere and the 
Majles ratified them.969 This was the first time Khomeini openly took sides with the 
IRP and criticised Banisadr. On 27 May he said, “the nation is hostile to the cult of 
personality and anyone who refused to accept the sovereignty of Majles and the 
decisions of the Guardian Council is corrupt and spreading corruption on Earth.” He 
further stated that if “certain intellectuals did not like the clergy, they should go back to 
Europe”.970 Here, also, we can see a relatively serious attempt at the emergence of 
cohesive leadership in the democratic front, when Bazargan for the fist time openly
966 Enghelabe Eslami, 3 June 1981 [13 khordad 1360].
967 Enghelabe Eslami, 4 June 1981 [14 khordad 1360].
968 Ibid.
969 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, pp. 319-20.
970 Ayatollah's Khomeini's speech, Tehran Times, 27 May 1981.
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criticised Khomeini, describing his comments as far from “truth and fairness” and
0 7 1
criticising him for leaving his neutral stand in favour of IRP.
Banisadr was unbowed, however, and increased his criticism of the IRP. He accused 
the “monopolists” of preparing the ground for a one-party totalitarian regime and in a 
letter criticised Khomeini for lending his support to the IRP to achieve this goal: “you 
have sold the leadership of a nation for authority over a fistful of corrupt, power-thirsty 
party leaders.. .you have committed gradual suicide and destroyed the discourse of
Q79revolution”. Being aware of the Tudeh Party’s role in engineering and directing the 
IRP campaign to force him out of office, he warned that Stalinists and fascists were 
lurking in the background. He warned his supporters that if they were not vigilant about 
the rights won by the revolution, its fate, like that of many other great revolutions, 
would be dictatorship. He again stressed that “this [was] not a republic of which I am 
proud to be president”.973 Some observers have argued that Banisadr’s statements 
probably made him the first head of state in the world to become a chief spokesperson 
for the opposition.
Finally, on 20 May 1981, referring to Article 59 of the constitution and to Khomeini’s 
famous statement during the revolution in which he argued that the criterion in Islam is 
people’s vote, Banisadr asked, “if the criterion is the people’s vote, then do I have a 
right to ask this criteria to be expressed or not?”974 From his point of view the 
differences between him and the IRP were not about power itself. “The quarrel”, he 
said, “is about freedom. You [IRP] want to have absolute authority and you are against 
people’s freedom. You want that no one dares to question your affairs. However, the 
president is in favour of freedom and warns the people that if they lose freedom they 
will lose development.”975 Rafsanjani charged that Banisadr was “copying 
Mussadiq”976 and criticised his demand. However, Banisadr simply repeated that “the 
healthiest way to solve the problem is for everybody to agree to go to the people and 
that their vote should decide”.977 Beheshti, aware that the “suggestion of referendum”
971 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, pp. 681-84.
972 Banisadr, Naamehaa be Khomeini and others, p. 449.
973 Abrahimian, Iranian Mojahedin, p. 66.
974 Enghelabe Eslami, 3 June 1981 [13 khordad 1360].
975 Enghelabe Eslami, 18 December 1980 [27 azar 1359],
976 See Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 123.
977 Enghelabe Eslami, 20 May 1981 [30 ordibehesht 1360].
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while Banisadr was at the height of his popularity would reveal the lack of public 
support for the IRP, argued that the “suggestion of referendum aims at weakening the
Q7RIslamic Republic, the constitution, the parliament and the government”. Ahmad 
Salamatian had already argued that most of these institutions were weak anyway, as in 
the example of the Majles. “The parliament is controlled by those who received 4.7% 
of the vote.”979 Bazargan also gave total support to Banisadr’s demand: “let us go to 
ballot boxes in order to solve the country’s issues”.980 Ayatollah Lahouti gave his 
support as well, saying “we have to be sorry for a revolution in which 8% of the people 
rule over 80%”.981 However, after a few days of silence, Khomeini came out strongly 
against the proposal. “If everybody opposes it, I oppose it and if everybody agrees with 
it, still, I oppose it.” Soon after in a statement he removed any ambiguity about his 
opinion of the value of democratic votes: “if 35 million people say yes, I say no”.983
Open confrontation increases support for the president
Meanwhile, popular and army support for Banisadr continued to grow and long queues 
formed hours before the arrival of his papers at newspaper kiosks. It had already had 
become the most widely read in Iranian history.984 Khomeini's public attack on the 
president, in which he told him “if you don’t like Islam, then, you can go to the US and
Q O C  Q ft /*
Europe”, and on the paper proved counter-productive. After Khomeini’s direct 
attack against him, Banisadr received an enthusiastic show of support by the pilots and 
air force personnel in Shiraz base. This was matched in the city itself, when the 
president paid a surprise visit to the city and a spontaneous demonstration of hundreds 
of thousands of people brought the city to standstill.987 This spontaneous expression of 
public support repeated itself in different cities and military bases. During one such a
978 Enghelabe Eslami, 28 May 1981 [7 khordad 1360].
979 Enghelabe Eslami, 20 May 1981 [30 ordibehesht 1360].
980 Mizan, 21 May 1981 [31 ordibehesht 1360].
981 Mizan, 16 May 1981 [26 ordibehesht 1360].
982 Khomeini’s speech, 26 May 1981 in Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour, vol. 14, p. 377.
983 3 5 million was the population of Iran at the time. Khomeini’s speech 25 June 1981 in Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour,
vol. 15, pp. 20-1.
984 The newspaper’s circulation had already reached half a million, but because of massive demand, the paper asked
Etela ’at news paper (where it was published) for one million copies a day. However the paper, which was
under control of pro-IRP management, refused the request and threatened to stop printing the paper all 
together” (Jafari, interview, 9 September 2004).
985 Keyhan, 28 May 1981 [7 khordad 1360].
986 Khomeini later argued “we need newspapers, but we don’t need Enghelabe Eslamf'. Jomhooriye Eslami, 25 June
1981 [4 tir 1360].
987 Taghizadeh, interview, 15 August 2004. Taghizadeh accompanied the president during his Shiraz visit.
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visit to Zahedan, a town where at the beginning of his presidency he was least popular 
(in the presidential election he had received just 20% of the votes),988 the public show of 
support was so enthusiastic that Eric Rouleau, who accompanied him, wrote: “it is a 
plebiscite! What can Khomeini do against that?”989 However, this growing support was 
countered by growing street violence. According to one army intelligence report, 
organised attacks on opposition groups were carried out at the rate of 1200 a week.990 
Following Khomeini’s attack on Banisadr the prosecutor banned 40 newspaper and 
magazines, including Enghelabe Eslami?91
By now events were moving at a very rapid pace. The day of Khomeini’s first indirect 
attack against Banisadr, and within an increasingly violent atmosphere, the conciliation 
committee, disregarding attempts to remove the president’s remaining legal power, 
reprimanded Banisadr for making provocative speeches and thereby disobeying the 
Imam’s [Khomeini’s] orders for all politicians to maintain silence over disputed 
subjects. Banisadr’s total isolation within the regime was so apparent that even his 
representative on the committee, Eshraqi, voted against him. Here we can see that his 
isolation was reinforced by his own miscalculation of making an inappropriate 
appointment to the committee. The next day, Beheshti once again stated that Banisadr 
would be tried for ordering the Hezbollahi arrests at the 5 March rally, as well as for 
refusing to endorse the Prime Minister’s ministerial appointments. Banisadr had 
already responded to these threats by stating “do not scare me with a trial; this trial will 
turn into another revolution in Iran. This trial will be the trial of a nation who has 
elected me. When one is ready to die on the burning sands of the war zone, then he is 
not scared of Evin Prison”.992 Later that same day as MPs were still discussing whether 
to remove Ali-Reza Nobari, the pro-Banisadr director of the Central Bank, 
revolutionary guards surrounded the Central Bank building in an attempt to arrest him. 
Nobari was rescued by Khomeini’s grandson, Seyed Hussein Khomeini, who was also 
pro-Banisadr.993 However, Manouchehr Masoudi, his legal advisor was arrested and a 
few months later put to death. On 6 June, the interior minister closed down the Offices 
of Cooperation and Coordination of People with the President. Its offices across the
988 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 225.
989 Banisadr quotes this from Eric Rouleau, who has confirmed this in an interview with the author, 9 June 2005.
990 Qutoed in Banisadr, “Roozha”, 11 April 1981 [09 ordibehesht 1360].
991 Ghasem Ravan Bakhsh, Baaz khaaniye parvandeye yek reis jomhoor [Re-reading of the case of a president]
(Jaryaane Shenaasi Taarikhe Moaser-Daftare nohom, Entesharate Homaye Ghadir, 1382), p. 124.
992 Ardebili, Ghaeleh Chahardahe Esfand, pp. 670-71.
993 Nobari, in a speech in Versailles on 24 June 2006, revealed how he was rescued by Khomeini’s grandson.
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country were ransacked and all their members arrested. Banisadr remained defiant and 
sent a message to the people: “what is important is not the elimination of the president, 
but the fact that the demon of despotism and oppression once again wants to impose 
itself upon you, the people, and to make the effect of the precious blood of those, which 
was shed for Islam and freedom, worthless”.994 He asked the people to resist and 
neutralise this attempt.
Khomeini replied through a radio speech, asking “you call this dictatorship because you 
want to disobey the Islamic Parliament and the Islamic Prosecutor General? Today to 
close the bazaar and demonstrate is to defy the Prophet and to defy Islam. The day I 
feel danger to the Islamic Republic, I will cut everybody’s hand o ff’. He added, “I will 
break pens and shut mouths”, and ended his speech by warning Banisadr that if he did 
not stop his defiance, “you saw what I've done with Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. I 
will do the same to you if you do not obey the Islamic Parliament, the Islamic 
Prosecutor General, and the Supreme Defence Council”.995 Banisadr responded to 
Khomeini’s threats the same day. In a letter he warned Khomeini that by establishing 
complete censorship, thus making it impossible for the people to participate in politics, 
and by entrusting authority to “corrupt and power-hungry” clergy, he was destroying the 
revolution—he was “committing suicide”. He once again asked Khomeini to do the 
right thing and rescue the revolution from degenerating into dictatorship. He again 
demanded the dissolution and reconstitution of the parliament, government, High 
Judicial Council and the Guardianship Council.996 According to Khomeini’s nephew 
(Reza Pasandideh, the messenger between the two), Khomeini was so outraged by 
Banisadr’s response that he said from then on he would not read Banisadr’s letters. 
Shortly thereafter, he informed Banisadr that if he expelled his colleagues and 
condemned and suppressed eight political organisations,997 Khomeini will retain him as 
president and commander-in-chief and change the government to his liking. This 
“carrot” was accompanied with a stick, as Khomeini threatened that if the president did 
not cooperate with the IRP, he woul finish the job.998 Banisadr, however, asked why it 
would be worthwhile to be commander in chief and president if he had to eliminate
994 Ardebili, Ghaeleh Chahardahe Esfand, p. 680.
995 The Times, 9 June 1981; Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 156.
996 Banisadr, Khyanat be Omid, pp. 19-20.
997 The eight organisations were: National Front (including JAMA), Mujaheddin, Tudeh Party, Fedaeen, Kurdish
Democratic Party, Koomeleh and “ atheistic groups”. Most opposed Banisadr, while a few had made gradual 
moves towards his position.
998 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 136.
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freedoms, and then responded to Khomeini’s threat directly, saying “you have 
threatened me by stating ‘otherwise I will finish the job’—what does that mean? 
Executioner and execution? Your state only lacked a Karbala999 and you are preparing 
for it?”1000 The same day he sent a message to nation, in which he said: “people, if I 
wouldn’t have become your voice of protest and on a daily bases given you a report of 
the country’s real state of affairs; and if I would provide legal cover for whatever was 
happening now, would they treat me in this manner? There is not much left of freedom. 
Once a condemned at the gallows said, ‘oh, freedom, how much crime they have 
committed under you name’. Today I say, ‘oh, Islam, how much crime they are 
committing under your name’. They will discredit Islam to such an extent that for the 
next hundred years no one will be able to talk about religion”.1001 In the evening on the 
day of his message, a furious Khomeini dismissed Banisadr as commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces.1002 Banisadr called a meeting with his generals, in which he told 
them, “I only accepted the presidency and commandership of armed forces with 
intention of establishing independence for the country and freedom for the 
people.. .none of us has the right to sacrifice these goals.. .you should want me for Iran 
and not vice versa”.1003 Then he sent a message to the army in which he said “your duty 
is to remain faithful to your commitment to the country. You must not interfere in 
internal politics.”
The army ponders coup d’etat
Banisadr later revealed that during this time his generals, primarily Zahir Nejad,1004 
offered to intervene militarily, arguing that this would not be considered a coup as he 
had popular support and it would only be an attempt to defeat a minority who were 
trying to monopolise state power. They had already told Banisadr that “was it not 
because of the war, we would swallow the Revolutionary Guards”.1005 Banisadr, 
however, was opposed to a coup, arguing that his method of political action was based
999 Within the Shia paradigm, Karbala is the most explicit manifestation of a struggle between truth and falsity as it is
where Hussein and his followers were killed.
1000 Banisadr, Naamehaa be Khomeini, pp. 452-54.
1001 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, unpublished statement to the Iranian people read in the Majles, 14 June 1981.
1002 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 156.
1003 Banisadr, Khyanat be Omid, p. 16.
1004 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
1005 This is part of the confession, which was forced out by MP Ghazanfar Pour while in prison in order to discredit
Banisadr. Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, pp. 726-27.
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on achieving goals via the people, since in his view this was the method for achieving 
democracy in Iran. He could not violate his own method.1006 Nevertheless, he asked 
his generals to determine whether a coup could be operational, so in the future he could 
not be accused of depriving the people from a chance to avoid religious totalitarianism. 
After a discussion, the generals conceded that the plan was not in fact operational as 
there were not enough army units in Tehran to execute it. Other military units would 
have to be brought from the front and it could not be certain that Saddam Hussein 
would not take advantage of the situation. Furthermore, the plan could not be 
successful without decapitating the regime, which meant eliminating Khomeini, 
Beheshti and Rafsanjani. In any case, Banisadr did not give his consent.1007 Therefore, 
the army did not move in Banisadr’s favour. In a press conference on 10 June, the army 
chiefs, despite the risks they knew they are making, praised Banisadr as “a faithful 
soldier of Islam and Iran”, but reiterated their determination to stay out of politics and 
devote themselves to fighting the war with Iraq. They also reaffirmed their loyalty to 
Khomeini. Later that day the Majles passed a law according to which the president 
either had to sign legislation within five days or face its enforcement without his 
signature.
On 14 June, the president asked Ghazanfarpour, an MP and one of Banisadr’s loyal 
allies, to read a letter to the Iranian people in the Majles, which had already been 
distributed in limited numbers. In it he revealed to the deputies that four ministers from 
the non-aligned countries were supposed to have arrived on 8 June to propose a peace 
plan advantageous to Iran and that Rajaei’s government had postponed the visit, causing 
Iran to lose its last chance of victory. Banisadr predicted that the war would continue 
until it consumed both Iranian and Iraqi forces. This would in turn lead to American 
hegemony over oil resources in the Persian Gulf. He also predicted that the war would 
continue until Iran was humiliated, as had happened with the hostage-taking.1008 He 
said that the ruling clergy were doing to him what they were doing because he resisted 
the temptation of power and, instead of joining them and collaborating with the ruling 
clergy, had decided to become the mouth of the people and not betray his belief, the 
people’s trust and their votes. He further argued that his only sin was that “I wanted the
1006 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 335.
1007 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, pp. 163-64.
1008 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 165.
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Islam, which is the guarantor of independence and freedom and [the Islam], which 
provides the conditions of development for people in all spheres”.
The same day, fearful that the Friday prayers would turn into pro-Banisadr's 
demonstrations, the government banned the Friday prayer in a number of major cities 
including Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd and Sari.
Despite great pressure from Khomeini and the IRP, the president remained 
uncompromising. The IRP, though it still had not received Khomeini’s total support in 
its attempt to remove Banisadr, tried to dismiss the president. At first it attempted to 
remove him constitutionally. Beheshti tried to convince the lawyers of the Judiciary 
Council to remove Banisadr, but the lawyers, considering the move unconstitutional, 
did not bow to this pressure.1009 The IRP then tried to remove him via the Majles. On 
17 June, the Majles met to discus Banisadr’s competence as president. The IRP argued 
that his statement of 12 June, in which he had told the people that a coup was under way 
and asked the people to “rise against the move”, proved his incompetence as president. 
Thus, the study of the fronts demonstrate that while the IRP front had mobilised all the 
forces available to it and drastically increased the use of street violence in order to 
terrorise its opponents, the democratic front, lacking sufficient organisation and 
coherent leadership, was still dispersed, divided and unable to mobilise the massive 
forces available to it.
Disarray and indecisiveness within the democratic camp
By June 1981, Iranian society was immersed in political tension and political gatherings 
were banned. However, in practice these bans applied only to meetings organised by 
pro-Banisadr forces. IRP supporters freely roamed the streets attacking Banisadr’s 
supporters, calling him the “Iranian Pinochet” and demanding his death. Armoured 
vehicles guarded important places and what Banisadr declined to do for patriotic 
reasons the IRP did: it brought back Revolutionary Guard units from the war front.1010 
The democratic forces made a feeble support of the president. On 15 June 1981, the 
National Front called for a demonstration of all democratic parties against the
1009 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 161.
10,0 Rafsanjani, Memoir, pp. 160-61.
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retribution bill and in support of Banisadr’s stance on freedom. Khomeini made a 
ferocious attack against the call, not only calling the NF “apostates” and giving 
Bazargan’s Freedom Movement an ultimatum to distance itself, but also accused 
Mussadiq of not being a Moslem, and indirectly supporting the 1953 coup. “These 
people were proud of him [Mussadiq]. He was not a Moslem. I said he will be slapped 
and it did not take long until he was slapped. If he had remained [in power] he would 
slap Islam.. .The National Front is apostate; the Freedom Movement has until this 
evening to say that the NF’s statement is blasphemous.”1011 Nevertheless, the pro- 
Banisadr demonstration on 15 June was supported by all other pro-democracy parties, 
including, importantly, the Freedom Movement. Despite this, Khomeini still hoped to 
maintain Banisadr as president, although an obedient and submissive president who 
would endorse the oppressive policies of the regime, and thus asked Banisadr to 
repent.1012
Khomeini’s speech was broadcast at 2:00 p.m. on that day. Following the broadcast, 
Bazargan, fearful of retribution, left the democratic camp and hurried to the radio 
station, and at 3:00 p.m. submitted to Khomeini, disassociating himself from the 
demonstration. His quick and unconditional submission had considerable effect on his 
supporters, who had been ready to challenge the IRP. After this, the president’s was 
isolated. Bazargan’s submission had two important effects. First, it demoralised his 
supporters and had repercussions throughout the society, and second, it emboldened the 
IRP’s supporters. Rafsanjani argued that Bazargan had “saved himself by issuing a 
statement”.1013 Also, fearing for their lives, the NF leaders did not attend the 
demonstration. Most of the demonstrators therefore left, and those who remained were 
disorganised and leaderless and soon found themselves surrounded by Hezbollahis. The 
meeting turned into a fiasco. Later, the NF headquarters were attacked and ransacked 
by Hezbollahis.1014 This event, more than any other exposed the lack of cohesive and 
courageous leadership within the democratic front. It also illustrated how isolated 
Banisadr had become on the leadership level. The only serious political organisation, 
the Mujaheddin Khalq, was fighting for its survival and left with no option but to
1011 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour, vol. 15, pp. 20-21; see also Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, pp. 691-92.
1012 Soon after, Khomeini realised that he had made a mistake, for in Islam, unlike in Catholicism, repentance is an
act which takes place between God and a believer; there is no mediator. He tried to correct himself by saying
that “Islam will accept the act of repentance”. Also see the Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 23 June
1981, item no. 062236.
1013 Rafsanjani, Memoir, p. 157.
1014 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 158; Hiro, Iran Under Ayatollahs, p. 182; Banisadr, Khyanat be Omid, pp. 29-
31.
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support the president. It was thus willing to use its resources to support the president. 
The organisation had already made a U-turn from its initial opposition to the president 
and boycott of the presidential election. Rajavi, the leader of the organization met him 
and offered his support. Banisadr responded that he had trusted Khomeini 100%, who 
nevertheless turned out to be untrustworthy, but he was 100% distrustful of Rajavi. 
However, Banisadr offered them a pact based on three principles. The first was that 
they should commit themselves to observing democratic principles in their struggle; the 
second was loyalty to the country’s independence, which meant not seeking foreign 
support in its political struggle; and the third that they should not seek hegemony over 
other groups and organisations.1015
Thus, the NF leaders were in hiding, Bazargan had declared his submission, and 
Khomeini was in the front seat of the attempt to establish the hegemony of the ruling 
clergy over state, while the army was engaged at the front and the public deprived of 
most venues of protest and effective leadership and organisation for mobilisation. 
Surprisingly to many, however, Banisadr remained defiant. He had already stated that 
if he had to choose between power or principles, he would chose his principles.1016 
Embedded in this defiance lay two important hopes; first, as mentioned earlier, that 
Khomeini would realise the heavy price he had to pay for establishing IRP hegemony 
and that he would therefore change his mind; and second, the hope for spontaneous 
public uprising. As has been discussed already, it seems the president was in denial in 
his first hope for Khomeini. As a theorist of power, he should have recognised that 
power creates its own dynamism and that Khomeini found it difficult to resist the 
temptation of power regardless of its cost. He was aware that Khomeini was personally 
involved in secret IRP’s negotations with Reagan’s administration in what became 
known as the “October Surprise”, and that Khomeini could hence not stop supporting 
the IRP without seriously jeopardising his own position. He had seen how Khomeini 
violated his promise of amnesty to the Shah’s generals and approved their execution, 
and ordered the execution of all armed forces personnel accused of participating in the 
najeh coup. His hope in Khomeini, in other words, was misled.
1015 Banisadr, interview, 24 January 2005. See also Misaaghe Shoraaye Jebheye Moghavemat Meli [The treaty of
Iranian Council of National Resistance], unpublished document.
1016 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 726.
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However, Banisadr’s hope for spontaneous public uprising had roots in the history of 
Iranian social movements. It increased as he was informed of the increase of women 
who actively supported him. His ceaseless defense of women’s freedom and equal 
rights with men in a histocially patriarchal society had mobilised women in his support.
Women’s position in Banisadr’s discourse of freedom
Banisadr’s criticism of Islam as a discourse of power was partly grounded in his
perception of it as being a hellenised and hence alienated form of Islam, which
dissociated the meaning of tawhid from its origins and replaced it with the principle of
dichotomy. Ergo, for him, one of the effects of the domination of Aristotelain
philosophy1017 on Islamic thought was the adoption of a belief that women were
imperfect versions of men and hence inferior to them.1018 In order to counter this deeply
ingrained belief system, he used numerous Koranic verses to argue that women and men
were essentially equal and enjoyed equal rights, which must be guaranteed.1019
Furthermore, he argued that relationships between men and women should not be based
on power relations, which are necessarily conflictual, but rather on love and 
1020compassion.
Soon after the overthrow of the monarchy, Banisadr had used the emergence of freedom 
in the the mass media and numerous large public gatherings to communicate his views 
in society. During his presidency, he also actively aimed at promoting women’s rights 
as he saw this as a pre-condition of freedom and development: “without women’s 
freedom with its actual meaning”, he said, “we won’t be able to have an Islamic society, 
which is supposed to be critical and analytical”.1021 He criticised men who viewed 
women as “weak”, “inferior” or as “sexual objects”,1022 arguing that “man’s worth is not 
measured by perceiving women as weak. Women are the art of creation. If you want to 
have a better life, have pity on yourself and respect women; the respect they
1017 The historical roots of this belief in both Christian and Islamic work can be traced to Aristotlian
philosophy, in which women are viewed as inferior to men. See Aristotle, Politics, Book One, Part 
II, translated by Trevor Saunders (New York: Clarendon Press, 1995).
1018 Abol-Hassan Banisadr, Zan va Zanashooee darEslam  [Woman and Marriage in Islam] (Germany: Enteshaaraate
Engelaabe Eslami, 1992), p. 78.
1019 See Keyhan, 17 March 1979 [26 esfand 1357]. For a detailed examination of the principle see Banisadr, Zan va
Zanashooee dar Eslam, Chapter 1.
1020 Koran, 30:21.
1021 Enghelabe Eslami, 9 March 1981 [18 esfand 1359].
1022 Enghelabe Eslami, 2 January 1981 [12 day 1359].
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deserve”.1023 He also criticised women who had internalised and shared these views: 
“when men think that women are created for their pleasure, and if women share this 
view, then how can women develop a critical mind in regard to society?” He also 
argued that “women should be present in social struggle so they can understand the 
problems. They should not be like their previous generations, which were fearful of 
sacrifice”.1024 And in this task, he said, “women, you should not wait for others to do it 
for you”.1025 On these grounds, Banisadr forcefully opposed the imposition of veiling 
on women. Upon Khomeini’s first attempt to make hejab compulsory, Banisadr 
travelled to Qom and reminded Khomeini of his promise for freedom of choice in 
regard to hejab. The same night he appeared on national television and openly opposed 
the imposition of hejab'. “clothing cannot be forced upon society. If one wants to force 
people to wear special clothes, then that is the very thing we are against, since we 
wanted to do away with force”.1026 Furth ermore, throughout his presidency he
1 0 0  7prevented Rajaei from making hejab compulsory in governmental offices. As a 
result of his defense of women’s rights, Banisadr’s support base among women,
i nosespecially the young, widened considerably. Still, after the closure of universities 
and in the absence of effective organised opposition, this support failed to actualise its 
potential. While sporadic resistance and violent encounters with Hezbollahis continued, 
Banisadr, recognising Khomeini’s pivotal postion, continued to communicate with him.
In response to Khomeini’s demand, Banisadr reiterated his political stand in an open 
letter which accused Khomeini of treating him unjustly and invited him to a free public 
debate with the leaders of the three branches of government.1029 Later in a telegram he
1023 Enghelabe Eslami, 15 March 1981 [24 esfand 1359].
1024 Published as Abol-Hassan Banisadr, Khanevaadeh dar Eslamyaa Maghaam va Manzelat Zand dar Eslam
[Family and Women’s Position in Islam] (Germany: Entesharate Enghelabe Eslami, 1980), pp. 14-15.
1025 Enghelabe Eslami, 15 March 1981 [24 esfand 1359],
1026 Later the speech was transcribed and published in Banisadr, Khanevaadeh dar Eslam, p. 101. It might be useful
to mention that at the same meeting, an audience member referred to a comment directed to her from a male 
student, who had told her that “female hair produces a ray which affects men” (ibid., p. 99), implying that 
female hair sexually arouses men. Later in the propaganda war within the revolutionary elite, this student’s 
comment was presented as Banisadr’s comment. The Kayhan London newspaper played a leading role in this 
representation, which was soon picked up by numerous papers and political activists. The character 
assassination on Banisadr was so effective that even today, for many Iranians outside Iran, Banisadr is viewed 
as the one who supported the imposition of hejab based on a belief that women’s hair sexually arouses men. In 
one of the most recent examples, on International Women’s Day, Parvin Darabi said “Banisadr told my sister 
that women’s hair puts out a ray that, when it hits a man’s eyes, they go wild and want to rape the women”. See 
http://www.marzeporgohar.org/index.php7M &cat=15&scat=&artid=320.
1027 See Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 55. Because of Banisadr’s opposition he was unable to do so, but soon after
Banisadr’s removal and as soon as he became the president, he enforced his wish. See Miaanji, Khaandanihaa 
az Zendegiye Yek, p. 126.
1028Ahmad Salamatian, interview by the author, 20 May 2005. Salamatian was director of the Centre for Conducting 
Public Opinion Surverys until he was elected as an MP in 1980.
1029 Miaanji, Khaandanihaa az Zendegiye Yek, p. 696.
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also accused Khomeini of preventing free public debates with political groups in order 
to politicise issues and annihilate them. He further argued that if the government paid 
attention to the people’s real needs, which were economic problems, the absence of 
security and the creation of different crises and war, then it would be seen that the issue 
of political groups has been a false one.1030 During this time, the IRP sped up it moves 
to depose the president. After the lawyers of the Judiciary Council refused to provide 
legal coverage for Banisadr’s removal, it was left to the Majles to provide it. The focus 
of political struggle within the state shifted from the judiciary to the parliament.
The Majles removes the president
Despite his public criticism of Banisadr, Khomeini was still reluctant to depose the 
president and it seemed he was hoping that Banisadr, in return for the incentives 
offered, would submit to his conditions. On 12 June, 107 deputies signed a motion 
asking for the competence of the president to be debated in the house. The day after, 
Rafsanjani, sought Khomeini's approval for the motion, but Khomeini was still hesitant. 
Facing Khomeini's disapproval, he was forced to block the attempt, stating that it was 
“preferable” if Banisadr remained president, provided he recognised the limitations of 
the post. He further argued that “nothing new has happened. The president can carry 
on his duties as president”.1031 When this statement was issued, the Presidential office 
had already being ransacked and OCCP offices across the entire country had been 
closed. However, following Banisadr’s defiance, Rafsanjani received Khomeini’s 
consent. He criticised Banisadr and took the lead in forwarding the motion.
Two days before the speech, on 17 June, after a two-day debate, the Majles passed a law 
which set out procedures to be followed in judging Banisadr's competence, allotting five 
hours each to pro and anti-Banisadr speakers. The house also decided to settle the issue 
on 20 June, after the Iranian weekend, which implied that Banisadr was still being given 
a final chance to come to terms. On 20 June the session started in an atmosphere of 
terror and menace; the parliament was surrounded by Hezbollahis. At their
1030 Banisadr, Khyanat be Omid, pp. 30-31.
1031 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Sokhanranihaye 1360 [Speeches 1982] (Tehran: Daftar-e Nashre Ma’arefe Enghelab, 1999
[1377]), p. 136; Rafsanjani, Memoir, p. 152.
1032 Rafsanjani, Memoir, p. 63.
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strongest, at the outset of Banisadr's presidency, the pro-Banisadr forces mustered 40- 
45 votes out of 218. The rest belonged to the IRP and its allies. However, under these 
extremely threatening conditions, with the Public Gallery of the Majles and the 
surrounding streets filled with shouting and threatening Hezbollahis, the number of pro- 
Banisadr deputies dwindled—20 to 25 deputies, fearing attack, absented themselves 
from the chamber. The IRP also tried to buy off some respected deputies, among them 
E. Sahabi, who informed Banisadr that he had been asked to stay away from the 
struggle as he would be appointed prime minister after Banisadr’s was overthrown.1033 
All but one of the rest abstained on the critical ballot.1034
The success of the Majles in removing Banisadr with such a margin should be seen 
mainly as Rafsanjani’s work. According to Salamatian, Rafsanjani never worked to 
manage the Majles but rather to control it, not only through carrot-and-stick policies, 
but also by using the extreme measure of assassination. Some deputies were threatened 
by other armed deputies, and when mere threats failed to silence them, assassinations 
were planned. In fact, in early June, revolutionary guards tried to assassinate 
Salamatian and Ghazanfarpoor just outside the parliament.1035
The anti-Banisadr attack was led by Khamenei (then the Friday prayer of Tehran who 
became president in 1982 and later became spiritual leader), Musavi Khoeineeha (the 
spiritual leader of the Students of the Imam’s Line), Mohammad Yazdi (who became 
the head of the judiciary) and Ali-Akbar Velayati (who served as Foreign Minister for 
16 years from December 1981 to August 1997). They charged the president with 
standing against Khomeini and lacking belief in Velayat-e faghih, making common 
cause with the opposition and discrediting revolutionary organisations. They also 
accused him, as the commander-in-chief, of leaving Iran vulnerable to foreign 
aggression. Banisadr was also accused of insincerity and haughtiness, shaming Iran in
1033 Banisadr, interview, 9 May 2005. In front of other deputies who were meeting him, Banisadr warned him that
this was a trick, that they wanted his silence and would later have nothing to do with him.
1034 In his memoir Rafsanjani talks about only one vote, which opposed the bill to remove Banisadr. See Rafsanjani,
Oboor az bohran, p. 165.
1035 Salamatian, interview, 26 May 2005. Rafsanjani also refers to it as “the shooting incident”; see Rafsanjani,
Memoir, p. 153. According to Salamatian, they tried to assassinate him at least three times. The second 
attempt took place in the Majles lobby, by a Revolutionary Guard. He succeeded in disarming and arresting 
the guard. However, the authority in the Majles failed to imprison the guard and saw it as a laughing matter, 
advising Salamatian to wear nappies. Days after, the same guard with the help of another tried to assassinate 
them just outside the parliament and escaped the scene when the president’s guards came to the rescue (same 
interview).
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foreign eyes by his accusation of torture in prisons, and attempting to “discredit Islam 
and reinforce nationalism”1036 Khamenei, Tehran’s Friday Imam, accused Banisadr of 
undermining the judiciary system by spreading rumours of torture, as well as 
undermining Khomeini’s authority. He also accused him of planning to restore the 
monarchy and making himself the new monarch. He promised to present the people 
with documents which proved that “he [Banisadr] was taking the country towards 
absolute dictatorship”.1037 Musavi Khoeinihaa accused him of collaborating with 
America and argued that his criticism of the occupation of the American embassy had 
damaged the greater revolution.1038
Of the ten deputies who were signed up to speak in Banisadr's favour, four withdrew 
their names, fearing for their safety. Another four, though blaming Banisadr in part, 
still gave him their cautious and lukewarm support. Another (Hojatol Eslam Hojatee-ye 
Kermani) made a U-turn on the platform and instead of defending the president fiercely 
attacked him for opposing Khomeini. He said, “be certain that I will not choose any 
other way but the Imam’s. I believe that standing against the Imam is an historical 
mistake and I believe that Mr. Banisadr has committed such a thing”.1039 It was left to 
Moin'far to support him without hesitation. He condemned the reign of terror, the 
illegal closure of opposition newspapers, and the alliance of the regime’s newspapers, 
radio and television, and Friday prayers in attacking the President. He also testified that 
the crowd outside the parliament was threatening deputies who intended to defend 
Banisadr and argued that under such circumstances, no proper debate about the fate of 
the president could be carried out. He concluded his statement by asserting that “it is 
not the constitution that regulates the country, but the law of violence, as in the future 
whoever can mobilise more Hezbollahis can rule. Your debates will not change the 
course of events. The verdict is already in and the victim already designated”.1040 His 
speech had not yet finished when shouts of “Death to Moin’far!” rose from the street.
1036 For more details of the speeches, see Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, pp. 704-13.
1037 Keyhan, 20 June 1981 [30 khordad 1360]. The documents have yet to be presented to the people. Still, soon
after Khomeini’s death Khamenei became the absolute ruler of the country, enjoying legal power which even 
Khomeini did not have. For the speech, see Khamenei’s Friday prayer, 19 June 1981, quoted in Ardebili, 
Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 701.
1038 Ibid., p. 706.
1039 Ibid., p. 711.
1040 Keyhan, 22 May 1981 [01 khordad 1360],
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Banisadr was expected to defend himself in the Majles, but he was informed that there 
were plans to assassinate him with the Hezbollais gathered outside the Majles. Later, 
they could argue that he was killed by angry mob. His house had already been raided 
and he was in hiding, issuing statements to the people. Nevertheless, he argues that his 
main reason for not attending in the Majles was that by doing so he would have given 
legitimacy to the creeping coup, which was in its final stages in the illegitiamate 
parliament.1041 Recognising that Khomeini was still in a position to shape the course of 
events, he wrote to him and asked him to save the revolution by changing his policies. 
Ayatollah Mohamadi-e Gilaani, the head of the Revolutionary Courts, had already 
issued his death penalty to be carried out three times unless Banisadr went to Khomeini 
and repented for his sins.1042 Banisadr agreed not only to repent, but in a letter declared 
that he was ready to be executed on the condition that Khomeini become the “Khomeini 
of Paris” and return to people their freedoms, establish a competent and devoted 
government to end external and internal wars, and build the shattered economy and 
securities.1043 This response again illustrates the complicated relationship between 
Khomeini and Banisadr and the effect that such a relation can have on the outcome of 
the revolution. As much as Khomeini did not want to let Banisadr go and expected him 
to submit to his conditions, the president did not hesitate to express his love and 
devotion to Khomeini, on the condition that Khomeini observed what Banisadr believed 
to be the original goals of the revolution. “I am ready to die for you... [so that] you 
come alive by rediscovering the lost spirituality, which emerged in you in Paris. It 
would be a real shame for the deprived people of the world who see our revolution for 
as a great lesson to observe the alienation of the leader of revolution from a 
manifestation of spirituality to a blood-thirsty despotic demon, which becomes more 
barbaric everyday”.1044
Because Khomeini realised that Banisadr would not bow to threats and pressue, he did 
not intervene in the process of his removal. Hence, in the afternoon the deputies finally 
voted on the motion: 177 voted in favour of declaring Banisadr incompetent, twelve 
abstained, and only one voted against.1045 The remaining 28 deputies did not attend the 
parliamentary session. Rafsanjani, Khalkhali and Hadi Gafaari (the chief of the
1041 Enghelabe Eslami, no. 426.
1042 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, p. 6.
1043 Banisadr, Khyanat be omid, pp. 27-8.
1044 Ibid.
1045 Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 165.
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Hezbollahi groups) addressed the jubilant crowd from the balcony of the Majles 
building, shouting “death to Banisadr”. Rafsanjani concluded his speech by saying, 
“with your help, one of the greatest barriers to the continuation of the revolution has 
been eliminated. From this moment, Banisadr is removed from the Islamic Republic. 
Switch your slogans to America” and the crowd did so.1046 Rafsanjani described 
Banisadr’s overthrow as the “third revolution”.1047 The regime’s intellectuals also 
shared the jubilation, above all A. K. Soroush, still a philosopher-despot, who argued, 
“we are pleased to experience the end for the pain of having such an unpleasant 
president...and as the healthy body rejects the corrupt body members, we have rejected 
the president... the people could see that he had stood against the Imam [Khomeini] and 
that caused his downfall”.1048 Khomeini himself, who until the previous month had 
lavished the president with praise, did not hesitate to call his removal an “authentic 
revolution”.1049 Soon after, he classified him with those whom he saw as 
“Bankrupt”,1050 with an “imperfect mind”1051, “ignorant”,1052 and belonging to those 
who have “no religion”.1053
Legal removal or coup?
It is important to interrogate Banisadr’s claim that he was overthrown by a creeping 
coup. It is understandable, for example, that he would interpret the power struggle 
within the government and state as an illegal act aimed at removing him during the final 
stages this coup against freedoms. After all, he had already begun to warn against such 
a coup one year before his removal. That is partly because if he accepted the legality of 
the attempts to remove his legal authority as a president and his eventual impeachment, 
he would be unable to legitimise his own struggle as one of the main leaders of the 
opposition against a regime, in which he served as first president. The regime, 
however, has since maintained that he was removed constitutionally for
1046 Bakhash, Reign o f  Ayatollahs, p. 162.
1047 In order to see the rapid spread of this categorisation by the regime, one just has to see the series of books
published by the ministiy of Islamic propaganda: Enghelabe nour, enghelabe sevom [Revolution of Light, the 
Third Revolution] (Tehran: Islamic Propaganda Ministry 1363 [1983]).
1048 Soroush, 1981, nos. 112, 113 and 114. In a personal email communication on 24 March 2005, he was asked
whether he had any comment on these documents and if they reflect his actual political position during those 
years. Mr Soroush did not reply to the email. The reason for the contact was because it would be interesting 
for the reader to know when the transfer from philosopher-despot to liberal philosopher took place.
1049 Keyhan, 20 June 1981 [30 khordad 1360],
1050 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour, vol. 15, p. 93.
1051 Ibid.
1052 Keyhan, 24 June 1981 [3 tir 1360].
1053 Jomhooriye Eslami, 25 June 1981 [4 tir 1360].
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incompetence,1054 citing the spread of rumours of torture, criticism of the occupation of 
American embassy, lack of belief in Velayate faghih, undermining Khomeini’s and the 
people’s authority, and the attempt to establish a monarchy and make himself a new 
monarch with absolute powers.
These criticisms were based on two levels: belief and action. To argue that the 
president did not believe in Velayat-e faghih and that this justifies his removal is 
difficult, as even before his presidency he had openly criticised the doctrine in the 
Council of Experts, which had been documented. He also played a leading role in 
challenging Ayat’s attempt to assign absolute authority to the leader. Hence, if 
Banisadr’s criticism of Veleyat-e faghih was a reason for dismissal, then it must be 
asked why Khomeini did not openly intervene in his candidacy for presidency in the 
first place. After all, he had prevented Rajavi from running on the grounds that the 
latter had boycotted the constitutional referendum. In addition, this would contradict 
Khomeini’s constant attempt to incorporate the president to the system until his last 
days in office.
On the level of action, the argument that Banisadr spread rumours of torture in prisons, 
openly opposed the occupation of the American embassy and defied Khomeini’s orders, 
could not be used as a legal basis for his removal. According to the constitution, tortue 
is illegal in Iran,1055 even though after Banisadr’s revelation some authorities in the 
judiciary and prisons did not deny its existence and some even approved it. Since this 
time, international human rights organisations have regularly condemned the Iranian 
regime for its torture of prisoners. So it cannot be argued that he had “spread rumours” 
of torture; merely that he had exposed it and hence acted constitutionally by trying to 
prevent it. The occupation of the American embassy was also an illegal act, which 
violated both international laws and the United Nations’ code of conduct, to which Iran 
is a signatory. The president of a country cannot be expected not to oppose such an 
illegal act, and Banisadr’s opposition to it can be interpreted as nothing less than his 
exercise of duty as president.
The next charge against Banisadr is that he undermined Khomeini and the people’s 
authority. This is contradictory, however, since it was Khomeini who undermined the 
people’s authority by openly stating that he would overrule democratic wishes and
1054 Iranian Constitution, Articles 89 and 110 (section 10).
1055 Ibid., Article 38.
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demands.1056 It was the president who in fact tried to uphold them by demanding a 
referendum in order for the people to decide which direction the country had to move. 
His authority, in other words, had emanated from the democratic process. Hence, 
Khomeini had undermined his own authority by defying the people and denying them 
the opportunity to define their political future. Therefore this charge also cannot be 
considered proof of the president’s incompetency.
The last charge, which was presented by Khamenei, was that Banisadr aimed to 
establish a new monarchy with himself as its absolute dictator. This charge contradicts 
the mass of evidence, which suggests that the defence of democratic freedom was the 
basis upon which Banisadr defined the struggle between his camp and the IRP. As 
discussed previously, the IRP had on various occasions also indicated this by labelling 
Banisadr and Bazargan “liberals”.1057 Years after Banisadr’s removal, on several 
occasions Khomeini contacted Banisadr in France, asking him to return to work things 
out, and Banisadr conditioned this on the re-establishment of democracy and 
freedom.1058 Hence, it can be argued that if the president’s aim were anything but the 
establishment of freedoms, he would not have lost these opportunities. Furthermore, his 
accuser became a leader with absolute authority after 1989.1059 Finally, when Khamenei 
made this claim he argued that documents exist to prove his accusation, but after more 
than 25 years those documents have yet to be released. In short, it is difficult to argue 
that these accusations provided a legal basis for removing the first elected president of 
the republic less than 16 months after his overwhelming victory.1060
1056 Khomeini’s speech 26 May 1981 in Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour, vol. 14, p. 377. Also see Khomeini’s speech 25
June 1981 in Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nour, vol. 15, pp. 20-1.
1057 For example, “revolutionary institutions, Majles, judiciary council and hezbollah will not bear the liberals’
government”. Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 71.
1058 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005. In this interview he argued that Khomeini and his son Ahmad contacted
him six times. Abolghasem Mesbahi partly verifies this claim. Mesbahi was co-founder o f Iran’s intelligence 
service and later deputy of Said Emami, deputy minister of Iran’s intelligence ministiy. In the Mykonos trial 
he revealed that Khomeini twice sent him to Paris to ask Banisadr to return. “In 1985 and 1986 with 
Khomeini’s emphatic agreement I met Banisadr, who was living in exile in Paris, in order to encourage him to 
return to Iran. Despite having been given guarantees for his safety, he refused.” Emami stated this in the 
1997 Myconos trial in Germany, in which the court declared that the assassination of Kurdish leaders in Berlin 
in 1992 had been ordered by Iranian leaders, among them, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, and Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, the president of the country at the time. In trial, the testimony of “witness C” [Abolghasem 
Mesbahi] was crucial, as before his defection he was co-founder of Iran’s intelligence service and later 
Emami’s deputy. See “Text of interrogation of witness C” (1 October 1996). Asnade Daadgaahe Myconos 
[Documents of Myconos Trial], translated from German into Persian by Mehran Payandeh, Abas Khodagholi 
and Hamid Nozari (Enteshaarate Archive asnad va pazoohesh’haaye Iran, 2000), p. 175.
1059 Iranian Constitution, Articles 107 and 110. Even Khomeini did not possess the legal powers assigned to the
leader in the revised constitution of 1989.
1060 Banisadr’s election could be seen as the only truly democratic presidential election in Iran because there was no
legal instituion, which could screen candidates and determine eligibility. Even the election of Khatami, which
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On the other, hand Banisadr argues that his removal was the final stage of what he 
called a creeping coup. The manner in which the power of the president was gradually 
eroded and the treatment of his supporters raises a number of questions. For example, 
the last few months of his presidency, pro-Banisadr socio-political forces were 
increasingly harassed and threatened and in some cases the staff of his newspaper were 
beaten and imprisoned.1061 Several months before his removal, in his paper, Banisadr 
exposed an army intelligence report which informed him that in recent months physical 
attacks against opponents of the IRP had reached 1,200 a week. Just as importantly, 
four years later an official report by the judiciary system explicitly revealed and 
supported the decisive role of organised violence in defeating the opponents of the 
totalitarian camp on at least two main occasions. “If the 14 Esfand [September 1981 
anniversary of Mussadiq] event would have taken place without the presence of 
revolutionary institutions and the thundering cry of Hezbollah, and if the 25 Khordad 
[June 1981, National Front demonstration] event would pass without the attacks of the 
revolution’s devotees...for certain we would not be where we are now.”1062
This explicit approval of violence by a judiciary system organised to uphold the law 
indicates the systematic use of violence by IRP supporters against their opponents and 
confirms Banisadr’s accusation.1063 Furthermore, the use of violence in the form of 
attempted assassination was soon exercised at the elite level and even in the Parliament 
pro-Banisadr MPs were threatened and beaten. Soon after, assassination attempts were 
made against two pro-Banisadr MPs as they were leaving the Parliament. All forty 
opposition newspapers were closed, and even in the case of Banisadr’s paper, the 
closure led to the arrest of its chief editor and execution of some of its writers.1064 As 
mentioned already, Revolutionary Guards surrounded the Central Bank in order to 
arrest its director, who was reprieved by Khomeini’s grandson, Seyed Hussein
brielfly rattled the regime, was done under such a system and many presidential candidates (among them E.
Sahabi, a main FM leader) were prevented from running.
1061 On one occasion, after meeting the families of three Enghelabe Eslami reporters, the president told the families:
“this is a historical astonishment, in which you have a president whose supporters are getting arrested”. See 
Enghelabe Eslami, 14 May 1981 [24 ordibehesht 1360]. On another occasion he sent a message to Hojat 
Farah, a reporter who had gone on hunger strike in prison. See Enghelabe Eslami, 9 May 1981 [19 ordibehesht 
1360],
1062 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand. For more detail, see pp. 488-522.
1063 Ayatollah Beheshti was head of both judiciary systems and the IRP when these attacks took place. This extensive
report was published in 1985, when Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili, a leading member of the IRP, was head of the 
judiciary.
1064 Mohammad Jafari, interview by the author, 20 October 2006. Jafari was one of the leaders of the student
organisation in Europe from 1971-78 and the chief editor of Enghelabe Eslami from 1979-81.
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Khomeini. The president’s legal advisor, Manouchehr Masoudi, was arrested and soon 
after executed. The Offices of Cooperation of People with the President in various 
cities and towns continued to be ransacked, and their employees brutally beaten and 
taken to prison. Many were later executed.
On the day of Banisadr’s impeachment, the Parliament was filled with Hezbollahis who 
threatened the few remaining pro-Banisadr MPs to such an extent that those who had 
registered to speak in defence of the President had to either absent themselves or speak 
against Banisadr. The atmosphere of terror created by spectators was exemplified in a 
speech by Moin Far, the only MP who dared to support the president. He began his 
speech with a declaration of faith (shahadah), which in the circumstances indicated his 
readiness to die as a result of what he was about to say. He was constantly interrupted 
with shouts and threats, but argued “in the gatherings in the streets and around the 
parliament, if anybody dares to mention the name of Banisadr or make the slightest 
defence, then he is punished in the severest manner”.1065 Furthermore, it is hard to 
ignore Ayat’s infamous tape, in which the year before the president’s removal he 
discussed plans to remove him. “Tell everyone to stand strong and firm, soon the wave 
will change.. .we have a plan so that even Banisadr’s father can not do a thing.. ..This 
time he can not resist like last time.. .we have to act through available channels.. .as the 
Majles begins its work it will stand against the president... Banisadr is a danger to this 
revolution and in order to neutralise it something should be done. We are not alone, 
Imam is also with us”.1066
Considering the above, Banisadr’s claim of a creeping coup which gradually eroded his 
authority and culminated in his removal can be grounded in fact rather than dismissed 
as political opportunism. This, however, has yet to be recognised as a major and 
consequential political event in scholarship about Iran and the 1979 Iranian revolution. 
From a theoretical perspective it can be argued that the more the regime moved towards 
totalitarian control, the less it tolerated political contestation from within. Banisadr had 
become “dangerous” because he did not tow the regime’s “line” and continued policies 
of exposure, transparency and criticising the strangulation of freedom within Iran. The 
definition of legality/illegality itself became contingent upon the regime’s increasing 
monopolisation of power, and the meanings of the terms changed in order to fulfil the 
needs of this process. Hence, the removal of a president who observed the rule of law
1065 Keyhan, 22 May 1981 [1 khordad 1360],
1066 For details of the tape see Etela’at, 15 and 19 June 1980 [25 khordad and 29 1359].
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and defence of freedoms became legal since the discourse of power that framed the 
regime’s operations defined any threat to its domination as illegal.
However, the activities of the regime had themselves become illegal: denying 
democratic rights through closing universities and newspapers, holding a fraudulent 
election, attacking political gatherings, arrests, imprisonments and using torture to 
terrorise the society. All of these acts violated the principles of the discourse that had 
been previously produced by democratically oriented elites and that was in fact 
introduced by Khomeini in Paris, and hence compromised the regime’s legitimacy.
This is why the president interpreted his removal as a coup, as he argued that any action 
which eroded democratic rights would be a coup against freedom and the guiding 
principles and stated goals of the revolution. This illustrates that the regime and 
Banisadr interpreted the events of his removal within the competing discourses they had 
constructed: Islam as a discourse of power, and Islam as a discourse of freedom.
The final showdown of the opposition
Throughout the Majles debate over Banisadr, demonstrations and clashes continued in 
the streets. However, the greatest challenge from Banisadr's supporters came on 20 
June, when a variety of small leftist groups led by the Mujaheddin, the largest organised 
pro-Banisadr group, organised unannounced demonstrations in Tehran and many 
provincial cities and towns to use public sympathy for the president for their own 
political purpose. The largest demonstration took place in Tehran and initially began 
with a few hundred participants. However, as ordinary people poured from houses, cars 
and public buses, they turned it into the biggest pro-Banisadr mass rally; within a few 
hours its numbers swelled to over half a million as it began to move towards the 
parliament. The IRP was initially shocked by the rapidly growing number of 
demonstrators, to the extent that Mohammad Hejazi, the Mashad deputy, told 
Rafsanjani “we are finished”.1067 However, the demonstration came to a rapid halt as, 
revolutionary guards opened fire on the demonstrators and killed and injured scores of 
participants. To make matters worse, the organisers realised that the rally had become 
genuinely pro-Banisadr and that their initial slogans were replaced by slogans
1067 Banisadr was later informed of the conversation. Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
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supporting the president. Hence, in order to re-claim the demonstration, they brought 
out pictures of their leader, Rajavi, next to those of the president and began chanting
slogans in his support. As a result, most of the disillusioned demonstrators left the
. ^ . 1068 streets.
The very fact of an unannounced demonstration which could attract over half a million 
people in the span of less than a few hours once again illustrated the fluidity and 
fragility of the political situation in the country and the real possibility for change. 
Encouraged by the massive spontaneous support of the people, another demonstration 
was planned. This time Banisadr would personally attend in the bazaar and lead the 
demonstration. However, once again, failures at the leadership level made the plan a 
non-starter.1069 That same afternoon, on 20 June, the Mujaheddin issued a statement 
urging its members to practise “revolutionary resistance in all its forms” and to 
“exercise revolutionary justice against their attackers”.1070 Rafsanjani and the 
government interpreted this as a declaration of war against their regime1071 and stated, 
“these people have made war against God. They are oppressors. They have revolted 
against the Islamic Republic. They have shed blood”.1072 Khalkhali announced that the 
courts had the sacred duty to shoot at least 50 troublemakers per day1073 and said “we 
will dig the grave of Mujaheddin in the streets”.1074 To complement that, the Chief 
Prosecutor declared that in such extraordinary circumstances the guards could dispense 
with the niceties of trials and execute rioters on the spot.1075 At dawn the next day 15 
demonstrators were executed,1076 among them two teenage girls. This marked the 
beginning of a period of unprecedented violence in which the regime, in order to 
terrorise its opponents, began to publish the number of people executed on an everyday 
basis—well over 400 in the first two months.1077 A week after Banisadr’s overthrow, 
on 28 June, a large bomb exploded at the IRP headquarters in Tehran. Over 100 people 
were killed, including some of the most prominent IRP leaders—Beheshti, the most 
celebrated leader, head of the judiciary and a man whom America viewed as the future
1068 Here I have used myself as a reference, as I was an active participant in the demonstration from beginning to end.
1069 Taghizadeh, interview, 15 August 2004.
1070 The leaflets by the Mujaheddin were distributed on the afternoon of 20 June.
1071 Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 163.
1072 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 706.
1073 Kayhan, 22 June 1981.
1074 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 706.
1075 Iran Times, 25 September 1981.
1076 Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 166.
1077 Banisadr, Khyanat be Omid, p. 53.
279
“strong man” of Iran; four cabinet ministers, seven assistant ministers, 27 Majles 
members and many party functionaries.
The identities of the bombers remain shrouded in mystery, and blame for the explosion 
has constantly shifted from one group to another in order to achieve various political 
purposes. The Mujaheddin at first denied responsibility and told Banisadr that they had 
nothing to do with it,1078 but after leaving Iran declared they had done it.1079 The regime 
itself held the Mujaheddin responsible and in retaliation hastened the execution of 
Mujaheddin and other political prisoners. Three yeas later, when the Tudeh party were 
outlawed and its members arrested, they were accused. However, in 1986, after the 
execution of Mehdi Hashemi (Ayatollah Montazeri’s son-in-law, who played a leading 
role in revealing the secret relationship between the US government and Iran in the 
Irangate scandal) Rafsanjani claimed that the bombing had been carried out on Mehdi 
Hashemi’s orders.1080 Banisadr has argued that the explosion was carried out by direct 
order of Khomeini, since he had became suspicious of Beheshti’s close relationship 
with America and wanted to force America to deal with him directly.1081 There is also a 
report, which argues that the explosion was a result of a power struggle within the IRP, 
and asks why Rafsanjani, Rajaei and Behzand Nabavi suddenly decided to leave the 
meeting a few minutes before the explosion.1082
The seriousness of these accusations and constant shift of blame are heightened by the 
fact that the regime never carried out a proper investigation on an explosion which 
killed scores of its leaders. Banisadr surprised his associates by issuing a strong 
condemnation of the explosion, even though it had caused the death of those who in his 
view had destroyed the revolution and plunged the country into civil war. He said he 
wished they “would observe the law and show insightfulness, so things would not end
10R1up as they did”. He defended his position on the grounds of that if he and other
1078 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
1079 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 167.
1080 Rafsanjani’s sermon in Friday prayer after the execution of Mehdi Hashemi on 21 September 1987. Quoted in
Enghelabe Eslami-Dar Hejrat, no. 171, October 1987.
1081 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
1082 Christian Science Monitor, 09 July 1981.
1083 Statements in prison made by Nabab Safavi, Banisadr’s close associate, who was soon after executed. See
Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 732.
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leaders had more seriously resisted the first executions of the Shah’s men in the name of 
the revolution then the destiny of the revolution might have been different.1084
The bomb unleashed a reign of terror unprecedented in recent Iranian history. Over the 
next five weeks, over 1,000 people were sent to the firing squads. This was twice the 
number of monarchists executed within the previous two and half years. Within three 
months of the bombing, more than 2,665 political prisoners were executed, among them 
prominent leaders such as Manucher Masudi, Banisadr’s legal advisor, Khosrow 
Gashgaee, the pro-National Front tribal leader, and Haj Karim Dastmalchi and Hajj Ali- 
Akbar Zahtabchi, two well-known pro-democracy bazaar leaders.1085 This violence was 
countered by the Mujaheddin's violence. They assassinated a number of prominent 
Friday prayers’ Imams and hundreds of IRP supporters. On 30 August, another 
explosion killed Rajaei, then the president of the republic, and his prime minister, 
Bahonar. The regime once again accused the Mujaheddin, though this time the 
Mujaheddin gladly accepted responsibility in order to increase its prestige as the most 
serious opposition group. However, as with the first explosion, no thorough 
investigation was carried out and its real perpetrators have never been identified.
Removal of Banisadr, the “third revolution”
The occupation of the American embassy was seen as the “second revolution”; in 
Khomeini’s words, a “revolution greater than the first”. This resulted in Bazargan’s 
resignation and provided conditions for the monopolisation of power by the IRP. 
However, the election of Banisadr, who despite a massive campaign against him 
inflicted a crushing electoral defeat on the IRP camp, was a huge blow to the party's 
efforts and clearly illustrated its social isolation.1086 The IRP’s domination of the 
Majles allowed it to overcome this limitation and isolate Banisadr within the state. It 
was, however, Banisadr’s decision not to turn his protest over IRP vote rigging into a 
major battle, which enabled the IRP to dominate the Majles—a factor which proved 
decisive in his overthrow. Furthermore, once the initial fear of military defeat with Iraq 
was removed, the war provided the IRP with opportunities to suppress its opponents in
1084 Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 167.
1085 Abrahimian, Iranian Mojahedin, p. 68.
1086 For example, see Muzzaffar, Avaleen reis jomhoor, pp. 95-101, 151-57.
281
the name of the war effort. The possibility of peace under the presidency of Banisadr 
therefore seriously threatened to undermine its position. This partly explains the 
dizzying attempts to remove Banisadr during April and June 1981, since by that time a 
ceasefire had become a real possibility.
Khomeini stayed officially neutral almost until the last month. However, from the very 
beginning he had helped the IRP to extend and consolidate its power over the state by 
appointing its leaders and allies to key positions, like head of the Judiciary and the 
Council of Guardians, and by foisting Rajaei as prime minister on Banisadr and giving 
his blessing to the flawed Majles election. Bazargan also unintentionally helped the 
IRP penetrate the state and consolidate its position by offering ministerial job to the
1 0 8 7clergy, primarily Rafsanjani, in the naive hope that when the clergy experienced the
difficulties of governing they would give up the desire to govern. The decision proved
1 0 8 8to be fatal; in reality, the clergy experienced the taste of power. Thus, by the time of 
the IRP’s final confrontation with Banisadr, the IRP controlled all state institutions 
except the army and Revolutionary Guards1089 and the presidency. Nevertheless, 
because it lacked majority support, the IRP could not consolidate its position. Their 
total dependence on Khomeini was illustrated in the letters they wrote to Khomeini, 
which in various ways begged for his open support and asked him to taking a lead in 
opposing Banisadr.1090 This total dependency can illustrate Khomeini’s unique 
position, again illustrating the open-endedness of the outcome.
The situation grew more acute when the end of the war on Iranian terms became a real 
possibility, and when in the last few months of his presidency Banisadr’s popularity 
exceeded Khomeini’s. The last poll showed that 76% of the people were satisfied with 
Banisadr and 49.5% with Khomeini. The gap was much wider among the young 
generation: nearly 80% supported Banisadr while 30-35% supported Khomeini.1091 
This was verified by many reporters, among them Eric Rouleau, who argued that by
1087 Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, p. 144.
1088 Ahmadi, Darse tajrobeh, p. 216.
1089 Dr Hussein Reza-Zadegan, interview by the author, 08 September 2004. Reza-Zadegan was the commander of
Tehran’s Revolutionary Guards from 1979-81. He argued that the rank and file of the Revolutionary Guards 
supported Banisadr. However, this support was neuturalised when Khomeini directly intervened and stood 
against him.
1090 Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, pp. 14-26.
1091 Data from Markaz-e Sanjesh-e Afkaar [The Centre for Public Opinion Survey], This can also be found in
Banisadr, My Turn to Speak, p. 155.
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June 1981 Banisadr’s popularity surpassed Khomeini’s by a wide margin.1092 
According to the same surveys, Beheshti, Rafsanjani and Khamenei were the most 
disliked leaders in the country. However, in order for this change in attitude to be 
transferred into a change in behaviour, time was essential. Because of Banisadr’s late 
direct encounter with Khomeini, time was a scarce commodity in the final stages of the 
struggle. This thus became another important factor in the public’s failure to actively 
oppose the IRP’s attempts to control the state. It also therefore became another 
important factor for putting Khomeini in a unique position.
Khomeini eventually chose to openly intervene in support of the IRP, thus tipping the 
balance of power against the president and the democratic camp as a whole. The 
overthrow of the first elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran signified that the 
revolution had failed to achieve its primary and declared goal: the democratisation of 
the political and social system. The unprecedented democratisation of the political 
sphere that had followed the revolution turned out to be short lived, as the IRP 
successfully transferred the authoritarian powers of the Pahlavi state into a totalitarian 
state. In actuality, this was the meaning of Rafsanjani’s statement when he described 
Banisadr’s overthrow as the “third revolution”.
Flight to France
Banisadr argued that the low turn out would mean he still had the trust of the people and 
the duty to continue the struggle by exposing the secret relations with America and the 
decision to continue the war, which he saw as interlinked.1093 Soon after the election, 
he was informed that 2.7 million people had voted. The regime itself had already 
predicted a very low turout, saying the election will be without competitor and with low 
participation”.1094 But publicly stated, the number of participants was over 14 million. 
Consequently, Banisadr decided to leave the country in order to continue his struggle.
In his view, the regime could not have been able to establish a totalitarian regime 
without American support. Soon after the election, on 29 July 1981 he left the country
1092 Eric Rouleau verified such findings, which were presented to him by Banisadr’s office at the time. Rouleau,
interview, 9 June 2005.
1093 Banisadr, interview, 22 January 2005.
1094 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Oboor az bohran, p. 198.
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for France in a dramatic escape, accompanied by Rajavi, the head of the Mujaheddin.
In his first interview in the airport he stated “I have left Iran in order to expose the 
organic relationship between Khomeinism and Reaganism”.1095
Khomeini died in 1989—failing to win the war in Iraq, leaving behind a shattered 
economy and impoverished society, and having transformed the constitutional power of 
the leader into an absolute form. At the same time, its first president began a second life 
in exile, which proved much longer than his first exile under the Shah, when he lived in 
France for sixteen years. This exile still continues.
1095 BBC Persian section news, 29 July 1981.
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Conclusion
The twentieth century was the most dynamic in Iranian history since the collapse of the 
Safavid dynasty in the early eighteenth century. It was a century of numerous socio­
political upheavals and the first period in which we observe the emergence of an 
organised elite unified around democratic principles. This elite, which enjoyed 
widespread public support, demanded the abolition of the despotic power of the 
monarchical dynasty and aimed to limit and condition the power of the monarchs. It 
aimed to provide space and opportunity for the public participation in political affairs 
for the first time in Iran’s history. The roots of these upheavals and of public demand 
for political participation must be sought in Iran’s encounter with dominant western 
powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The new elites perceived this as 
an encounter between tradition and modernity. For them, rapid progress in the West 
exposed, more than at any other time, the backward state of Iranian society. This 
recognition provoked a search for the causes of the status quo, and democracy was 
identified as the principle element in western progress. From this perspective, it was 
also perceived as the solution, which could redeem the backward state of the country. 
Western-educated elites were among the first to demand democracy; discourses of 
democratisation were soon also adopted by other sections of the elite, particularly in the 
economic sector, the bazaar, and more importantly among some sections of high-level 
clergy, which argued for its compatibility with Islamic rules of government.
Eventually, the demand for democracy trickled down to the urban population and a 
large section of the public identified its connection with a historical desire for justice. 
Hence, it became widespread as the elite tapped into historical discontent with 
governing authorities.
This movement resulted in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, which ended in failure 
partly as a result of Russian military intervention in 1911 and more importantly as a 
result of the British-backed coup d’etat in 1921. The coup ultimately resulted in the 
termination of the Qajar dynasty and the enthronement of Reza Shah in 1923. As the 
domination of non-western countries by imperialist western powers needed legitimacy, 
the modernisation project and its “civilising effect” became an integral part of the 
political landscape. However, as pursuing this project through democratic means would 
undermine imperial authority, new Orientalist discourses (which in the past had even 
led thinkers like Karl Marx to give their support for colonialism) were used to legitimise
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the use of modernist despots as vehicles to modernise their countries. This was in lieu 
of a democratic model of modernisation, which remained the monopoly of the West. 
Thus, modernist despots were viewed as the best model for government in many non- 
western countries and seen as the most effective way of forcing traditional societies into 
the modem era. Iran’s Reza Shah was celebrated as one of a number of modernist 
despots who emerged during this period in the Middle East, Africa and South America.
While seeking to establish legitimacy for his regime through rapid industrialisation, 
Reza Shah also tried to secure his rule by establishing a reign of terror and suppressing 
his opponents and potential rivals. However, his later pro-German sympathies served 
him poorly and his reign came to an abrupt end when the country was invaded in 1941 
by Allied forces. The Allies appointed his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, as his 
successor. The power vacuum which was created as a result of Reza Shah’s abdication 
and the fragile position of the young and inexperienced Shah led to the emergence of 
new political freedoms and Iran experienced a second wave of democracy during World 
War II. This in turn led to the widespread emergence of new political parties and 
newspapers. It is within this context that Mussadiq, an experienced and charismatic 
Iranian leader and a veteran of the Constitutional Revolution, emerged to unify the 
majority of these parties into the National Front in order to re-establish the country’s 
independence. This attempt manifested itself specifically in the movement for the 
nationalisation of oil in 1951. However, the emerging democracy failed to become 
institutionalised as the country experienced economic hardship as a result of economic 
sanctions levied by the British government. A wave of dissent appeared in the National 
Front, gradually leading to its fragmentation and weakening.
This illustrates how international factors can condition the outcome of struggle between 
different political factions, particularly when one section of the political apparatus 
cooperates with an external power in order to achieve its political objectives. As a 
result of shared interests between foreign actors and their domestic supporters, most 
notably the monarchy and certain Islamic leader and groups, primarily Ayatollah 
Kashani, Behbahani and the Fedaeen Islam, the American and British governments 
successfully engineered a coup d’etat in 1953 which deposed Mussadiq and resulted in 
the establishment of Mohammad Reza Shah’s authoritarian regime.
286
Apart from a brief period of relative political freedom in the early 1960s that ended with 
a bloody suppression in 1963, Iran experienced twenty-five years of authoritarian rule in 
which, while certain social freedoms were recognised, in the political domain the Shah 
of Iran ruthlessly suppressed all political opposition and increasingly monopolised the 
state and government. The bloody closure of the political opening in the early 1960s 
and the Shah’s increasingly use of an iron-fist policy considerably shaped the political 
objectives of the opposition and resulted in the increasing radicalisation of a range of 
opposition groups, which was reinforced by international factors and the introduction of 
guerrilla warfare as a method of struggle against western dominant powers and their 
domestic proxies in countries like Cuba and Vietnam. However, the reformist 
nationalist opposition ignored Mussadiq’s policy of “negative equilibrium” and 
developed a dichotomist relationship between independence and freedom, prioritising 
freedom at the cost of independence. It also failed to communicate with society at large 
and lost popularity, particularly among the educated young. This was concomitant with 
a drastic weakening in the social bases of the secular left in Iran, which occurred as a 
result of its role during Mussadiq’s premiership, its disregard for the strong patriotic 
tendencies of the majority of Iranians, and its committed pro-Soviet policies.
As the social base of these political groups shrunk, a political and ideological vacuum 
developed. This was soon filled by emerging Islamic scholars and intellectuals who 
aimed to construct an Islamic alternative to both secular nationalism and Marxism.
Rapid structural changes in socio-economic and political domains created conditions for 
the dialectical encounter between tradition and modernity that they engaged with.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Iranian Moslem scholars and intellectuals played an 
important political role by producing a new discourse of Islam which synthesised 
traditional cultural elements of Islam and redefined Islamic culture with new concept of 
democratisation. Without exception, but to varying degrees and from various 
perspectives, their language, philosophical assumptions, political objectives and cultural 
knowledge aimed at the production and consumption of resistance and rebellion, rather 
than indifference and submission. The ideological resources of this resistance were 
drawn from their local or localised culture. Ali Shariati, the most celebrated intellectual 
of this generation, played a historical role by redefining “quietest” and non-political 
Islamic beliefs which had for centuries been used to justify submission to political 
authorities into beliefs which promoted resistance to political suppression, if not 
rebellion. The utilisation and reinterpretation of existing forms of cultural capital in
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Iranian society resonated across a wide range of social classes and segments within the 
society. Also the new and progressive interpretation of Islam had provided conditions 
in which Iranian society move from a largely traditional society into a modem society 
without going through an identity crisis.
Also, as twentieth-century Iranian revolutions were primarily urban phenomena, the 
rapid increase in oil price in the early 1970s led to deep economic changes that 
constituted part of the social and economic conditions for revolution. While these 
changes drastically increased the power of the state, they also altered the composition of 
Iranian society through migration, widespread urbanisation and the expansion of the 
middle and working classes. This provided a much larger pool of human resources that 
could be mobilised to participate in the revolution. Finally, the changes also increased 
the economic power of the traditional bourgeoisie, the bazaari, who were hostile to the 
Shah’s authoritarian power. They too therefore had expanded resources available to 
them in the impending revolution.
The Shah’s rigid policy of preventing any meaningful participation on the part of these 
diverse social classes in political affairs further weakened the monarchy’s legitimacy. 
The newly rich section of society, which had gained astronomical wealth as a result of 
its close association with the Shah’s family, was far too small and disloyal to provide a 
viable social base for the regime. They were the first to flee the country, starting at least 
two years before revolution. The modem middle class that was culturally closest to the 
monarchy and which to a large extent owed its new comfortable status to the regime’s 
policies felt no loyalty to the regime as it had no political representation. As a result, 
the monarchy was isolated and found itself to be entirely dependent on its security 
forces as well as its “special relation” with America; these conditions made it vulnerable 
to public unrest. Furthermore, perceived changes in American foreign policy—in 
particular Jimmy Carter’s election in 1976—had a deep impact on both the Shah and the 
opposition. This proved to be the final straw which set the wheels of revolution in 
motion.
The history of the 1979 revolution illustrates again how the domestic dynamics of 
revolution were affected by international factors, and how the interaction of 
international and domestic variables created socio-political conditions for the rising 
revolution. The critical analysis of revolutionary events in Iran from 1979-81 also
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reveals how important it is to understand the intersection of political events, their 
strategic interpretation by social actors, the regime’s responses to these actions, and the 
effect of international factors on the evolving dynamism created by mass mobilisation 
and the regime’s resistance to it. These historical conjunctures reveal potential 
trajectories which challenge claims about the inevitability of particular revolutionary 
outcomes. Bakhtiar’s refusal to be appointed as Khomeini’s prime minister since it was 
opposed by the US government, the delayed release of the American hostages, and as 
Banisadr was prevented from making a favourable peace treaty with Iraq before the 
coup in 1981 are all examples of points at which the history of the revolution may have 
been transformed through changes in either structural conditions or human agency. The 
consideration of such pivotal decisions is not an attempt to give recognition and validity 
to “hypothetical history” or “counter factualism”, but rather, as this in-depth study of 
the process demonstrates, a reminder that in socio-historical research the contingency 
factor should be taken seriously. If alternative historical trajectories are not interpreted 
as real possibilities, if we neglect to ask “why not” in addition to “why”, then the 
underpinning basis of any analysis will not only be descriptive, but will also be a form 
of historical determinism.
The Iranian experience: a challenge for understanding social revolutions
From this perspective we can understand how the Iranian revolution posed serious 
challenges in both political and academic spheres. In the 1970s the Pahlavi regime was 
the strongest US ally in the Middle East, one which had enjoyed the total support of the 
West and the acquiescence of the USSR; it was governed by a regime that relied on 
powerful and undefeated security forces, massive oil revenues and a seemingly 
developing economy. Despite all this, it was overthrown by the hands of its people who 
recruited non-violent methods and avoided receiving any foreign power’s support.
This, as well as the revolution’s demographic location, political resources and 
ideological framework, posed a major challenge to sociological theories of revolution. 
During the Cold War, the dominant method of revolution was the use of violence, 
organised by a small vanguard party, which used armed struggle to wage war against a 
regime; gradually, the masses would join and form the rank and file of the revolutionary 
organisation. However, two major characteristics of the Iranian revolution introduced a 
new revolutionary model: its non-violent methods and its spontaneity. While other 
revolutions, as forms of urban and rural warfare, often resorted to violence as a means
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to achieve their goals, the Iranian revolution specifically and consciously employed a 
series of innovative non-violent methods of struggle, best exemplified by large peaceful 
demonstrations and widespread national strikes. This new model set a precedent for the 
revolutions in Eastern Europe (in the late 1980s and early 1990s) and to the present 
time. In addition, the revolution was so unexpected that until the closure of the bazaar, 
even Khomeini did not believe that the revolution was in the making as he had already 
grown pessimistic and resigned himself to the status quo.1096 It not only took political 
leaders by surprise, but set new challenges for academic experts of social revolutions. It 
emerged that theories about other revolutions failed to explain the ideological, 
methodological and demographic aspects of the Iranian revolution and thus could not be 
generalised to it.
The demographic bases of the revolution posed another challenge to theories of 
revolution. The Iranian revolution transferred the central gravity of social revolutions 
from rural areas to the urban sector of the population. Until then, the Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Algerian and other contemporary revolutions (with the exception of the 
1917 Russian revolution) suggested that the urban sector, apart from recruiting the bulk 
of revolutionary elite, played a secondary role in mass revolutionary participation. The 
Iranian revolution saw one of the highest levels of urban participation in a revolutionary 
process; although there is no specific data on exact numbers of participants, the plethora 
of visual and journalistic reports during this period indicates that the absolute majority 
of the urban population, to various degrees participated in the revolution. The causes of 
this have yet to receive serious scholarly research.
Furthermore, the revolution also differentiated itself politically from other revolutions. 
Unlike other revolutions in which foreign powers (primarily the USSR) played major 
military and political roles, the Iranian revolution actively tried to distance itself from 
any foreign power, to the extent that the slogan “neither East nor West” formed the 
basis for one of its main guiding principles. In addition, the revolution received the 
general and, to varying degrees, enthusiastic support of global public opinion, not only 
in Islamic countries but in large section of the West as well.
1096 Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revoluion, p. 21.
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Finally, the revolution differentiated itself from other revolutions on an ideological 
level. Twentieth-century revolutions had until then been motivated by either 
nationalism or socialism and in most cases some combination of the two. While the 
Iranian revolution was reinforced by elements of nationalism and socialism, its most 
important ideological formation had an Islamic base. Until then, religion had been seen 
as an increasingly spent social force whose socio-political role declined rapidly when 
faced by the increasing advance of modernisation project.
The inadequacy of existing theories of revolution and mass mobilisation is not confined 
to the first stage of the Iranian revolution, but continues to the domain of its process and 
outcome as well. Structuralist theories of revolution are by their very nature unable to 
scrutinise the process as they leave little space for the effects of human action, events 
and chance. Within structuralist approaches, the process is to a large extent seen as 
organic and automatic, leading to a predetermined outcome. Modernisation theories 
also struggle to produce adequate theorisations of the revolution, mainly because of the 
negative perception they have toward social revolutions in general and religious 
movements in particular. Positivism, as a philosophical base of both modernist and 
structuralist theories, has created a blind spot concerning the various (if not conflicting) 
roles that religion can play in social movements. Because they are more concerned with 
the establishment of social order rather than social change, structural functionalist 
theorists of revolution have perceived any possible outcome of social revolution with 
deep scepticism. The common denominator between these theories of revolution is 
their failure to develop an overarching theory, which is neither too general to be a viable 
sociological explanation nor too specifically awash with exceptions that the theory itself 
becomes an exception. Instead, we might more usefully ask why relatively similar 
socio-economic and political circumstances lead to different types of social action in 
different countries.
The cultural factor in theories of revolutions
In this thesis I have tried to demonstrate that culture offers a key to answering this 
question. Through the filter of culture, human agents not only subjectify the objective 
structural conditions in which they live and interpret the world, but also objectify their 
subjective interpretations of this structure. In other words, it is cultural value systems 
that determine whether people living in specific structural conditions produce and
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consume practices of submission, consent, passive resistance or rebellion. Ignoring the 
spatial and temporal differences between societies has led to the development of 
determinist theories of revolution, both structuralist and agentic. This research 
demonstrates that in order to develop a non-determinist theory we need to combine 
theoretical and empirical variables through an analysis of the relationship between 
structure and agency. Culture is the key ingredient in such a theory as it is a relatively 
autonomous mediating factor, constrained and enabled by its internal dynamism and its 
interaction with structural variables.
However, the cultural factor cannot play its primary role in challenging the 
deterministic aspect of many theories of revolution as long as it is perceived as an 
essential value system which lacks the dynamism, innovation and ability not only to 
adopt but also to change social reality. Islam has often been perceived as a belief 
system which “does not develop, and neither do Muslims; they are merely are”.1097 
From this perspective, culture cannot be recruited to explain why universal theories of 
revolution have not been developed. Furthermore, such essentialisation of culture 
makes it impossible to excavate and investigate the dynamic complexities of the culture 
of revolution, and hence the open-endedness of the Iranian revolution.
One of the main tasks of this work has been to question the essentialisation of culture, a 
concept which in our contemporary world has made it possible for theorists such as 
Samuel Huntington to develop his theory of the clash of civilisations. The task of de- 
essentialising the role of Islam in the Iranian revolution is achieved in two ways: first, 
by demonstrating the wide differences between different Islamic discourses and 
identifying their social bases, and second, by analysing the revolutionary process and 
the dynamic relation between agent and structure as mediated by culture. Recognising 
the relative autonomy of culture makes it possible the development of a non- 
deterministic theory of revolution.
The consideration of spatial and temporal differences between societies is key to the 
development of non-deterministic theories. However, we also examine certain 
theoretical and empirical variables through the lens of an analysis of the relationship 
between structure and agency. In other words, to consider culture as the key ingredient 
in such a theory and as a mediating factor, which is constrained and enabled by its
1097 Vatikiotis, Revolution in the Middle East, quoted in Said, Orientalism, p. 317.
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internal dynamism and its interaction with structural variables, the study of the 
historical context becomes necessary. It is within this context that it also becomes 
important to consider how the effect of ideology on elite decision-making conditioned 
the medium term outcome of the revolution.
Ideology and elite decision-making in post-revolutionary Iran
A number of competing approaches to state building emerged during Bazargan’s nine- 
month premiership in 1979. What we initially observed in this period was the 
termination of revolutionary consensus, accompanied by the overthrow of the ancien 
regime. We also observed the emergence and formation of competing political groups, 
which gradually formed clusters and ultimately divided into two fronts: a totalitarian 
front, which eventually controlled and dominated all state and societal institutions, and 
a democratic front, which in a much looser form was represented by Bazargan and later 
by Banisadr. The totalitarian front used a number of specific methods to strip 
Bazargan’s government of its power and form a shadow government; in particular, its 
skilful use of the very opportunities that were provided by Bazargan’s government, like 
his invitation of IRP leaders to join his government and more importantly the 
establishment of revolutionary guards and construction jihad in villages, which were 
soon taken out of Bazargan’s control.
The totalitarian forces initially had neither resources nor capability to monopolise the 
state. Bazargan’s government, however, made a number of critical decisions that 
ultimately provided the conditions for the success of the theocratic bid for power. 
However, the main cause of Bazargan’s demise can be found in his political ideology. 
He was a committed reformist, not a revolutionary and never wished for a revolution. 
Although his reformism was incompatible with the expectations the revolution had 
created, he continued to base his political actions on an unpopular, reformist logic. He 
failed to realise that irrespective of his beliefs, the revolution had taken place and he had 
to adjust his political action based on this premise. He failed to do so in all domains, 
particularly that of foreign policy and the economy, while the state’s bureaucracy and its 
despotic structure remained intact. This led to the growth of discontent, especially 
among the youth, and provided legitimacy for the IRP’s growing interference in 
governmental affairs. In other words, the ideological roots of Bazargan’s government 
made it increasingly unpopular among its own support base and thus vulnerable to the
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totalitarian front’s creeping coup, which eventually, according to him, turned his 
government into a knife without a blade.
The occupation of the American embassy in 1979 proved to be the single most 
important political event in this period, which conditioned the dynamism of the 
revolution and its trajectory to the present time. Bazargan’s last political action— 
resigning over the affair— proved to be his last mistake as a prime minister, as it made 
it possible for the totalitarian front to legitimise its power through the constitution and 
advance even closer to assuming total control of the state. This attempt, however, was 
challenged by Banisadr after he was elected the first president in what had historically 
been a land of monarchs. Unlike Bazargan, Banisadr was guided by a social philosophy 
of revolution and aimed to make his actions compatible with the expectations of those 
favouring revolutionary politics; according to him, he was determined to not let the 
revolution to become “deviated” from its goals and guiding principles and to be 
hijacked by a “fistful of fascist clergy”.1098
This objective at first seemed to be a real possibility as his election in 1980 was a 
shattering defeat for the totalitarian front; it severely humiliated their candidate at the 
polls and provided democratic forces with a golden opportunity to foil the IRP’s bid for 
state control. However, his presidency and the future of the democratic front were 
largely conditioned by two international events. First, as pointed out already, the 
occupation of the American embassy not only forced Bazargan’s government to resign, 
but also made it possible for the clergy to institutionalise its power within the 
constitution. The hostage-taking also secured the victory of Ronald Reagan as US 
president in 1980, which further strengthened the totalitarian front in Iran.1099 Second, 
the Iran-Iraq war and, as has already been argued, its deliberate continuation, was 
another decisive factor which resulted from the embassy occupation. This enabled the 
totalitarian forces to use the war to their advantage by preventing a peace deal during 
Banisadr’s administration, which would dash any hope of consolidating their power.
The Stalinist left in this case also lent their support to the IRP by labelling Banisadr as
1098 Eric Rouleau, “Iran in search of a president”, Le Monde, 25 December 1980.
i°99 -j'hjg js because it both made possible clandestine agreements between the US and Iranian governments (the Iran- 
Contra affair should be seen within this context, as should the October Surprise, though the latter is still under 
debate) and enabled both to have a “public enemy”, which legitimised the Iranian regime and its policy of anti- 
Americanism and allowed Reagan to embark on an aggressive foreign policy.
294
the Napoleon of the Iranian revolution and later on as Pinochet.1100 The continuation of 
war was the most decisive strategy for consolidating their power.
As the effect of international forces increased, Banisadr’s position was weakened by a 
number of poor decisions and by Khomeini’s increasing support for the IRP. The most 
important of his mistakes was to allow the country’s first parliament to convene and to 
not seriously challenge its legality. This parliament was instrumental in weakening his 
political position. Fearful of Iraqi attack and desperate to have a government in place 
before it, this decision was compounded by another to the IRP, via Khomeini, impose 
its choice of prime minister upon him, he also let the IRP create a power base within his 
own domain, which drastically weakened his presidential position. Finally, the IRP’s 
creation of deliberate crisis and the prolonging of already existing crises proved to be 
deeply detrimental to the democratic front, as Banisadr’s presidency was thus marred by 
crises: the “cultural revolution”, the closure of universities, the continuation of civil war 
in Kurdistan and the war with Iraq.
The Stalinist left, as part of the totalitarian front, also played an important role in 
weakening the democratic front in two seemingly opposing ways. First, it initiated civil 
war in various parts of Iran, particularly Kurdistan, at the early days of revolution, when 
democratic venues for the opposition were still wide open. Stalinists used the 1917 
Russian revolution as a model, tried to instigate a “second revolution” by overthrowing 
Khomeini’s regime through armed struggle to precipitate an “October revolution”. This 
strategy strengthened the totalitarian front in two ways. The initiation of civil war 
introduced and legitimised the use of violence into the revolutionary process, which 
until then had been confined to the remnants of the ancien regime, thus justifying the 
use of violence by the IRP against other groups who participated in the revolution. By 
engaging large units of the army in Kurdistan, they also provided another military 
incentive for Saddam Hussein to invade Iran. The other way in which the Stalinist left 
enthusiastically helped the totalitarian front was through the Tudeh Party, which later on 
joined forces with the Fedaeen, the majority faction. The Tudeh Party, as the oldest 
leftist organisation in Middle East, lent its political expertise and resources to the 
inexperienced IRP leaders in their struggle against democratic front.
n00 Ardebili, Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand, p. 489.
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However, it could be argued that Banisadr’s most important blunder, one which 
conditioned his subsequent mistakes, was his total trust in and loyalty towards 
Khomeini. This was the decisive factor in the erosion of Banisadr’s authority. On 
several important occasions his belief in the Grand Ayatollah prevented him from 
recognising Khomeini’s propensity to use any violence against his political opponents, 
which prevented him from taking certain precautions in their relationship. This belief 
was only shattered when, during the final days of his presidency, the revolutionary 
guards raided his house in order to assassinate him.1101 This is not to say that Banisadr 
failed to identify Khomeini’s despotic tendencies in both his character and ideological 
beliefs, or that he failed to confront him about them on numerous occasions, but rather 
to say that he also believed that Khomeini would only go so far to implement his ideas. 
His analysis of the situation was based on a fact and a belief, the latter of which turned 
out to be a fantasy. The fact was that the totalitarian front was deprived of majority 
support and that in order to control the state Khomeini would have to give his support 
for major bloodshed. However, he failed to make the use of this fact by his belief that 
Khomeini, as a Grand Ayatollah and the leader of the revolution, would not give his 
permission for the bloody crackdown of the IRP’s opponents. Thus, he believed that as 
he enjoyed the support of the majority of the public and the army, he would be provided 
with the conditions to neutralise totalitarian front and rescue the revolution from falling 
onto a dictatorial path.
Finally, the research defines Khomeini as a catalyst in the outcome of the revolution, as 
it was his final decision to turn against the president which decided the fate of the 
fronts. His position as a catalyst was facilitated both by the failure of the democratic 
front to mobilise the massive resources available to it and by the inability of the IRP to 
remove the president without Khomeini’s total support. This provided him with an 
opportunity to shape the outcome of the struggle between the fronts. The constellation 
of these factors and the conditional responses of the main actors involved illustrate the 
open-endedness of the revolution and its ultimate outcome; an outcome, which has yet 
to be decided. The dice continue to roll.
1101 Salamatian used this as an example of the type of relationship Banisadr had with Khomeini. Salamatian, 
interview, 20 April 2005.
296
Bibliography
Abdulghani, J.M. Iraq and Iran: The Years o f  Crisis. London and Sydney: Croom 
Helm, 1984.
Abedi-ye Mianji, Mohammad. Khandaniha az zendegiye yek reis-e jomhoor-Mohamad 
Ali Rejaei [Interesting Parts of a Life of a President-Mohammad Ali Rejaei], 
Entesharate Noor-al-Sajad, 2001 [1380].
Abrahamian, Ervand. “The crowd in Iranian politics” in In Modern Iran: The 
Dialectics o f Continuity and Change, edited by M. Bonnine and N. Keddie. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1968.
—. Iran Between Two Revolutions. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982.
— . The Iranian Mojahedin. London: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1989.
— . Khomeinism. I.B. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1993.
— . Ali Shari’ati: Ideologue o f the Iranian Revolution. MERIP Reports, no. 102, Islam 
and Politics, (January) 1982.
Afkhami, Gholam R. The Iranian Revolution: Thanatos on a National Scale. 
Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1985.
Adelkhah, Fanba. Being modern in Iran, translated from the French by Jonathan 
Derrick. New York: Columbia University Press in association with the Centre d’Etudes 
et de Recherches Internationales, 2000.
Afary, Janet. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots 
Democracy, Social Democracy and the Origins o f  Feminism. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996.
Afary, Janet and Anderson, Kevin. Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and 
the Seductions oflslamism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Afshar, Haleh, ed. Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil. New York: Macmillan, 1985.
— . Islam and Feminisms: An Iranian Case-Study. London: Macmillan, 1998.
Agence France-Presse, “Iranian cleric goes to battle in cyberspace”, New York Times,
17 December 2000.
Ahmed, S. Islam Today: A Short Introduction to the Muslim World. New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 1999.
Ahmed, Sk. Ishtiaque. Iranian Politics: Intellectuals and Ulama. Delhi, India: Vista 
International Publishing House, 2006.
Ahmadi, Hamid. Tahghighi dar bareye tarikhe enghelabe Iran [Researching the History 
of the Iranian Revolution], Vol. 2. Enghelabe Eslami Publications, 2002 [1380].
297
— . Dorse Tajrobeh [Lessons of Experience: Abol-Hassan Banisadr’s Memoir in 
Conversation with Hamid Ahmadi]. Enghelabe Eslami Zeitung, 2003 [1380].
Ahmadi, Mohamad Reza, ed. Khaterate ayatollah mohammad ali gerami [The Memoir 
of Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Gerami], Iran Markaze Asnade Enghelabe Eslami, 2004 
[1381].
Ahmadi, Nader. Iranian Islam: The Concept o f  the Individual. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998.
Alam, Assadollah. Yadashthaaye Alam [Alam’s Notes, vol. 3]. Tehran: Maaziar, 2003 
[1383].
Alizadeh, Parvaneh. Khoob negah konid’rastakist [Look Carefully, It Is True]. 
Entesharate Khavaran, Bi-Ta, 2000 [1379].
Ali Baba-e, Davoud. 25 sal dar iran che gozasht [What Happened in 25 Years in Iran]. 
Entesharate Omid-e Farda, 2005 [1384].
Amnesty International. Annual Report, 1974-75.
Amsler, Sarah. Framing a National Consciousness: Representation o f Class in 
Historical Exhibits at the National Museum o f American History, 1957-1985. Masters 
thesis. Virginia: George Mason University, 1998.
Amsler, Sarah and Doris Schroeder. “Human rights: a dialogue with Abolhassan 
Banisadr”, Journal o f  Iranian Research and Analysis, 19, no. 1, 2003.
Amuzgar, Jahangir. The Dynamics o f the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis ’ Triumph 
and Tragedy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.
Andreeva, Elena. Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism. 
New York: Routledge, 2007.
Ansari, Ali. Iran, Islam and Democracy. UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
2000 .
Ansari, Hamid. Hadise bidari (Ketabkhaneye Archive Vezarate Kharejeh-e Jomhooriye 
Eslami, 1997 [1376].
— . Confronting Iran: The Failure o f American Foreign Policy and the Rroots o f  
Mistrust. London: C. Hurst and Co., 2006.
— . Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After. Harlow: Longman, 2003.
Ansari, Sadiq. Bakhshi az khatirat-i siyasi-ijtima 7 [Part of a Socio-political Memoir] 
Los Angeles: Nashre Ketab, 1996.
Araki, Mohammad Ali. A1 -Makasebo-al-Moharameh. Qom, 1934 [1313].
298
Ardebili, Seyed Abdolkarim Mousavi, ed. Ghaeleh chahardahe esfand [The Crisis of 
Fourteenth Esfand]. Tehran: Nejat, 1985 [1364].
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins o f  Modem Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, 1968.
Arjomand, Said Amir. The Turban for the Crown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988.
— . “History, Structure, and Revolution in the Shi'ite Tradition in Contemporary Iran”, 
International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique, 10, 
no. 2, The Historical Framework of Revolutions/Le contexte historique des revolutions. 
(April 1989).
Amjad, Mohammed. Iran: From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy. New York: 
Greenwood, 1989.
Asheghian, Parviz. “Comparative Efficiencies of Foreign Firms and Local Firms in 
Iran”, Journal o f International Business Studies, 13, no. 3 (1982).
Ashraf, Ahmad. Mavani-e tarikhi-ye rush-e sarmayeh dar Iran [Historical Obstacles for 
the Growth of Capital in Iran]. Tehran: Zamineh, 1980.
Asnad-e nehzat-e azadi, bayanieh ’ha va tahlil-haye siasi saal 1368. [Freedom 
Movement’s documents, statements and political analysis of 1368], 20 volumes.
Ayat, Hassan, Chehreye haghighiye mosadegh-al-saltaneh [The True Face of Moadegh- 
al-Saltaneh]. Iran: Daftare Entesharate Eslami Jame’eh Modaresin-e Hozeye Elmieh 
Qom, 1981 [1360].
Azari, Farah, ed. Women o f Iran: The Conflict with Fundamentalist Islam. London: 
Ithaca, 1983.
Baghaei. Ankeh na goft [The One Who Said No]. USA: Rafi Zadeh, 1984 [1363].
Baghi, Emad-al-Din. Baresiye Enghelabe Iran [To Investigate Iranian Revolution]. 
Nashre Sara ee, 2004 [1383].
Bakhash, Shaul. The Reign o f Ayatollahs. London: I. B. Tauris and Co., 1985.
— . “Iran”, The American Historical Review, 96, no. 5 (Dec. 1991).
Bakhtiar, Shapour. Si va haft rooz pas az si va haft sal [Thirty-seven Days after Thirty- 
seven Years]. Paris: Radiyr Iran, 1981.
Banisadr, Abol-Hassan. “Roozha bar reise jomhoor chegooneh migozarad” [How the 
days of the president pass by]. Enghelabe Eslami, March 1980 to June 1981.
—. Besat-e daemi va desate farhanghi [Constant Calling and Cultural Calling]. 
Entesharaate Payame Aazadi, 1980 [1359].
— . Eghtesaade tawhidi [Tawhid Economy]. Entesharate Bita Bina, 1980 [1359].
299
—. Ensan, hagh, ghezavat va hoghooghe ghezavat dar Ghoran [Human, Right, 
Judiciary and Rights of Judiciary in Koran]. Enteshaaraate Enghelaabe Eslami, 2004 
[1383].
— . Eslam va kaar [Islam and Labour]. Tehran: Entesharate Enghelabe Eslami, 1979
[1358].
— . Movazeneha [Equilibriums], Tehran: Entesharate Enghelab Eslami, 1980 [1358].
— . Osoole raahnamaa va zaabetehaaye hokoomate eslami [The Guiding Principles of 
Islamic State]. Enteshaaraate Enghelaabe Eslami, 1979 [1357].
— . Sadmaghaleh [Hundred Articles], Tehran: Entesharat-e Enghelabe Eslami, 1980 
[1359].
— . Khyanat be omid [Betrayal of Hope], n. p., 1981. Published in French as 
L ’Esperance Trahie, Paris: S.P.A.G. Papyrus Editions, 1982.
— . Unpublished statement to the Iranian people read in the Majles, 14 June 1981.
—. Human Rights in Islam. Arab Encyclopaedia House, 1987.
— . America and the Iranian Revolution, First book. Paris: Entesharate Enghelabe 
Eslami, 1989 [1367].
— . My Turn to Speak. Washington, DC: Brassey, 1991.
— . “Human rights and democracy.” Translated by Mahmood Delkhasteh and Sarah 
Amsler. Journal o f  Iranian Research and Analysis, 18, no. 2 (2002.
— . Tazad va towhid [Contrast and Towhid]. Entesharaate Payame Aazadi, 1979 [1358].
— . Tazad va tanaghoz [Contrast and Contradiction], Entesharaate Neuphe le Chateau, 
Bi Taa, 1980 [1359].
— . Tamime emaamat va mobarezeh baa sansoor [Diffusion of Leadership and Struggle 
Against Censorship]. Entesharaate Abrari, Bi Taa, 1979 [1358].
— . Khanevadeh dar Eslam [Family in Islam]. Entesharaate Enghelabe Eslami, 1980
[1359].
— . Kishe shakhsiat [Cult of Personality]. Entesharate Bi Naa, 1979 [1358].
— . Movaazeneha [Equilibriums]. Nashre Jahed, 1979 [1358].
— . Naft va solteh [Oil and Dominance]. Entesharate Musadigh 1978 [1356].
— . Interview with Nima Rashedan, 2002. Accessed online at 
http://news.goova.com/2002/08/14/ pdf/1408-05 .pdf.
— . Interview by the author and colleagues (Sarah Amsler, Doris Schroeder, Miltos 
Ladikas). Versailles, September 2003.
300
— . Interview by the author. 14 May 2004.
— . Interview by the author. 21 January 2005.
— . Interview by the author. 22 January 2005.
— . Interview by the author. 24 January 2005.
Banisadr, Firouzeh, ed. Nameh-ha az Banisadr be aghaye Khomeini va digaran. 
[Banisadr’s letters to Mr Khomeini and Others]. Entesharate Engelabe Eslami, 2006 
[1385].
Bank-e Markzi-e Iran [Central Bank of Iran], Annual Report. Tehran, 1978.
Baradaran, Monireh. Haghighat-e Sadeh [Simple Truth]. Entesha’rate Tashakole 
Mostaghele Democratic Zanan-e Irani dar hanover, Bi-Ta, n.d..
Baraheni, Reza. Dar Enghelab-e Iran, Cheh Shodeh va Che Khahad Shod? [In the 
Iranian Revolution, What Happened and What Will Happen?]. Tehran: Nashre Zaman,
1979.
Bashiriyeh, H. The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-1982. London: Croom Helm, 
1984.
Bayan, B. Persian Kingship in Transition. New York: American Universities Field 
Staff, 1968.
Bayat, Assef. Workers and Revolution in Iran: A Third World Experience o f  Workers ’ 
Control. London: Zed, 1987.
Bazargan, Mehdi. Bes ’at va daulat [Mission and State]. Tehran, 1981.
— . Moshkelat va masa ’el-e awalin sal-e enghelab [The Problems and Issues of the 
First Year of the Revolution]. Tehran: Nezhat-e Azadi-ye Iran, 1983.
— . Shur-ye enghelab va daulat-e movaqat [The Islamic Revolutionary Council and the 
Provisional Government]. Tehran, 1983.
— . Bazargan (Memoirs): Sixty Years o f Service and Opposition, Vol. 2, ed. by 
Gholamreza Nejati. Tehran: Rasa Publications, 1996).
— . Enghelab-e iran dar do harekat [Iranian Revolution in Two Processes]. Nasher 
Mohandes Bazargan, 1984 [1363].
Beheshti, Seyed Mohammad Husseini Beheshti. Javdaneh tarikh [Eternal History]. 
Sazemane Entesharate Rooznameh Jomhooriye Eslami, 2001 [1380].
Behnam. M. Reza. Cultural Foundations o f Iranian politics. Salt Lake City: University 
of Utah Press, 1986.
301
Behrooz, Mazria. Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran. International Journal 
o f Middle East Sutdies, 33, no.3 (August 2001.
Bell, David V. J. Resistance and Revolution. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973.
Benin, Joel and Stock, Joe. Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997.
Berberian, Houri. Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution o f 1905-1911: 
The Love for Freedom Has no Fatherland. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001.
Bharier, Julien. Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970. London: Open University 
Press, 1971.
Bill, James. The Eagle and The Lion: The Tragedy o f  American-Iranian Relations. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
Bina, Cyrus and Zangeneh, Hamid, eds. Modern Capitalism and Islamic Ideology in 
Iran. London: Macmillan, 1991.
Bish’tab, Javad. Faje ’eh siah cinamaye rex abadan [The Disaster of Black Rex Cinema 
in Abadan]. Paris, 1994 [1373].
Blair, John M. The Control o f  Oil. London: Macmillan, 1977.
Bonakdarian, Mansour. Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution o f 1906- 
1911: Foreign Policy, Imperialism, and Dissent. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press in 
association with the Iran Heritage Foundation, 2006.
Bonyade Farhangiye, Ayatollah Taleghani. YaadNaameh Abuzar-e Zaman 
[Remembrance of the Abu Zar of our time]. Sherkat-e Enteshar 1981 [1360],
Borovik, Artyom. The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist’s Account o f the Soviet War in 
Afghanistan. New Your: Grove Press, 1991.
Bourdieu, Pierre, et al. The Weight o f the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary 
Society, translated by Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999.
Bourojerdia, Mehrzad. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph o f  
Nativism. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996.
Briere, Claire and Pierre Blanchet. Iran, La Revolution au Nom de Dieu, translated into 
Persian as Enghelab be name khoda [Iran: Revolution with the Name of God]. Tehran: 
Kitab-e sahab, 1980 [1358].
Brezinzski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle. London: Widenfeld andNicolson, 1983.
Brodine, Virginia and Selden, Mark, eds. The Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine in Asia. New 
York : Harper and Row, 1972.
302
Brown, Ian. Khomeini’s Forgotten Sons: The Story o f  Iran’s Boy Soldiers. London: 
Grey Seal, 1990.
Brumberg, Daniel. Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Burke, Edmond. “Orientalism and World History: Representing Middle Eastern 
Nationalism and Islamism in the Twentieth Century”, Theory and Society, 27, no. 4, 
Special Issue on Interpreting Historical Change at the End of the Twentieth Century 
(August 1998).
Bums, Gene. “Ideology, Culture, and Ambiguity: The Revolutionary Process in Iran”, 
Theory and Society, 25, no. 3. (June 1996).
Byrne, Malcolm. “Iranians Debate the 1953 Coup”, Middle East Report, no. 216 
(Autumn 2000).
Buthe, Tim. “Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of 
Narratives as Evidence”, American Political Science Review, 96 (2002).
Carswell, Robert. “Economic sanctions and the Iran experience.” Foreign Affairs, 60 
(Winter 1981-82.
Carter, James. Keeping Faith: Memoirs o f  a President. New York: Bantam, 1982.
Chehabi, Houchang, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation 
Movement o f  Iran under the Shah and Khomeini. New York: Cornell University Press, 
1990.
— . “Staging the emperor’s new clothes: dress codes and nation building under Reza 
Shah.” Iranian Studies, 26 (Fall 1993.
Chelkowski, Peter J. and Dabashi, Hamid. Staging a Revolution: The Art o f  Persuasion 
in the Islamic Republic o f  Iran. London: Booth-Clibbom Editions, 2000.
Cheryl Bernard and Zalmay Khalizad. The Government o f God: Iran’s Islamic 
Republic. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
Christopher, Warren. American Hostages in Iran. New Haven, 1985.
Cleva, Gregory D. Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy. 
Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1989.
Cronin, Stephanie, ed. Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New 
Perspectives on the Iranian Left. New York and London: Routledge, 2004.
Cofedresion-e jahani-ye mohaselin va daneshjooyan-e Irani; az aghaz taa ensheab 
[Global Confederation of Pupils and Students of Iran; from the beginning till its 
digression] Nashre Gardoon, 1998 [1377].
303
Cottam, Richard. “Arms sales and human rights: the case of Iran.” In Peter Brown and 
Douglas Maclean, eds., Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Principles and 
Applications. MA: Lexington Books, 1979.
— . Nationalisation in Iran. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.
—. Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh,
1988.
Dabashi, Hamid. Theology o f  Discontent. New York: New York University Press, 1993.
Dadkhah, D. “The inflationary process of the Iranian economy, 1970-1980”, 
International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 17, no. 3 (August 1985.
Daneshvar, Parviz. Revolution in Iran. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan Press, 1996.
Daniel, Norman. Islam and the West: The Making o f an Image. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000.
Dastmalchi, Parviz. Bakhshi az asnad-e myconos [Part of Myconos’ Documents]. 
Nashre Azad, 1998 [1377].
Davani, A. Nahzat-e ruhaniyun-e Iran [The Movement of the Iranian Clergy], vol. 13. 
Qom: Imam Reza Foundation, 1981.
Didier, Eribon. Michel Foucault, translated by Betsy Wing. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1991.
Doostkam, Mansour and Hayedeh, Jalali. Paris, Imam and... Enteshaaraate Payaame 
Aazaadi, 1979 [1358].
Dorraj, Manochehr. From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.
Downes, Mark. Iran's unresolved revolution. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.
Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and its Aftermath. 
NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992.
Elwell-Sutton, L. P. Persian Oil. Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1976.
Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Thought. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.
Esposito, John L., ed. The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact. Miami: Florida 
International University Press, 1990.
Fallaci, Oriana. “Everybody wants to be the boss”, The New York Times Magazine, 28 
October 1979.
Farazmand, Ali. The State, Bureaucracy, and Revolution in Modern Iran: Agrarian 
Reform and Regime Politic. New York: Praeger, 1989.
304
Farhang, Mansour. “US policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.” In The United 
States and the Middle East, ed. by Hooshang Amir Ahmadi. Albany, 1993.
Farhi, Farideh. States and Urban-Based Revolutions, Iran and Nicaragua. Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press, 1990.
Farsi, Jalal-Aldin. Zavaayaaye Taarik [Dark Angels]. Moaseseye chap va entesharate 
hadis, 1994 [1373].
Fedayeen Organisation. Hasht sal mobarezeh-e mosalehaneh [Eight Years of Armed 
Struggle]. Tehran, 1979.
— . Tarikhcheh-i sazman-i cherik-ha-ye Fedayi [A Short History of the Fedayeen 
Guerillas]. Tehran, 1979.
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Boston: Little. 
Brown, 1978.
Ferdows, H. Amir. “Khomeini and Fadayan's Society and Politics”, International 
Journal o f  Middle East Studies, 15, no. 2 (May 1983.
Ferdows, Adele K. “Women and the Islamic Revolution”, International Journal o f  
Middle East Studies, 15, no. 2 (May 1983.
Fisher, M. J. Michael. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980.
Floor, Willem. “The guilds in Iran: an overview from the earliest beginnings till 1972.” 
Zetischrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, 125, no. 1 (1975).
Foran, John. Fragile resistance. CT: Westview Press, 1993.
Foran, John. “The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran's Populist Alliance: A Class 
Analysis of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911”, Theory and Society, 20, no. 6 
(December 1991).
Foran, John, ed. A Century o f  Revolution: Social Movements in Iran. London: UCL 
Press, 1994.
Front for the Liberation of the Iranian People (JAMA). Khomeini va jonbesh [Khomeini 
and the Movement]. Tehran, Moharam Press, 1973.
Fuller, E. Graham. “The Emergence of Central Asia”, Foreign Policy, 78 (Spring 1990).
Furet, Francois. Interpreting the French Revolution, translated by Elborg Forster. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Entezam, Amir. An sooye eteham; khaterat va modafe ’at [The Other Side of 
Accusaions: Memoir and Defences]. Nashre Ney 2002 [1381],
Ganji, Akbar, Tarik Khaneye Ashbah. “The Dungeon of Ghosts”. Iran: Entesharate 
Tarhe, 2000 [1379].
305
— . Alijenabe sorkhpoosh va alijenabane khakestari [The Red Eminence, The Grey 
Eminences]. Iran: Entesharate Tarhe, 2000 [1379].
Ganji, Manouchehr. Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a 
Leader o f Resistance. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002.
Gardner, J. Anthony. The Iraq-Iran War: A Bibliography. London: Mansell, 1988.
Garthwaite, G.R. Khans and Shahs: A Documentary Analysis o f  Bakhtiyari in Iran. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup d’etat in Iran”, International Journal o f  Middle 
East Studies, 19 (August 1987).
— . U.S. foreign policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991.
— . “The CIA Looks Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran”, Middle East Report, No. 216 
(Autumn, 2000).
Gasiorowski, J. Mark and Byrne, Malcom, eds. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 
Coup in Iran. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004.
Gates, Robert M. From The Shadows. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Geertz, Clifford. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New 
York: Basic Books, 1983.
Gharabaghi, Arteshbod. Haghayegh dar bar eye bohraan-e Iran [The Truth about the 
Iranian Crisis]. Sazemaan-e chaap va entesharate soheil, 1984.
Gieling, Saskia. Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran. London: Tauris, 1999.
Ghods, M. Reza. Iran in the Twentieth Century. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1989.
Gleave, Robert, ed. Religion and society in Qajar Iran. London: Routledge, 2005.
Golpoor-e Chamar Koohi, Reza, Shonoode ashbah, moroori bar karnameh sazeman-e 
mojahedin-e enghelab-e eslami [Hearing the Shadows: A Brief Look at the Progress 
Report of Mojahedin-e Enghelabe-e Eslami]. Tehran-Nashre kalidar, 2002 [1381].
Goodarzi, Jubin Moazamil. The Formative Years o f the Syrian-Iranian Alliance: Power 
Politics in the Middle East, 1979-1989. Doctoral dissertation, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2002.
Graham, Robert. Iran: The Illusion o f Power. London, Croom Helm, 1978.
Griffith, William, E. “The Revival of Islamic Fundamentalism: The Case of Iran”, 
International Security, 4, no. 1 (Summer 1979).
306
Guyers, J. “Liberation is the main casualty”, The Guardian, 17 September 1978.
Habibi, Hassan. Interview in Kayhan, 1 September 1979.
Hadise Velayat. Majmooehye Rahnemoodhaaye Magham-e Moazam-e Rahbari [The 
Tale of Guardianship: Collection of the Great Leader’s Guidance]. Tehran: Markaze 
Chap vaNashre Sazeman-e Tablighate Eslami, 1998 [1377].
Haji-Nejad, Mehri. Akharin Khandehye leylah, khaterat’e zendan [Leylah’s Last Smile: 
Prison Memoir]. Entesharate-e Bonyade Rezei’ha, 2005 [1384].
Halliday, Fred. “Economic development and revolutionary upheavals in Iran”, 
Cambridge Journal o f  Economics, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September, 1980).
— . Shahpur Bakhtiar: 'The Americans Played a Disgusting Role”, MERIP Reports, 
no. 104, Khomeini and the Opposition (March-April 1982).
— . “The Revolution's First Decade”, Middle East Report, no. 156, Iran's Revolution 
Turns Ten (January-February, 1989).
— . “The Politics of'Islam': A Second Look”, British Journal o f Political Science, 25, 
no. 3 (July 1995).
— . Islam and the Myth o f  Confrontation. New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2003.
Hamidian, Naghi. Safar baa baalhaaye aarezoo [Journey on the Wings of a Wish]. 
Stockholm: Aarash, 2004.
Harkness, Gladys. “The mysterious doings of the CIA” (Part two). Saturday Evening 
Post, 6 November 1954.
Harney, Desmond. The Priest and the King: An Eyewitness Account o f  the Iranian 
Revolution. London: British Academic Press, 1998.
Hasani Far, Abdol-al-Rahman, ed. Khaterat-e Siasi-ye Ahmad-Tavakoli, 1330-1360 
[Political Memoir of Ahmad Tavakoli, 1951-1981] Entesharate Markaze Asnad-e 
Enghelab-e Eslami, 2005 [1384].
Hashemi, Fatemeh, ed. Bad az Bohran, Khaterat-e Akbar-e Hashemi-ye Rafsanjani in 
7367[After the Crisis: The Memoir of Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1361]. Daftar-e Nashre 
Ma’arefe Enghelab, 2001 [1380].
Hashim, Ahmad. The crisis o f  the Iranian State: Domestic, Foreign and Security 
Policies in Post-Khomeini Iran. Oxford: OUP for the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1995.
Hefner,W. Robert. Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a 
Globalizing Age”, Annual Review o f  Anthropology, Vol. 27 (1998).
Heiss, Mary Ann. Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and 
Iranian oil, 1950-1954, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
307
Hengameh, Haj Hassan. Chashm Dar Chashme Hayoolaa [Eye to Eye with a Monster]. 
Entesharat’e Anjoman-e Homa, 2003 [1382].
Henrymunson, J. Islam and Revolution in the Middle East. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1988.
Herzog, Richard J. and Ronald G. Claunch, “Stories Citizens Tell and How 
Administrators Use Types of Knowledge,” Public Administration Review, 57 (1997).
Hiro, Dilip. Iran Under the Ayatollahs. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987.
— . “Chronicle of the Gulf War”, MERIP Reports, nos. 125/126, The Strange War in the 
Gulf (July-September 1984).
Hitchens, Christopher. The Trial o f Henry Kissinger. London and New York: Verso, 
2001 .
Honegger, Barbara. October Surprise, Leicester: Tudor Publishers, 1989.
Hooglund, Eric. Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980. Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1982.
— . “Iranian Populism and Political Change in the Gulf’, Middle East Report, no. 174, 
Democracy in the Arab World (January-February 1992).
Hoveyda, Fereydoum. The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic 
Revolution. Westport: Praeger, 2003.
Huitt, Ralph and Peabody, Robert. Congress: Two Decades o f Analysis. New York: 
Harper and Row, 1969.
Hulber, Mark. Interlock: The Untold Story o f American Banks, Oil Interests, the Shah’s 
Money, Debts and the Astounding Connections between Them. New York: Richardson 
and Snyder, 1982.
Hunter, T. Shireen. Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade. 
Bloomington': Indiana University Press, 1990.
Huntington, Samuel. The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order. New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Hussain, Asef. Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter-Revolution. London: Pinter, 1985.
Iktorowicz, W. Quintan, ed. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004.
Imam va mosa’a ’hebeha’a ’yeeepira’a ’ moone enghelabe Esla’a ’mi [The Imam and 
Interviews around the Islamic Revolution]. Tehran -Entesharat-e Enghelab-e Eslami, 
1980 [1360].
“Iran: interview with Valery Giscard d’Estaing.” Tus, 4 September 1999 [23 Shahrivar 
1377].
308
Iranian Women Group. Women in Iran: The Part they Played in the Revolution. 
London: Iranian Women’s Group, 1980.
Irfani, Suroush. Revolutionary Islam in Iran. Bath: The Pitman Press, 1983.
Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. London: Faber and Faber, 1992.
Islamic Propaganda Ministry. Enghelabe nour, enghelabe sevom [Revolution of Light, 
the Third Revolution]. Tehran, 1983 [1363].
Ivanov, Tarikh-e nuvin-e Iran [The Modem History of Iran]. Tehran: Entesharate 
Sepehr, 1978 [1357].
Jaami Research. Gozashteh cheraagh-e raah-e ayandey [The Past Lightens the Path to 
the Future], Tehran, Ghoghnoos Publishing Co., 1998 [1377].
Jafari, Mohammad. Evin: Gah, nameye panj salo andi [A Report of Over Five Years in 
Evin Prison]. Barzavand Publishing Co., 2002 [1380].
— . Interview by the author. London, 9 September 2004.
Jahanbeghloo, Ramin, ed. Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2004.
Jange Tahmili [Imposed War], Entesha’rate Daftare Namyandegiye Sazeman-e 
Tablighat-e Eslami, 1984 [1363].
Jahanbakhsh, Forough. Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran (1953- 
2000): from Bazargan to Soroush. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
Javadi, Ahmad Haj Seyed. Interview in Keyhan newspaper, 4 March 1979 [13 Esfand 
1357].
Javanshir, F. M. Tajrubi bisto hasht-e mordad [The Experience of 28 Mordad]. Tehran, 
Hezbe Tudeh Iran, 1980.
Jazani, B. Tarikh-e see saleh-e Iran [A Thirty-Year History of Iran]. Tehran, 1979.
Jordan, Hamilton. Crisis: The Last Year o f  the Carter Presidency. New York: Putnams,
1982.
Kadivar, Jamileh. Tahavole goftomaan-e siasi-e Shia dar Iran [The Transformation of 
Shia Political Discourse in Iran]. Entesharate tarhe, 2003 [1382].
Kamali, Masoud. Multiple Modernities, Civil Society and Islam: The Case o f  Iran and 
Turkey. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006.
Kamrava, Mehran. The Political History o f  Modern Iran: From Tribalism to Theocracy. 
Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992.
309
Kamrava, Mehran, ed. The New Voices o f  Islam: Reforming Politics and Modernity: A 
Reader. . London: I. B. Tauris, 2006.
Karimi-Kakkak, Ahmad. “Revolutionary Posturing: Iranian Writers and the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979”, International Journal o f  Middle East Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 
(November 1991).
Karshenas, Massoud. Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.
Katozian, H. The Political Economy o f  Modern Iran: Despotism to Pseudo-modernism, 
1926-1979. London: Macmillan 1981.
— . Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic o f  State and Society, New York: 
Routledge, 2002.
Katzman, Kenneth. The Warriors o f  Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992.
Kazemi, F. Poverty and Revolution in Iran. New York: New York University Press,
1980.
Keddei, R. Nikki. “The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran”, Past and 
Present, No. 34 (July, 1966).
— . Roots o f  Revolution: An Interpretive History o f  Modern Iran. London: Yale 
University Press, 1981.
— . Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi ’ism from Quietism to Revolution. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1983.
— . Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution. New York: New York 
University Press, 1995.
Keshavarz, Fereidun. “Tudeh’s Policy in a Betrayal of the Working Class”, MERIP 
Reports, no. 98, Iran Two Years After (July-August 1981).
Khami’i, Anvar. Az inshi'ab ta kudeta [From Split to Coup], vol. 3. Tehran: Hafteh,
1984.
Kheirabadi, Masoud. Iranian Cities: Formation and Development. Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1991.
Khoei, Ayatollah-Alozma. Altangih fi sharhe orvatol-vosghaa. [Tagriraat: notes from 
the lectures of Mirza Ali Garavi Tabrizi]. Qom, n.d.
Khomeini, Ruhollah M. “Kashfol-al Assrar” [The Discovery of the Secrets] n.p., 1943. 
— . Velayat-e faghih [Rule of the Jurist]. 1970 [1348].
— . Albai ’a. Iran-Qom: Entesha’rate Esmaeelian, Bi-Ta, n.d.
310
—. Kashf-al-Asrar [Revealing the Secrets]. Iran-Qom: Entesha’arate Azadi, Bi-Ta, n.d.
~  Neda-ye haq [A Collection of Imam Khomeini’s Declarations, Interviews and 
Speeches], vol.l, Tehran, 1979.
— . “New year message”, Kayhan, 22 March 1980.
— . Speech printed in Tehran Times, 27 May 1981.
~ . Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations o f  Imam Khomeini, translated by 
Hamid Algar. Berkley, 1981.
— . “Velayat-e faghih”, Kayhaan International, 15 March 1981.
— . Sahifeh-ye nour [The Book of Light]. Tehran: Markaz-e Madarek-e Entersharat-e 
Eslami, 1984.
Khomeini, Seyed Ahmad, Majmooeh asar-e yadgar-e emam seyed Ahmad Khomeini 
[Collected Works of Imam’s Memento]. Entesharate Moaseseye Tanzim va Nashre 
Asar-e Emam Khomeini, 1996 [1375].
Khonsari, Mehrdad. The National Movement o f  the Iranian Resistance 1979-1991: the 
role o f a banned opposition movement in international politics. Doctoral dissertation, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1995.
Kianouri, Nuraldin. “The national bourgeoisie: their nature and policy”, World Marxist 
Review, 2, no. 8 (September 1959).
Kimmel, Michael. Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1990.
Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: 
HarperCollins, 1995.
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
— . Years o f  Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982.
Kolko, Gabriel. Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980. 
New York: Pantheon, 1988.
Kritzman, Lawrence D., ed. Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture. New York: 
Routledge, 1988.
Kurzman, Charles. “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social- 
Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979”, American Sociological Review,
61, no. 1 (February 1996).
— . The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Harvard University Press, 2004.
— . “Not Ready For Democracy? Theoretical and Historical Objections To The Concept 
Of Prerequisites”, Journal o f Sociologial Analysis (December 1998).
311
Laingen, L. Bruce. Yellow Ribbon. New York: Brassey's, 1992.
Lake, C. M. “The Problems Encountered in Establishing an Islamic Republic in Iran 
1979-1983.” Bulletin o f the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 9, no. 2 (1982).
Latif, Mahin, Agar divaarhaa lab migoshoodand, khaterat-e zendan [If the Wall Would 
Talk: A Prison Memoir. Entesharat-e Amir Khiz, 2006 [1385].
Ledeen, Michael and William Lewis. Debacle: The American Failure in Iran. New 
York: Knopf, 1981.
Leiden, Carl and Karl M. Schmitt. The Politics o f  Violence: Revolution in the Modern 
World. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
Lenezowski, George, ed. Iran Under the Pahlavis. CA: University of Stanford Press, 
1978.
Lewis, Bernard. “Islamic concepts of revolution.” In P. J. Vatikiotis, ed., Revolution in 
the Middle East and Other Case Studies: Proceedings o f  a Seminar. London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1972.
Limbert, John W. Iran: At War With History'. Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1987.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited”, American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 59 (1994).
Litwak, Robert. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the 
Pursuit o f  Stability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Lynn, Karl Terry. “Dilemmas of Democratization in South America”, Comparative 
Politics, 23 (1990).
Lytle, Mark H. The origins o f the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953. New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1987.
Mahmood, M. The Political System o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran. Delhi: Kalpaz 
Publications, 2006.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia: Introduction to a Sociology o f Knowledge. 
London: Routledge, 1991.
Marsh, Steve. Anglo-American relations and Cold War Oil: Crisis in Iran. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Marx, Karl. The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte. New York: International 
Publishers, 1963.
— . A Contribution to the Critique o f Hegel's Philosophy o f  Right. London: Cambridge 
University Press, [1844] 1970.
312
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1967.
Majles-e Eslami-ye Iran [The Consultative Islamic Majles of Iran]. Tehran, 1981.
Malek-Ahmadi, Farshad. Trapped by History: 100 Years o f  Struggle for  
Constitutionalism and Democracy in Iran. New York and London: Routledge, 2003.
Mashroohe Mozaakeraate Majless Baresiye Nahaaeeye Ghaanoone Asaasi Jomhooriye 
Eslaami Iran [Details of Majles’ negotiations of the final study of the Islamic 
Constitution of Iran]. Tehran: Ravabete Omoomiye Majles, 1985 [1364].
Matthews, Donald R. U.S. Senators and Their World. New York: Vintage Books, 1960.
McDonald, H. P. Political Philosophy and Ideology. Maryland: University Press of 
America, 1997.
Milani, A. The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle o f the Iranian 
Revolution. Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2003.
Milani, Mohsen M. The Making o f  Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to 
Islamic Republic. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
— . “The ascendance of Shi’i fundamentalism in revolutionary Iran.” Journal o f  South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 13, nos. 1 and 2 (Fall/Winter 1989).
Mirdar-Morteza, ed. Khaterat-e hojat-al-eslam val-moslemin nateghe nouri [The 
Memoir of Nategh Nouri]. Markaze Asnad-e Enghelab-e Eslami, 2003 [1382].
Mirsepassi, Ali. Intellectual Discourses and the Politics o f Modernization: Negotiating 
Modernity in Iran. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Moaddel, Mansoor. Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992.
—. “Ideology as Episodic Discourse: The Case of the Iranian Revolution”, American 
Sociology Review, 57, no. 3 (June 1992).
Moazen, Naser, ed., Dah shab [Ten Nights]. Tehran, 1978.
Moens, Alexander. “President Carter’s Advisers and the Fall of the Shah”, Political 
Science Quarterly, 106, no.2 (Summer 1991).
Mohsen, M. Shanehchi. Ahzabe siasi-ye Iran [Iran’s Political Parties]. Tehran: 
Moaseseye khadamate farhanghi-ye rasa, 1997 [1375].
Momen, Moojan. An introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines o f  Twelver 
Shi'ism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.
Montazam, Mir Ali Asghar. Islam in Iran: The Background to the Rule o f Anarchy and 
Despotism in the Country’s Islamic Past and Present. London: Eurasia Press, 2003.
313
Montazeri, Hussein Ali. Memoir. Accessed online at
http://www.montazeri.com/html/books/ khaterat/febrest.htm on 7 February 2000.
Moore, Barrington. Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant 
in the Making o f the Modern World. London: Penguin, 1991.
Moqtader, Mohammad. “Barresi-ye sho’arha-ye enqelab” [Review of the slogans of the 
revolutionary period]. Ketab-e jam-eh, vol. 13. Entesharat-e Ghognoos, 1991 [1370].
Mortimer, Edward. The Iranian bulletins/the news bulletins o f the Committee for the 
Defence o f Political Prisoners in Iran. London : Index on Censorship, 1979.
Mostafa, Kazem, Parvaz dar khaaterehaa, Khaterat-e sarhange khalaban Behzad-e 
Moezi [Fly In Memories: The Memoirs of Pilot Colonel Behzad-e Moezi]. n.d.
Motahari, M. Imam va mosahebehaayee piramoone enghleabe eslami [The Imam and 
Interviews Around the Islamic Revolution]. Tehran: Entesharat-e Sadra, n.d.
— . Baresiye ejmali-ye nehzatha-ye eslami dar sad sale akhir [A Brief Analysis of 
Islamic Movements in the Last Hundred Years].Entesharat-e Sadra-Bi-Ta, 1982 [1361].
— . Fundamentals o f  Islamic Thought: God, Man and the Universe, Translated by 
R.Campbell. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1985.
— . Motahari, Morteza. Social and Historical Change: An Islamic Perspective. Berkley: 
Mizan Press, 1986.
Munson, Henry. Islam and Revolution in the Middle East. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1988.
Murray, Donette. US foreign policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations Since the 
Islamic Revolution. London: Routledge, 2007.
Muzzafar, Mohammad Javad. Avalin reis jomhoor [The First President]. Tehran: 
Entesharate Kavir, 2000 [1378].
Nashat, Guity, ed. Women and Revolution in Iran. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1983.
National Security Archives, “The Making of US Policy: Documents from the Den of 
Espionage”. Tehran, n.d.
Nima, Ramy. The Wrath o f Allah: Islamic Revolution and Reaction in Iran. London: 
Pluto, 1983.
Nissman, David B. The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan: The Use o f  Nationalism 
for Political Penetration. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
Nomani, Mohammad Manzoor. Khomeini, Iranian Revolution and the Shiate Faith. 
London: Furqn, 1988.
314
Olcott, Martha Brill. “Soviet Islam and World Revolution”, World Politics, 34, no. 4 
(July 1982).
Oliphant, Lancelot to P. Loraine, 6 March 1923. Loraine Papers, Correspondence with 
Lancelot Oliphant, Foreign Office Records, FO 1011.
Olson, William J. Anglo-Iranian Relations During World War I. London: Cass, 1984.
Omid, Homa. Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State in Iran. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1994.
Organisation of the Mujaheddin-e Khalq-e Iran (OMKHI). “The concept of total 
resistance.” Pamphlet, n. p., 1976.
—. “Friday prayer.” 1979.
—. “The critical problems of our movement.” Pamphlet, n.p., 1979.
Overseas Consultants Incorporated. Report on the Seven-Year Development Plan for the 
Organization o f the Imperial Government o f  Iran. New York, 1949.
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Eghelabe sefid [The White Revolution]. Tehran, 1967.
—. Answer to History. Translated by Michael Joseph. New York: Stein, 1981.
Paidar, Parvin. Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-century Iran. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Paine, Chris and Erica Schoenbergerl, Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers:
1872-1956. MERIP Reports, 37 (May 1975).
Parasiliti, T. Andrew. “Impact upon Alliance Politics and Global Peace The Causes 
and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment”, International Political 
Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique, 24, no. 1, Power Cycle 
Theory and Global Politics (January 2003).
Parry, Robert. Rise O f The Bush Dynasty From Watergate To Iraq. US: Media 
Consortium, 2004.
Parry, Robert and Komblu, Peter. “Iran-Contra’s Untold Story”, Foreign Affairs, No. 72 
(Autumn, 1988).
Parsa, Misagh. Social Origins o f the Iranian Revolution. (London: Rutgers University 
Press, 1989.
Parsi, Trita: Treacherous Alliance'. The Secret Dealings o f Israel, Iran, and the United 
States. US: Yale University Press, 2007.
Patterson, Molly and Kristen Renwick Monroe, “Narrative in Political Science”, Annual 
Review o f Political Science, 1 (1998).
315
Payandeh, Mehran, Khodagholi, Abas and Nozari, Hamid. Asanade daadgahe myconos; 
system-e jenayatkaar [Myconos Trial Documents: The Criminal System]. Berlin, 2000.
Pesaran, Hashem. “The system of dependent capitalism in pre- and post- revolutionary 
Iran”, International Journal o f  Middle East Studies, 14, no. 4 (1982).
Poulson, C. Stephen. Social Movement in Twentieth-century Iran: Culture, Ideology, 
and Mobilizing Frameworks. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005.
Precht, Henry. “Ayatollah Realpolitik”, Foreign Policy, 70 (Spring, 1988).
Rafsanjaani, Hashemi. Speech in Friday prayer. Tehran University, 9 May 1980.
— . Friday sermon. Tehran, 28 June 1981.
— . Sokhanranihaye [Speeches]. Tehran: daftar-e nashr-e maaref-e engelaab, 1999
[1377].
—. Oboor az bohran [Storming the Crisis]. Moaseseye Farhangee Honari-ye taher- 
Leyla, 1999 [1378].
Rahnama, Ali. Mosalmani dar jostejooye naakoja abad, zendeginameye Ali Sahriati [A 
Muslim in Search of Nowhereland: The Life of Ali Shariati]. Translated by Kiomarse 
Gergeloo. Tehran, 2003 [1381].
Rahnema, Saeed and Behdad, Sohrab, eds. Iran After the Revolution: Crisis o f  an 
Islamic State. London: Tauris, 1995.
Rajaee, Farhang, ed. Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War. Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 1997.
Razavi, Pouran Shariat. Interview in Mojahed, no. 122, 27 May 1981.
Rahnema, Saeed and Sohrab Behdad. Iran After the Revolution: Crisis o f  an Islamic 
State. London: I. B. Tauris and Co., 1995.
Ramazani, Rouhollah. K. The Foreign Policy o f Iran, A Developing Nation in World 
Affairs, 1500-1941. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966.
—. “Iran's Revolution: Patterns, Problems and Prospects”, International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 56, No. 3. (Summer, 1980).
—. Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1988.
Ravan Bakhsh, Ghasem. Baaz khaaniye parvandeye yek reis jomhoor [A Re-reading of 
the Case of a President]. Jaryaane Shenaasi Taarikhe Moaser-Daftare nohom, 
Entesharate Homaye Ghadir, 2003 [1382].
Rejaei, Ahmad A. and Sarvari, M. Panj dahe bad az koodeta [Five decades after the 
coup]. CIA documents regarding the 1953 coup. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1999.
316
Reneau, Allen. “Auschwitz namordeh ast” [Auschwitz is not dead] Nameye farhang. no. 
43,2003 [1381].
Renfrew, Nita M. “Who Started the War?” Foreign Policy, 66 (Spring 1987).
Reza-Zadegan, Hussein. Interview by the author. 8 September 2004.
Rezaei, Hassan. Saabet va moteghayer dar nezaame jazaaeeye Eslami [Stability and 
Change in the Islamic Criminal Justice System]. PhD thesis, Iran, Tarbiat Modarres 
University, 2002 [1381].
Risen, James. “The secret CIA history of the Iran coup, 1953.” New York Times, 16 
April and 18 June 2000.
Rosefsky Wickam, Carrie. Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change 
in Egypt. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
Rosen, Barry, ed. Iran Since The Revolution: Internal Dynamics, Regional Conflicts 
And The Superpowers. Brooklyn College Studies on Societies in Change, no. 47. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
Rubinstein, Alvain, Z. “The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini”, International 
Affairs, 57, no. 4 (Autumn 1981).
Ryan, Paul B. The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why it Failed. Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1985.
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control o f  Iran. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979.
Rouleau, Eric. Article in Le Monde, 10 June 1980.
—. Interview by the author. 9 June 2005.
Saberi-e Foomani, Kiomars. Chegoonegiye Entekhabe Avalin Nokhostvazire 
Jomhooriye Eslami Iran va Mokatebaate Rajaei va Banisadr [How the First Prime 
Minister of Islamic Republic of Iran was Chosen and Correspondence between Rajaei 
and Banisadr]. Tehran: Daftare Tahgigaat va Enteshaarate Ravabete Omoomiye 
Nokhostvaziri, 1981 [1360].
Sabet, Fariba. Yaad-haye zendan [Prison memories]. Entesha’arte Khavaran, [1383].
— . Nagofteh ’haye enghelabe va mabahese bonyadi meli [What is Unsaid About the 
Revolution and Fundamental National Debates]. Tehran: Entesharate Game, 2004 
[1383].
Sayeed, S. M. A. Iran Before and After Khomeini: A Study in the Dialectics o f  Shi’ism 
and Modernity. Karachi, Pakistan: Royal Book Co., 1999.
Safiri, Masoud, ed. Haghighatha va maslahatha; goftego baa hashemi rafsanjani [Truth 
and Expediencies: Dialogue with Hashemi Rafsanjani]. Tehran: Nashre Ney 1999
[1378].
317
Sahabi, Ezatollah. Dar shoraye enghelab che gozasht [What Happened in the Council 
of Revolution]. Iran Far da, no. 52, farvardin 1378 [May 1999].
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. London: Penguin Books, 1991 [1985].
Salamatian, Ahmad. Interview by the author. 20 May 2005.
—. Interview by the author. 25 May 2005.
Sanasarian, Eliz. The Women's Rights Movement in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and 
Repression from 1900 to Khomeini. New York: Praeger Press, 1982.
Sanjabi, Karim. Umidha va na-umidiiha [Hopes and Disappointments]. London: Nashr- 
e Ketab, 1989.
Schahgaldian, Nikola with the assistance of Gina Barkhordarian. The Iranian Military 
Under the Islamic Republic. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1987.
—. The clerical Establishment in Iran. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1989.
Schirazi, Asghar. The Constitution o f  Iran. Translated by John O’Kane. London: I. B. 
Tauris and Co., 1997.
Seif-Amirhosseini, Zahra. Socio-Political Change and Development in Iran: Reza Shah 
and the Shi’i Hierocracy. Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2002.
Shahidian, Hammed. “The Iranian Left and the ‘Woman Question’ in the Revolution of 
1978-79”, International Journal o f  Middle East Studies, 26, no. 2. (May, 1994).
Shahrzad. Dar inja dokhtaran nemimirand [Here Girls Don’t Die]. Entesharat’e 
Khavaran, Bi-Ta, n.d.
Shai, Shaul. Islamic Terror Abductions in the Middle East. Eastbourne, Sussex: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2007.
Shakibi, Zhand P. The King, the Tsar, and the Shah: Agency and the Making o f  
Revolution in Bourbon France, Romanov Russia and Pahlavi Iran. PhD thesis,
London, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001.
Shamkhani, Ali. Hemaseye Hoveyzeh [The Epic of Hoveyzeh]. n.p., 1987 [1366].
Shariati, Ali. Eslamshenasi [Islamology: The Basic Design for a School of Thought and 
Action]. Tehran, 1979 [1357].
— . Kavir [Desert]. Tehran, 1977 [1355].
— .Resalat-e- rawshanfekr bara-ye sakhtane-e jaam ’eh [The Intellegentsia: a Task in 
the Reconstruction of Society]. N.p., 1979.
318
— . Selection and/or Election. Translated by Ali Asghar Ghassemy. Tehran: 
Hosseniyeh Ershad and Hamdami Publishers, 1979.
— . Majmooeh asar 5: Maa va eghbal [Us and Iqbal]. Tehran: Husseinieh Ershad 
Publishing Co., 1980 [1360].
— . Majmooeh asar 14: tarikh va shenakht-e adyan [Collected Works, Vol. 14: History 
and Understanding of Religion]. Tehran: Ghalam Publishing Co., 1988 [1368].
— . Majmooeh asar 20: Che Bayad Kard [What is to Be Done?]. Iran: Bee Ja Bita, 1981 
[1361].
— . Majmooeh asar 29: MiadbBaa Ebrahim [Rendevous with Abraham] Iran: Bee Ja 
Bita, 1984 [1363].
— . Majmooeh asar 30: Eslam-Shenasi [Islamology]. Iran: Bee Ja Bita, 1984 [1363].
— . “Mazhab alayhe mazhab” [Religion against religion]. Lecture published as 
pamphlet, 1979 [1357].
—. “Tashayo-e Safavi va Tashayo-e Alavi [Safavid Shia and Alavid Shia]. Tehran: 
Entesharate Husseinieh Ersahd, 1979 [1357].
— . Majmooeh aasaar [Collected Works]. Vol. 12. Tehran: Husseinieh Ershaad, 1982 
[1361].
Siavoshi, S. Liberal Nationalism in Iran. CT: Westview Press, 1990.
—. “The oil nationalization movement.” In John Foran, ed. A Century o f  Revolution: 
Social Movements in Iran. London: UCL Press.
Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran. New York, Tauris,
1985.
Sobhe, Khosrow. “Education in Revolution: Is Iran Duplicating the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution?” Comparative Education, 18, no. 3 (1982).
Stempel, John D. Inside the Iranian Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1981.
Stivers, Camilla. “Reflections on the Role of Personal Narrative in Social Science”, 
Signs, 18 (1993).
Students of the Imam’s Line. Asnad-e lanah-e jasusi [Documents from the Den of 
Spies]. 77 vols.
Sullivan, William. Mission to Iran. New York and London: Norton, 1981.
Sullivan, Zohreh T. Exiled memories: Stories o f Iranian Diaspora. Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press, 2001.
319
Swindler, Ann and Jorge Arditi. “The New Sociology of Knowledge”, Annual Review 
o f Sociology, 20 (1994).
Tabari, Azar and Yeganeh, Nahid, eds. In the Shadow o f Islam: The Women's Movement 
in Iran. London: Zed Press, 1982.
Tabari, Ehsan and Moin Masood. “Tudeh: ‘Socialism and Islam’”, MERIP Reports, nos. 
75/76, Iran in Revolution (March-April 1979).
Taghizadeh, Abdolsamad. Interview by the author. London, 15 August 2004.
Taleghani, Ayatollah. Majmooeh-ye kaamele elamiehha, payamha, mosabeheha, 
sokhanraniha, khotbeh haye namaze jomeh va tafasire televisioni [Complete Collection 
of Statements, Messages, Interviews, Speeches, Friday Prayers and TV (Koran) 
interpretations], Entesharate Rasa, 1981 [1359].
Talihe-ye enqelab-e Eslami [Analysis of the Islamic Revolution: a collection of 
interviews given by Khomeini in Najaf, Paris and Qom]. Germany: Enghelabe Eslami, 
1979 [1358].
Tavasoli, Mohammad. Soghoote dolate Bazargan [The Collapse of Bazargan’s 
Government]. Tehran: Enteshaarat-e Nehzate Azadi, 1984 [1363].
Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution. MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978.
Touhidi-Baghini, Behzad. Historic Roots o f  the Iranian Revolution. PhD dissertation, 
Washington, DC, American University, 1983.
Moghadam, M. Valentine, ed. Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in 
Muslim Societies: London: Zed Books, 1994.
Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
Vilanilam, John V. Reporting a Revolution: the Iranian Revolution and the NIICO 
Debate. New Delhi and London: Sage Publications, 1989.
Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. by 
Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946 [1918],
—. The Theory o f  Social and Economic Organisation. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1964.
Wirth, Luis. Preface to Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. Florida: Harcourt Brace 
and Co., 1991.
Woods, Alan. Struggle Inside Iran: the First Shots o f  the Iranian Revolution. London: 
Socialist Appeal, 1999.
Wright, Robin. “Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes”, Foreign Policy, 103 
(Summer 1996).
320
Xinhua General Overseas News Service. “Iran’s Majles starts to debate on Banisadr’s 
‘political competence’. Item No. 061730. 18 June 1981.
Yambert, Karl, ed. The Contemporary Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press, 2006.
Yazdi, Amer Ebrahim. Akharin talashha dar akharin roozha [The Last Attempts in the 
Last Days. N.p.: Ghalam Publishing, 1984 [1363].
— . “Poshte sahneye enghelab dar Paris” [Behind the scenes of revolution in Paris: a 
dialogue with Ebrahim Yazdi]. Iran Far da, no. 52, 1999 [1378].
Yeganeh, Nahid. “Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse 
in Iran”, Feminist Review, no. 44, Nationalisms and National Identities (Summer 1993).
Yu, Dal Seung. The role o f  Political Culture in Iranian Political Development. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.
Zaaher, Rafgi. Almantegh-al-soori, Altabatol Avali. Egypt: Ghahereh, Maktabatol 
Alnahsat-al-Mesriah, 1980.
Zabih, Sepehr. The Communist Movement in Iran. Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1966.
— . Iran’s Revolutionary upheaval: An Interpretive Essay. San Francisco: Alchemy 
Books, 1979.
—. The Mossadegh Era. Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982.
— . Iran Since the Revolution. London: Croom Helm, 1982.
Zahedi, Dariush. The Iranian Revolution: Then And Now. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000.
Zakhireh’haaye Amperialism, Banisadr va Monaafegin [The Reserves of Imperialism, 
Banisadr and Hypocrites]. Daftare Siasiye Sepaahe Pasdaran, 1981 [1360].
Zangeneh, Hamid, ed. Islam, Iran and World Stability. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.
Zanjani, A. A. Amid. Gozideye ketabe enghelabe Eslami va reeshehaye aan (Sazamane 
chap va entesharate vezarate farhange va ershade eslami, 19989 [1375].
Zarkar, Y. Khaterat-e yek cherk dar zendan: hemase-ye moqavemat [The Memory of a 
Partisan in Prison: Epic of Resistance] n.p., 1974.
Zavareei, Manizheh. “Dependent capitalist development in Iran and the mass uprising 
of 1979.” In Research in Political Economy: A Research Manual, ed. by Paul 
Zarembka. CT: JAI, 1982.
Zirinsky, Michael. “The rise of Reza Khan.” In Social Movements in Iran: Historical 
and Theoretical Perspectives, ed. by John Foran. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994.
321
Zubaida, Sami. Islam, the People and the State: Essays on Political Ideas and 
Movements in the Middle East. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.
Newspapers and magazines
Abrar
Akhbar
American Diplomacy
Andisheye Jame ’eh
Australian Financial Review
Ayandegan
Bakhtar-e Emrooz
Bamdad
Boston Globe
Boston Herald
Chashm Andaz
Chicago Tribune
Christian Science Monitor
Columbia Journalism Review
Economist, The
Eghelabe Eslami
Eghelabe Eslami-Dar Hejrat
Etelaa ’at
Etemad-e Meli
Fath
Financial Times, The
Frontline
Ghods
Gozaresh
Guradian, The
Khordad
Hokomat-e Eslami 
Iran
Iran-Farda 
Iranian, The 
Iran Times 
Jomhuree-ye Eslami 
Kar 
Kayhan
Khalq-e Mosalman 
Loh
Los Angeles Times 
Le Monde 
Miami Herald 
Mihan 
Mizan
Motale-at-Tarikhi 
Mojahed 
Nabarde Melat 
Nation, The 
New Republic 
New Statesman
322
New Week 
New York Times 
Par
Partov-e Sokhan 
Paymane Mojahed 
Ranjbar 
Rastakhiz 
Resalat
Rocky Mountain Times
Shalamcheh
Shargh
Siasate Khareji 
Sobhe Azadegan 
Sobhe Emrooz 
Soroush 
Times, The
United Press International 
USA Today 
Village Voice 
Wall Street Journal 
Washington Post 
Washington Times 
World Policy Journal 
Yaa-Lesaart-e al-Hussein 
Yaas-e No
